15 Virginia opinions name it 5 courts 1984–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Heller v. Doe Ex Rel. Doegreen2 sentences2007We find no precedential basis to apply a strict scrutiny standard as Gray contends and therefore apply a rational basis standard of review to Gray's challenge that Code § 18.2-31(12) is unconstitutional under equal protection grounds. 10 A classification reviewed under a rational basis standard "is accorded a strong presumption of validity." Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 , 318-21, 113 S.Ct. 2637 , 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993); see FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 , 313-15, 113 S.Ct. 2096 , 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993); Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 462 , 108 S.Ct. 2481 ; Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 2007We find no precedential basis to apply a strict scrutiny standard as Gray contends and therefore apply a rational basis standard of review to Gray's challenge that Code § 18.2-31(12) is unconstitutional under equal protection grounds. 10 A classification reviewed under a rational basis standard "is accorded a strong presumption of validity." Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 , 318-21, 113 S.Ct. 2637 , 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993); see FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 , 313-15, 113 S.Ct. 2096 , 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993); Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 462 , 108 S.Ct. 2481 ; Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 | 1 | 2 |
Caldwell v. Seaboard System RR, Inc.green2 sentences2025See Caldwell v. Seaboard S. R., Inc., 238 Va. 148 (1989) (rejecting the use of a strict scrutiny analysis of a statute that does not affect fundamental rights). 2025See Caldwell v. Seaboard S. R., Inc., 238 Va. 148 (1989) (rejecting the use of a strict scrutiny analysis of a statute that does not affect fundamental rights). | 1 | 1 |
Adams Outdoor Advertising v. City of Newport Newsgreen2 sentences2014“When . . . governmental regulation is based upon the content of speech, as opposed to a time, place, and manner classification, the regulation must be strictly scrutinized . . . because regulation that relates to subject matter ‘slip[s] from the neutrality of time, place, and circumstance into a concern about content.’” Adams Outdoor Advertising v. City of Newport News, 236 Va. 370, 381 , 373 S.E.2d 917, 922-23 (1988) (quoting Police Dept. of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)). 2014“When . . . governmental regulation is based upon the content of speech, as opposed to a time, place, and manner classification, the regulation must be strictly scrutinized . . . because regulation that relates to subject matter ‘slip[s] from the neutrality of time, place, and circumstance into a concern about content.’” Adams Outdoor Advertising v. City of Newport News, 236 Va. 370, 381 , 373 S.E.2d 917, 922-23 (1988) (quoting Police Dept. of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)). | 1 | 1 |
Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosleygreen2 sentences2014“When . . . governmental regulation is based upon the content of speech, as opposed to a time, place, and manner classification, the regulation must be strictly scrutinized . . . because regulation that relates to subject matter ‘slip[s] from the neutrality of time, place, and circumstance into a concern about content.’” Adams Outdoor Advertising v. City of Newport News, 236 Va. 370, 381 , 373 S.E.2d 917, 922-23 (1988) (quoting Police Dept. of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)). 2014Id. (citing Consol. | 1 | 1 |
In RE MARRIAGE OF ARNOLD v. Arnoldgreen1 sentence2012In such instances, the trial court must determine custody using the ‘best interest of the child’ test.”); In re Marriage of Momb, 130 P.3d 406, 410 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (“But no case has applied a strict scrutiny standard when weighing the interests of two parents.” (citation omitted)); Arnold v. Arnold, 679 N.W.2d 296, 299 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (“So, when the Troxel court was speaking of fundamental rights in the raising of children, it was speaking to the existing disparity between natural parents and grandparents.”). -8- court is not foreclosed from ordering some form of controlled visitati | 1 | 1 |
Momb v. Ragonegreen1 sentence2012In such instances, the trial court must determine custody using the ‘best interest of the child’ test.”); In re Marriage of Momb, 130 P.3d 406, 410 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (“But no case has applied a strict scrutiny standard when weighing the interests of two parents.” (citation omitted)); Arnold v. Arnold, 679 N.W.2d 296, 299 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (“So, when the Troxel court was speaking of fundamental rights in the raising of children, it was speaking to the existing disparity between natural parents and grandparents.”). -8- court is not foreclosed from ordering some form of controlled visitati | 1 | 1 |
Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc.green2 sentences2007We find no precedential basis to apply a strict scrutiny standard as Gray contends and therefore apply a rational basis standard of review to Gray's challenge that Code § 18.2-31(12) is unconstitutional under equal protection grounds. 10 A classification reviewed under a rational basis standard "is accorded a strong presumption of validity." Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 , 318-21, 113 S.Ct. 2637 , 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993); see FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 , 313-15, 113 S.Ct. 2096 , 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993); Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 462 , 108 S.Ct. 2481 ; Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 2007We find no precedential basis to apply a strict scrutiny standard as Gray contends and therefore apply a rational basis standard of review to Gray's challenge that Code § 18.2-31(12) is unconstitutional under equal protection grounds. 10 A classification reviewed under a rational basis standard "is accorded a strong presumption of validity." Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 , 318-21, 113 S.Ct. 2637 , 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993); see FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 , 313-15, 113 S.Ct. 2096 , 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993); Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 462 , 108 S.Ct. 2481 ; Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Walborngreen1 sentence2007See State v. Walborn, 729 So.2d 504 (Fla.Ct. | 1 | 1 |
Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'ngreen2 sentences2005See Perry Education Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 , 103 S. Ct. 948, 955 , 74 L. 2005See Perry Education Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 , 103 S. Ct. 948, 955 , 74 L. | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2002Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995). 2002Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 , 115 S.Ct. 2475 , 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Plyler v. Mooregreen1 sentence2002Id. at 720-21 ; see also Phyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 1996). | 1 | 1 |
Daniel v. City of Tampa, Floridagreen2 sentences2001See Daniel v. City of Tampa, 38 F.3d 546 (11th Cir.1994). 2001See Daniel v. City of Tampa, 38 F.3d 546 (11th Cir.1994). | 1 | 1 |
Romer v. Evansgreen1 sentence1999See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993); see also Miller v. Locher Silica Corp., 12 Va. App. 1213 , 408 S.E.2d 566 (1991). “[Courts] will uphold a law that neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class so long as the legislative classification bears a rational relation to some independent and legitimate legislative end.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 2 Additionally, suspect or quasi-suspect classes entitled to heightened scrutiny are limited to groups generally defined by their status, such as race, ethnic origin, gender, and illegitimacy, and not by the conduct in whic | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Locher Silica Corp.green2 sentences1999See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993); see also Miller v. Locher Silica Corp., 12 Va. App. 1213 , 408 S.E.2d 566 (1991). “[Courts] will uphold a law that neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class so long as the legislative classification bears a rational relation to some independent and legitimate legislative end.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 2 Additionally, suspect or quasi-suspect classes entitled to heightened scrutiny are limited to groups generally defined by their status, such as race, ethnic origin, gender, and illegitimacy, and not by the conduct in whic 1999See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993); see also Miller v. Locher Silica Corp., 12 Va. App. 1213 , 408 S.E.2d 566 (1991). “[Courts] will uphold a law that neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class so long as the legislative classification bears a rational relation to some independent and legitimate legislative end.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 2 Additionally, suspect or quasi-suspect classes entitled to heightened scrutiny are limited to groups generally defined by their status, such as race, ethnic origin, gender, and illegitimacy, and not by the conduct in whic | 1 | 1 |
Vance v. Bradleygreen1 sentence1984See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lawrence v. Texas
green
2 sentences2018More relevantly, in Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), the Supreme Court overturned a Florida custody order using the strict scrutiny test, the highest tier of review, because it had been based on racial considerations. -4- Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), overturned Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), and invalidated a Texas anti-sodomy law on the grounds that Bowers had too narrowly characterized the behavior at issue as “whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566 . 2018More relevantly, in Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), the Supreme Court overturned a Florida custody order using the strict scrutiny test, the highest tier of review, because it had been based on racial considerations. -4- Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), overturned Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), and invalidated a Texas anti-sodomy law on the grounds that Bowers had too narrowly characterized the behavior at issue as “whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566 . | 2 | 2005–2018 |
Bowers v. Hardwick
red
1 sentence2018More relevantly, in Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), the Supreme Court overturned a Florida custody order using the strict scrutiny test, the highest tier of review, because it had been based on racial considerations. -4- Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), overturned Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), and invalidated a Texas anti-sodomy law on the grounds that Bowers had too narrowly characterized the behavior at issue as “whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Palmore v. Sidoti
green
1 sentence2018More relevantly, in Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), the Supreme Court overturned a Florida custody order using the strict scrutiny test, the highest tier of review, because it had been based on racial considerations. -4- Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), overturned Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), and invalidated a Texas anti-sodomy law on the grounds that Bowers had too narrowly characterized the behavior at issue as “whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission
green
2 sentences2008Id. at 347 , 115 S.Ct. 1511 . 2008Id. at 347 , 115 S.Ct. 1511 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Qutb v. Strauss
green
1 sentence2007Under a strict scrutiny standard, the legislative act is accorded "no presumption of constitutionality." Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 , 492 (5th Cir.1993). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools
green
2 sentences2007We find no precedential basis to apply a strict scrutiny standard as Gray contends and therefore apply a rational basis standard of review to Gray's challenge that Code § 18.2-31(12) is unconstitutional under equal protection grounds. 10 A classification reviewed under a rational basis standard "is accorded a strong presumption of validity." Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 , 318-21, 113 S.Ct. 2637 , 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993); see FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 , 313-15, 113 S.Ct. 2096 , 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993); Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 462 , 108 S.Ct. 2481 ; Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 2007We find no precedential basis to apply a strict scrutiny standard as Gray contends and therefore apply a rational basis standard of review to Gray's challenge that Code § 18.2-31(12) is unconstitutional under equal protection grounds. 10 A classification reviewed under a rational basis standard "is accorded a strong presumption of validity." Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 , 318-21, 113 S.Ct. 2637 , 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993); see FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 , 313-15, 113 S.Ct. 2096 , 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993); Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 462 , 108 S.Ct. 2481 ; Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia
green
2 sentences2007We find no precedential basis to apply a strict scrutiny standard as Gray contends and therefore apply a rational basis standard of review to Gray's challenge that Code § 18.2-31(12) is unconstitutional under equal protection grounds. 10 A classification reviewed under a rational basis standard "is accorded a strong presumption of validity." Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 , 318-21, 113 S.Ct. 2637 , 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993); see FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 , 313-15, 113 S.Ct. 2096 , 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993); Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 462 , 108 S.Ct. 2481 ; Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 2007We find no precedential basis to apply a strict scrutiny standard as Gray contends and therefore apply a rational basis standard of review to Gray's challenge that Code § 18.2-31(12) is unconstitutional under equal protection grounds. 10 A classification reviewed under a rational basis standard "is accorded a strong presumption of validity." Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 , 318-21, 113 S.Ct. 2637 , 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993); see FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 , 313-15, 113 S.Ct. 2096 , 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993); Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 462 , 108 S.Ct. 2481 ; Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Hodel v. Indiana
green
2 sentences2007We find no precedential basis to apply a strict scrutiny standard as Gray contends and therefore apply a rational basis standard of review to Gray's challenge that Code § 18.2-31(12) is unconstitutional under equal protection grounds. 10 A classification reviewed under a rational basis standard "is accorded a strong presumption of validity." Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 , 318-21, 113 S.Ct. 2637 , 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993); see FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 , 313-15, 113 S.Ct. 2096 , 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993); Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 462 , 108 S.Ct. 2481 ; Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 2007We find no precedential basis to apply a strict scrutiny standard as Gray contends and therefore apply a rational basis standard of review to Gray's challenge that Code § 18.2-31(12) is unconstitutional under equal protection grounds. 10 A classification reviewed under a rational basis standard "is accorded a strong presumption of validity." Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 , 318-21, 113 S.Ct. 2637 , 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993); see FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 , 313-15, 113 S.Ct. 2096 , 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993); Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 462 , 108 S.Ct. 2481 ; Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Osborne v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2003Id. at 110 , 110 S. Ct. at 1696-97 , 109 L. 2003Id. at 110 , 110 S. Ct. at 1696-97 , 109 L. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition
green
2 sentences2003As the Illinois Supreme Court recently stated in Alexander , the “First Amendment’s ‘vast and privileged sphere’ (Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 244 , 152 L. 2003As the Illinois Supreme Court recently stated in Alexander , the “First Amendment’s ‘vast and privileged sphere’ (Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 244 , 152 L. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Washington v. Glucksberg
green
2 sentences2002In Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), the court held that government regulation that infringes on fundamental rights of a person must be “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” For example, the right to marriage, family life, and upbringing of children are fundamental rights afforded a high degree of protection and the laws infringing these rights are analyzed under the strict scrutiny test. 2002Id. at 720-21 ; see also Phyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 1996). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Williams v. Fears
green
2 sentences2000In my view, the RRHA's privatization effort and barment procedure does not satisfy the requirement that the barment-trespass procedure be narrowly tailored because the procedure (1) infringes on the constitutionally protected right of a person's freedom to "remove from one place to another according to inclination," Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 , 21 S.Ct. 128, 129 , 45 L.Ed. 186 (1900), and to move freely in a traditional public forum, see City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 54 , 119 S.Ct. 1849, 1858 , 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999) (holding "it is apparent that an individual's decision to 2000In my view, the RRHA's privatization effort and barment procedure does not satisfy the requirement that the barment-trespass procedure be narrowly tailored because the procedure (1) infringes on the constitutionally protected right of a person's freedom to "remove from one place to another according to inclination," Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 , 21 S.Ct. 128, 129 , 45 L.Ed. 186 (1900), and to move freely in a traditional public forum, see City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 54 , 119 S.Ct. 1849, 1858 , 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999) (holding "it is apparent that an individual's decision to | 1 | 2000–2000 |
City of Chicago v. Morales
green
2 sentences2000In my view, the RRHA's privatization effort and barment procedure does not satisfy the requirement that the barment-trespass procedure be narrowly tailored because the procedure (1) infringes on the constitutionally protected right of a person's freedom to "remove from one place to another according to inclination," Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 , 21 S.Ct. 128, 129 , 45 L.Ed. 186 (1900), and to move freely in a traditional public forum, see City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 54 , 119 S.Ct. 1849, 1858 , 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999) (holding "it is apparent that an individual's decision to 2000In my view, the RRHA's privatization effort and barment procedure does not satisfy the requirement that the barment-trespass procedure be narrowly tailored because the procedure (1) infringes on the constitutionally protected right of a person's freedom to "remove from one place to another according to inclination," Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 , 21 S.Ct. 128, 129 , 45 L.Ed. 186 (1900), and to move freely in a traditional public forum, see City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 54 , 119 S.Ct. 1849, 1858 , 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999) (holding "it is apparent that an individual's decision to | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.