scrutiny test in Ohio

2007Thus in order to determine whether R.C. 2317.45 [part of the Tort Reform Act of 1987] violates the Due Process Clause of the Ohio Constitution, a strict scrutiny standard of review applies.” Id. at 423, 633 N.E.2d 504 .

2007Thus in order to determine whether R.C. 2317.45 [part of the Tort Reform Act of 1987] violates the Due Process Clause of the Ohio Constitution, a strict scrutiny standard of review applies.” Id. at 423, 633 N.E.2d 504 .

2002See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland (1961), 366 U.S. 420 , 81 S.Ct. 1101 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 [ 17 O.O.2d 151 ], for the traditional scrutiny test; see, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson (1969), 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 ; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections (1966), 383 U.S. 663 , 86 S.Ct. 1079 , 16 L.Ed.2d 169 ; Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), 381 U.S. 479 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 , 14 L.Ed.2d 510 for a discussion of `fundamental interest'; and see, e.g., Graham v. Richardson (1971), 403 U.S. 365 , 91 S.Ct. 1848 , 29 L.Ed.2d 534 ; Loving v. Virginia (1967), 388 U.S. 1 , 87 S.Ct. 1817 , 18 L.Ed.2d 10

2002See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland (1961), 366 U.S. 420 , 81 S.Ct. 1101 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 [ 17 O.O.2d 151 ], for the traditional scrutiny test; see, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson (1969), 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 ; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections (1966), 383 U.S. 663 , 86 S.Ct. 1079 , 16 L.Ed.2d 169 ; Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), 381 U.S. 479 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 , 14 L.Ed.2d 510 for a discussion of `fundamental interest'; and see, e.g., Graham v. Richardson (1971), 403 U.S. 365 , 91 S.Ct. 1848 , 29 L.Ed.2d 534 ; Loving v. Virginia (1967), 388 U.S. 1 , 87 S.Ct. 1817 , 18 L.Ed.2d 10

2002See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland (1961), 366 U.S. 420 , 81 S.Ct. 1101 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 [ 17 O.O.2d 151 ], for the traditional scrutiny test; see, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson (1969), 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 ; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections (1966), 383 U.S. 663 , 86 S.Ct. 1079 , 16 L.Ed.2d 169 ; Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), 381 U.S. 479 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 , 14 L.Ed.2d 510 for a discussion of `fundamental interest'; and see, e.g., Graham v. Richardson (1971), 403 U.S. 365 , 91 S.Ct. 1848 , 29 L.Ed.2d 534 ; Loving v. Virginia (1967), 388 U.S. 1 , 87 S.Ct. 1817 , 18 L.Ed.2d 10

2002See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland (1961), 366 U.S. 420 , 81 S.Ct. 1101 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 [ 17 O.O.2d 151 ], for the traditional scrutiny test; see, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson (1969), 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 ; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections (1966), 383 U.S. 663 , 86 S.Ct. 1079 , 16 L.Ed.2d 169 ; Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), 381 U.S. 479 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 , 14 L.Ed.2d 510 for a discussion of `fundamental interest'; and see, e.g., Graham v. Richardson (1971), 403 U.S. 365 , 91 S.Ct. 1848 , 29 L.Ed.2d 534 ; Loving v. Virginia (1967), 388 U.S. 1 , 87 S.Ct. 1817 , 18 L.Ed.2d 10

2002See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland (1961), 366 U.S. 420 , 81 S.Ct. 1101 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 [ 17 O.O.2d 151 ], for the traditional scrutiny test; see, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson (1969), 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 ; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections (1966), 383 U.S. 663 , 86 S.Ct. 1079 , 16 L.Ed.2d 169 ; Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), 381 U.S. 479 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 , 14 L.Ed.2d 510 for a discussion of `fundamental interest'; and see, e.g., Graham v. Richardson (1971), 403 U.S. 365 , 91 S.Ct. 1848 , 29 L.Ed.2d 534 ; Loving v. Virginia (1967), 388 U.S. 1 , 87 S.Ct. 1817 , 18 L.Ed.2d 10

2002See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland (1961), 366 U.S. 420 , 81 S.Ct. 1101 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 [ 17 O.O.2d 151 ], for the traditional scrutiny test; see, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson (1969), 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 ; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections (1966), 383 U.S. 663 , 86 S.Ct. 1079 , 16 L.Ed.2d 169 ; Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), 381 U.S. 479 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 , 14 L.Ed.2d 510 for a discussion of `fundamental interest'; and see, e.g., Graham v. Richardson (1971), 403 U.S. 365 , 91 S.Ct. 1848 , 29 L.Ed.2d 534 ; Loving v. Virginia (1967), 388 U.S. 1 , 87 S.Ct. 1817 , 18 L.Ed.2d 10

2002See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland (1961), 366 U.S. 420 , 81 S.Ct. 1101 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 [ 17 O.O.2d 151 ], for the traditional scrutiny test; see, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson (1969), 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 ; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections (1966), 383 U.S. 663 , 86 S.Ct. 1079 , 16 L.Ed.2d 169 ; Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), 381 U.S. 479 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 , 14 L.Ed.2d 510 for a discussion of `fundamental interest'; and see, e.g., Graham v. Richardson (1971), 403 U.S. 365 , 91 S.Ct. 1848 , 29 L.Ed.2d 534 ; Loving v. Virginia (1967), 388 U.S. 1 , 87 S.Ct. 1817 , 18 L.Ed.2d 10

2002See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland (1961), 366 U.S. 420 , 81 S.Ct. 1101 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 [ 17 O.O.2d 151 ], for the traditional scrutiny test; see, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson (1969), 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 ; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections (1966), 383 U.S. 663 , 86 S.Ct. 1079 , 16 L.Ed.2d 169 ; Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), 381 U.S. 479 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 , 14 L.Ed.2d 510 for a discussion of `fundamental interest'; and see, e.g., Graham v. Richardson (1971), 403 U.S. 365 , 91 S.Ct. 1848 , 29 L.Ed.2d 534 ; Loving v. Virginia (1967), 388 U.S. 1 , 87 S.Ct. 1817 , 18 L.Ed.2d 10

2006The Trial Court erred in failing to apply the strict scrutiny analysis as mandated under the United States and Ohio Constitutions in contravention of Troxel v. Granville (2000), 530 U.S. 57 , 65-66 ; Harrold v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44 , 50 , 2005-Ohio-5334 , ¶ 39-40 (Mandating Strict Scrutiny analysis when the challenged legislation impinges upon the fundamental constitutional right "of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children." Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66 ); Clark v. Jeter (1988), 486 U.S. 456 , 461 ; Sorrell v. Thevenir (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 415 , 4

2006The Trial Court erred in failing to apply the strict scrutiny analysis as mandated under the United States and Ohio Constitutions in contravention of Troxel v. Granville (2000), 530 U.S. 57 , 65-66 ; Harrold v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44 , 50 , 2005-Ohio-5334 , ¶ 39-40 (Mandating Strict Scrutiny analysis when the challenged legislation impinges upon the fundamental constitutional right "of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children." Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66 ); Clark v. Jeter (1988), 486 U.S. 456 , 461 ; Sorrell v. Thevenir (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 415 , 4

2020“In meeting the strict scrutiny test for a content-based law, the government is required to show that the regulation is 7 necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest by the least restrictive means.” Harrison Hills, supra, at ¶17, citing Perry, supra, at 45 and Playboy, supra, at 813 ; accord Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-462 (1980) (citations omitted) (“When government regulation discriminates among speech-related activities in a public forum, the Equal Protection Clause mandates that the legislation be finely tailored to serve substanti

2016United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 , 120 S.Ct. 1878 , 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000); Perry Ed. Assn., 460 U.S. at 45 .

2020“In meeting the strict scrutiny test for a content-based law, the government is required to show that the regulation is 7 necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest by the least restrictive means.” Harrison Hills, supra, at ¶17, citing Perry, supra, at 45 and Playboy, supra, at 813 ; accord Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-462 (1980) (citations omitted) (“When government regulation discriminates among speech-related activities in a public forum, the Equal Protection Clause mandates that the legislation be finely tailored to serve substanti

2016United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 , 120 S.Ct. 1878 , 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000); Perry Ed. Assn., 460 U.S. at 45 .

2002Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers (1959), 358 U.S. 522 , 530 , 79 S.Ct. 437 , 442 , 3 L.Ed.2d 480 [ 1 O.O.2d 342 ]." Bd. of Edn. v. Walter (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 368 , 373-376 , 390 N.E.2d 813 [ 12 O.O.3d 327 ], certiorari denied (1980), 444 U.S. 1015 , 100 S.Ct. 665 , 62 L.Ed.2d 644 .

1985Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers (1959), 358 U.S. 522, 530 .” Bd. of Edn. v. Walter (1979), 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 373-376 [ 12 O.O.3d 327 ], certiorari denied (1980), 444 U.S. 1015 .

2006The Trial Court erred in failing to apply the strict scrutiny analysis as mandated under the United States and Ohio Constitutions in contravention of Troxel v. Granville (2000), 530 U.S. 57 , 65-66 ; Harrold v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44 , 50 , 2005-Ohio-5334 , ¶ 39-40 (Mandating Strict Scrutiny analysis when the challenged legislation impinges upon the fundamental constitutional right "of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children." Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66 ); Clark v. Jeter (1988), 486 U.S. 456 , 461 ; Sorrell v. Thevenir (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 415 , 4

2005The Trial Court erred in failing to apply the strict scrutiny analysis as mandated under the United States and Ohio Constitutions in contravention of Troxel v. Granville (2000), 530 U.S. 57 , 65-66 ; Clark v. Jeter (1988), 486 U.S. 456 , 461 ; Sorrell v. Thevenir (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 415 , 423 , * * * and further in violation of Appellant's fundamental rights pursuant to the First and Ninth Amendments of the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution, Article I , Sections One, Three, and Twenty and the Due Process and Equal Protection provisions of the United States and Ohio Constit

2005Nevertheless, in Matthews , this court stated, “The test generally applied is whether the motion for reconsideration calls to the attention of the court an obvious error in its decision or raises an issue for our consideration that was either not considered at all or was not fully considered by us when it should have been.” Id. at 143 , 5 OBR 320, 450 N.E.2d 278 . {¶ 3} In his application, defendant contends that we erred because we failed “to distinguish the sort of rights ‘deeply rooted in our history,’ such as the expectation of a reasonable degree of privacy, that give rise to cognizable d

2003"Recognized fundamental rights include the right to vote, the right of interstate travel, rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, the right to procreate, and other rights of a uniquely personal nature." State v. Williams (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 513 , 530 . {¶ 16} Although Appellant is correct in his assertion that a fundamental right is involved (the right to procreate), we nevertheless reject Appellant's contention that this Court should apply a strict scrutiny analysis to determine the constitutionality of the condition imposed upon him based upon this Court

2003I, § 16 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: {¶ 9} "All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay." {¶ 10} We find it unnecessary to determine whether the strict scrutiny test applies in this case, because we conclude that the application of the sexual offender classification provision in this case does not satisfy the looser, rational basis test. {¶ 11} In a case in which the Ohio Supreme Court found that strict scrutiny did no

2003Article I, § 16 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: {¶ 10} "All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay." {¶ 11} We find it unnecessary to determine whether the strict scrutiny test applies in this case, because we conclude that the application of the sexual offender classification provision in this case does not satisfy the looser, rational basis test. {¶ 12} In a case in which the Ohio Supreme Court found that strict scruti

2003The court went on to opine that "Federal due process is satisfied if there is a rational relationship between a statute and its purpose." Id., citing Martinez v. California (1980), 444 U.S. 277 , 283 , 100 S.Ct. 553 , 558 , 62 L.Ed.2d 481 , 488 . {¶ 13} Pursuant to R.C. 2950.01 , et seq., Ohio's version of "Megan's Law," persons who commit certain offenses are subject to classification as a sexual predator, an habitual sex offender, or a sexually oriented offender.

2003The court went on to opine that "Federal due process is satisfied if there is a rational relationship between a statute and its purpose." Id., citing Martinez v. California (1980), 444 U.S. 277 , 283 , 100 S.Ct. 553 , 558 , 62 L.Ed.2d 481 , 488 . {¶ 13} Pursuant to R.C. 2950.01 , et seq., Ohio's version of "Megan's Law," persons who commit certain offenses are subject to classification as a sexual predator, an habitual sex offender, or a sexually oriented offender.

1999Metro Broadcasting at 565-566, 110 S.Ct. at 3009 , 111 L.Ed.2d at 463-464 .

1999Metro Broadcasting at 565-566, 110 S.Ct. at 3009 , 111 L.Ed.2d at 463-464 .

1999That determination, coupled with Justice Scalia’s concurring view that strict scrutiny applies “to all governmental classification by race, whether or not its asserted purpose is ‘remedial’ or ‘benign,’ ” id. at 520 , 109 S.Ct. at 735-736 , 102 L.Ed.2d at 899 , constituted a majority in support of the strict scrutiny standard.

1999That determination, coupled with Justice Scalia’s concurring view that strict scrutiny applies “to all governmental classification by race, whether or not its asserted purpose is ‘remedial’ or ‘benign,’ ” id. at 520 , 109 S.Ct. at 735-736 , 102 L.Ed.2d at 899 , constituted a majority in support of the strict scrutiny standard.

1999In Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (1990), 494 U.S. 872 , the Supreme Court rejected this strict scrutiny standard as a way of adjudicating religiously motivated challenges to neutral, generally applicable laws.

1996Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (1990), 494 U.S. 872 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 , 108 L.Ed.2d 876 , a majority of the Supreme Court, similar to the plurality opinion in Bowen v. Roy, rejected the strict scrutiny standard as a way of adjudicating religiously motivated challenges to neutral, generally applicable laws.

1999Id.

1999Id.

1992Bd. of Elections (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 166 , 545 N.E.2d 1256 , we upheld a two-year durational residency requirement for city council candidates, holding that the effects on the rights of travel and association were so minimal that they did not invoke the strict scrutiny test under the Fourteenth Amendment and required only a rational basis.

1992Bd. of Elections (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 166 , 545 N.E.2d 1256 , we upheld a two-year durational residency requirement for city council candidates, holding that the effects on the rights of travel and association were so minimal that they did not invoke the strict scrutiny test under the Fourteenth Amendment and required only a rational basis.

2023City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). {¶73} Evans presented no evidence that she is a member of a suspect class warranting a strict scrutiny analysis.

2023City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). {¶73} Evans presented no evidence that she is a member of a suspect class warranting a strict scrutiny analysis.