scrutiny test in Pennsylvania

2023See Nixon v. Commonwealth, 839 A.2d 277, 287 (Pa. 2003) (“Where laws infringe upon certain rights considered fundamental, . . . courts apply a strict scrutiny test.”). - 11 - J-A19022-23 i.e., providing an opportunity to voluntary relinquish parental rights or amending the child’s birth certificate.

2022Where laws infringe upon fundamental rights, courts apply a strict scrutiny test wherein “a law may only be deemed constitutional if it is narrowly tailored to a 9 compelling state interest.” Id.

2024That test is an onerous one, and demands that the government show that the restrictions are “(1) narrowly tailored to serve (2) a compelling state interest.” Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 , 775, 122 S.Ct. 2528 , 153 L.Ed.2d 694 (2002).

2024That test is an onerous one, and demands that the government show that the restrictions are “(1) narrowly tailored to serve (2) a compelling state interest.” Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 , 775, 122 S.Ct. 2528 , 153 L.Ed.2d 694 (2002).

2018Steinfurth v. LaManna, 590 A.2d 1286, 1288 (Pa. Super. 1991); see also Rohm and Haas Co. v. Lin, 992 A.2d 132, 141-42 (Pa. Super. 2010) (holding appellate review stringent where a default judgment is entered as a discovery sanction).

2016Steinfurth v. LaManna, 590 A.2d 1286 (Pa.Super. 1991); see also Rohm and Haas Co. v. Lin, 992 A.2d 132 (Pa.Super. 2010) (holding appellate review stringent where a default judgment is entered as a discovery sanction). ____________________________________________ 1 Since Mr. Legrande’s issues consist of arguments in support of his larger position that the court’s dismissal of the action with prejudice for a discovery violation was improper, we will consider them together. -3- J-A22003-15 As this Court recognized in Stewart v. Rossi, 681 A.2d 214, 217 (Pa.Super. 1996), "since dismissal is the mo

2010See In re S.A., 925 A.2d 838, 846 (Pa.Super.2007); In re K.A.P., 916 A.2d 1152, 1161 (Pa.Super.2007).

2010See In re S.A., 925 A.2d 838, 846 (Pa.Super.2007); In re K.A.P., 916 A.2d 1152, 1161 (Pa.Super.2007).

2010See In re S.A., 925 A.2d 838, 846 (Pa.Super.2007); In re K.A.P., 916 A.2d 1152, 1161 (Pa.Super.2007).

2010See In re S.A., 925 A.2d 838, 846 (Pa.Super.2007); In re K.A.P., 916 A.2d 1152, 1161 (Pa.Super.2007).

2010Commonwealth v. MacPherson, 752 A.2d 384, 388 (Pa.2000) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 1Í11 We begin with Appellant’s equal protection challenge, in which he claims that Act 21 implicates a “fundamental right of liberty,” and therefore, is subject to a strict scrutiny analysis.

2010Commonwealth v. MacPherson, 752 A.2d 384, 388 (Pa.2000) (citations and quotation marks omitted). ¶ 11 We begin with Appellant's equal protection challenge, in which he claims that Act 21 implicates a "fundamental right of liberty," and therefore, is subject to a strict scrutiny analysis.

2006See Khan v. State Bd. of Auctioneer Examiners, 577 Pa. 166 , 842 A.2d 936, 947 (2004); Nixon v. Commonwealth, 576 Pa. 385 , 839 A.2d 277, 281 (2003).

2006See Khan v. State Bd. of Auctioneer Examiners, 577 Pa. 166 , 842 A.2d 936, 947 (2004); Nixon v. Commonwealth, 576 Pa. 385 , 839 A.2d 277, 281 (2003).

2025Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 , 135 S.Ct. 2218 , 192 L.Ed.2d 236 (2015).

2025Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 , 135 S.Ct. 2218 , 192 L.Ed.2d 236 (2015).

2006To the extent this case can be seen as more analogous to the secondary effects cases than to Arcara, see City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440 , 122 S.Ct. 1728 , 152 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002); City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 299 , 120 S.Ct. 1382 , 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 50 , 106 S.Ct. 925 , 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986); we would agree with the Commonwealth Court that the intermediate scrutiny test set forth in O'Brien would be met here. [13] While we have concluded that Pap's II does not compel the application of the strict scrutin

2006To the extent this case can be seen as more analogous to the secondary effects cases than to Arcara, see City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440 , 122 S.Ct. 1728 , 152 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002); City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 299 , 120 S.Ct. 1382 , 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 50 , 106 S.Ct. 925 , 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986); we would agree with the Commonwealth Court that the intermediate scrutiny test set forth in O'Brien would be met here. [13] While we have concluded that Pap's II does not compel the application of the strict scrutin

1974The Federal Constitution does not give this Court the power to overturn the State's choice under the guise of constitutional interpretation because the Justices of this Court believe that they can provide better rules." 401 U.S. at 537 , 91 S.Ct. at 1020, 28 L.Ed.2d at 293 . [7] In Rodriguez, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States noted that, as delineated in prior decisions of that Court, the strict scrutiny test converts the usual presumption of constitutionality which state legislation generally enjoys to one of invalidity; places the "heavy burden of justification" upon the state ra

1974The Federal Constitution does not give this Court the power to overturn the State's choice under the guise of constitutional interpretation because the Justices of this Court believe that they can provide better rules." 401 U.S. at 537 , 91 S.Ct. at 1020, 28 L.Ed.2d at 293 . [7] In Rodriguez, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States noted that, as delineated in prior decisions of that Court, the strict scrutiny test converts the usual presumption of constitutionality which state legislation generally enjoys to one of invalidity; places the "heavy burden of justification" upon the state ra

2019Because Section 5325 infringes upon a fundamental right, “to survive a due process or equal protection challenge, Section 5325 must satisfy the constitutional standard known as strict scrutiny.” Id.; see also Hiller, supra at 885 (holding that we must apply a strict scrutiny analysis when the state infringes upon the fundamental rights of parents to direct the care, custody, and control of their children). ____________________________________________ 3 The Pennsylvania Constitution, Article 1, Section 1 provides: “All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and ind

2014Id.

2018Steinfurth v. LaManna, 590 A.2d 1286, 1288 (Pa. Super. 1991); see also Rohm and Haas Co. v. Lin, 992 A.2d 132, 141-42 (Pa. Super. 2010) (holding appellate review stringent where a default judgment is entered as a discovery sanction).

2016Steinfurth v. LaManna, 590 A.2d 1286 (Pa.Super. 1991); see also Rohm and Haas Co. v. Lin, 992 A.2d 132 (Pa.Super. 2010) (holding appellate review stringent where a default judgment is entered as a discovery sanction). ____________________________________________ 1 Since Mr. Legrande’s issues consist of arguments in support of his larger position that the court’s dismissal of the action with prejudice for a discovery violation was improper, we will consider them together. -3- J-A22003-15 As this Court recognized in Stewart v. Rossi, 681 A.2d 214, 217 (Pa.Super. 1996), "since dismissal is the mo

2014Jae, 946 A.2d at 808-09 (citation omitted).

2011Id. at 808-809 .

2006It thus applied the strict scrutiny test, which it also denominated the “least intrusive means analysis”, id., and found that the ordinance did not pass constitutional muster.

2006It thus applied the strict scrutiny test, which it also denominated the "least intrusive means analysis", id., and found that the ordinance did not pass constitutional muster.

2026See Stretton, 944 F.2d at 138, 141 (applying strict scrutiny to a provision of Pennsylvania’s Code prohibiting “candidates for a judicial office in an (continued…) [J-58-2025] - 23 The problem for Judge Cohen, however, is that he was not a candidate for any office at the time he made his Facebook posts.

2026The Court formally adopted the strict scrutiny test twelve years later, in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 444 (2015) (“[W]e hold today what we assumed in White: A State may restrict the speech of a judicial candidate only if the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.”). 18 A decade earlier, the Third Circuit applied strict scrutiny to a materially identical announce clause.

2025The Superior Court did not address Dr. Gross’ constitutional claims, deciding instead that the case could “be resolved without reaching the constitutional question.”13 The panel ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dr. Gross’ continuance request because that request was made just one week before trial was scheduled to begin.14 The intermediate court began its analysis with Rule 216(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which states: No application for a continuance shall be granted if based on a cause existing and known at the time of publication or prior call of th

2025“Content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional and are subject to the strict scrutiny standard, which requires the government to prove that the restrictions are narrowly tailored to serve a -3- J-S16001-25 compelling state interest.” Rogowski v. Kirven, 291 A.3d 50, 61 (Pa.Super. 2023) (cleaned up).

2024See Lambert, supra. We agree with the trial court’s analysis that the restriction satisfied the intermediate scrutiny test as set forth in O’Brien.

2024See Lambert, supra. We agree with the trial court’s analysis that the restriction satisfied the intermediate scrutiny test as set forth in O’Brien.