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13 South Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1978–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dandridge v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1989A rule does not fail the minimal scrutiny test simply because it is “not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.” United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 , 101 S.Ct. 453, 459 , 66 L.Ed.2d 368, 376 (1980) (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 , 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161 , 25 L.Ed.2d 491, 501-02 (1970)). 1989A rule does not fail the minimal scrutiny test simply because it is “not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.” United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 , 101 S.Ct. 453, 459 , 66 L.Ed.2d 368, 376 (1980) (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 , 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161 , 25 L.Ed.2d 491, 501-02 (1970)). | 2 | 2 |
United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritzgreen2 sentences1989A rule does not fail the minimal scrutiny test simply because it is “not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.” United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 , 101 S.Ct. 453, 459 , 66 L.Ed.2d 368, 376 (1980) (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 , 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161 , 25 L.Ed.2d 491, 501-02 (1970)). 1989A rule does not fail the minimal scrutiny test simply because it is “not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.” United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 , 101 S.Ct. 453, 459 , 66 L.Ed.2d 368, 376 (1980) (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 , 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161 , 25 L.Ed.2d 491, 501-02 (1970)). | 2 | 2 |
Miller v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2000VI, § 2), the 1996 amendment was corrective and, therefore, constitutional. [¶ 23.] The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” The purpose is to promote “racial neutrality' in governmental decisionmak-ing.” Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 , 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2482 , 132 L.Ed.2d 762, 771 (1995) (citations omitted). ' Thus, any legislation which makes distinctions on the basis of -race or ethnicity is inherently suspect and, thus, subject to a strict scrutiny analysis. ’ Id. 2000VI, § 2), the 1996 amendment was corrective and, therefore, constitutional. [¶ 23.] The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” The purpose is to promote “racial neutrality' in governmental decisionmak-ing.” Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 , 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2482 , 132 L.Ed.2d 762, 771 (1995) (citations omitted). ' Thus, any legislation which makes distinctions on the basis of -race or ethnicity is inherently suspect and, thus, subject to a strict scrutiny analysis. ’ Id. | 1 | 2 |
In RE MARRIAGE OF ARNOLD v. Arnoldgreen1 sentence2024Rather, in Washington, courts attempt to discern the best interests of the child.”); Marriage of Arnold v. Arnold, 679 N.W.2d 296, 299 (Wis. 2004) (distinguishing Troxel and rejecting a parent’s substantive due process argument raised against the other parent); McDermott v. Dougherty, 869 A.2d 751, 771, 808 (Md. 2005) (explaining that “[t]he best interests of the child standard is, axiomatically, of a different nature than a parent’s fundamental constitutional right[,]” and that “the most important application of the [best interests] standard[] is in disputes between fit natural parents [who s | 1 | 1 |
In Re Parentage of LBgreen1 sentence2024Ct. App. 2011) (noting that “numerous courts . . . have found Troxel does not apply to custody disputes between natural parents”); Enrique M. v. Angelina V., 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 883, 889 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 2009) (holding that “Troxel . . . does not compel courts to apply a substantive due process analysis in resolving custody or custody -12- #30644 related disputes between parents”); In re R.A., 891 A.2d 564, 576 (N.H. 2005) (noting that “strict scrutiny need not be applied [when] balancing the rights of two fit parents, both of whom have the same constitutional right to custody of their children | 1 | 1 |
In re R.A.green1 sentence2024Ct. App. 2011) (noting that “numerous courts . . . have found Troxel does not apply to custody disputes between natural parents”); Enrique M. v. Angelina V., 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 883, 889 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 2009) (holding that “Troxel . . . does not compel courts to apply a substantive due process analysis in resolving custody or custody -12- #30644 related disputes between parents”); In re R.A., 891 A.2d 564, 576 (N.H. 2005) (noting that “strict scrutiny need not be applied [when] balancing the rights of two fit parents, both of whom have the same constitutional right to custody of their children | 1 | 1 |
McDermott v. Doughertygreen1 sentence2024Rather, in Washington, courts attempt to discern the best interests of the child.”); Marriage of Arnold v. Arnold, 679 N.W.2d 296, 299 (Wis. 2004) (distinguishing Troxel and rejecting a parent’s substantive due process argument raised against the other parent); McDermott v. Dougherty, 869 A.2d 751, 771, 808 (Md. 2005) (explaining that “[t]he best interests of the child standard is, axiomatically, of a different nature than a parent’s fundamental constitutional right[,]” and that “the most important application of the [best interests] standard[] is in disputes between fit natural parents [who s | 1 | 1 |
Enrique M. v. Angelina V.green1 sentence2024Ct. App. 2011) (noting that “numerous courts . . . have found Troxel does not apply to custody disputes between natural parents”); Enrique M. v. Angelina V., 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 883, 889 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 2009) (holding that “Troxel . . . does not compel courts to apply a substantive due process analysis in resolving custody or custody -12- #30644 related disputes between parents”); In re R.A., 891 A.2d 564, 576 (N.H. 2005) (noting that “strict scrutiny need not be applied [when] balancing the rights of two fit parents, both of whom have the same constitutional right to custody of their children | 1 | 1 |
Behrns v. Burkegreen1 sentence1978See, Behrns v. Burke, 1975, S.D., 229 N.W.2d 86, 88, n. 7 . [1] I agree with the majority that this is not a "fundamental interest" or a "suspect classification" based upon race, religion, national origin or sex which requires a strict scrutiny test; but is to be considered by the rational-relation test. [2] Except, of course, in situations such as City of Aberdeen v. Meidinger, 1975, S.D., 233 N.W.2d 331 , where the court can find no legitimate legislative purposes. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Budahl v. Gordon & David Associates
green
2 sentences2002Budahl v. Gordon and David Associates, 287 N.W.2d 489 (S.D.1980). 2002Budahl v. Gordon and David Associates, 287 N.W.2d 489 (S.D.1980). | 2 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Baker
green
2 sentences1999Baker, 440 N.W.2d at 289 . 1999Baker, 440 NW2d at 289 . | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Matter of Estate of Gab
green
2 sentences2003Id. at 926 . [¶ 10.] Merry would have us hold that any postnuptial agreement entered into by Marcella and Ray would not have survived *923 application of the strict scrutiny standard. 2003Id. at 926 . [¶ 10.] Merry would have us hold that any postnuptial agreement entered into by Marcella and Ray would not have survived *923 application of the strict scrutiny standard. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Cohen v. California
green
2 sentences2003Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22-26 , 91 S.Ct. 1780, 1786-89 , 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971); see RAV v. City of St. 2003Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22-26 , 91 S.Ct. 1780, 1786-89 , 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971); see RAV v. City of St. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Riggins v. Nevada
green
2 sentences2000Riggins, 504 U.S. at 136 , 112 S.Ct. at 1815 , 118 L.Ed.2d at 490 . 2000Riggins, 504 U.S. at 136 , 112 S.Ct. at 1815 , 118 L.Ed.2d at 490 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
City of Aberdeen v. Meidinger
green
2 sentences1978Except, of course, in situations such as City of Aberdeen v. Meidinger, 1975, S.D., 233 N.W.2d 331 , where the court can find no legitimate legislative purposes. 1978See, Behrns v. Burke, 1975, S.D., 229 N.W.2d 86, 88, n. 7 . [1] I agree with the majority that this is not a "fundamental interest" or a "suspect classification" based upon race, religion, national origin or sex which requires a strict scrutiny test; but is to be considered by the rational-relation test. [2] Except, of course, in situations such as City of Aberdeen v. Meidinger, 1975, S.D., 233 N.W.2d 331 , where the court can find no legitimate legislative purposes. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.