preponderance of the evidence standard in Wyoming

2025We measure the juvenile court’s decision to change the permanency plan “against the preponderance of the evidence standard.” In re SK, ¶ 23, 544 P.3d at 613-14 (quoting In re DT, 2017 WY 36, ¶ 30 , 391 P.3d 1136, 1145 (Wyo. 2017)); In re AM, 2021 WY 119, ¶ 11 , 497 P.3d at 918 (“The State must prove that a change in the permanency plan is justified by a preponderance of the evidence.

2025We measure the juvenile court’s decision to change the permanency plan “against the preponderance of the evidence standard.” In re SK, ¶ 23, 544 P.3d at 613-14 (quoting In re DT, 2017 WY 36, ¶ 30 , 391 P.3d 1136, 1145 (Wyo. 2017)); In re AM, 2021 WY 119, ¶ 11 , 497 P.3d at 918 (“The State must prove that a change in the permanency plan is justified by a preponderance of the evidence.

2003“Whether an exception exists in a particular case is a question of fact that may be properly resolved by a preponderance of the evidence standard in the light of all attendant circumstances.” City of Laramie v. Hysong, 808 P.2d 199, 203 (Wyo.1991).

2002"Whether an exception exists in a particular case is a question of fact that may be properly resolved by a preponderance of the evidence standard in the light of all attendant cireumstances." Gehnert v. State, 956 P.2d 359, 362 (Wyo.1998) (quoting City of Laramie v. Hysong, 808 P.2d 199, 203 (Wyo.1991)).

2026“To change a permanency plan from family reunification to adoption, a juvenile court must find that the Department made reasonable efforts to achieve reunification without success and that reunification is no longer in the children’s best interest.” Id. (citation modified). [¶23] “In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in a neglect proceeding, we measure the juvenile court’s decision against the preponderance of the evidence standard.” In re JN, 2024 WY 105, ¶ 24 , 556 P.3d 748, 755 (Wyo. 2024) (quoting Int. of SK, 2024 WY 25, ¶¶ 21-23 , 544 P.3d 606, 613-14 (Wyo. 2024)).

2026In re JF, 2025 WY 14, ¶ 14 , 562 P.3d 853, 859 (Wyo. 2025); see also In re LH, ¶ 15, 565 P.3d at 687 .

2026In re JF, 2025 WY 14, ¶ 14 , 562 P.3d 853, 859 (Wyo. 2025); see also In re LH, ¶ 15, 565 P.3d at 687 .

2026In re JF, 2025 WY 14, ¶ 14 , 562 P.3d 853, 859 (Wyo. 2025); see also In re LH, ¶ 15, 565 P.3d at 687 .

2024See HP, 2004 WY 82, ¶ 25 , 93 P.3d at 989–90 (“Accordingly, we review the court’s findings only in the context of a review hearing in a neglect proceeding and under the preponderance of the evidence standard that is applicable to neglect proceedings.

2024See HP, 2004 WY 82, ¶ 25 , 93 P.3d at 989–90 (“Accordingly, we review the court’s findings only in the context of a review hearing in a neglect proceeding and under the preponderance of the evidence standard that is applicable to neglect proceedings.

2024“A court abuses its discretion if ‘it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Int. of SMD, 2022 WY 24, ¶ 27 , 503 P.3d at 652). [¶23] “In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in a neglect proceeding, we measure the juvenile court’s decision against the preponderance of the evidence standard.” Int. of DT, 2017 WY 36, ¶ 30 , 391 P.3d 1136, 1145 (Wyo. 2017) (quoting In re RE, 2011 WY 170 , ¶ 12, 267 P.3d 1092 , 1096 (Wyo. 2011)).

2024“A court abuses its discretion if ‘it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Int. of SMD, 2022 WY 24, ¶ 27 , 503 P.3d at 652). [¶23] “In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in a neglect proceeding, we measure the juvenile court’s decision against the preponderance of the evidence standard.” Int. of DT, 2017 WY 36, ¶ 30 , 391 P.3d 1136, 1145 (Wyo. 2017) (quoting In re RE, 2011 WY 170 , ¶ 12, 267 P.3d 1092 , 1096 (Wyo. 2011)).

2026“To change a permanency plan from family reunification to adoption, a juvenile court must find that the Department made reasonable efforts to achieve reunification without success and that reunification is no longer in the children’s best interest.” Id. (citation modified). [¶23] “In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in a neglect proceeding, we measure the juvenile court’s decision against the preponderance of the evidence standard.” In re JN, 2024 WY 105, ¶ 24 , 556 P.3d 748, 755 (Wyo. 2024) (quoting Int. of SK, 2024 WY 25, ¶¶ 21-23 , 544 P.3d 606, 613-14 (Wyo. 2024)).

2026“To change a permanency plan from family reunification to adoption, a juvenile court must find that the Department made reasonable efforts to achieve reunification without success and that reunification is no longer in the children’s best interest.” Id. (citation modified). [¶23] “In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in a neglect proceeding, we measure the juvenile court’s decision against the preponderance of the evidence standard.” In re JN, 2024 WY 105, ¶ 24 , 556 P.3d 748, 755 (Wyo. 2024) (quoting Int. of SK, 2024 WY 25, ¶¶ 21-23 , 544 P.3d 606, 613-14 (Wyo. 2024)).

2026“To change a permanency plan from family reunification to adoption, a juvenile court must find that the Department made reasonable efforts to achieve reunification without success and that reunification is no longer in the children’s best interest.” Id. (citation modified). [¶23] “In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in a neglect proceeding, we measure the juvenile court’s decision against the preponderance of the evidence standard.” In re JN, 2024 WY 105, ¶ 24 , 556 P.3d 748, 755 (Wyo. 2024) (quoting Int. of SK, 2024 WY 25, ¶¶ 21-23 , 544 P.3d 606, 613-14 (Wyo. 2024)).

2026“To change a permanency plan from family reunification to adoption, a juvenile court must find that the Department made reasonable efforts to achieve reunification without success and that reunification is no longer in the children’s best interest.” Id. (citation modified). [¶23] “In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in a neglect proceeding, we measure the juvenile court’s decision against the preponderance of the evidence standard.” In re JN, 2024 WY 105, ¶ 24 , 556 P.3d 748, 755 (Wyo. 2024) (quoting Int. of SK, 2024 WY 25, ¶¶ 21-23 , 544 P.3d 606, 613-14 (Wyo. 2024)).

2024See Meyer, 2014 WY 91, ¶ 21 , 330 P.3d at 269 (“Appellant therefore bore the burden of proving undue influence by presenting evidence clearly demonstrating that Mrs. Carlsen’s free agency was destroyed and that her volition was replaced by that of her other daughters.”); Kelly v. McNeel, 2011 WY 79, ¶ 18 , 250 P.3d 1105, 1110 (Wyo. 2011) (“The party contesting a will bears the burden of proving undue influence by presenting evidence clearly demonstrating that the testator’s free agency was destroyed and his volition was substituted for that of another.”); Kibbee, 2010 WY 143 , ¶ 53, 242 P.3d a

2024See Meyer, 2014 WY 91, ¶ 21 , 330 P.3d at 269 (“Appellant therefore bore the burden of proving undue influence by presenting evidence clearly demonstrating that Mrs. Carlsen’s free agency was destroyed and that her volition was replaced by that of her other daughters.”); Kelly v. McNeel, 2011 WY 79, ¶ 18 , 250 P.3d 1105, 1110 (Wyo. 2011) (“The party contesting a will bears the burden of proving undue influence by presenting evidence clearly demonstrating that the testator’s free agency was destroyed and his volition was substituted for that of another.”); Kibbee, 2010 WY 143 , ¶ 53, 242 P.3d a

2024See Meyer, 2014 WY 91, ¶ 21 , 330 P.3d at 269 (“Appellant therefore bore the burden of proving undue influence by presenting evidence clearly demonstrating that Mrs. Carlsen’s free agency was destroyed and that her volition was replaced by that of her other daughters.”); Kelly v. McNeel, 2011 WY 79, ¶ 18 , 250 P.3d 1105, 1110 (Wyo. 2011) (“The party contesting a will bears the burden of proving undue influence by presenting evidence clearly demonstrating that the testator’s free agency was destroyed and his volition was substituted for that of another.”); Kibbee, 2010 WY 143 , ¶ 53, 242 P.3d a

2024See Meyer, 2014 WY 91, ¶ 21 , 330 P.3d at 269 (“Appellant therefore bore the burden of proving undue influence by presenting evidence clearly demonstrating that Mrs. Carlsen’s free agency was destroyed and that her volition was replaced by that of her other daughters.”); Kelly v. McNeel, 2011 WY 79, ¶ 18 , 250 P.3d 1105, 1110 (Wyo. 2011) (“The party contesting a will bears the burden of proving undue influence by presenting evidence clearly demonstrating that the testator’s free agency was destroyed and his volition was substituted for that of another.”); Kibbee, 2010 WY 143 , ¶ 53, 242 P.3d a

2024See Meyer, 2014 WY 91, ¶ 21 , 330 P.3d at 269 (“Appellant therefore bore the burden of proving undue influence by presenting evidence clearly demonstrating that Mrs. Carlsen’s free agency was destroyed and that her volition was replaced by that of her other daughters.”); Kelly v. McNeel, 2011 WY 79, ¶ 18 , 250 P.3d 1105, 1110 (Wyo. 2011) (“The party contesting a will bears the burden of proving undue influence by presenting evidence clearly demonstrating that the testator’s free agency was destroyed and his volition was substituted for that of another.”); Kibbee, 2010 WY 143 , ¶ 53, 242 P.3d a

2024See Meyer, 2014 WY 91, ¶ 21 , 330 P.3d at 269 (“Appellant therefore bore the burden of proving undue influence by presenting evidence clearly demonstrating that Mrs. Carlsen’s free agency was destroyed and that her volition was replaced by that of her other daughters.”); Kelly v. McNeel, 2011 WY 79, ¶ 18 , 250 P.3d 1105, 1110 (Wyo. 2011) (“The party contesting a will bears the burden of proving undue influence by presenting evidence clearly demonstrating that the testator’s free agency was destroyed and his volition was substituted for that of another.”); Kibbee, 2010 WY 143 , ¶ 53, 242 P.3d a

2024See Meyer, 2014 WY 91, ¶ 21 , 330 P.3d at 269 (“Appellant therefore bore the burden of proving undue influence by presenting evidence clearly demonstrating that Mrs. Carlsen’s free agency was destroyed and that her volition was replaced by that of her other daughters.”); Kelly v. McNeel, 2011 WY 79, ¶ 18 , 250 P.3d 1105, 1110 (Wyo. 2011) (“The party contesting a will bears the burden of proving undue influence by presenting evidence clearly demonstrating that the testator’s free agency was destroyed and his volition was substituted for that of another.”); Kibbee, 2010 WY 143 , ¶ 53, 242 P.3d a

2024See Meyer, 2014 WY 91, ¶ 21 , 330 P.3d at 269 (“Appellant therefore bore the burden of proving undue influence by presenting evidence clearly demonstrating that Mrs. Carlsen’s free agency was destroyed and that her volition was replaced by that of her other daughters.”); Kelly v. McNeel, 2011 WY 79, ¶ 18 , 250 P.3d 1105, 1110 (Wyo. 2011) (“The party contesting a will bears the burden of proving undue influence by presenting evidence clearly demonstrating that the testator’s free agency was destroyed and his volition was substituted for that of another.”); Kibbee, 2010 WY 143 , ¶ 53, 242 P.3d a

2024See Meyer, 2014 WY 91, ¶ 21 , 330 P.3d at 269 (“Appellant therefore bore the burden of proving undue influence by presenting evidence clearly demonstrating that Mrs. Carlsen’s free agency was destroyed and that her volition was replaced by that of her other daughters.”); Kelly v. McNeel, 2011 WY 79, ¶ 18 , 250 P.3d 1105, 1110 (Wyo. 2011) (“The party contesting a will bears the burden of proving undue influence by presenting evidence clearly demonstrating that the testator’s free agency was destroyed and his volition was substituted for that of another.”); Kibbee, 2010 WY 143 , ¶ 53, 242 P.3d a

2021See also, Stroble v. State, 2020 WY 158, ¶ 12 , __ P.3d ___ (Wyo. 2020) (melding the abuse of discretion standard of review with the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in a probation revocation case). 9 [¶35] Under the CPA, DFS is required to make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families, except as provided by § 14-2-309(b) or (c).

2020Common law principles consistent with the statutory “[t]he only standard of proof referenced in K.S.A. 21-3219 is to the standard of probable cause” and rejecting the preponderance of the evidence standard adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court, whose statute “makes no mention of any standard”); Rodgers v. Com., 285 S.W.3d 740, 754 (Ky. 2009) (“infer[ring] from [§ 503.085] that the controlling standard of proof remains ‘probable cause.’”).

2014"The normal standard of proof in administrative hearings is the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard." JM v. Dept. of Family Servs., 922 P.2d 219, 223 (Wyo.1996).

2011Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931, 940 (Wyo.2000).