scrutiny standard in Connecticut

2000Further, in Browne v. Peters , 33 Conn. Sup. 531 , 536 , 360 A.2d 131 , cert. denied, 171 Conn. 730 , 357 A.2d 510 (1976), the court held that "[i]ndigency alone has not been regarded as a "suspect' classification that would trigger application of the strict scrutiny test, which requires that a compelling state interest be demonstrated in order to justify the restitution on the particular group involved." (citing San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez , 411 U.S. 1 , 29 , 93 S.Ct. 1278 , 36 L.Ed. 16 (1976)).

2000Further, in Browne v. Peters , 33 Conn. Sup. 531 , 536 , 360 A.2d 131 , cert. denied, 171 Conn. 730 , 357 A.2d 510 (1976), the court held that "[i]ndigency alone has not been regarded as a "suspect' classification that would trigger application of the strict scrutiny test, which requires that a compelling state interest be demonstrated in order to justify the restitution on the particular group involved." (citing San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez , 411 U.S. 1 , 29 , 93 S.Ct. 1278 , 36 L.Ed. 16 (1976)).

2001If the statute does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect class, its classification need only be rationally related to some legitimate governmental purpose in order to withstand an equal protection challenge. . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Benjamin v. Bailey , 234 Conn. 455 , 477 (1995).

1997If the statute does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect class, its classification need only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose in order to withstand an equal protection challenge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Benjamin v. Bailey, 234 Conn. 455, 477 , 662 A.2d 1226 (1995).

1990In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721 , 93 S. Ct. 2851 , 37 L.

1990In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721 , 93 S. Ct. 2851 , 37 L.

2022If the statute does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect class, its classification need only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose in order to with- stand an equal protection challenge.’’ (Footnote omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, 259 Conn. 855, 877 , 792 A.2d 774 (2002). ‘‘Although the federal constitution does not expressly enumerate any suspect classes, the United States Supreme Court has identified three such classifications, namely, race, alienage and national ori- gin.’’ Kerrigan v. Commissioner o

2022If the statute does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect class, its classification need only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose in order to with- stand an equal protection challenge.’’ (Footnote omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, 259 Conn. 855, 877 , 792 A.2d 774 (2002). ‘‘Although the federal constitution does not expressly enumerate any suspect classes, the United States Supreme Court has identified three such classifications, namely, race, alienage and national ori- gin.’’ Kerrigan v. Commissioner o

2017If the statute does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect class, its classification need only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose in order to withstand an equal protection challenge." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Harris v. Commissioner of Correction , 271 Conn. 808 , 831, 860 A.2d 715 (2004).

2017If the statute does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect class, its classification need only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose in order to withstand an equal protection challenge." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Harris v. Commissioner of Correction , 271 Conn. 808 , 831, 860 A.2d 715 (2004).

2002This motion to intervene seeking visitation of a minor child over the objection of the parents must be viewed in its constitutional setting. "[C]onsistent with the court's determination that a parent's interest in the care, custody and control over his or her children is "perhaps one of the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the] Court'; Troxel v. Granville . [ 530 U.S. 57 , 65 (2002)]; the application of the strict scrutiny test is required to any infringement it may suffer.

2002Before the court is the plaintiffs motion to dismiss the amended motion to intervene and the intervenors' objection thereto. 1 This motion to intervene seeking visitation of a minor child over the objection of the parents must be viewed in its constitutional setting. "[C]onsistent with the court's determination that a parent's interest in the care, custody and control over his or her children is `perhaps one of the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the] Court'; Troxel v. Granville . [ 530 U.S. 57 , 65 (2002)]; the application of the strict scrutiny test is required to

2002Castagno v. Wholean , [ 239 Conn. 336 , 344 (1996)]. ("The right to family autonomy and privacy acknowledged in the common law has been recognized as so fundamental as to merit constitutional protection.

2002Castagno v. Wholean , [ 239 Conn. 336 , 344 (1996)]. (`The right to family autonomy and privacy acknowledged in the common law has been recognized as so fundamental as to merit constitutional protection.

1997"The first step in confronting the plaintiffs' equal protection argument is to ascertain whether the rational basis test or the more stringent strict scrutiny test applies." Gallacher v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 221 Conn. 166 , 181 , 602 A.2d 996 (1992).

1997"The first step in confronting the plaintiffs' equal protection argument is to ascertain whether the rational basis test or the more stringent strict scrutiny test applies." Gallacher v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 221 Conn. 166 , 181 , 602 A.2d 996 (1992).

1997"When a statutory classification impinges upon an inherently suspect class or affects a CT Page 2182 fundamental personal right, the statute is subject to strict scrutiny and is justified only by a compelling state interest." Keogh v. Bridgeport, 187 Conn. 53 , 66 , 444 A.2d 225 (1982).

1997"When a statutory classification impinges upon an inherently suspect class or affects a CT Page 2182 fundamental personal right, the statute is subject to strict scrutiny and is justified only by a compelling state interest." Keogh v. Bridgeport, 187 Conn. 53 , 66 , 444 A.2d 225 (1982).

2024If the statute does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect class, its classification need only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose in order to with- stand an equal protection challenge.’’ (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) Taylor v. Commissioner of Cor- rection, 216 Conn. App. 570 , 586–87, 286 A.3d 449 (2022). ‘‘A party challenging a law under rational basis review bears the burden of proving that the law’s class-based distinctions are wholly irrational.’’ State v. Dyous, 307 Conn. 299 , 317, 53 A.3d 153 (2012).

2022If the statute does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect class, its classification need only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose in order to with- stand an equal protection challenge.’’ (Footnote omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, 259 Conn. 855, 877 , 792 A.2d 774 (2002). ‘‘Although the federal constitution does not expressly enumerate any suspect classes, the United States Supreme Court has identified three such classifications, namely, race, alienage and national ori- gin.’’ Kerrigan v. Commissioner o

2022If the statute does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect class, its classification need only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose in order to with- stand an equal protection challenge.’’ (Footnote omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, 259 Conn. 855, 877 , 792 A.2d 774 (2002). ‘‘Although the federal constitution does not expressly enumerate any suspect classes, the United States Supreme Court has identified three such classifications, namely, race, alienage and national ori- gin.’’ Kerrigan v. Commissioner o

2022If the statute does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect class, its classification need only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose in order to with- stand an equal protection challenge.’’ (Footnote omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, 259 Conn. 855, 877 , 792 A.2d 774 (2002). ‘‘Although the federal constitution does not expressly enumerate any suspect classes, the United States Supreme Court has identified three such classifications, namely, race, alienage and national ori- gin.’’ Kerrigan v. Commissioner o

2022If the statute does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect class, its classification need only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose in order to with- stand an equal protection challenge.’’ (Footnote omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, 259 Conn. 855, 877 , 792 A.2d 774 (2002). ‘‘Although the federal constitution does not expressly enumerate any suspect classes, the United States Supreme Court has identified three such classifications, namely, race, alienage and national ori- gin.’’ Kerrigan v. Commissioner o

2022If the statute does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect class, its classification need only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose in order to with- stand an equal protection challenge.’’ (Footnote omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, 259 Conn. 855, 877 , 792 A.2d 774 (2002). ‘‘Although the federal constitution does not expressly enumerate any suspect classes, the United States Supreme Court has identified three such classifications, namely, race, alienage and national ori- gin.’’ Kerrigan v. Commissioner o

2022If the statute does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect class, its classification need only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose in order to with- stand an equal protection challenge.’’ (Footnote omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, 259 Conn. 855, 877 , 792 A.2d 774 (2002). ‘‘Although the federal constitution does not expressly enumerate any suspect classes, the United States Supreme Court has identified three such classifications, namely, race, alienage and national ori- gin.’’ Kerrigan v. Commissioner o

2021We previously have held that ‘‘[this] explicit prohibition of discrimination because of physical [or mental] disability defines . . . constitutionally protected class[es] of persons whose rights are protected by requiring encroachments on these rights to pass a strict scrutiny test.’’ Daly v. DelPonte, 225 Conn. 499 , 513–14, 624 A.2d 876 (1993). ‘‘In the absence of a claim of deprivation of a funda- mental right [or the targeting of a suspect class], we have scrutinized such questions under a rational basis test. . . . [Under that standard] [t]he party claiming a constitutional violation bear

2021We previously have held that ‘‘[this] explicit prohibition of discrimination because of physical [or mental] disability defines . . . constitutionally protected class[es] of persons whose rights are protected by requiring encroachments on these rights to pass a strict scrutiny test.’’ Daly v. DelPonte, 225 Conn. 499 , 513–14, 624 A.2d 876 (1993). ‘‘In the absence of a claim of deprivation of a funda- mental right [or the targeting of a suspect class], we have scrutinized such questions under a rational basis test. . . . [Under that standard] [t]he party claiming a constitutional violation bear

2021However, ‘‘the powers of local boards of education are not defined only by state statute, and . . . a local charter may limit the powers of the local board of education [when] its provisions are ‘not inconsis- tent with or inimical to the efficient and proper operation of the educational system otherwise entrusted by state law to the local boards.’ ’’ Cheshire v. McKenney, 182 Conn. 253, 259 , 438 A.2d 88 (1980). 14 Because we conclude that the plaintiff has not advanced a serious challenge to the constitutionality of the charter provision by providing authority in support of her claim that th

2021However, ‘‘the powers of local boards of education are not defined only by state statute, and . . . a local charter may limit the powers of the local board of education [when] its provisions are ‘not inconsis- tent with or inimical to the efficient and proper operation of the educational system otherwise entrusted by state law to the local boards.’ ’’ Cheshire v. McKenney, 182 Conn. 253, 259 , 438 A.2d 88 (1980). 14 Because we conclude that the plaintiff has not advanced a serious challenge to the constitutionality of the charter provision by providing authority in support of her claim that th

2018We note, moreover, that it was not until more than fifteen years after the passage of the statute that this court, in Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford , supra, 301 Conn. at 774 , 23 A.3d 1192 , recognized the ministerial exception as a jurisdictional bar to employment discrimination actions.

2018We note, moreover, that it was not until more than fifteen years after the passage of the statute that this court, in Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford , supra, 301 Conn. at 774 , 23 A.3d 1192 , recognized the ministerial exception as a jurisdictional bar to employment discrimination actions.

2018The court further noted, however, that, "[i]n protecting the religious practices of individuals, the legislature made the distinction between the 'exercise of religion,' which it protected with the strict scrutiny test found in [subsection] ... (b) of § 52-571b, and 'religious beliefs,' which [it] prevented from being burdened by subsection (d)." Id., at 662, 911 A.2d 319 .

2018As the Appellate Court explained in Rweyemamu , although the legislative history reveals "that the legislature was, in general, mindful of the impact that Smith might have had on employment discrimination laws," its primary focus "[was on] protecting individual religious practices through [the application of] the strict scrutiny test." 19 Id., at 661-62, 911 A.2d 319 .

2011There, the Rweyemamu court acknowledged that § 52-571b was enacted largely in response to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, supra, 494 U.S. 872 , which held that the government does not have to apply the strict scrutiny test in determining whether the State can burden the Free Exercise of religion.

2010We applied the strict scrutiny analysis from Horton v. Meskill, 195 Conn. 24, 38-39 , 486 A.2d 1099 (1985) (Horton III); see footnote 34 of this opinion; and noted that the “methodology requires us to balance the legislature’s affirmative constitutional obligation to provide all of the state’s schoolchildren with a substantially equal educational opportunity against the legislature’s recognized significant discretion in matters of public elementary and secondary education.” Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 37 .

2010We applied the strict scrutiny analysis from Horton v. Meskill, 195 Conn. 24, 38-39 , 486 A.2d 1099 (1985) (Horton III); see footnote 34 of this opinion; and noted that the “methodology requires us to balance the legislature’s affirmative constitutional obligation to provide all of the state’s schoolchildren with a substantially equal educational opportunity against the legislature’s recognized significant discretion in matters of public elementary and secondary education.” Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 37 .

2010We applied the strict scrutiny analysis from Horton v. Meskill, 195 Conn. 24, 38-39 , 486 A.2d 1099 (1985) ( Horton III ); see footnote 34 of this opinion; and noted that the "methodology requires us to balance the legislature's affirmative constitutional obligation to provide all of the state's schoolchildren with a substantially equal educational opportunity against the legislature's recognized significant discretion in matters of public elementary and secondary education." Sheff v. O'Neill, supra, 238 Conn. at 37 , 678 A.2d 1267 .

2010We applied the strict scrutiny analysis from Horton v. Meskill, 195 Conn. 24, 38-39 , 486 A.2d 1099 (1985) ( Horton III ); see footnote 34 of this opinion; and noted that the "methodology requires us to balance the legislature's affirmative constitutional obligation to provide all of the state's schoolchildren with a substantially equal educational opportunity against the legislature's recognized significant discretion in matters of public elementary and secondary education." Sheff v. O'Neill, supra, 238 Conn. at 37 , 678 A.2d 1267 .

2007Id., at 217-18, 789 A.2d 431 .

2007If the statute does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect class, its classification need only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose in order to withstand an equal protection challenge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Batte-Holmgren v. Commissioner of Public Health, 281 Conn. 277, 295 , 914 A.2d 996 (2007).

2007If the statute does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect class, its classification need only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose in order to withstand an equal protection challenge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Batte-Holmgren v. Commissioner of Public Health, 281 Conn. 277, 295 , 914 A.2d 996 (2007).

2004If the statute does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect class, its classification need only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose in order to withstand an equal protection challenge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, 259 Conn. 855, 877 , 792 A.2d 774 (2002). “[T]he analytical predicate [of consideration of an equal protection claim] is a determination of who are the persons similarly situated.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) City Recycling, Inc. v. State, 257 Conn. 429, 448 , 778 A.2d 77 (2001).

2004If the statute does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect class, its classification need only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose in order to withstand an equal protection challenge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, 259 Conn. 855, 877 , 792 A.2d 774 (2002). “[T]he analytical predicate [of consideration of an equal protection claim] is a determination of who are the persons similarly situated.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) City Recycling, Inc. v. State, 257 Conn. 429, 448 , 778 A.2d 77 (2001).

2002If the statute does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect class, its classification need only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose in order to withstand an equal protection challenge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barton v. Ducci Electrical Contractors, Inc., 248 Conn. 793, 813-14 , 730 A.2d 1149 (1999).

2002If the statute does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect class, its classification need only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose in order to withstand an equal protection challenge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barton v. Ducci Electrical Contractors, Inc., 248 Conn. 793, 813-14 , 730 A.2d 1149 (1999).

2002The defendants cite two cases for the proposition that the strict scrutiny standard should not be applied in equal protection cases made in the context of eminent domain, Jackson v. Water Works, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission , 793 F.2d 1090 , 1093 (Ca. 9, 1986); U.S. v. 16.92 Acres of Land , 670 F.2d 1369 , 1373 (Ca. 7, 1982).

2002The defendants cite two cases for the proposition that the strict scrutiny standard should not be applied in equal protection cases made in the context of eminent domain, Jackson v. Water Works, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission , 793 F.2d 1090 , 1093 (Ca. 9, 1986); U.S. v. 16.92 Acres of Land , 670 F.2d 1369 , 1373 (Ca. 7, 1982).