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11 Oklahoma opinions name it 4 courts 1989–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oklahoma courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
OKLAHOMA CALL FOR REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE v. DRUMMONDgreen2 sentences2023See OCRJ I , ¶ 11 (Darby, J, dissenting) (noting the lack of explanation or citation to relevant caselaw for the new standard of review). 2023See OCRJ I , ¶ 11 (Darby, J, dissenting) (noting the lack of explanation or citation to relevant caselaw for the new standard of review). | 2 | 2 |
Blevins v. Thomasgreen2 sentences2023See , e.g. , In re Blevins , 1984 OK CIV APP 41, ¶ 9 , 695 P.2d 556, 559-60 ("The courts will apply the tests of strict judicial scrutiny to a state law which interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights and liberties explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution."); San Antonio Indep. 2023See , e.g. , In re Blevins , 1984 OK CIV APP 41, ¶ 9, 695 P.2d 556, 559-60 ("The courts will apply the tests of strict judicial scrutiny to a state law which interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights and liberties explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution."); San Antonio Indep. | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Adoption of Blevinsgreen2 sentences2023See , e.g. , In re Blevins , 1984 OK CIV APP 41, ¶ 9 , 695 P.2d 556, 559-60 ("The courts will apply the tests of strict judicial scrutiny to a state law which interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights and liberties explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution."); San Antonio Indep. 2023See , e.g. , In re Blevins , 1984 OK CIV APP 41, ¶ 9, 695 P.2d 556, 559-60 ("The courts will apply the tests of strict judicial scrutiny to a state law which interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights and liberties explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution."); San Antonio Indep. | 1 | 1 |
Starkey v. Oklahoma Department of Correctionsgreen2 sentences2016The State may impose registration duties and may publish registration information as part of its punishment of this category of defendants." Starkey , 2013 OK 43, ¶ 78 . ¶21 Davis has not shown that application of the Registration Act in effect when he moved to Oklahoma fails the strict scrutiny test. 2016The State may impose registration duties and may publish registration information as part of its punishment of this category of defendants." Starkey , 2013 OK 43, ¶ 78. ¶21 Davis has not shown that application of the Registration Act in effect when he moved to Oklahoma fails the strict scrutiny test. | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Lillardgreen2 sentences2016Accord Brown v. Lillard , 1991 OK 74, 814 P.2d 1040. ¶20 Nonetheless, Davis argues that application of the version of the Registration Act in effect when he moved to Oklahoma, rather than the version in effect when he was convicted in Indiana, fails the strict scrutiny test. 2016Accord Brown v. Lillard , 1991 OK 74, 814 P.2d 1040. ¶20 Nonetheless, Davis argues that application of the version of the Registration Act in effect when he moved to Oklahoma, rather than the version in effect when he was convicted in Indiana, fails the strict scrutiny test. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Castillogreen1 sentence2009See Castillo, 140 F.3d at 883 ("the defendant [on trial for sexual abuse and sexual abuse of a minor] does not belong to a suspect class ... | 1 | 1 |
Wackerly v. Stategreen2 sentences2009While the rule does treat those accused of child molestation differently than other criminal defendants, such a classification is not subject to a heightened standard of review"); Wackerly v. State, 2000 OK CR 15, ¶ 54 , 12 P.3d 1, 17 ("Appellant does not argue that he is a member of a suspect class ..."). ¶ 33 Instead, he argues § 2413 cannot survive a strict scrutiny analysis as the statute "impermissibly interferes with a fundamental right under Oklahoma law—the right to be convicted, if at all, by evidence of the charged offense and not by evidence of similar offense which show a propensit 2009While the rule does treat those accused of child molestation differently than other criminal defendants, such a classification is not subject to a heightened standard of review"); Wackerly v. State, 2000 OK CR 15, ¶ 54 , 12 P.3d 1, 17 ("Appellant does not argue that he is a member of a suspect class ..."). ¶ 33 Instead, he argues § 2413 cannot survive a strict scrutiny analysis as the statute "impermissibly interferes with a fundamental right under Oklahoma law—the right to be convicted, if at all, by evidence of the charged offense and not by evidence of similar offense which show a propensit | 1 | 1 |
Crawford v. Stategreen2 sentences1996If a petitioner fails to make that showing (which requires application of the strict scrutiny standard, see Crawford v. State, 881 P.2d 88, 90 (Okl.Cr.1994)), he must prove that the statute is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest, also called the “rational relationship test.” Id. 1996If a petitioner fails to make that showing (which requires application of the strict scrutiny standard, see Crawford v. State, 881 P.2d 88, 90 (Okl. | 1 | 1 |
Thayer v. Phillips Petroleum Co.green2 sentences1989Thus, we need not apply a strict scrutiny standard of review, which is used when “the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class.” Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 , 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2566 , 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976). 613 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Okl.1980). 3 Unlike Thayer v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 613 P.2d at 1044-45 , wherein we held that a statute relating to *921 payment of attorney’s fees impinged upon a fundamental right of access, the present case does not involve the denial o 1989Thus, we need not apply a strict scrutiny standard of review, which is used when “the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class.” Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 , 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2566 , 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976). 613 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Okl.1980). 3 Unlike Thayer v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 613 P.2d at 1044-45 , wherein we held that a statute relating to *921 payment of attorney’s fees impinged upon a fundamental right of access, the present case does not involve the denial o | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oklahoma. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Roulston v. State
green
2 sentences2009While the rule does treat those accused of child molestation differently than other criminal defendants, such a classification is not subject to a heightened standard of review"); Wackerly v. State, 2000 OK CR 15, ¶ 54 , 12 P.3d 1, 17 ("Appellant does not argue that he is a member of a suspect class ..."). ¶ 33 Instead, he argues § 2413 cannot survive a strict scrutiny analysis as the statute "impermissibly interferes with a fundamental right under Oklahoma law—the right to be convicted, if at all, by evidence of the charged offense and not by evidence of similar offense which show a propensit 2009While the rule does treat those accused of child molestation differently than other criminal defendants, such a classification is not subject to a heightened standard of review"); Wackerly v. State, 2000 OK CR 15, ¶ 54 , 12 P.3d 1, 17 ("Appellant does not argue that he is a member of a suspect class ..."). ¶ 33 Instead, he argues § 2413 cannot survive a strict scrutiny analysis as the statute "impermissibly interferes with a fundamental right under Oklahoma law—the right to be convicted, if at all, by evidence of the charged offense and not by evidence of similar offense which show a propensit | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Buckley v. Valeo
green
1 sentence2009Id. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Bryan v. State
green
2 sentences2009While the rule does treat those accused of child molestation differently than other eriminal defendants, such a classification is not subject to a heightened standard of review"); Wackerly v. State, 2000 OK CR 15, 154 , 12 P.3d 1, 17 ("Appellant does not argue that he is a member of a suspect class..."). '[ 33 Instead, he argues § 2418 cannot survive a strict scrutiny analysis as the statute "impermissibly interferes with a fundamental right under Oklahoma law-the right to be convicted, if at all, by evidence of the charged offense and not by evidence of similar offense which show a propensity 2009While the rule does treat those accused of child molestation differently than other criminal defendants, such a classification is not subject to a heightened standard of review"); Wackerly v. State, 2000 OK CR 15, ¶ 54 , 12 P.3d 1, 17 ("Appellant does not argue that he is a member of a suspect class ..."). ¶ 33 Instead, he argues § 2413 cannot survive a strict scrutiny analysis as the statute "impermissibly interferes with a fundamental right under Oklahoma law—the right to be convicted, if at all, by evidence of the charged offense and not by evidence of similar offense which show a propensit | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Fair School Finance Council of Oklahoma, Inc. v. State
green
1 sentence2001Despite its being mentioned in the Constitution, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has declined to use a strict scrutiny standard of review. ¶ 13 In Fair School Finance Council of Oklahoma, Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 , 1148 (Okla. 1987), plaintiffs contended that education was a fundamental interest based on provisions mentioning public education in the state Constitution; therefore, strict judicial scrutiny must be applied. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tenn. v. McCray
green
2 sentences1998As de *948 scribed above, Thayer upheld treating a successful plaintiff differently from a successful defendant. 5 And the Mashore interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution was impaired by the United States Supreme Court in Life & Casualty Insurance Company v. McCray, 291 U.S. 566 , 54 S.Ct. 482 , 78 L.Ed. 987 (1934). 6 We feel constrained to apply Thayer , which directly resolved the issue at hand, rather than Professional Credit Collections, which did not have before it a discriminatory attorney fee statute, and dealt with the issue in dicta. ¶ 13 Pursuant 1998As de *948 scribed above, Thayer upheld treating a successful plaintiff differently from a successful defendant. 5 And the Mashore interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution was impaired by the United States Supreme Court in Life & Casualty Insurance Company v. McCray, 291 U.S. 566 , 54 S.Ct. 482 , 78 L.Ed. 987 (1934). 6 We feel constrained to apply Thayer , which directly resolved the issue at hand, rather than Professional Credit Collections, which did not have before it a discriminatory attorney fee statute, and dealt with the issue in dicta. ¶ 13 Pursuant | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Marquette v. Marquette
green
1 sentence1998We assume the legislature enacted the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act as a “result of increased public awareness regarding the serious nature of domestic violence.” Marquette v. Marquette, 1984 OK CIV APP 25 , 686 P.2d 990, 993 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Anderson v. Celebrezze
green
2 sentences1995Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788-89 , 103 S.Ct. at 1569-70 . 1995Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788-89 , 103 S.Ct. at 1569-70 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia
green
2 sentences1989Thus, we need not apply a strict scrutiny standard of review, which is used when “the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class.” Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 , 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2566 , 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976). 613 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Okl.1980). 3 Unlike Thayer v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 613 P.2d at 1044-45 , wherein we held that a statute relating to *921 payment of attorney’s fees impinged upon a fundamental right of access, the present case does not involve the denial o 1989Thus, we need not apply a strict scrutiny standard of review, which is used when “the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class.” Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 , 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2566 , 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976). 613 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Okl.1980). 3 Unlike Thayer v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 613 P.2d at 1044-45 , wherein we held that a statute relating to *921 payment of attorney’s fees impinged upon a fundamental right of access, the present case does not involve the denial o | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.