scrutiny standard in Florida

2019See, e.g., Fla. Dept. of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602, 607 (Fla. 2004) ("When a statute impinges on a fundamental liberty interest, we analyze the statute's constitutionality under a strict scrutiny standard." (citing Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1276 (Fla. 1996))); J.P., 907 So. 2d at 1109 ("When a statute . . . impairs the exercise of a fundamental right, then the law must pass strict scrutiny." (first citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); and then citing Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521, 527 (Fla. 2001))); cf. T.M. v. State, 784 So. 2d 442, 444 (Fla. 2001) (

2002Citing State v. T.M., 761 So.2d 1140 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), quashed, 784 So.2d 442 (Fla.2001), we concluded that the constitutionality of the Tampa ordinance should be measured by a heightened scrutiny test.

2002See J.P. v. State, 788 So.2d 953 (Fla.2001). 1 Without addressing the second question, the supreme court remanded the matter back to this court to apply the strict scrutiny test to the ordinance.

2002See J.A. v. State, 779 So.2d 390 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), quashed 788 So.2d 953 (Fla.2001).’ In affirming the trial, court, this court applied the heightened scrutiny test.

2019See, e.g., Fla. Dept. of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602, 607 (Fla. 2004) ("When a statute impinges on a fundamental liberty interest, we analyze the statute's constitutionality under a strict scrutiny standard." (citing Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1276 (Fla. 1996))); J.P., 907 So. 2d at 1109 ("When a statute . . . impairs the exercise of a fundamental right, then the law must pass strict scrutiny." (first citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); and then citing Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521, 527 (Fla. 2001))); cf. T.M. v. State, 784 So. 2d 442, 444 (Fla. 2001) (

2016As the supreme court explained in Florida Dep’t of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So.2d 602, 607 (Fla.2004): When a statute impinges on a fundamental liberty interest, we analyze the statute’s constitutionality under a strict scrutiny standard.

2019See, e.g., Fla. Dept. of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602, 607 (Fla. 2004) ("When a statute impinges on a fundamental liberty interest, we analyze the statute's constitutionality under a strict scrutiny standard." (citing Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1276 (Fla. 1996))); J.P., 907 So. 2d at 1109 ("When a statute . . . impairs the exercise of a fundamental right, then the law must pass strict scrutiny." (first citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); and then citing Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521, 527 (Fla. 2001))); cf. T.M. v. State, 784 So. 2d 442, 444 (Fla. 2001) (

2018Id. "[I]f the interest which is being taken is a fundamental interest ... then the means or method employed by the statute to remedy the asserted problem must meet not only the rational basis test, but also the strict scrutiny test." Mitchell v. Moore , 786 So.2d 521 , 527 (Fla. 2001).

2005Unlike rational basis review, the strict scrutiny standard "imposes a heavy burden of justification upon the state to show an important societal *1100 need and the use of the least intrusive means to achieve that goal." N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., 866 So.2d at 646 (Pariente, J., specially concurring) (quoting Chiles v. State Employees Attorneys Guild, 734 So.2d 1030, 1033 (Fla.1999)).

2004See N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So.2d 612, 634 (Fla.2003)(" NFWHCS ") (declining the State's invitation to abandon the strict scrutiny standard in favor of the less stringent undue burden standard announced in Casey ).

2019See, e.g., Fla. Dept. of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602, 607 (Fla. 2004) ("When a statute impinges on a fundamental liberty interest, we analyze the statute's constitutionality under a strict scrutiny standard." (citing Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1276 (Fla. 1996))); J.P., 907 So. 2d at 1109 ("When a statute . . . impairs the exercise of a fundamental right, then the law must pass strict scrutiny." (first citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); and then citing Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521, 527 (Fla. 2001))); cf. T.M. v. State, 784 So. 2d 442, 444 (Fla. 2001) (

2014When a state enacts legislation that infringes on fundamental rights, courts will review the law under a strict scrutiny test and uphold it only when it is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 , 113 S.Ct. 1439 , 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993).

2004See, e.g., Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 944-46 (9th Cir.1997) (finding juveniles’ fundamental rights implicated and applying strict scrutiny); Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 863 (Michael, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ‘fundamental rights’ of minors are no less fundamental than those of adults and, thus, must be protected with the same vigor under a strict scrutiny analysis.”); Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir.1993) (assuming, without deciding, that a fundamental right to move about freely is implicated by a juvenile curfew ordinance and applying strict scrutiny); City of Sumner v. Wal

2004See, e.g., Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 944-46 (9th Cir.1997) (finding juveniles' fundamental rights implicated and applying strict scrutiny); Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 863 (Michael, J., dissenting) ("[T]he `fundamental rights' of minors are no less fundamental than those of adults and, thus, must be protected with the same vigor under a strict scrutiny analysis."); Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir.1993) (assuming, without deciding, that a fundamental right to move about freely is implicated by a juvenile curfew ordinance and applying strict scrutiny); City of Sumner v. Wal

2002Citing State v. T.M., 761 So.2d 1140 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), quashed, 784 So.2d 442 (Fla.2001), we concluded that the constitutionality of the Tampa ordinance should be measured by a heightened scrutiny test.

2002Citing State v. T.M., 761 So.2d 1140 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), quashed, 784 So.2d 442 (Fla.2001), we concluded that the constitutionality of the Tampa ordinance should be measured by a heightened scrutiny test.

2019See, e.g., Fla. Dept. of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602, 607 (Fla. 2004) ("When a statute impinges on a fundamental liberty interest, we analyze the statute's constitutionality under a strict scrutiny standard." (citing Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1276 (Fla. 1996))); J.P., 907 So. 2d at 1109 ("When a statute . . . impairs the exercise of a fundamental right, then the law must pass strict scrutiny." (first citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); and then citing Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521, 527 (Fla. 2001))); cf. T.M. v. State, 784 So. 2d 442, 444 (Fla. 2001) (

2013See State v. J.P., 907 So.2d 1101, 1116-18 (Fla.2004) (while protecting juveniles from victimization and reducing juvenile crime satisfy the compelling interest prong of the strict scrutiny test, a restrictive action cannot include “otherwise innocent and legal conduct by minors”).

2019See, e.g., Fla. Dept. of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602, 607 (Fla. 2004) ("When a statute impinges on a fundamental liberty interest, we analyze the statute's constitutionality under a strict scrutiny standard." (citing Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1276 (Fla. 1996))); J.P., 907 So. 2d at 1109 ("When a statute . . . impairs the exercise of a fundamental right, then the law must pass strict scrutiny." (first citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); and then citing Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521, 527 (Fla. 2001))); cf. T.M. v. State, 784 So. 2d 442, 444 (Fla. 2001) (

2004See also Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So.2d 510 (Fla.1998) (applying the strict scrutiny standard in addressing the visitation rights of grandparents when a child's parent is deceased); J.A.S. v. State, 705 So.2d 1381 (Fla.1998) (applying the strict scrutiny standard in addressing a statutory rape law); Krischer v. McIver, 697 So.2d 97 (Fla.1997) (applying the strict scrutiny standard in addressing assisted suicide); Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So.2d 1271 (Fla.1996) (applying the strict scrutiny standard in addressing the visitation rights of grandparents when a child’s parents are living together); B.B.

2017Winfield, 477 So.2d at 547 . 4 In an attempt to sustain the burden under the strict scrutiny test, Dr. Myers and the amici assert that the legislative intent behind the amendments is sufficient: to encourage settlement by providing equal access to relevant information, --resulting in the inexpensive and expeditious administration of justice; screening out frivolous claims; and streamlining medical malpractice litigation.

2017Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 547 .4 In an attempt to sustain the burden under the strict scrutiny test, Dr. Myers and the amici assert that the legislative intent behind the amendments is sufficient: to encourage settlement by providing equal access to relevant information, resulting in the inexpensive and expeditious administration of justice; screening out frivolous claims; and streamlining medical malpractice litigation.

2004See also Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So.2d 510 (Fla.1998) (applying the strict scrutiny standard in addressing the visitation rights of grandparents when a child's parent is deceased); J.A.S. v. State, 705 So.2d 1381 (Fla.1998) (applying the strict scrutiny standard in addressing a statutory rape law); Krischer v. McIver, 697 So.2d 97 (Fla.1997) (applying the strict scrutiny standard in addressing assisted suicide); Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So.2d 1271 (Fla.1996) (applying the strict scrutiny standard in addressing the visitation rights of grandparents when a child’s parents are living together); B.B.

2004Thus, while the dissent may embrace the rational basis standard under the guise of a "concession of error," it is actually an abandonment of the strict scrutiny standard established by the Court's unanimous holdings in T.M. and J.P. [2] "The doctrine of stare decisis, or the obligation of a court to abide by its own precedent, is grounded on the need for stability in the law and has been a fundamental tenet of Anglo-American jurisprudence for centuries." N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So.2d 612, 637 (Fla.2003). [3] See also Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So.2d 510 (Fla

2004See also Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So.2d 510 (Fla.1998) (applying the strict scrutiny standard in addressing the visitation rights of grandparents when a child's parent is deceased); J.A.S. v. State, 705 So.2d 1381 (Fla.1998) (applying the strict scrutiny standard in addressing a statutory rape law); Krischer v. McIver, 697 So.2d 97 (Fla.1997) (applying the strict scrutiny standard in addressing assisted suicide); Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So.2d 1271 (Fla.1996) (applying the strict scrutiny standard in addressing the visitation rights of grandparents when a child’s parents are living together); B.B.

2004Thus, while the dissent may embrace the rational basis standard under the guise of a "concession of error," it is actually an abandonment of the strict scrutiny standard established by the Court's unanimous holdings in T.M. and J.P. [2] "The doctrine of stare decisis, or the obligation of a court to abide by its own precedent, is grounded on the need for stability in the law and has been a fundamental tenet of Anglo-American jurisprudence for centuries." N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So.2d 612, 637 (Fla.2003). [3] See also Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So.2d 510 (Fla

1997White Egret Condominium, Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So.2d 346, 351 (Fla.1979) (“The law is now clear.that restriction of individual rights on the basis of age need not pass the strict scrutiny test, and therefore age is not a suspect class.”); Metropolitan Dade County v. Pred, 665 So.2d 252 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)[, review denied, 676 So.2d 413 (Fla.1996) ]. (“[UJnder both the Florida and United States Constitution, children, due to their special nature and vulnerabilities, do not enjoy the same quantum or quality of rights as adults.”).

1997White Egret Condominium, Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So.2d 346, 351 (Fla.1979) ("The law is now clear that restriction of individual rights on the basis of age need not pass the strict scrutiny test, and therefore age is not a suspect class."); Metropolitan Dade County v. Pred, 665 So.2d 252 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)[, review denied, 676 So.2d 413 (Fla.1996) ]. ("[U]nder both the Florida and United States Constitution, children, due to their special nature and vulnerabilities, do not enjoy the same quantum or quality of rights as adults.").

2011See, e.g., Simmons v. State, 944 So.2d 317, 323 (Fla.2006).

2011See, e.g., Simmons v. State, 944 So.2d 317, 323 (Fla.2006).

2004In a strict scrutiny analysis, legislative conclusions are not taken at face value and "do not ... obviate the need for judicial scrutiny." Chiles, 734 So.2d at 1034 (quoting Chiles v. State Employees Atty's Guild, 714 So.2d 502, 506 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)).

2004In a strict scrutiny analysis, legislative conclusions are not taken at face value and “do not ... obviate the need for judicial scrutiny.” Chiles, 734 So.2d at 1034 (quoting Chiles v. State Employees Atty’s Guild, 714 So.2d 502, 506 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)).

2005Unlike rational basis review, the strict scrutiny standard "imposes a heavy burden of justification upon the state to show an important societal *1100 need and the use of the least intrusive means to achieve that goal." N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., 866 So.2d at 646 (Pariente, J., specially concurring) (quoting Chiles v. State Employees Attorneys Guild, 734 So.2d 1030, 1033 (Fla.1999)).

2004In a strict scrutiny analysis, legislative conclusions are not taken at face value and “do not ... obviate the need for judicial scrutiny.” Chiles, 734 So.2d at 1034 (quoting Chiles v. State Employees Atty’s Guild, 714 So.2d 502, 506 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)).

2004See, e.g., Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 944-46 (9th Cir.1997) (finding juveniles’ fundamental rights implicated and applying strict scrutiny); Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 863 (Michael, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ‘fundamental rights’ of minors are no less fundamental than those of adults and, thus, must be protected with the same vigor under a strict scrutiny analysis.”); Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir.1993) (assuming, without deciding, that a fundamental right to move about freely is implicated by a juvenile curfew ordinance and applying strict scrutiny); City of Sumner v. Wal

2004See, e.g., Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 944-46 (9th Cir.1997) (finding juveniles' fundamental rights implicated and applying strict scrutiny); Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 863 (Michael, J., dissenting) ("[T]he `fundamental rights' of minors are no less fundamental than those of adults and, thus, must be protected with the same vigor under a strict scrutiny analysis."); Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir.1993) (assuming, without deciding, that a fundamental right to move about freely is implicated by a juvenile curfew ordinance and applying strict scrutiny); City of Sumner v. Wal

2004See T.M., 784 So.2d at 444 ; J.P., 788 So.2d at 953 ; R.J.H., 788 So.2d at 952 ; J.A., 788 So.2d at 954; D.N.S., 788 So.2d at 955 ; M.R., 788 So.2d at 958 (all holding that “strict scrutiny applies to juvenile curfew ordinances”).

2004See T.M., 784 So.2d at 444 ; J.P., 788 So.2d at 953 ; R.J.H., 788 So.2d at 952 ; J.A., 788 So.2d at 954; D.N.S., 788 So.2d at 955 ; M.R., 788 So.2d at 958 (all holding that "strict scrutiny applies to juvenile curfew ordinances").

1985Although Shapiro involved the right to interstate travel and therefore invoked the strict scrutiny test, the Court specifically noted that the classification failed even the "traditional standard," i.e. "equal protection is denied only if the classification is `without any reasonable basis.'" Id. at 638, n. 20 , 89 S.Ct. at 1333, n. 20 .

1985Although Shapiro involved the right to interstate travel and therefore invoked the strict scrutiny test, the Court specifically noted that the classification failed even the "traditional standard," i.e. "equal protection is denied only if the classification is `without any reasonable basis.'" Id. at 638, n. 20 , 89 S.Ct. at 1333, n. 20 .

2004Cf. Renee B. v. Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin., 790 So.2d 1036 (Fla.2001) (declining to apply the strict scrutiny standard after determining that the right to privacy was not implicated by agency rules that barred public funding for abortions); City of N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So.2d 1025 (Fla.1995) (declining to apply strict scrutiny standard after determining that plaintiff's reasonable expectation of privacy was not implicated by administrative regulation requiring all job applicants to sign affidavit stating they had not used tobacco products during preceding year). .

2004Cf. Renee B. v. Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin., 790 So.2d 1036 (Fla.2001) (declining to apply the strict scrutiny standard after determining that the right to privacy was not implicated by agency rules that barred public funding for abortions); City of N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So.2d 1025 (Fla.1995) (declining to apply strict scrutiny standard after determining that plaintiff's reasonable expectation of privacy was not implicated by administrative regulation requiring all job applicants to sign affidavit stating they had not used tobacco products during preceding year). [4] There are three re

2004See also Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So.2d 510 (Fla.1998) (applying the strict scrutiny standard in addressing the visitation rights of grandparents when a child's parent is deceased); J.A.S. v. State, 705 So.2d 1381 (Fla.1998) (applying the strict scrutiny standard in addressing a statutory rape law); Krischer v. McIver, 697 So.2d 97 (Fla.1997) (applying the strict scrutiny standard in addressing assisted suicide); Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So.2d 1271 (Fla.1996) (applying the strict scrutiny standard in addressing the visitation rights of grandparents when a child’s parents are living together); B.B.

2004Thus, while the dissent may embrace the rational basis standard under the guise of a "concession of error," it is actually an abandonment of the strict scrutiny standard established by the Court's unanimous holdings in T.M. and J.P. [2] "The doctrine of stare decisis, or the obligation of a court to abide by its own precedent, is grounded on the need for stability in the law and has been a fundamental tenet of Anglo-American jurisprudence for centuries." N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So.2d 612, 637 (Fla.2003). [3] See also Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So.2d 510 (Fla

2004See T.M., 784 So.2d at 444 ; J.P., 788 So.2d at 953 ; R.J.H., 788 So.2d at 952 ; J.A., 788 So.2d at 954; D.N.S., 788 So.2d at 955 ; M.R., 788 So.2d at 958 (all holding that “strict scrutiny applies to juvenile curfew ordinances”).

2004See T.M., 784 So.2d at 444 ; J.P., 788 So.2d at 953 ; R.J.H., 788 So.2d at 952 ; J.A., 788 So.2d at 954; D.N.S., 788 So.2d at 955 ; M.R., 788 So.2d at 958 (all holding that "strict scrutiny applies to juvenile curfew ordinances").

2004See T.M., 784 So.2d at 444 ; J.P., 788 So.2d at 953 ; R.J.H., 788 So.2d at 952 ; J.A., 788 So.2d at 954; D.N.S., 788 So.2d at 955 ; M.R., 788 So.2d at 958 (all holding that “strict scrutiny applies to juvenile curfew ordinances”).

2004See T.M., 784 So.2d at 444 ; J.P., 788 So.2d at 953 ; R.J.H., 788 So.2d at 952 ; J.A., 788 So.2d at 954; D.N.S., 788 So.2d at 955 ; M.R., 788 So.2d at 958 (all holding that "strict scrutiny applies to juvenile curfew ordinances").