13 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Crafton v. Gibsongreen2 sentences2016Crafton v. Gibson, 752 N.E.2d 78, 91 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). 2001Crafton v. Gibson, 752 N.E.2d 78, 91 (Ind.Ct.App., 2001). | 2 | 2 |
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regentsgreen1 sentence2020However, the United States Supreme Court has rejected age as a suspect class, stating that “[o]ld age . . . does not define a discrete and insular minority because all persons, if they live out their normal life spans, will experience it.” Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Leegreen1 sentence2017Rev. 1407 , 1413-15 (1992) (specifically identifying United States v. Lee as one such decision); see also United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 262 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (concluding that the government’s 5 In the seventeen cases between 1963 and 1990 in which the United States Supreme Court considered religious exemptions under the strict scrutiny test, in thirteen the Court sided with the government. | 1 | 1 |
Sobieralski v. City of South Bendgreen1 sentence1987City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-42 , 105 S.Ct. at 3254-55 , 87 L.Ed.2d at 320-21 ; Deibler , at 333; Sobieralski , at 100. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith
red
2 sentences1998In 1990, however, the strict scrutiny test requiring a compelling interest and least restrictive means was abandoned by the court in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 , 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). 1998In 1990, however, the strict scrutiny test requiring a compelling interest and least restrictive means was abandoned by the court in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 , 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). | 2 | 1998–1998 |
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.
green
2 sentences1987City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-42 , 105 S.Ct. at 38254-55 , 87 L.Ed.2d at 320-21 ; Deibler, at 333; Sobieralski, at 100. 1987City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-42 , 105 S.Ct. at 38254-55 , 87 L.Ed.2d at 320-21 ; Deibler, at 333; Sobieralski, at 100. | 2 | 1987–1987 |
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission
green
2 sentences2013Id. 2013Id. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Pro-Choice Mississippi v. Fordice
green
1 sentence2005Fordice, 716 So.2d at 655 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Planned Parenthood of Middle Tennessee v. Sundquist
red
2 sentences2005Applying the strict scrutiny test, the Tennessee court found that the State had failed to carry its burden of showing that Tennessee's two-day waiting period requirement was "narrowly tailored to further its compelling interest in maternal health." Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d at 24 . 2005Applying the strict scrutiny test, the Tennessee court found that the State had failed to carry its burden of showing that Tennessee's two-day waiting period requirement was "narrowly tailored to further its compelling interest in maternal health." Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d at 24 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Brown v. State
green
2 sentences1996In Brown v. State, 262 Ind. 629 , 322 N.E.2d 708 (1975), the supreme court held that a statute authorizing credit for presentence confinement affected the fundamental right to be at liberty by denying retroactive application. 1996In Brown v. State, 262 Ind. 629 , 322 N.E.2d 708 (1975), the supreme court held that a statute authorizing credit for presentence confinement affected the fundamental right to be at liberty by denying retroactive application. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
In Re Marriage of Murray
green
2 sentences1991In re Marriage of Murray (1984), Ind. App., 460 N.E.2d 1023 . 1991In re Marriage of Murray (1984), Ind.App., 460 N.E.2d 1023 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Bolling v. Sharpe
green
1 sentence1978Inasmuch as non-resident students have not yet been characterized as a suspect class as in the case of classifications based on race or national origin, Brown v. Board of Education (1954), 347 U.S. 483 ; Bolling v. Sharpe (1954), 347 U.S. 497 ; or alienage, Graham v. Richardson (1971), *262 403 U.S. 365 , we need not apply a strict scrutiny test to the classification in question, but need merely determine if the classification relates to a proper governmental purpose and is reasonably drawn. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Brown v. Board of Education
green
1 sentence1978Inasmuch as non-resident students have not yet been characterized as a suspect class as in the case of classifications based on race or national origin, Brown v. Board of Education (1954), 347 U.S. 483 ; Bolling v. Sharpe (1954), 347 U.S. 497 ; or alienage, Graham v. Richardson (1971), *262 403 U.S. 365 , we need not apply a strict scrutiny test to the classification in question, but need merely determine if the classification relates to a proper governmental purpose and is reasonably drawn. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Graham v. Richardson
green
1 sentence1978Inasmuch as non-resident students have not yet been characterized as a suspect class as in the case of classifications based on race or national origin, Brown v. Board of Education (1954), 347 U.S. 483 ; Bolling v. Sharpe (1954), 347 U.S. 497 ; or alienage, Graham v. Richardson (1971), *262 403 U.S. 365 , we need not apply a strict scrutiny test to the classification in question, but need merely determine if the classification relates to a proper governmental purpose and is reasonably drawn. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.