scrutiny test in Georgia

2024GACE argues that because the Assessment is content-based, it is subject to a strict scrutiny test, “which requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to 17 achieve that interest.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 , 171 ( 135 SCt 2218 , 192 LE2d 236) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2024GACE argues that because the Assessment is content-based, it is subject to a strict scrutiny test, “which requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to 17 achieve that interest.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 , 171 ( 135 SCt 2218 , 192 LE2d 236) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2012Under the strict scrutiny test, a statute that infringes on a person’s fundamental constitutional rights is “deemed unconstitutional unless the State can demonstrate it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest.” (Citation omitted.) Final Exit Network v. State of Ga., 290 Ga. 508, 509 (2) ( 722 SE2d 722 ) (2012) (addressing the constitutionality of a content-based statute restricting speech).

2012Under the strict scrutiny test, a statute that infringes on a person’s fundamental constitutional rights is “deemed unconstitutional unless the State can demonstrate it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest.” (Citation omitted.) Final Exit Network v. State of Ga., 290 Ga. 508, 509 (2) ( 722 SE2d 722 ) (2012) (addressing the constitutionality of a content-based statute restricting speech).

2012“Unless governmental action infringes upon a fundamental right or the complaining party is a member of a suspect class, [however,] a substantive due process or equal protection challenge is examined under the ‘rational basis’ test.” (Citation omitted.) Favorito v. Handel, 285 Ga. 795, 796 (1) ( 684 SE2d 257 ) (2009) (holding that, even though the right to vote is a fundamental constitutional right, some laws establishing the manner of voting are subject to review under the rational basis test).

2012“Unless governmental action infringes upon a fundamental right or the complaining party is a member of a suspect class, [however,] a substantive due process or equal protection challenge is examined under the ‘rational basis’ test.” (Citation omitted.) Favorito v. Handel, 285 Ga. 795, 796 (1) ( 684 SE2d 257 ) (2009) (holding that, even though the right to vote is a fundamental constitutional right, some laws establishing the manner of voting are subject to review under the rational basis test).

2025See Elliott, 305 Ga. at 188 (II) (C).

2025See Elliott, 305 Ga. at 188 (II) (C).

2011See Advance Technology Consultants v. RoadTrac, LLC, 250 Ga. App. 317, 319-320 (1) ( 551 SE2d 735 ) (2001) (one-sided nature of contract demonstrated unequal bargaining power); Herndon v. Waller, 241 Ga. App. 494, 495 ( 525 SE2d 159 ) (1999) (citing no evidence of consideration for covenant as distinction justifying application of strict scrutiny).

2011See Advance Technology Consultants v. RoadTrac, LLC, 250 Ga. App. 317, 319-320 (1) ( 551 SE2d 735 ) (2001) (one-sided nature of contract demonstrated unequal bargaining power); Herndon v. Waller, 241 Ga. App. 494, 495 ( 525 SE2d 159 ) (1999) (citing no evidence of consideration for covenant as distinction justifying application of strict scrutiny).

2011See Advance Technology Consultants v. RoadTrac, LLC, 250 Ga. App. 317, 319-320 (1) ( 551 SE2d 735 ) (2001) (one-sided nature of contract demonstrated unequal bargaining power); Herndon v. Waller, 241 Ga. App. 494, 495 ( 525 SE2d 159 ) (1999) (citing no evidence of consideration for covenant as distinction justifying application of strict scrutiny).

2011See Advance Technology Consultants v. RoadTrac, LLC, 250 Ga. App. 317, 319-320 (1) ( 551 SE2d 735 ) (2001) (one-sided nature of contract demonstrated unequal bargaining power); Herndon v. Waller, 241 Ga. App. 494, 495 ( 525 SE2d 159 ) (1999) (citing no evidence of consideration for covenant as distinction justifying application of strict scrutiny).

2007See Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F3d 732 (4th Cir. 1999) (discussing the different analysis that should be applied to legislative enactments and executive acts challenged as violating substantive due process rights).

2004(Cit.)' Atlanta Dwellings v. Wright, 272 Ga. 231, 233 ( 527 SE2d 854 ) (2000).” Byelick v. Michel Herbelin USA, 275 Ga. 505, 506 (1) ( 570 SE2d 307 ) (2002).

2004(Cit.)' Atlanta Dwellings v. Wright, 272 Ga. 231, 233 ( 527 SE2d 854 ) (2000).” Byelick v. Michel Herbelin USA, 275 Ga. 505, 506 (1) ( 570 SE2d 307 ) (2002).

2004(Cit.)' Atlanta Dwellings v. Wright, 272 Ga. 231, 233 ( 527 SE2d 854 ) (2000).” Byelick v. Michel Herbelin USA, 275 Ga. 505, 506 (1) ( 570 SE2d 307 ) (2002).

2004(Cit.)' Atlanta Dwellings v. Wright, 272 Ga. 231, 233 ( 527 SE2d 854 ) (2000).” Byelick v. Michel Herbelin USA, 275 Ga. 505, 506 (1) ( 570 SE2d 307 ) (2002).

2004In the sole enumeration of error, defendants contend that the trial court erred in granting the interlocutory injunction because the trial court should have used the strict scrutiny standard to evaluate Dr. Martinez’s noncompete clause in what they contend was an employment contract, the geographical territory in Dr. Martinez’s noncompete clause is unreasonably broad and unenforceable regardless of the level of scrutiny, and a tolling provision in Dr. Martinez’s Medical Director Agreement for the East Macon facility is unreasonable under the strict scrutiny standard. 2 Atrial court may grant a

2004In the sole enumeration of error, defendants contend that the trial court erred in granting the interlocutory injunction because the trial court should have used the strict scrutiny standard to evaluate Dr. Martinez’s noncompete clause in what they contend was an employment contract, the geographical territory in Dr. Martinez’s noncompete clause is unreasonably broad and unenforceable regardless of the level of scrutiny, and a tolling provision in Dr. Martinez’s Medical Director Agreement for the East Macon facility is unreasonable under the strict scrutiny standard. 2 Atrial court may grant a

1981Application of the strict scrutiny test means that the classification is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity and that the State bears the burden of proving that the classification system ‘has been structured with “precision” and is “tailored” narrowly to serve legitimate objectives and that it has selected the less “drastic means” for effectuating its objectives.’ San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra at 16-17.” 3) APEG “creates great disparity in the expenditures per child among school districts . . .

1981Application of the strict scrutiny test means that the classification is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity and that the State bears the burden of proving that the classification system `has been structured with "precision" and is "tailored" narrowly to serve legitimate objectives and that it has selected the less "drastic means" for effectuating its objectives.' San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra at 16-17." 3) APEG "creates great disparity in the expenditures per child among school districts ...

1980See New Jersey v. Krol, supra, 344 A2d at 298 . 5 Code Ann. § 88-501 (u) provides: " 'Full and fair hearing or hearing’ shall mean a proceeding before a hearing examiner, under § 88-506.5, or before a court, as defined in subsection (r) of this section.