scrutiny test in California

2025The California Supreme Court has cautioned against the application of strict scrutiny based solely on the rationale that “ ‘personal liberty is a fundamental interest.’ ” (People v. Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99 , 123 (Williams) [quoting People v. Olivas (1976) 17 Cal.3d 236, 251 ].) The Court has observed that this language “should not be interpreted so broadly as to require strict scrutiny ‘whenever one challenges upon equal protection grounds a penal statute or statutes that authorize different sentences for comparable crimes, because such statutes always implicate the right to “personal li

2024Relying on People v. Olivas (1976) 17 Cal.3d 236 , Barner argues that in determining whether the differential treatment of insanity acquittees subject to life or determinate terms of commitment is justified, we should apply the strict scrutiny standard of review, under which “the state must first establish that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law and then demonstrate that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further that purpose.” (Id. at p. 251, italics omitted.) He claims that strict scrutiny is appropriate because applying the Three Strikes law to calculate a

2024But the challenged distinction is not based on a suspect classification and, although defendant contends it implicates a fundamental interest in personal liberty, the California Supreme Court has stated that a defendant “ ‘does not have a fundamental interest in a specific term of imprisonment[.]’ ” (People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 838 ; accord, Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 847–848.) Defendant’s claim is therefore properly subject to rational basis review, given “the broad discretion the Legislature traditionally has been understood to exercise in defining crimes and specifying

2023In People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821 (Wilkinson), for example, the Supreme Court said of its prior decision, “[t]he language in Olivas could be interpreted to require application of the strict scrutiny standard whenever one challenges upon equal protection grounds a penal statute or statutes that authorize different sentences for comparable crimes, because such statutes always implicate the right to ‘personal liberty’ of the affected individuals.” (Wilkinson, at p. 837.) However, said the court, “Olivas properly has not been read so broadly.” (Ibid., citing People v. Davis (1979) 92 Ca

1989There are two tests. (8) When a statute involves a "suspect classification" or touches on a "fundamental interest," a strict scrutiny test is used. ( D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 17 [ 112 Cal. Rptr. 786 , 520 P.2d 10 ].) Here "the state bears the burden of establishing not only that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law but that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further its purpose." ( Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 785 [ 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ], original italics.) (9) A statute offering trial setting preference

1989There are two tests. (8) When a statute involves a "suspect classification" or touches on a "fundamental interest," a strict scrutiny test is used. ( D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 17 [ 112 Cal. Rptr. 786 , 520 P.2d 10 ].) Here "the state bears the burden of establishing not only that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law but that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further its purpose." ( Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 785 [ 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ], original italics.) (9) A statute offering trial setting preference

2018However, the People point out the court specifically rejected the notion that its decision extended *918 the strict scrutiny standard to " 'every detail of every civil commitment program.' " ( McKee I , supra , 47 Cal.4th at p. 1210, fn. 13 , 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 , 223 P.3d 566 .) That exacting standard is not properly applied in evaluating the justification for extending a testimonial privilege to NGI's but not SVP's, the People submit, because the right not to be called as a witness for the prosecution touches on "a single aspect of the trial process." There is no constitutional right not to

2018However, the People point out the court specifically rejected the notion that its decision extended *918 the strict scrutiny standard to " 'every detail of every civil commitment program.' " ( McKee I , supra , 47 Cal.4th at p. 1210, fn. 13 , 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 , 223 P.3d 566 .) That exacting standard is not properly applied in evaluating the justification for extending a testimonial privilege to NGI's but not SVP's, the People submit, because the right not to be called as a witness for the prosecution touches on "a single aspect of the trial process." There is no constitutional right not to

2025Assuming this is a fundamental right, “not every limitation or incidental burden on a fundamental right is subject to the strict scrutiny standard.” (Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 33, 47 (Fair Political Practices).) “It is only when there exists a real and appreciable impact on, or a significant interference with the exercise of the fundamental right that the strict scrutiny doctrine will be applied.” (Ibid.) Benabou has not shown that Measure ULA imposes a significant interference with property rights.

2025Assuming this is a fundamental right, “not every limitation or incidental burden on a fundamental right is subject to the strict scrutiny standard.” (Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 33, 47 (Fair Political Practices).) “It is only when there exists a real and appreciable impact on, or a significant interference with the exercise of the fundamental right that the strict scrutiny doctrine will be applied.” (Ibid.) Benabou has not shown that Measure ULA imposes a significant interference with property rights.

1989There are two tests. (8) When a statute involves a "suspect classification" or touches on a "fundamental interest," a strict scrutiny test is used. ( D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 17 [ 112 Cal. Rptr. 786 , 520 P.2d 10 ].) Here "the state bears the burden of establishing not only that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law but that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further its purpose." ( Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 785 [ 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ], original italics.) (9) A statute offering trial setting preference

1989There are two tests. (8) When a statute involves a "suspect classification" or touches on a "fundamental interest," a strict scrutiny test is used. ( D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 17 [ 112 Cal. Rptr. 786 , 520 P.2d 10 ].) Here "the state bears the burden of establishing not only that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law but that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further its purpose." ( Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 785 [ 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 , 471 P.2d 487 ], original italics.) (9) A statute offering trial setting preference

2014(See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC (2010) 558 U.S. 310, 340 ; Zablocki v. Redhail (1978) 434 U.S. 374 , 388-389 ; Dunn v. Blumstein (1972) 405 U.S. 330, 342-342 .) However, as stated, the McKee II court understood that the strict scrutiny test required the government to “show both a compelling state interest justifying the disparate treatment and that the disparate treatment is necessary to further that compelling state interest. [Citations.]” (McKee II, supra, at p. 1349.) Given the evidence produced in McKee II by the People that many SVP’s do not participate in treatment and paraphilia diso

2005(See Fair Political Practices Com. v. Superior Court, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 48-49; see also Zablocki v. Redhail, supra, 434 U.S. at pp. 386-387.) Under the strict scrutiny test, a statute or ordinance is unconstitutional if it is substantially overbroad or underinclusive.

2024But the challenged distinction is not based on a suspect classification and, although defendant contends it implicates a fundamental interest in personal liberty, the California Supreme Court has stated that a defendant “ ‘does not have a fundamental interest in a specific term of imprisonment[.]’ ” (People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 838 ; accord, Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 847–848.) Defendant’s claim is therefore properly subject to rational basis review, given “the broad discretion the Legislature traditionally has been understood to exercise in defining crimes and specifying

2021(People v. Bell (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1030, 1049 [a broad reading of Olivas would “intrude[ ] too heavily on the police power and the Legislature’s prerogative to set criminal justice policy”]; People v. Mitchell (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 783, 796 [“[d]etermining gradations of culpability . . . does not implicate the strict scrutiny test for equal protection purposes”]; People v. Silva (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1167 [all criminal laws are not subject to strict scrutiny].) Assuming, but only for the purposes of our discussion, that the “no imputation of malice” rule is extended to attempted murde

2016(See In re Moye (1978) 22 Cal.3d 457, 465 [explaining that “[b]ecause petitioner’s personal liberty is at stake, . . . the applicable standard for measuring the validity of the [NGI] statutory scheme now before us [as distinguished from the mentally disordered sex offender scheme then in effect] requires application of the strict scrutiny standard of equal protection analysis”].) Under the strict scrutiny standard, “the state must establish both that it has a ‘compelling interest’ which justifies the challenged procedure and that the distinctions drawn by the procedure are necessary to further

2016Accordingly, the state must establish both that it has a ‘compelling interest’ which justifies the challenged procedure and that the distinctions drawn by the procedure are necessary to further that interest. [Citation.]” (In re Moye (1978) 22 Cal.3d 457, 465 (Moye).) Defendant contends that prospective SVP’s are similarly situated to prospective NGI committees with respect to the question of whether they can be compelled to testify in their commitment proceedings, and that under the strict scrutiny standard, there is no justification for disparate treatment in this regard. 17 This issue was r

2014(See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC (2010) 558 U.S. 310, 340 ; Zablocki v. Redhail (1978) 434 U.S. 374 , 388-389 ; Dunn v. Blumstein (1972) 405 U.S. 330, 342-342 .) However, as stated, the McKee II court understood that the strict scrutiny test required the government to “show both a compelling state interest justifying the disparate treatment and that the disparate treatment is necessary to further that compelling state interest. [Citations.]” (McKee II, supra, at p. 1349.) Given the evidence produced in McKee II by the People that many SVP’s do not participate in treatment and paraphilia diso

2013Relying on Bernal v. Fainter (1984) 467 U.S. 216 (Bernal) and Dunn v. Blumstein (1972) 405 U.S. 330 , defendant argues that “[t]he element of necessity under the strict scrutiny standard required that the prosecution show that the disparate treatment of SVP[’]s constituted the least restrictive means possible.” Defendant contends that the McKee II court misapplied the strict scrutiny test by improperly “reject[ing] the need for the prosecution” to show that the disparate treatment of SVP’s was the least restrictive means. 22 McKee made a similar argument relying on Bernal, and the McKee II cou

2023In People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821 (Wilkinson), for example, the Supreme Court said of its prior decision, “[t]he language in Olivas could be interpreted to require application of the strict scrutiny standard whenever one challenges upon equal protection grounds a penal statute or statutes that authorize different sentences for comparable crimes, because such statutes always implicate the right to ‘personal liberty’ of the affected individuals.” (Wilkinson, at p. 837.) However, said the court, “Olivas properly has not been read so broadly.” (Ibid., citing People v. Davis (1979) 92 Ca

2021(People v. Bell (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1030, 1049 [a broad reading of Olivas would “intrude[ ] too heavily on the police power and the Legislature’s prerogative to set criminal justice policy”]; People v. Mitchell (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 783, 796 [“[d]etermining gradations of culpability . . . does not implicate the strict scrutiny test for equal protection purposes”]; People v. Silva (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1167 [all criminal laws are not subject to strict scrutiny].) Assuming, but only for the purposes of our discussion, that the “no imputation of malice” rule is extended to attempted murde

2008“In applying the strict scrutiny test, it must be remembered that the rights created by the equal protection clause are not group rights; they are personal rights which are guaranteed to the individual.” (Connerly, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 35 .) Plaintiffs contend many men are similarly situated to women with respect to domestic violence and prison programs for parents. “ ‘ “The concept of the equal protection of the laws compels recognition of the proposition that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment.” ’ [Citation.]” (In re Eri

2008“In applying the strict scrutiny test, it must be remembered that the rights created by the equal protection clause are not group rights; they are personal rights which are guaranteed to the individual.” (Connerly, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 35 .) Plaintiffs contend many men are similarly situated to women with respect to domestic violence and prison programs for parents. “ ‘ “The concept of the equal protection of the laws compels recognition of the proposition that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment.” ’ [Citation.]” (In re Eri

2022(Warden v. State Bar (1999) 21 Cal.4th 628, 641 [citations].) Alternatively stated, applying the strict scrutiny standard, a law “is upheld only if it is necessary to further a compelling state interest. [Citation.]” (People v. McKee (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1335 (McKee II).) Several courts have recognized that, while civil commitments in general implicate an individual’s fundamental liberty interest, not all legislative enactments involving civil commitments directly impact this liberty interest.

2018(See also, Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138 , 1153, fn. 20, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492 , 969 P.2d 584 ["this court has traditionally subjected involuntary civil commitment statutes to the most rigorous form of constitutional review"]; Dunley , supra , 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1443, 1450, 1453, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 335 [NGI's, SVP's, and those involuntarily committed as a condition of parole under the Mentally Disordered Offenders Act are all similarly situated with respect to the testimonial privilege, and the strict scrutiny test applies in determining whether disparate treatment on this iss

2016After the McKee I court remanded the case, the McKee II court independently reviewed all of the evidence and concluded that “the disparate treatment of SVP’s under the [SVPA] is reasonable and factually based and was adequately justified by the People at the evidentiary hearing on remand.” (McKee II, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 1348 ; see McKnight, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 864 [finding that the “claim that the appellate court failed to independently review the trial court’s determination is frivolous”]; Landau, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at pp. 47-48; McDonald, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1

2015(People v. Gray (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 285 ; People v. Kisling (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 544, 547-548 [declining to follow McKee II would be contrary to the California Supreme Court’s clear intent in remanding McKee I to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing]; People v. McDonald (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1378-1383 [per McKee I equal protection challenge was to be resolved on a classwide basis rather than affording each potential SVP the right to present his or her own evidence on the matter, McKee II conducted the required de novo review, applied a true strict scrutiny standard, and corre

2013Appeals Bd. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 395, 400 ; Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby (1971) 5 Cal.3d 1, 17-20 .) In evaluating legislation under the strict scrutiny standard, “‘the state bears the burden of establishing not only that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law but that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further its purpose.’” (Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, supra, at pp. 16-17 .)4 4 In contrast to California law, a gender-based classification challenged under the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution is subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny.

2013Appeals Bd. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 395, 400 ; Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby (1971) 5 Cal.3d 1, 17-20 .) In evaluating legislation under the strict scrutiny standard, “‘the state bears the burden of establishing not only that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law but that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further its purpose.’” (Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, supra, at pp. 16-17 .)4 4 In contrast to California law, a gender-based classification challenged under the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution is subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny.

2021(People v. Bell (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1030, 1049 [a broad reading of Olivas would “intrude[ ] too heavily on the police power and the Legislature’s prerogative to set criminal justice policy”]; People v. Mitchell (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 783, 796 [“[d]etermining gradations of culpability . . . does not implicate the strict scrutiny test for equal protection purposes”]; People v. Silva (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1167 [all criminal laws are not subject to strict scrutiny].) Assuming, but only for the purposes of our discussion, that the “no imputation of malice” rule is extended to attempted murde

2019Nevertheless, Olivas properly has not been read so broadly. . . . ‘California courts have never accepted the general proposition that “all criminal laws, because they may result in a defendant’s incarceration, are perforce subject to strict judicial scrutiny.”’” (Wilkinson, at p. 838; see People v. Bell (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1030, 1049 [a broad reading of Olivas would “intrude[] too heavily on the police power and the Legislature’s prerogative to set criminal justice 31 policy”]; People v. Mitchell (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 783, 796 [“[d]etermining gradations of culpability . . . does not implicat

2015(People v. Gray (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 285 ; People v. Kisling (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 544, 547-548 [declining to follow McKee II would be contrary to the California Supreme Court’s clear intent in remanding McKee I to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing]; People v. McDonald (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1378-1383 [per McKee I equal protection challenge was to be resolved on a classwide basis rather than affording each potential SVP the right to present his or her own evidence on the matter, McKee II conducted the required de novo review, applied a true strict scrutiny standard, and corre

2014(People v. McDonald, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1377- 1378.) The court further rejected the arguments that the Court of Appeal in McKee II failed to conduct the required de novo review (People v. McDonald, at pp. 1378-1379), did not apply a true strict scrutiny standard (id. at pp. 1379-1380), and incorrectly assessed the evidence (id. at pp. 1380-1382). 30. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1078-1079, 1085-1086 [First Dist.

1992(E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail (1978) 434 U.S. 374 . . . [regulations affecting the right to marry]; Califano v. Jobst (1977) 434 U.S. 47 . . . [same]; Kash Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 19 Cal.3d 294, 303-305 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 53 , 562 P.2d 1302 ] . . . [reasonable limitations on placement of newspaper racks]; Gould v. Grubb (1975) 14 Cal.3d 661 , 670 . . . [rational basis standard applicable to numerous statutes detailing the mechanisms of the right to vote].) It is only when there exists a real and appreciable impact on, or a significant interference with the exercise of the fun

1986(E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail (1978) 434 U.S. 374 . . . [regulations affecting the right to marry]; Califano v. Jobst (1977) 434 U.S. 47 . . . [same]; Kash Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 19 Cal.3d 294 , 303-305 . . . [reasonable limitations on placement of newspaper racks]; Gould v. Grubb (1975) 14 Cal.3d 661 , 670 . . . [rational basis standard applicable to numerous statutes detailing the mechanisms of the right to vote].) It is only when there exists a real and appreciable impact on, or a significant interference with the exercise of the fundamental right that the strict scrut

2016The California Supreme Court has long held that because involuntary civil commitment schemes involve the committed person's fundamental interest in liberty, equal protection challenges to such schemes under the California Constitution are reviewed under the strict scrutiny standard. 9 ( Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138 , 1153, fn. 20, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492 , 969 P.2d 584 ; Conservatorship of Hofferber (1980) 28 Cal.3d 161 , 171, fn. 8, 167 Cal.Rptr. 854 , 616 P.2d 836 ; see also McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1203 , 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 , 223 P.3d 566 [involuntary commitment procee

2016The California Supreme Court has long held that because involuntary civil commitment schemes involve the committed person's fundamental interest in liberty, equal protection challenges to such schemes under the California Constitution are reviewed under the strict scrutiny standard. 9 ( Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138 , 1153, fn. 20, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492 , 969 P.2d 584 ; Conservatorship of Hofferber (1980) 28 Cal.3d 161 , 171, fn. 8, 167 Cal.Rptr. 854 , 616 P.2d 836 ; see also McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1203 , 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 , 223 P.3d 566 [involuntary commitment procee

2025(See, e.g., In re Smith (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1251, 1263 [“Under California law, “ ‘[s]trict scrutiny is the appropriate standard against which to measure [equal protection] claims of disparate treatment in civil commitment. [Citations.]” ’ . . . ‘Because petitioner’s personal liberty is at stake, the People concede that the applicable standard for measuring the validity of the statutory scheme now before us requires application of the strict scrutiny standard of equal protection analysis.’ ”]; see also People v. Dunley (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1451 [“The California Supreme Court has long held

2025(See, e.g., In re Smith (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1251, 1263 [“Under California law, “ ‘[s]trict scrutiny is the appropriate standard against which to measure [equal protection] claims of disparate treatment in civil commitment. [Citations.]” ’ . . . ‘Because petitioner’s personal liberty is at stake, the People concede that the applicable standard for measuring the validity of the statutory scheme now before us requires application of the strict scrutiny standard of equal protection analysis.’ ”]; see also People v. Dunley (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1451 [“The California Supreme Court has long held

2024(Warden v. State Bar (1999) 21 Cal.4th 628, 641 .) Alternatively stated, applying the strict scrutiny standard, a law “is upheld only if it is necessary to further a compelling state interest. [Citation.]” (People v. Buffington (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1156 .) C.

2022(Warden v. State Bar (1999) 21 Cal.4th 628, 641 [citations].) Alternatively stated, applying the strict scrutiny standard, a law “is upheld only if it is necessary to further a compelling state interest. [Citation.]” (People v. McKee (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1335 (McKee II).) Several courts have recognized that, while civil commitments in general implicate an individual’s fundamental liberty interest, not all legislative enactments involving civil commitments directly impact this liberty interest.

2018IX, § 5.) While education is not a fundamental right under the federal Constitution, our Supreme Court has held that education is a " 'fundamental interest.' " ( Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584 , 608-609, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601 , 487 P.2d 1241 ( Serrano ).) Serrano struck down a public school financing scheme as violating equal protection guaranties "because it discriminated against a fundamental interest-education-on the basis of a suspect classification-district wealth-and could not be justified by a compelling state interest under the strict scrutiny test thus applicable." ( *1146 Butt v. S

2018IX, § 5.) While education is not a fundamental right under the federal Constitution, our Supreme Court has held that education is a " 'fundamental interest.' " ( Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584 , 608-609, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601 , 487 P.2d 1241 ( Serrano ).) Serrano struck down a public school financing scheme as violating equal protection guaranties "because it discriminated against a fundamental interest-education-on the basis of a suspect classification-district wealth-and could not be justified by a compelling state interest under the strict scrutiny test thus applicable." ( *1146 Butt v. S

2008Our statement in Catholic Charities, supra, 32 Cal.4th at page 562 , that this court in the future might adopt some “as-yet unidentified rule” governing free exercise of religion claims under the state Constitution contemplated only three possible tests: (1) The strict scrutiny standard the United States Supreme Court established in Sherbert, supra, 374 U.S. 398 , and later used in Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. 205 ; (2) the high court’s subsequent test established in Smith, supra, 494 U.S. 872 , and in Lukumi, supra, 508 U.S. 520 , under which religious objectors’ challenges to valid and neutral law

2004In other cases, both before and after Sherbert , the court had upheld laws and governmental actions challenged under the free exercise clause without applying strict scrutiny. [7] Eight years before Smith, supra, 494 U.S. 872 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 , Justice Stevens wrote that most of the court's holdings were better explained not by the strict scrutiny test of Sherbert, supra, 374 U.S. 398 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 , as by "a standard that places an almost insurmountable burden on any individual who objects to a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescrib

2018(See also, Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138 , 1153, fn. 20, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492 , 969 P.2d 584 ["this court has traditionally subjected involuntary civil commitment statutes to the most rigorous form of constitutional review"]; Dunley , supra , 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1443, 1450, 1453, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 335 [NGI's, SVP's, and those involuntarily committed as a condition of parole under the Mentally Disordered Offenders Act are all similarly situated with respect to the testimonial privilege, and the strict scrutiny test applies in determining whether disparate treatment on this iss

2018(See also, Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138 , 1153, fn. 20, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492 , 969 P.2d 584 ["this court has traditionally subjected involuntary civil commitment statutes to the most rigorous form of constitutional review"]; Dunley , supra , 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1443, 1450, 1453, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 335 [NGI's, SVP's, and those involuntarily committed as a condition of parole under the Mentally Disordered Offenders Act are all similarly situated with respect to the testimonial privilege, and the strict scrutiny test applies in determining whether disparate treatment on this iss

2015(People v. Gray (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 285 ; People v. Kisling (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 544, 547-548 [declining to follow McKee II would be contrary to the California Supreme Court’s clear intent in remanding McKee I to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing]; People v. McDonald (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1378-1383 [per McKee I equal protection challenge was to be resolved on a classwide basis rather than affording each potential SVP the right to present his or her own evidence on the matter, McKee II conducted the required de novo review, applied a true strict scrutiny standard, and corre

2014(People v. McDonald, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1377- 1378.) The court further rejected the arguments that the Court of Appeal in McKee II failed to conduct the required de novo review (People v. McDonald, at pp. 1378-1379), did not apply a true strict scrutiny standard (id. at pp. 1379-1380), and incorrectly assessed the evidence (id. at pp. 1380-1382). 30. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1078-1079, 1085-1086 [First Dist.

2023In People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821 (Wilkinson), for example, the Supreme Court said of its prior decision, “[t]he language in Olivas could be interpreted to require application of the strict scrutiny standard whenever one challenges upon equal protection grounds a penal statute or statutes that authorize different sentences for comparable crimes, because such statutes always implicate the right to ‘personal liberty’ of the affected individuals.” (Wilkinson, at p. 837.) However, said the court, “Olivas properly has not been read so broadly.” (Ibid., citing People v. Davis (1979) 92 Ca

2016Nevertheless, Olivas properly has not been read so broadly.” (Id. at p. 837.) The court concluded: “We do not read Olivas as requiring the courts to subject all criminal classifications to strict scrutiny requiring the showing of a compelling state interest therefor.” (Id. at p. 838, quoting People v. Davis (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 250, 258 .) The court held that the rational basis standard applies to sentencing disparities of the type alleged here.