scrutiny standard in Maine

2020The court employed a strict scrutiny analysis and found that the state could not demonstrate a compelling governmental interest in the alphabetical order procedure, which granted an advantage to candidates whose names appear earlier in the alphabet. 14 Cal. 3d at 674-75 .

2020The Plaintiffs have also emphasized the significance of the Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Mann v. Powell, 333 F.Supp. 1261 (N.D.

2020Taxpayers Action Network, 2002 ME 64, ¶ 8 , 795 A.2d 75 (quotation marks omitted), application of the strict scrutiny standard has not always been required in cases involving the regulation of ballot access, including cases involving the regulation of petition circulation, because “‘there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.’” Buckley, 525 U.S. at 187 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)); see Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 430, 433 (1992) (reviewi

2020Taxpayers Action Network, 2002 ME 64, ¶ 8 , 795 A.2d 75 (quotation marks omitted), application of the strict scrutiny standard has not always been required in cases involving the regulation of ballot access, including cases involving the regulation of petition circulation, because “‘there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.’” Buckley, 525 U.S. at 187 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)); see Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 430, 433 (1992) (reviewi

2014First, because forcing a parent to expend time and resources defending against a third-party claim to a child is itself an infringement on the fundamental right to parent, 17 Conlogue, 2006 ME 12, ¶ 13 , 890 A.2d 691 ; Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 30 , 761 A.2d 291 , a party seeking de facto parenthood status must, at the outset, establish his or her standing to initiate the litigation by making a prima facie showing of de facto parenthood according to the two-part test we have announced today, i.e., that the petitioner had a permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible role 17 This prelimina

2014First, because forcing a parent to expend time and resources defending against a third-party claim to a child is itself an infringement on the fundamental right to parent, 17 Conlogue, 2006 ME 12, ¶ 13 , 890 A.2d 691 ; Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 30 , 761 A.2d 291 , a party seeking de facto parenthood status must, at the outset, establish his or her standing to initiate the litigation by making a prima facie showing of de facto parenthood according to the two-part test we have announced today, i.e., that the petitioner had a permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible role 17 This prelimina

2014Pursuant to the strict scrutiny standard, we have limited the State’s intrusions into the parent-child relationship to those instances in which there is some urgent reason 3 or there are exceptional circumstances affecting the child that justify the intrusion. 4 See Robichaud v. Pariseau, 2008 ME 54, ¶7 , 820 A.2d 1212 ; Merchant v. Bussell, 189 Me. 118 , 121-22, 27 A.2d 816 (1942). [¶ 13] There are currently four statutory means by which the Legislature allows the State, through the courts, to order parental rights or visitation to a non-parent. 5 We have addressed three of the four statutory

2014Pursuant to the strict scrutiny standard, we have limited the State’s intrusions into the parent-child relationship to those instances in which 8 there is some urgent reason3 or there are exceptional circumstances affecting the child that justify the intrusion.4 See Robichaud v. Pariseau, 2003 ME 54, ¶ 7 , 820 A.2d 1212 ; Merchant v. Bussell, 139 Me. 118, 121-22 , 27 A.2d 816 (1942). [¶13] There are currently four statutory means by which the Legislature allows the State, through the courts, to order parental rights or visitation to a non-parent.5 We have addressed three of the four statutory

2014Pursuant to the strict scrutiny standard, we have limited the State’s intrusions into the parent-child relationship to those instances in which 8 there is some urgent reason3 or there are exceptional circumstances affecting the child that justify the intrusion.4 See Robichaud v. Pariseau, 2003 ME 54, ¶ 7 , 820 A.2d 1212 ; Merchant v. Bussell, 139 Me. 118, 121-22 , 27 A.2d 816 (1942). [¶13] There are currently four statutory means by which the Legislature allows the State, through the courts, to order parental rights or visitation to a non-parent.5 We have addressed three of the four statutory

2014Pursuant to the strict scrutiny standard, we have limited the State’s intrusions into the parent-child relationship to those instances in which 8 there is some urgent reason3 or there are exceptional circumstances affecting the child that justify the intrusion.4 See Robichaud v. Pariseau, 2003 ME 54, ¶ 7 , 820 A.2d 1212 ; Merchant v. Bussell, 139 Me. 118, 121-22 , 27 A.2d 816 (1942). [¶13] There are currently four statutory means by which the Legislature allows the State, through the courts, to order parental rights or visitation to a non-parent.5 We have addressed three of the four statutory

2014Pursuant to the strict scrutiny standard, we have limited the State’s intrusions into the parent-child relationship to those instances in which 8 there is some urgent reason3 or there are exceptional circumstances affecting the child that justify the intrusion.4 See Robichaud v. Pariseau, 2003 ME 54, ¶ 7 , 820 A.2d 1212 ; Merchant v. Bussell, 139 Me. 118, 121-22 , 27 A.2d 816 (1942). [¶13] There are currently four statutory means by which the Legislature allows the State, through the courts, to order parental rights or visitation to a non-parent.5 We have addressed three of the four statutory

2012Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413-14 , 415 n. 12, 122 S.Ct. 2179 , 153 L.Ed.2d 413 (2002) (noting two categories of denial of access to courts cases: cases involving (1) systemic official action that presently denies an opportunity to litigate for a class of potential plaintiffs, and (2) a specific official act that, among other things, may "have caused the loss or inadequate settlement of a meritorious case"). [11] Though recognizing that "the right to vote is fundamental" and that "[a] restriction on candidacy implicates a fundamental right . . . `if the challenged restriction unfair

2012Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413-14 , 415 n. 12, 122 S.Ct. 2179 , 153 L.Ed.2d 413 (2002) (noting two categories of denial of access to courts cases: cases involving (1) systemic official action that presently denies an opportunity to litigate for a class of potential plaintiffs, and (2) a specific official act that, among other things, may "have caused the loss or inadequate settlement of a meritorious case"). [11] Though recognizing that "the right to vote is fundamental" and that "[a] restriction on candidacy implicates a fundamental right . . . `if the challenged restriction unfair

2008McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 345-46 , 115 S.Ct. 1511 ; City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 59 , 114 S.Ct. 2038 , 129 L.Ed.2d 36 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring).

2008McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 345-46 , 115 S.Ct. 1511 ; City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 59 , 114 S.Ct. 2038 , 129 L.Ed.2d 36 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring).

2008McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 345-46 , 115 S.Ct. 1511 ; City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 59 , 114 S.Ct. 2038 , 129 L.Ed.2d 36 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring).

2008McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 345-46 , 115 S.Ct. 1511 ; City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 59 , 114 S.Ct. 2038 , 129 L.Ed.2d 36 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring).

2007Specifically, Judge Nadeau argues that the First Amendment protects an “opinion” such as “inappropriately,” and requires the Court to assign benign meanings to terms open to multiple meanings such as “pulling” and “forced.” See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 , 110 S.Ct. 2695 , 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990); Levinsky’s, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127 F.3d 122 (1st Cir. 1997). [¶ 17] At the outset, we find that the meaning of “knowingly,” as defined in Canon II(3)(J) and applied in Canon 5(B)(2)(c), meets the strict scrutiny standard applicable to restrictions on political speech under t

2007Specifically, Judge Nadeau argues that the First Amendment protects an “opinion” such as “inappropriately,” and requires the Court to assign benign meanings to terms open to multiple meanings such as “pulling” and “forced.” See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 , 110 S.Ct. 2695 , 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990); Levinsky’s, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127 F.3d 122 (1st Cir. 1997). [¶ 17] At the outset, we find that the meaning of “knowingly,” as defined in Canon II(3)(J) and applied in Canon 5(B)(2)(c), meets the strict scrutiny standard applicable to restrictions on political speech under t

2007Specifically, Judge Nadeau argues that the First Amendment protects an “opinion” such as “inappropriately,” and requires the Court to assign benign meanings to terms open to multiple meanings such as “pulling” and “forced.” See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 , 110 S.Ct. 2695 , 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990); Levinsky’s, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127 F.3d 122 (1st Cir. 1997). [¶ 17] At the outset, we find that the meaning of “knowingly,” as defined in Canon II(3)(J) and applied in Canon 5(B)(2)(c), meets the strict scrutiny standard applicable to restrictions on political speech under t

2006Bagley, 1999 ME 60, ¶ 27 , 728 A.2d at 136-37 .

2006Bagley, 1999 ME 60, ¶ 27 , 728 A.2d at 136-37 .

2006Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 , 101 S.Ct. 1425 , 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981).

2006Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 , 101 S.Ct. 1425 , 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981).

2000Reflective of this “de minimis” state interest, “there is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children.’ Troxel , 530 U.S. at -, 120 S.Ct. at 2062 (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 , 99 S.Ct. 2493 , 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979)). [¶ 53] The strict scrutiny test, the requirement that an invasion of parental rights be narrowly tailored and justified by a compelling state interest, and the presumption that fit parents act in the best interest of their children all cannot be avoided by a generalized statement that “[a] statute is presumed to be constitutional and the

2000Reflective of this “de minimis” state interest, “there is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children.’ Troxel , 530 U.S. at -, 120 S.Ct. at 2062 (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 , 99 S.Ct. 2493 , 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979)). [¶ 53] The strict scrutiny test, the requirement that an invasion of parental rights be narrowly tailored and justified by a compelling state interest, and the presumption that fit parents act in the best interest of their children all cannot be avoided by a generalized statement that “[a] statute is presumed to be constitutional and the

1999REV. 7 (1993). [40] There is no indication in equal protection jurisprudence that the strict scrutiny analysis for religious-based classifications differs from the analysis of race-based classifications. [41] See also United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 , 107 S.Ct. 1053 , 94 L.Ed.2d 203 (1987) (considering "the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies" when determining whether a classification was narrowly tailored). [42] In his dissent in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 , 105 S.Ct. 3232 , 87 L.Ed.2d 290 (1985), a case since overruled in Agostini v. Felton, 52

1999REV. 7 (1993). [40] There is no indication in equal protection jurisprudence that the strict scrutiny analysis for religious-based classifications differs from the analysis of race-based classifications. [41] See also United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 , 107 S.Ct. 1053 , 94 L.Ed.2d 203 (1987) (considering "the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies" when determining whether a classification was narrowly tailored). [42] In his dissent in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 , 105 S.Ct. 3232 , 87 L.Ed.2d 290 (1985), a case since overruled in Agostini v. Felton, 52