preponderance of the evidence standard in Maryland

2002As to this, the preponderance of the evidence standard is the applicable measure of proof.’’ (Alteration in original) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Bakas, 322 Md. 603, 606 , 589 A.2d 52, 53 (1991)). 14 .

2002As to this, the preponderance of the evidence standard is the applicable measure of proof.’’ (Alteration in original) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Bakas, 322 Md. 603, 606 , 589 A.2d 52, 53 (1991)). 14 .

2020While reasonable suspicion requires “something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch,” Sellman, 449 Md. at 543 (quoting Crosby, 408 Md. at 507 ), “the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 (citing Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 ).

2016In United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002), the Supreme Court commented on the same easily satisfied quantitative standard for a constitutional Terry stop: “Although an officer’s reliance on a mere ‘hunch’ is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard[.]” (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted).

2024Trooper Greathouse’s report was further supported by dashcam footage documenting Mr. Usan’s failed SFSTs. 4 We have explained that “reasonable suspicion requires less in the way of quantity and quality of evidence than is required for probable cause and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Shea, 415 Md. at 19 , 997 A.2d at 778 (cleaned up); see also Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Medvedeff, 466 Md. 455, 468 , 221 A.3d 955 , 963 (2019). 11 We “defer to the [ALJ’s] fact-finding and drawing of inferences if they are supported by the record.” Carpenter, 424

2024Trooper Greathouse’s report was further supported by dashcam footage documenting Mr. Usan’s failed SFSTs. 4 We have explained that “reasonable suspicion requires less in the way of quantity and quality of evidence than is required for probable cause and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Shea, 415 Md. at 19 , 997 A.2d at 778 (cleaned up); see also Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Medvedeff, 466 Md. 455, 468 , 221 A.3d 955 , 963 (2019). 11 We “defer to the [ALJ’s] fact-finding and drawing of inferences if they are supported by the record.” Carpenter, 424

2024Trooper Greathouse’s report was further supported by dashcam footage documenting Mr. Usan’s failed SFSTs. 4 We have explained that “reasonable suspicion requires less in the way of quantity and quality of evidence than is required for probable cause and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Shea, 415 Md. at 19 , 997 A.2d at 778 (cleaned up); see also Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Medvedeff, 466 Md. 455, 468 , 221 A.3d 955 , 963 (2019). 11 We “defer to the [ALJ’s] fact-finding and drawing of inferences if they are supported by the record.” Carpenter, 424

2024Trooper Greathouse’s report was further supported by dashcam footage documenting Mr. Usan’s failed SFSTs. 4 We have explained that “reasonable suspicion requires less in the way of quantity and quality of evidence than is required for probable cause and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Shea, 415 Md. at 19 , 997 A.2d at 778 (cleaned up); see also Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Medvedeff, 466 Md. 455, 468 , 221 A.3d 955 , 963 (2019). 11 We “defer to the [ALJ’s] fact-finding and drawing of inferences if they are supported by the record.” Carpenter, 424

2024Trooper Greathouse’s report was further supported by dashcam footage documenting Mr. Usan’s failed SFSTs. 4 We have explained that “reasonable suspicion requires less in the way of quantity and quality of evidence than is required for probable cause and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Shea, 415 Md. at 19 , 997 A.2d at 778 (cleaned up); see also Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Medvedeff, 466 Md. 455, 468 , 221 A.3d 955 , 963 (2019). 11 We “defer to the [ALJ’s] fact-finding and drawing of inferences if they are supported by the record.” Carpenter, 424

2024Trooper Greathouse’s report was further supported by dashcam footage documenting Mr. Usan’s failed SFSTs. 4 We have explained that “reasonable suspicion requires less in the way of quantity and quality of evidence than is required for probable cause and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Shea, 415 Md. at 19 , 997 A.2d at 778 (cleaned up); see also Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Medvedeff, 466 Md. 455, 468 , 221 A.3d 955 , 963 (2019). 11 We “defer to the [ALJ’s] fact-finding and drawing of inferences if they are supported by the record.” Carpenter, 424

2022See Crane v. Dunn, 382 Md. 83, 92 (2004) (explaining that the trial court generally applies the preponderance of the evidence standard in making admissibility determinations); see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.10 (“These matters should be established by a preponderance of proof.”). 3.

2022See Crane v. Dunn, 382 Md. 83, 92 (2004) (explaining that the trial court generally applies the preponderance of the evidence standard in making admissibility determinations); see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.10 (“These matters should be established by a preponderance of proof.”). 3.

2003The preponderance of the evidence test simply requires the trier of fact to “determine[ ] which side outweighs the other, without being concerned with how much or how clearly one side may outweigh the other.” Foster, 304 Md. at 477 , 499 A.2d at 1255-56 .

2003The preponderance of the evidence test simply requires the trier of fact to “determine[ ] which side outweighs the other, without being concerned with how much or how clearly one side may outweigh the other.” Foster, 304 Md. at 477 , 499 A.2d at 1255-56 .

2022See Crane v. Dunn, 382 Md. 83, 92 (2004) (explaining that the trial court generally applies the preponderance of the evidence standard in making admissibility determinations); see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.10 (“These matters should be established by a preponderance of proof.”). 3.

2022See Crane v. Dunn, 382 Md. 83, 92 (2004) (explaining that the trial court generally applies the preponderance of the evidence standard in making admissibility determinations); see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.10 (“These matters should be established by a preponderance of proof.”). 3.

2006Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Garfield, 369 Md. 85 , 99 n. 13, 797 A.2d 757 , 765 n. 13 (2002) (Alteration in original) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. James, 355 Md. 465, 483 , 735 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1999) and Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bakas, 322 Md. 603, 606 , 589 A.2d 52, 53 (1991)). 12 .

2006Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Garfield, 369 Md. 85 , 99 n. 13, 797 A.2d 757 , 765 n. 13 (2002) (Alteration in original) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. James, 355 Md. 465, 483 , 735 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1999) and Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bakas, 322 Md. 603, 606 , 589 A.2d 52, 53 (1991)). 12 .

2005Cf. State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13 , 524 A.2d 130, 151, 155-56 (1987); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 80-81 (Utah 1981).

2005Cf. State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13 , 524 A.2d 130, 151, 155-56 (1987); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 80-81 (Utah 1981).

2005Cf. State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13 , 524 A.2d 130, 151, 155-56 (1987); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 80-81 (Utah 1981).

2005Cf. State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13 , 524 A.2d 130, 151, 155-56 (1987); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 80-81 (Utah 1981).

2020While reasonable suspicion requires “something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch,” Sellman, 449 Md. at 543 (quoting Crosby, 408 Md. at 507 ), “the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 (citing Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 ).

2013Nevertheless, reasonable suspicion ‘embraces something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch,' and the determination 'must be based on the totality of the circumstances.’ Crosby, 408 Md. at 507 , 970 A.2d at 904 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2013Reasonable suspicion requires less in the way of quantity and quality of evidence than is required for probable cause, see Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 308 (1990), 'and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard,’ United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 , 122 S.Ct. 744, 751 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740, 750 (2002).

2013Reasonable suspicion requires less in the way of quantity and quality of evidence than is required for probable cause, see Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 308 (1990), 'and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard,’ United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 , 122 S.Ct. 744, 751 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740, 750 (2002).

2002State v. Calhoun, 306 Md. 692, 739-40 , 511 A.2d 461, 485 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910 , 107 S.Ct. 1339 , 94 L.Ed.2d 528 (1987); Foster v. State, 304 Md. 439, 477 , 499 A.2d 1236, 1255-56 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010 , 106 S.Ct. 3310 , 92 L.Ed.2d 723 (1986); Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 729-734 , 415 A.2d 830, 848-50 (1980), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 993 , 104 S.Ct. 2374 , 80 L.Ed.2d 846 (1984).

2002State v. Calhoun, 306 Md. 692, 739-40 , 511 A.2d 461, 485 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910 , 107 S.Ct. 1339 , 94 L.Ed.2d 528 (1987); Foster v. State, 304 Md. 439, 477 , 499 A.2d 1236, 1255-56 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010 , 106 S.Ct. 3310 , 92 L.Ed.2d 723 (1986); Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 729-734 , 415 A.2d 830, 848-50 (1980), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 993 , 104 S.Ct. 2374 , 80 L.Ed.2d 846 (1984).

2015“Accordingly, the officer’s assessment of the likelihood that there will be relevant evidence inside the car must be based on more than ‘a mere hunch,’ but ‘falls considerably short of [needing to] satisfy! ] a preponderance of the evidence standard.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002)); see Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 433 , 572 A.2d 1086 (1990) (Quotation omitted.) (“[T]he level of suspicion for a Terry stop and frisk ‘is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence’ ... [and] ‘the level of susp

2015“Accordingly, the officer’s assessment of the likelihood that there will be relevant evidence inside the car must be based on more than ‘a mere hunch,’ but ‘falls considerably short of [needing to] satisfy[ ] a preponderance of the evidence standard.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 74 (2002)); see Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 433 (1990) (Quotation omitted.)) (“[T]he level of suspicion for a Terry stop and frisk ‘is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence’ . . . [and] ‘the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less

2015“Accordingly, the officer’s assessment of the likelihood that there will be relevant evidence inside the car must be based on more than ‘a mere hunch,’ but ‘falls considerably short of [needing to] satisfy! ] a preponderance of the evidence standard.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002)); see Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 433 , 572 A.2d 1086 (1990) (Quotation omitted.) (“[T]he level of suspicion for a Terry stop and frisk ‘is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence’ ... [and] ‘the level of susp

2015“Accordingly, the officer’s assessment of the likelihood that there will be relevant evidence inside the car must be based on more than ‘a mere hunch,’ but ‘falls considerably short of [needing to] satisfy[ ] a preponderance of the evidence standard.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 74 (2002)); see Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 433 (1990) (Quotation omitted.)) (“[T]he level of suspicion for a Terry stop and frisk ‘is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence’ . . . [and] ‘the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less

2012See also, Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 , 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2778-79 , 97 L.Ed.2d 144, 152-53 (1987).

2012See also, Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 , 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2778-79 , 97 L.Ed.2d 144, 152-53 (1987).

2011See Wills, 329 Md. at 376-384, 388 , 620 A.2d at 297-302, 303 (holding that the reasonable doubt instruction given in that case was more like the preponderance of the evidence standard and "did not measure up to an acceptable explanation of the reasonable doubt standard," because the instruction could lead a jury to believe that, "if the evidence adduced by the state has more convincing force and produces in the minds of the jury a belief that it is more likely true than not, the reasonable doubt standard has been met"); see also Ruffin, 394 Md. at 371 , 906 A.2d at 370 (collecting cases on th

2011See Wills, 329 Md. at 376-384, 388 , 620 A.2d at 297-302, 303 (holding that the reasonable doubt instruction given in that case was more like the preponderance of the evidence standard and "did not measure up to an acceptable explanation of the reasonable doubt standard," because the instruction could lead a jury to believe that, "if the evidence adduced by the state has more convincing force and produces in the minds of the jury a belief that it is more likely true than not, the reasonable doubt standard has been met"); see also Ruffin, 394 Md. at 371 , 906 A.2d at 370 (collecting cases on th

2020The juvenile court applied a preponderance of the evidence standard, although it did not analyze the issue.23 The Court of Special Appeals considered the question in some detail and, relying on this Court’s decision in Volodarsky v. Tarachanskaya, 397 Md. 291 (2007), concluded that it was appropriate to apply a preponderance standard of proof.

2019For that to be true, the Court observed, the earlier finding must have been made by, at a minimum, a preponderance of the evidence standard. 14 *153 Id. at 308 , 916 A.2d 991 .

2015“Accordingly, the officer’s assessment of the likelihood that there will be relevant evidence inside the car must be based on more than ‘a mere hunch,’ but ‘falls considerably short of [needing to] satisfy! ] a preponderance of the evidence standard.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002)); see Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 433 , 572 A.2d 1086 (1990) (Quotation omitted.) (“[T]he level of suspicion for a Terry stop and frisk ‘is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence’ ... [and] ‘the level of susp

2015“Accordingly, the officer’s assessment of the likelihood that there will be relevant evidence inside the car must be based on more than ‘a mere hunch,’ but ‘falls considerably short of [needing to] satisfy[ ] a preponderance of the evidence standard.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 74 (2002)); see Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 433 (1990) (Quotation omitted.)) (“[T]he level of suspicion for a Terry stop and frisk ‘is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence’ . . . [and] ‘the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less

2019See, e.g. , Coleman v. Anne Arundel County Police Dep't , 369 Md. 108 , 129, 797 A.2d 770 (2002) (noting that "the preponderance of the evidence standard is generally applied in civil cases") (quoting Everett v. Balt.

2019See, e.g. , Coleman v. Anne Arundel County Police Dep't , 369 Md. 108 , 129, 797 A.2d 770 (2002) (noting that "the preponderance of the evidence standard is generally applied in civil cases") (quoting Everett v. Balt.

2011See Wills, 329 Md. at 376-384, 388 , 620 A.2d at 297-302, 303 (holding that the reasonable doubt instruction given in that case was more like the preponderance of the evidence standard and "did not measure up to an acceptable explanation of the reasonable doubt standard," because the instruction could lead a jury to believe that, "if the evidence adduced by the state has more convincing force and produces in the minds of the jury a belief that it is more likely true than not, the reasonable doubt standard has been met"); see also Ruffin, 394 Md. at 371 , 906 A.2d at 370 (collecting cases on th

2011See Wills, 329 Md. at 376-384, 388 , 620 A.2d at 297-302, 303 (holding that the reasonable doubt instruction given in that case was more like the preponderance of the evidence standard and "did not measure up to an acceptable explanation of the reasonable doubt standard," because the instruction could lead a jury to believe that, "if the evidence adduced by the state has more convincing force and produces in the minds of the jury a belief that it is more likely true than not, the reasonable doubt standard has been met"); see also Ruffin, 394 Md. at 371 , 906 A.2d at 370 (collecting cases on th

2006The new sentencing proceeding, whether before a judge alone or a jury, may include consideration of the sentence of death in accordance with the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence standard, see Evans v. State, 389 Md. 456, 482-83 , 886 A.2d 562, 577 (2005); Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179, 253 , 835 A.2d 1105, 1148 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1017 , 124 S.Ct. 2084 , 158 L.Ed.2d 632 (2004), and irrespective of Appellant's argument under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.

2006The new sentencing proceeding, whether before a judge alone or a jury, may include consideration of the sentence of death in accordance with the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence standard, see Evans v. State, 389 Md. 456, 482-83 , 886 A.2d 562, 577 (2005); Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179, 253 , 835 A.2d 1105, 1148 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1017 , 124 S.Ct. 2084 , 158 L.Ed.2d 632 (2004), and irrespective of Appellant's argument under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.

2006In Williams v. State, 326 Md. 367, 375 , 605 A.2d 103, 107 (1992), the court indicated “the prejudicial effect of counsel’s deficient performance need not meet a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Therefore, a defendant need only show that, based on counsel’s errors, there is a “substantial or significant possibility that the verdict of the trier of fact would have been affected.” Williams, 326 Md. at 375 , 605 A.2d at 107 .

2006In Williams v. State, 326 Md. 367, 375 , 605 A.2d 103, 107 (1992), the court indicated “the prejudicial effect of counsel’s deficient performance need not meet a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Therefore, a defendant need only show that, based on counsel’s errors, there is a “substantial or significant possibility that the verdict of the trier of fact would have been affected.” Williams, 326 Md. at 375 , 605 A.2d at 107 .