scrutiny test in New York

2009Ctr. of State of NY., 39 NY2d 326, 332 [1976].) In Burnet , the court was asked to determine whether non-English-speaking defendants constituted a “suspect class.” The court ruled that non-English-speaking defendants are not a suspect class and thus are not entitled to a strict scrutiny analysis.

1983Center, 39 NY2d 326 .) Where, however, the classification is a “suspect” classification, a mere rational basis for the ordinance is not enough, and the classification is subject to a strict scrutiny test and a court will make a painstaking inquiry to ensure the existence of a proper governmental objective.

1998The proper standard for the Court of Claims to apply in this case is the strict scrutiny test, which places the burden on the State to prove that the means used in the investigation were necessary to promote a compelling State interest (see, Montgomery v Daniels, supra, at 59).

1977(See Matter of Malpici-Orsini, 36 NY2d 568 and Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41 .) Application of the strict scrutiny test to this ordinance would require affirmance of the legislative action.

1983“Between those two tests, a third has developed to evaluate a constitutional challenge to a gender-based statute which ‘must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives’ (Craig v Boren, 429 US 190, 197 ; see Califano v Webster, 430 US 313, 316-317 ).” Chief Judge Cooke in Matter of Quinton A. ( 49 NY2d 328, 337 ) says that strict scrutiny is the proper test “only where the challenged law classifies persons along suspect lines, e.g., race, or where it impinges upon some fundamental constitutional right such as liberty”.

1980Nor do I disagree with the use of the Craig v Boren ( 429 US 190, 197 ) and Califano v Webster ( 430 US 313, 316-317 ) “intermediate scrutiny” test which requires that statutory classifications be substantially related to an important governmental objective rather than the lesser rational relationship to a permissible objective test or the more stringent strict scrutiny test which turns constitutionally on whether there is a necessary relationship to a compelling State interest.

1982It is for no lesser reasons that the inroads produced by subdivision 2 must be subjected to the strict scrutiny test, which, simply stated, places the burden on the State itself to demonstrate both that a compelling State interest is served by a classification such as the one we confront here and that the classification constitutes the least drastic means available to satisfy that interest (Illinois Elections Bd. v Socialist Workers Party, 440 US 173 ; see, generally, Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term — Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 Harv L Rev 1; Sa

1981There is no suspect class involved in this case and notwithstanding the New York State constitutional mandate for a free education for all children (NY Const, art XI, § 1), the issue presented here is not such a fundamental constitutional right as to be entitled to require the application of a strict scrutiny test (Matter of Levy, 38 NY2d 653, 658 , citing San Antonio School Dist. v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 16 ).

2003(Id. at 435.) Pointing out that the Supreme Court has ruled that Congress does not have the power to authorize the individual states to violate the Equal Protection Clause (see Graham v Richardson, 403 US 365, 382 [1971]), and that Congress, in effect, has authorized New York “to determine for itself the extent to which it will discriminate against legal aliens for State Medicaid eligibility” (Aliessa, 96 NY2d at 433 ), the Court of Appeals concluded that the challenged state legislation could not take advantage of the applicability of the rational basis test to federal legislation but, rather

1999Social Services Law § 122 cannot withstand a strict scrutiny analysis, much like the State law in Graham {supra) could not survive such an analysis.

2003In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals recognized that the rational basis test applies to federal legislation which places restrictions on the rights of aliens and that, in some instances, the application of this test may be extended to state legislation which, under the express authority of Congress, implements such federal legislation. ( See Aliessa , 96 NY2d at 432-433 .) However, emphasizing that, under the United {** 2 Misc 3d at 613 }States Constitution, Congress is charged with the exclusive responsibility for establishing uniform rules on immigration and on the conditions im

1978Previously identified by the United States Supreme Court as suspect are classifications based on alienage (Matter of Griffiths, 413 US 717 ), national origin (Hernandez v Texas, 347 US 475 ; Takahashi v Fish Comm., 334 US 410, 418, 420 ), and race (Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1 ; McLaughlin v Florida, 379 US 184 ).

1997In light of our *75 holding in this case, we do not consider whether the strict scrutiny standard might also apply when a statute, though framed in neutral terms, accomplishes a denominational preference nonetheless (compare, Corporation of Presiding Bishop v Amos, 483 US 327, 338-339 , with Grumet v Board of Educ., 81 NY2d 518, 532 [Kaye, J., concurring]).

1994Pursuant to both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, legislation that singles out a particular religious group for special benefits or burdens should be evaluated under a strict scrutiny test, requiring that the law be closely fitted to a compelling State interest (Grumet v Board of Educ., 81 NY2d 518, 532 [Kaye, Ch.

1981Furthermore, in considering plaintiffs’ constitutional claim, “the appropriate standard is not the so-called strict scrutiny test or anything approaching it, but rather the traditional rational basis test” (Matter of Levy, 38 NY2d 653, 658 ) and certainly in these days of high interest rates, a program designed to encourage cash rather than credit purchases of school buses is a rational one and this court cannot say that the formula the Legislature and the commissioner have adopted to pursue that objective is an irrational one which cannot achieve it.

1981There is no suspect class involved in this case and notwithstanding the New York State constitutional mandate for a free education for all children (NY Const, art XI, § 1), the issue presented here is not such a fundamental constitutional right as to be entitled to require the application of a strict scrutiny test (Matter of Levy, 38 NY2d 653, 658 , citing San Antonio School Dist. v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 16 ).

2003Relying in large part on its decision in Alvarino , the First Department applied the rational basis test and held that the Medicaid restrictions imposed on immigrants did not violate equal protection or article XVII. ( See Aliessa v Novello , 274 AD2d at 347 .) On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. ( See Matter of Aliessa v Novello , 96 NY2d 418 [2001].) In doing so, the Court concluded that the strict scrutiny test, rather than the rational basis test, should be applied. ( See id. at 430-436 .) Applying strict scrutiny, the Court of Appeals held that the statute could not survive. ( See i

2003Relying in large part on its decision in Alvarino , the First Department applied the rational basis test and held that the Medicaid restrictions imposed on immigrants did not violate equal protection or article XVII. ( See Aliessa v Novello , 274 AD2d at 347 .) On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. ( See Matter of Aliessa v Novello , 96 NY2d 418 [2001].) In doing so, the Court concluded that the strict scrutiny test, rather than the rational basis test, should be applied. ( See id. at 430-436 .) Applying strict scrutiny, the Court of Appeals held that the statute could not survive. ( See i

1985In Craig v Boren, Justice Powell expressly acknowledged that classifications based on gender evoke a standard of review more sharply focused than the normally deferential rational basis standard, but less demanding than the strict scrutiny standard ( 429 US 190, 210-211 [Powell, J., concurring opn]).

1980Nor do I disagree with the use of the Craig v Boren ( 429 US 190, 197 ) and Califano v Webster ( 430 US 313, 316-317 ) “intermediate scrutiny” test which requires that statutory classifications be substantially related to an important governmental objective rather than the lesser rational relationship to a permissible objective test or the more stringent strict scrutiny test which turns constitutionally on whether there is a necessary relationship to a compelling State interest.

1977(Matter of Malpica-Orsini, supra, p 582; Atkin v Onondaga County Bd. of Elections, 30 NY2d 401, 404 , supra; Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330, 342-343 ; Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618 .) This determination, that article XVII establishes a fundamental right, must, of necessity, thrust upon the State the burden of establishing the constitutionality of section 15 under this strict scrutiny test "beyond a reasonable doubt”.

1977(See Matter of Malpici-Orsini, 36 NY2d 568 and Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41 .) Application of the strict scrutiny test to this ordinance would require affirmance of the legislative action.

2009In contending that the strict scrutiny standard does not apply, defendants rely on Hayden v County of Nassau ( 180 F3d 42 [1999]).

2007While claimants are correct that racial classifications imposed by defendant must be analyzed under the strict scrutiny test in which a compelling government interest must be demonstrated (see Grutter v Bollinger, 539 US 306, 326-327 [2003]; see also Johnson v California, 543 US 499, 505 [2005]), the testimony and documentary evidence adduced at trial failed to demonstrate that the State Police in their investigation ever adopted a policy (or followed a law) which “expressly classified] persons on the basis of race” so as to constitute the type of express racial classification triggering stric

1989The central question presented by this appeal is whether the challenged zoning ordinance is an attempt to regulate bookstores by their content, which would be subject to a traditional strict scrutiny analysis (see, Police Dept. v Mosley, 408 US 92, 95, 98-99 ), or is instead a "content-neutral” rule directed only toward the unwanted "secondary effects” of certain kinds of business establishments in the community.

1978(See Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330 ; Harper v Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 US 663 ; Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618 , and Police Dept. of Chicago v Mosley, 408 US 92 .) It is asserted that the denial of the transfer has deprived petitioner of certain of her fundamental rights, including the right to vote, freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of petition and right to privacy.

1975While I find these arguments relevant and interesting, according to my reading, to date only four Justices of the Supreme Court have concluded that sexual discrimination involves a "suspect classification” (see Frontiero v Richardson, 411 US 677 , supra; and see concurring opinion of Powell, J., p 691; see, also, Stanton v Stanton, 421 US 7 , supra), and no opinion yet holds that "illegitimacy” constitutes a suspect category.

1975Nor, indeed, is there any occasion to determine the details of the standard for testing constitutionality where the right sought to be vindicated might be found to call for a test somewhere along the sliding scale between strict scrutiny at one end and rational basis at the other (cf. San Antonio School Dist. v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 70-135 [dissenting opn of Mr. Justice Makshall]; Vlandis v Kline, 412 US 441, 458 [concurring opn of Mr. Justice White]; Jimenez v Weinberger, 417 US 628, 632 ; Stanton v Stanton, 421 US 7 ; see Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term— Forward: In Search of Evolving D

2026Under that test, a land use permit condition is permissible if it: 1. has an "essential nexus" to the government's land-use interest; and 2. is "rough[ly] proportional[ ]" to the impact of granting the permit on that land-use interest—in other words, to the "social costs of the [permit] applicant's proposal" ( Sheetz , 601 US at 275-276, quoting Nollan , 483 US at 837, and Dolan , 512 US at 391; see Koontz , 570 US at 605-606).

2026Under that test, a land use permit condition is permissible if it: 1. has an "essential nexus" to the government's land-use interest; and 2. is "rough[ly] proportional[ ]" to the impact of granting the permit on that land-use interest—in other words, to the "social costs of the [permit] applicant's proposal" ( Sheetz , 601 US at 275-276, quoting Nollan , 483 US at 837 , and Dolan , 512 US at 391 ; see Koontz , 570 US at 605-606 ).