scrutiny test in Maryland

2010For the reasons stated by Judge Chasanow in Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 378-85 , 601 A.2d 102, 120-123 (1992) (Chasanow, J., dissenting), I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and direct that the Circuit Court conduct further proceedings at which it shall apply the heightened scrutiny test to determine whether the Cap violates the equal protection guarantee embodied in Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

2010For the reasons stated by Judge Chasanow in Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 378-85 , 601 A.2d 102, 120-123 (1992) (Chasanow, J., dissenting), I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and direct that the Circuit Court conduct further proceedings at which it shall apply the heightened scrutiny test to determine whether the Cap violates the equal protection guarantee embodied in Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

2006City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 , 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (reiterating that any classification by race, alienage, or national origin is suspect and must be evaluated under a strict scrutiny standard); Broadwater v. State, 306 Md. 597, 603 , 510 A.2d 583, 586 (1986) (stating that general rule of sustaining a statutory classification if it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest gives way when a statute classifies by race, alienage or national origin (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 , 105 S.Ct. 3249

2006City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 , 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (reiterating that any classification by race, alienage, or national origin is suspect and must be evaluated under a strict scrutiny standard); Broadwater v. State, 306 Md. 597, 603 , 510 A.2d 583, 586 (1986) (stating that general rule of sustaining a statutory classification if it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest gives way when a statute classifies by race, alienage or national origin (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 , 105 S.Ct. 3249

2006Included among these have been classifications based on gender (Mississippi University For Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 , 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3335 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1090, 1097 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 , 97 S.Ct. 451 , 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 , 92 S.Ct. 251 , 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971)), 10 discrimination against illegitimate *718 children under some circumstances (Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, 406 U.S. 164 , 92 S.Ct. 1400 , 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 , 88 S.Ct. 1509 , 20 L.Ed.2d 436 (1968)), a classification between children of

2006Included among these have been classifications based on gender (Mississippi University For Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 , 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3335 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1090, 1097 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 , 97 S.Ct. 451 , 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 , 92 S.Ct. 251 , 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971)), 10 discrimination against illegitimate *718 children under some circumstances (Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, 406 U.S. 164 , 92 S.Ct. 1400 , 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 , 88 S.Ct. 1509 , 20 L.Ed.2d 436 (1968)), a classification between children of

2006Included among these have been classifications based on gender (Mississippi University For Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 , 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3335 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1090, 1097 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 , 97 S.Ct. 451 , 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 , 92 S.Ct. 251 , 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971)), 10 discrimination against illegitimate *718 children under some circumstances (Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, 406 U.S. 164 , 92 S.Ct. 1400 , 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 , 88 S.Ct. 1509 , 20 L.Ed.2d 436 (1968)), a classification between children of

2006Included among these have been classifications based on gender (Mississippi University For Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 , 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3335 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1090, 1097 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 , 97 S.Ct. 451 , 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 , 92 S.Ct. 251 , 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971)), 10 discrimination against illegitimate *718 children under some circumstances (Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, 406 U.S. 164 , 92 S.Ct. 1400 , 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 , 88 S.Ct. 1509 , 20 L.Ed.2d 436 (1968)), a classification between children of

2006We conclude, under a strict scrutiny standard, that Appellants have failed to justify their decision to eliminate the funding. 23 In Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 394 U.S. at 622 , 89 S.Ct. at 1324 , 22 L.Ed.2d at 608 , the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a State or District of Columbia statutory provision denying welfare assistance to residents of the State or District who had not resided within their jurisdictions for at least one year immediately preceding their applications for such assistance.

2006We conclude, under a strict scrutiny standard, that Appellants have failed to justify their decision to eliminate the funding. 23 In Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 394 U.S. at 622 , 89 S.Ct. at 1324 , 22 L.Ed.2d at 608 , the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a State or District of Columbia statutory provision denying welfare assistance to residents of the State or District who had not resided within their jurisdictions for at least one year immediately preceding their applications for such assistance.

2010Id. at 356, 421 . 13 The Court noted that the case that it cited for this proposition had been "discredited" for the particular application of that principle that it had offered — whether to recognize an interracial marriage.

2010Id. at 356, 421 . 13 The Court noted that the case that it cited for this proposition had (continued...) Gen. 3] 11 C.

2007See In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. 267 , 279 n. 13, 923 A.2d 115 , 122 n. 13 (2007) (“This Court has applied a strict scrutiny standard when reviewing gender-based discrimination claims.”); Murphy, 325 Md. at 357 n. 7, 601 A.2d at 109 n. 7 (“In Maryland, because of the Equal Rights Amendment to the Maryland Constitution ..., classifications based on gender are suspect and subject to strict scrutiny.”); Burning Tree II, 315 Md. at 293, 554 A.2d at 386 (“In [.Burning Tree I], ... a majority of this Court took the position that the enactment of legislation which on its face draws classifications bas

2007See In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. 267 , 279 n. 13, 923 A.2d 115 , 122 n. 13 (2007) ("This Court has applied a strict scrutiny standard when reviewing gender-based discrimination claims."); Murphy, 325 Md. at 357 n. 7, 601 A.2d at 109 n. 7 ("In Maryland, because of the Equal Rights Amendment to the Maryland Constitution . . ., classifications based on gender are suspect and subject to strict scrutiny."); Burning Tree II, 315 Md. at 293, 554 A.2d at 386 ("In [Burning Tree I], . . . a majority of this Court took the position that the enactment of legislation which on its face draws classifications

1974Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 , 93 S. Ct. 705 , 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535 , 62 S. Ct. 1110 , 86 L.

1974Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 , 93 S. Ct. 705 , 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535 , 62 S. Ct. 1110 , 86 L.

1979Consequently, under Bullock v. Carter, supra, § 405 of the Prince George’s County Charter must be judged by the strict scrutiny standard. 5 Under this strict review standard, it is incumbent upon the appellant Board to show that the five year registration requirement is “reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of legitimate” governmental objectives, Bullock v. Carter, supra, 405 U. S. at 144, 146-149, or “necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest,” Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 634 , 89 S. Ct. 1322, 1331 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969).

1974Thus, only in cases where the restriction imposed by law “has a real and appreciable impact on the exercise of the franchise,” Bullock, supra, ( 405 U. S. at 144 ) will the Court invoke the strict scrutiny test.

2016"Because in the case of a designated public forum and a limited public forum, the government intentionally has created a forum for free expression by members of the public, regulation of speech in those fora, like regulation of speech in a traditional public forum, must satisfy the strict scrutiny standard.” Mitchell, 225 Md.App. at 549, 126 A.3d at 177 (citing Perry v. McDonald, 280 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2001) [hereinafter McDonald , to avoid confusion with Perry Educ.

2015Perry v. McDonald, 280 F.3d at 166 .

2007Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the court held that a statute permitting 17- year-old boys to be charged as adults for certain crimes, but requiring 17-year-old girls to be tried as juveniles, violated the Illinois ERA. 30 Id. at 99, 101. 4.

2007Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the court held that a statute permitting 17-year-old boys to be charged as adults for certain crimes, but requiring 17-year-old girls to be tried as juveniles, violated the Illinois ERA. [30] Id. at 99, 101. 4.

1985In Waldron we held that where a statute creates a “sensitive,” though not “suspect” criterion] of classification, affects “important,” though not fundamental personal rights or works a “significant interference” with a liberty or benefit vital to the individual, the courts will apply a standard more exacting than the rational basis test but less rigorous than the strict scrutiny analysis. [Department of Transportation v. Armacost, 299 Md. 392, 410 , 474 A.2d 191, 200 (1984).] The type of important, though not fundamental, personal right to which heightened scrutiny applies is illustrated by Re

1985In Waldron we held that where a statute creates a “sensitive,” though not “suspect” criterion] of classification, affects “important,” though not fundamental personal rights or works a “significant interference” with a liberty or benefit vital to the individual, the courts will apply a standard more exacting than the rational basis test but less rigorous than the strict scrutiny analysis. [Department of Transportation v. Armacost, 299 Md. 392, 410 , 474 A.2d 191, 200 (1984).] The type of important, though not fundamental, personal right to which heightened scrutiny applies is illustrated by Re

1983The Court noted that the Texas financing system did not result in the absolute deprivation of an education to any definable category of the poor; that "a large, diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to have less taxable wealth than other districts" lacked the traditional indicia of "suspectness" necessary to trigger strict scrutiny equal protection analysis. 411 U.S. at 28 .

1983Rodriguez itself strongly *651 reflects this view, noting that education presents a myriad of intractable economic and social problems. 411 U.S. at 42 .

2021See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976).

2021Id.; see also Arkansas Writers’ Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 , 227 n.3 (1987) (noting that a publication’s “First Amendment claims are obviously intertwined with interests arising under the Equal Protection Clause”).

2020Cf. Cherry Hill Vineyard, LLC v. Baldacci, 505 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 2007) (challenger of state wine law under dormant Commerce Clause relied only on discrimination in effect theory and did not invoke Pike balancing). 30 Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Assoc. v. Thomas, 139 S.Ct. 2449 (2019). 22 milk pricing regulations,31 solid waste disposal ordinances,32 apple labeling laws.33 Favorable tax treatment for in-state entities has been found to affect interstate commerce in a number of contexts – e.g., a charitable property tax exemption statute,34 a tax credit for in-state produced ethanol f

2016These limiting characteristics distinguish the no-unsupervised-contact condition from those reflected in the cases discussed by Petitioner, cf. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d at 1089 (striking a condition of supervised release that prohibited the defendant from “residing] in the home, residence, or be[ing] in the company of any child under the age of 18[ ]” “without the prior written approval of the United States Probation [Office]); Lonjose, 663 F.3d at 1303 (striking a condition of supervised release requiring prior written permission by the United States Probation Office before the defendant could ha

2016These limiting characteristics distinguish the no-unsupervised-contact condition from those reflected in the cases discussed by Petitioner, cf. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d at 1089 (striking a condition of supervised release that prohibited the defendant from “residing] in the home, residence, or be[ing] in the company of any child under the age of 18[ ]” “without the prior written approval of the United States Probation [Office]); Lonjose, 663 F.3d at 1303 (striking a condition of supervised release requiring prior written permission by the United States Probation Office before the defendant could ha

2016"Because in the case of a designated public forum and a limited public forum, the government intentionally has created a forum for free expression by members of the public, regulation of speech in those fora, like regulation of speech in a traditional public forum, must satisfy the strict scrutiny standard.” Mitchell, 225 Md.App. at 549, 126 A.3d at 177 (citing Perry v. McDonald, 280 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2001) [hereinafter McDonald , to avoid confusion with Perry Educ.

2016"Because in the case of a designated public forum and a limited public forum, the government intentionally has created a forum for free expression by members of the public, regulation of speech in those fora, like regulation of speech in a traditional public forum, must satisfy the strict scrutiny standard.” Mitchell, 225 Md.App. at 549, 126 A.3d at 177 (citing Perry v. McDonald, 280 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2001) [hereinafter McDonald , to avoid confusion with Perry Educ.