scrutiny test in New Hampshire

2025See Akins v. Sec’y of State, 154 N.H. 67, 73 (2006) (setting out strict scrutiny standard).

2025To satisfy the strict scrutiny standard, a law must “be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be necessary to the accomplishment of its legitimate purpose.” Id. at 73 (quotation omitted). [¶53] On appeal, the State has not identified a “compelling governmental interest” justifying the current level of funding, nor has it otherwise disputed the trial court’s conclusion that, once the burden shifted, the State failed to meet it.

2006The trial court then followed with an exposition of the intermediate scrutiny test, that the ordinance “‘must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.’” Id. at 69 (quoting Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 932 (1980)).

1982Accordingly, we will employ the rational basis test in evaluating the classification made by the legislature in RSA ch. 502-A. The mandate imposed by the equal protection clauses of both the State and the Federal constitutions is that “those who are similarly situated be similarly treated.” Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. at 931 , 424 A.2d at 830 .

2024Wyo. 2023) (noting that “[t]o the extent [a school policy] prohibits a teacher or school employee, upon inquiry by a parent or legal guardian, from responding or providing accurate and complete information concerning their minor child (and absent a threat to the wellbeing of the student), it burdens a parent’s fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody and education of their child”). [¶21] “When dealing with legislative activity in the area of fundamental rights this court has applied the strict scrutiny test.” State v. Robert H., 118 N.H. 713, 716 (1978), overruled on ot

2024Wyo. 2023) (noting that “[t]o the extent [a school policy] prohibits a teacher or school employee, upon inquiry by a parent or legal guardian, from responding or providing accurate and complete information concerning their minor child (and absent a threat to the wellbeing of the student), it burdens a parent’s fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody and education of their child”). [¶22] “When dealing with legislative activity in the area of fundamental rights this court has applied the strict scrutiny test.” State v. Robert H., 118 N.H. 713, 716 (1978), overruled on ot

2024Wyo. 2023) (noting that “[t]o the extent [a school policy] prohibits a teacher or school employee, upon inquiry by a parent or legal guardian, from responding or providing accurate and complete information concerning their minor child (and absent a threat to the wellbeing of the student), it burdens a parent’s fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody and education of their child”). [¶21] “When dealing with legislative activity in the area of fundamental rights this court has applied the strict scrutiny test.” State v. Robert H., 118 N.H. 713, 716 (1978), overruled on ot

2024Wyo. 2023) (noting that “[t]o the extent [a school policy] prohibits a teacher or school employee, upon inquiry by a parent or legal guardian, from responding or providing accurate and complete information concerning their minor child (and absent a threat to the wellbeing of the student), it burdens a parent’s fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody and education of their child”). [¶22] “When dealing with legislative activity in the area of fundamental rights this court has applied the strict scrutiny test.” State v. Robert H., 118 N.H. 713, 716 (1978), overruled on ot

2019See Cheshire Medical Center v. Holbrook , 140 N.H. 187 , 189, 663 A.2d 1344 (1995) ; see also LeClair v. LeClair , 137 N.H. 213 , 222, 624 A.2d 1350 (1993) ("We apply the strict scrutiny test ... when the classification involves a suspect class based on race, creed, color, gender, national origin, or legitimacy ...." (quotation omitted) ) (superseded by statute on other grounds).

2019See Cheshire Medical Center v. Holbrook , 140 N.H. 187 , 189, 663 A.2d 1344 (1995) ; see also LeClair v. LeClair , 137 N.H. 213 , 222, 624 A.2d 1350 (1993) ("We apply the strict scrutiny test ... when the classification involves a suspect class based on race, creed, color, gender, national origin, or legitimacy ...." (quotation omitted) ) (superseded by statute on other grounds).

2019See Cheshire Medical Center v. Holbrook , 140 N.H. 187 , 189, 663 A.2d 1344 (1995) ; see also LeClair v. LeClair , 137 N.H. 213 , 222, 624 A.2d 1350 (1993) ("We apply the strict scrutiny test ... when the classification involves a suspect class based on race, creed, color, gender, national origin, or legitimacy ...." (quotation omitted) ) (superseded by statute on other grounds).

2019See Cheshire Medical Center v. Holbrook , 140 N.H. 187 , 189, 663 A.2d 1344 (1995) ; see also LeClair v. LeClair , 137 N.H. 213 , 222, 624 A.2d 1350 (1993) ("We apply the strict scrutiny test ... when the classification involves a suspect class based on race, creed, color, gender, national origin, or legitimacy ...." (quotation omitted) ) (superseded by statute on other grounds).

2018However, for the purposes of this opinion, given the lack of a factual record, like our colleagues, we assume that HB 1264 severely burdens the fundamental right to vote. 10 That assumption triggers the requirement that HB 1264 satisfy the strict scrutiny standard, meaning that it must be "narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance." Burdick , 504 U.S. at 434 , 112 S.Ct. 2059 (quotation omitted); see Guare , 167 N.H. at 663 , 117 A.3d 731 .

2008See Alexander, 791 N.E.2d at 511 (concluding that, in Ashcroft , “section!] 2256(8)(B)... did not pass strict scrutiny because ... [it was] not narrowly tailored to advance the government’s compelling interest in protecting actual children from sexual abuse”); Note, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: How can Virtual Child Pornography be Banned Under the First Amendment, 31 PEPP.

2008See Alexander, 274 Ill.Dec. 414 , 791 N.E.2d at 511 (concluding that, in Ashcroft, "section [] 2256(8)(B) . . . did not pass strict scrutiny because . . . [it was] not narrowly tailored to advance the government's compelling interest in protecting actual children from sexual abuse"); Note, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: How can Virtual Child Pornography be Banned Under the First Amendment, 31 Pepp.

2007See In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867, 872 (Minn.) (noting that standard for determining whether civil commitment law violates substantive due process is strict scrutiny), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1049 (1999).

2007See In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867, 872 (Minn.) (noting that standard for determining whether civil commitment law violates substantive due process is strict scrutiny), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1049 (1999).

1993We apply the strict scrutiny test, in which the government must show a compelling State interest in order for its actions to be valid, when the classification involves a suspect class based on “race, creed, color, gender, national origin, or legitimacy,” State v. LaPorte, 134 N.H. 73, 76 , 587 A.2d 1237, 1239 (1991) (quotation omitted), or affects a fundamental right, see Merrill v. City of Manchester, 124 N.H. 8, 14-15 , 466 A.2d 923, 927 (1983) (private real property ownership rights recognized as fundamental); Provencal v. Provencal, 122 N.H. 793, 797 , 451 A.2d 374, 377 (1982) (decisions r

1993We apply the strict scrutiny test, in which the government must show a compelling State interest in order for its actions to be valid, when the classification involves a suspect class based on “race, creed, color, gender, national origin, or legitimacy,” State v. LaPorte, 134 N.H. 73, 76 , 587 A.2d 1237, 1239 (1991) (quotation omitted), or affects a fundamental right, see Merrill v. City of Manchester, 124 N.H. 8, 14-15 , 466 A.2d 923, 927 (1983) (private real property ownership rights recognized as fundamental); Provencal v. Provencal, 122 N.H. 793, 797 , 451 A.2d 374, 377 (1982) (decisions r

1993The requirement that an ex pert’s testimony be reliable is reflected in the evidentiary practices of properly establishing an expert’s qualifications, see, e.g., State v. Coleman, 133 N.H. 713, 715-16 , 584 A.2d 755, 757 (1990), and subjecting technical evidence to the scrutiny of the test set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.

1993The requirement that an ex pert’s testimony be reliable is reflected in the evidentiary practices of properly establishing an expert’s qualifications, see, e.g., State v. Coleman, 133 N.H. 713, 715-16 , 584 A.2d 755, 757 (1990), and subjecting technical evidence to the scrutiny of the test set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.

1993We apply the fair and substantial relation test to classifications involving “important substantive rights,” including the right to tort recovery, see Brannigan v. Usitalo, 134 N.H. 50, 55 , 587 A.2d 1232, 1236 (1991); City of Dover v. Imperial Cas. & Indemn.

1993We apply the fair and substantial relation test to classifications involving “important substantive rights,” including the right to tort recovery, see Brannigan v. Usitalo, 134 N.H. 50, 55 , 587 A.2d 1232, 1236 (1991); City of Dover v. Imperial Cas. & Indemn.

1993We apply the strict scrutiny test, in which the government must show a compelling State interest in order for its actions to be valid, when the classification involves a suspect class based on “race, creed, color, gender, national origin, or legitimacy,” State v. LaPorte, 134 N.H. 73, 76 , 587 A.2d 1237, 1239 (1991) (quotation omitted), or affects a fundamental right, see Merrill v. City of Manchester, 124 N.H. 8, 14-15 , 466 A.2d 923, 927 (1983) (private real property ownership rights recognized as fundamental); Provencal v. Provencal, 122 N.H. 793, 797 , 451 A.2d 374, 377 (1982) (decisions r

1993We apply the strict scrutiny test, in which the government must show a compelling State interest in order for its actions to be valid, when the classification involves a suspect class based on “race, creed, color, gender, national origin, or legitimacy,” State v. LaPorte, 134 N.H. 73, 76 , 587 A.2d 1237, 1239 (1991) (quotation omitted), or affects a fundamental right, see Merrill v. City of Manchester, 124 N.H. 8, 14-15 , 466 A.2d 923, 927 (1983) (private real property ownership rights recognized as fundamental); Provencal v. Provencal, 122 N.H. 793, 797 , 451 A.2d 374, 377 (1982) (decisions r

1993Cir. 1923), see State v. Vandebogart (DNA), 136 N.H. 365, 373 , 616 A.2d 483, 489 (1992).

1993Cir. 1923), see State v. Vandebogart (DNA), 136 N.H. 365, 373 , 616 A.2d 483, 489 (1992).

1993Your first question asks also whether such classification violates the equal protection clause of the New Hampshire Constitution. Únder our State Constitution, “equal protection analysis of statutes alleged to have had an adverse economic effect, absent a suspect classification, usually does not require application of the strict scrutiny standard.” Boehner v. State, 122 N.H. 79, 83 , 441 A.2d 1146, 1148 (1982).

1993Your first question asks also whether such classification violates the equal protection clause of the New Hampshire Constitution. Únder our State Constitution, “equal protection analysis of statutes alleged to have had an adverse economic effect, absent a suspect classification, usually does not require application of the strict scrutiny standard.” Boehner v. State, 122 N.H. 79, 83 , 441 A.2d 1146, 1148 (1982).

1993We apply the strict scrutiny test, in which the government must show a compelling State interest in order for its actions to be valid, when the classification involves a suspect class based on “race, creed, color, gender, national origin, or legitimacy,” State v. LaPorte, 134 N.H. 73, 76 , 587 A.2d 1237, 1239 (1991) (quotation omitted), or affects a fundamental right, see Merrill v. City of Manchester, 124 N.H. 8, 14-15 , 466 A.2d 923, 927 (1983) (private real property ownership rights recognized as fundamental); Provencal v. Provencal, 122 N.H. 793, 797 , 451 A.2d 374, 377 (1982) (decisions r

1993We apply the strict scrutiny test, in which the government must show a compelling State interest in order for its actions to be valid, when the classification involves a suspect class based on “race, creed, color, gender, national origin, or legitimacy,” State v. LaPorte, 134 N.H. 73, 76 , 587 A.2d 1237, 1239 (1991) (quotation omitted), or affects a fundamental right, see Merrill v. City of Manchester, 124 N.H. 8, 14-15 , 466 A.2d 923, 927 (1983) (private real property ownership rights recognized as fundamental); Provencal v. Provencal, 122 N.H. 793, 797 , 451 A.2d 374, 377 (1982) (decisions r

1982New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 303 (1976); San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 32-34 (1973); Opinion of the Justices, 117 N.H. 749, 757 , 379 A.2d 782, 787 (1977).

1982New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 303 (1976); San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 32-34 (1973); Opinion of the Justices, 117 N.H. 749, 757 , 379 A.2d 782, 787 (1977).

1982New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 303 (1976); San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 32-34 (1973); Opinion of the Justices, 117 N.H. 749, 757 , 379 A.2d 782, 787 (1977).

1982New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 303 (1976); San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 32-34 (1973); Opinion of the Justices, 117 N.H. 749, 757 , 379 A.2d 782, 787 (1977).