64 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1975–2026 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Davisgreen2 sentences2026In Connecticut, generally, as in many states, “when a civil statute is silent as to the applicable standard of proof, the preponderance of the evidence standard governs factual determinations required by that statute.” State v. Davis, 229 Conn. 285, 295–96, 641 A.2d 370 (1994); see also, e.g., E.M.D Sales, Inc. v. Carrera, 604 U.S. 45, 52, 145 S. Ct. 34, 220 L. 2026In Connecticut, generally, as in many states, “when a civil statute is silent as to the applicable standard of proof, the preponderance of the evidence standard governs factual determinations required by that statute.” State v. Davis, 229 Conn. 285, 295–96, 641 A.2d 370 (1994); see also, e.g., E.M.D Sales, Inc. v. Carrera, 604 U.S. 45, 52, 145 S. Ct. 34, 220 L. | 6 | 13 |
Mallory v. Mallorygreen2 sentences2010Similarly, in Mallory v. Mallory, 207 Conn. 48 , 539 A.2d 995 (1988), a case in which a custody order was based on a finding that a parent had sexually abused his child; id., 51 ; we acknowledged the “substantial social stigma” that ensues upon such a finding but concluded nonetheless “that a preponderance of the evidence standard adequately protects a parent from false accusations of sexual abuse, and that the ordinary civil standard of proof better serves the strong societal interest in protecting children from abusive parents.” Id., 52 . 2010Similarly, in Mallory v. Mallory, 207 Conn. 48 , 539 A.2d 995 (1988), a case in which a custody order was based on a finding that a parent had sexually abused his child; id., 51 ; we acknowledged the “substantial social stigma” that ensues upon such a finding but concluded nonetheless “that a preponderance of the evidence standard adequately protects a parent from false accusations of sexual abuse, and that the ordinary civil standard of proof better serves the strong societal interest in protecting children from abusive parents.” Id., 52 . | 3 | 6 |
Peralta v. Peraltagreen2 sentences2023Compare Peralta v. Peralta, 139 N.M. 231, 234 , 131 P.3d 81 (App. 2005) (The court recognized ‘‘the different burdens of proof required to contest a will and to establish tortious interference with inheritance . . . . 2023Compare Peralta v. Peralta, 139 N.M. 231, 234 , 131 P.3d 81 (App. 2005) (The court recognized ‘‘the different burdens of proof required to contest a will and to establish tortious interference with inheritance . . . . | 2 | 2 |
Huntington v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2010See Morford v. Peck, 46 Conn. 380, 384-85 (1878); Huntington v. Clark, 39 Conn. 540, 557 (1873). 1991See Morford v. Peck, 46 Conn. 380, 384-85 (1878); Huntington v. Clark, 39 Conn. 540, 557 (1873). | 2 | 2 |
Morford v. Peckgreen2 sentences2010See Morford v. Peck, 46 Conn. 380, 384-85 (1878); Huntington v. Clark, 39 Conn. 540, 557 (1873). 1991See Morford v. Peck, 46 Conn. 380, 384-85 (1878); Huntington v. Clark, 39 Conn. 540, 557 (1873). | 2 | 2 |
Santosky v. Kramergreen2 sentences1992The preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate in ordinary tort cases because the litigants should “ ‘share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion.’ ” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 , 102 S. Ct. 1388 , 71 L. 1992The preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate in ordinary tort cases because the litigants should “ ‘share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion.’ ” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 , 102 S. Ct. 1388 , 71 L. | 1 | 5 |
Berchtold v. Maggigreen2 sentences2019In addition, the trier of fact is no longer bound to inter- pret the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, or to draw every reasonable inference there- from, for it is axiomatic that it is within the province of the trier of facts to assess the credibility of witnesses.’’ (Citations omitted.) Berchtold v. Maggi, 191 Conn. 266, 272 , 464 A.2d 1 (1983); see also Sonepar Distribution New England, Inc. v. T & T Electrical Contractor’s, Inc., 133 Conn. App. 752, 755 , 37 A.3d 789 (2012) (‘‘We agree that the preponderance of the evidence standard is inapplicable to a motion to dismi 2019In addition, the trier of fact is no longer bound to inter- pret the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, or to draw every reasonable inference there- from, for it is axiomatic that it is within the province of the trier of facts to assess the credibility of witnesses.’’ (Citations omitted.) Berchtold v. Maggi, 191 Conn. 266, 272 , 464 A.2d 1 (1983); see also Sonepar Distribution New England, Inc. v. T & T Electrical Contractor’s, Inc., 133 Conn. App. 752, 755 , 37 A.3d 789 (2012) (‘‘We agree that the preponderance of the evidence standard is inapplicable to a motion to dismi | 1 | 2 |
Freeman v. Alamo Management Co.green2 sentences2010In addition, the plaintiffs argue that certain dictum in our decision in Freeman v. Alamo Management Co., 221 Conn. 674, 682-83 , 607 A.2d 370 (1992), clearly indicates that the Appellate Court’s holding in Schaffer v. Lindy, supra, 8 Conn. App. 96 , is unsound. 2010In addition, the plaintiffs argue that certain dictum in our decision in Freeman v. Alamo Management Co., 221 Conn. 674, 682-83 , 607 A.2d 370 (1992), clearly indicates that the Appellate Court’s holding in Schaffer v. Lindy, supra, 8 Conn. App. 96 , is unsound. | 1 | 2 |
In re Juvenile Appeal (84-AB)green2 sentences2008By contrast, this court held that due process is not violated by application of the preponderance of the evidence standard to *1094 either a petition by the state for temporary custody of a child; In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), supra, 189 Conn. at 295 , 455 A.2d 1313 ; a petition by the state to adjudicate a child neglected, uncared for or dependent; In re Juvenile Appeal (84-AB), supra, 192 Conn. at 263 , 471 A.2d 1380 ; or a third party petition for visitation; Roth v. Weston, supra, 259 Conn. at 231 , 789 A.2d 431 . 2008By contrast, this court held that due process is not violated by application of the preponderance of the evidence standard to *1094 either a petition by the state for temporary custody of a child; In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), supra, 189 Conn. at 295 , 455 A.2d 1313 ; a petition by the state to adjudicate a child neglected, uncared for or dependent; In re Juvenile Appeal (84-AB), supra, 192 Conn. at 263 , 471 A.2d 1380 ; or a third party petition for visitation; Roth v. Weston, supra, 259 Conn. at 231 , 789 A.2d 431 . | 1 | 2 |
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Board of Tax Reviewgreen2 sentences2026See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Board of Tax Review, 241 Conn. 749, 756, 699 A.2d 81 (1997); Sharr v. Stonington, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX, 2011 WL 1409420, *3 (Conn. Super. 2026See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Board of Tax Review, 241 Conn. 749, 756, 699 A.2d 81 (1997); Sharr v. Stonington, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX, 2011 WL 1409420, *3 (Conn. Super. | 1 | 1 |
Ramsey v. Ramseygreen2 sentences2026Compare, e.g., McCann ex rel. 12 See, e.g., Jizmejian v. Jizmejian, 16 Ariz. App. 270, 274, 492 P.2d 1208 (1972); In re Estate of Rodgers, 149 So. 2d 391, 392 (Fla. App. 1963); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, 679, 535 P.2d 53 (1975), overruled in part on other grounds by Rice v. Rice, 103 Idaho 85, 645 P.2d 319 (1982); In re Estate of Banks, 258 Ill. 2026Compare, e.g., McCann ex rel. 12 See, e.g., Jizmejian v. Jizmejian, 16 Ariz. App. 270, 274, 492 P.2d 1208 (1972); In re Estate of Rodgers, 149 So. 2d 391, 392 (Fla. App. 1963); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, 679, 535 P.2d 53 (1975), overruled in part on other grounds by Rice v. Rice, 103 Idaho 85, 645 P.2d 319 (1982); In re Estate of Banks, 258 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Jizmejian v. Jizmejiangreen2 sentences2026Compare, e.g., McCann ex rel. 12 See, e.g., Jizmejian v. Jizmejian, 16 Ariz. App. 270, 274, 492 P.2d 1208 (1972); In re Estate of Rodgers, 149 So. 2d 391, 392 (Fla. App. 1963); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, 679, 535 P.2d 53 (1975), overruled in part on other grounds by Rice v. Rice, 103 Idaho 85, 645 P.2d 319 (1982); In re Estate of Banks, 258 Ill. 2026Compare, e.g., McCann ex rel. 12 See, e.g., Jizmejian v. Jizmejian, 16 Ariz. App. 270, 274, 492 P.2d 1208 (1972); In re Estate of Rodgers, 149 So. 2d 391, 392 (Fla. App. 1963); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, 679, 535 P.2d 53 (1975), overruled in part on other grounds by Rice v. Rice, 103 Idaho 85, 645 P.2d 319 (1982); In re Estate of Banks, 258 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Estate of Banksgreen2 sentences2026Compare, e.g., McCann ex rel. 12 See, e.g., Jizmejian v. Jizmejian, 16 Ariz. App. 270, 274, 492 P.2d 1208 (1972); In re Estate of Rodgers, 149 So. 2d 391, 392 (Fla. App. 1963); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, 679, 535 P.2d 53 (1975), overruled in part on other grounds by Rice v. Rice, 103 Idaho 85, 645 P.2d 319 (1982); In re Estate of Banks, 258 Ill. 2026Compare, e.g., McCann ex rel. 12 See, e.g., Jizmejian v. Jizmejian, 16 Ariz. App. 270, 274 , 492 P.2d 1208 (1972); In re Estate of Rodgers, 149 So. 2d 391, 392 (Fla. App. 1963); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, 679 , 535 P.2d 53 (1975), overruled in part on other grounds by Rice v. Rice, 103 Idaho 85 , 645 P.2d 319 (1982); In re Estate of Banks, 258 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carreragreen2 sentences2026In Connecticut, generally, as in many states, “when a civil statute is silent as to the applicable standard of proof, the preponderance of the evidence standard governs factual determinations required by that statute.” State v. Davis, 229 Conn. 285, 295–96, 641 A.2d 370 (1994); see also, e.g., E.M.D Sales, Inc. v. Carrera, 604 U.S. 45, 52, 145 S. Ct. 34, 220 L. 2026In Connecticut, generally, as in many states, “when a civil statute is silent as to the applicable standard of proof, the preponderance of the evidence standard governs factual determinations required by that statute.” State v. Davis, 229 Conn. 285, 295–96, 641 A.2d 370 (1994); see also, e.g., E.M.D Sales, Inc. v. Carrera, 604 U.S. 45, 52, 145 S. Ct. 34, 220 L. | 1 | 1 |
In re Estate of Rodgersgreen2 sentences2026Compare, e.g., McCann ex rel. 12 See, e.g., Jizmejian v. Jizmejian, 16 Ariz. App. 270, 274, 492 P.2d 1208 (1972); In re Estate of Rodgers, 149 So. 2d 391, 392 (Fla. App. 1963); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, 679, 535 P.2d 53 (1975), overruled in part on other grounds by Rice v. Rice, 103 Idaho 85, 645 P.2d 319 (1982); In re Estate of Banks, 258 Ill. 2026Compare, e.g., McCann ex rel. 12 See, e.g., Jizmejian v. Jizmejian, 16 Ariz. App. 270, 274 , 492 P.2d 1208 (1972); In re Estate of Rodgers, 149 So. 2d 391, 392 (Fla. App. 1963); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, 679 , 535 P.2d 53 (1975), overruled in part on other grounds by Rice v. Rice, 103 Idaho 85 , 645 P.2d 319 (1982); In re Estate of Banks, 258 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Ireland v. Irelandgreen2 sentences2021As Justice Borden explained in his concurring opinion in Ireland v. Ireland, 246 Conn. 413 , 717 A.2d 676 (1998), applying a preponderance of the evidence standard is sufficient in a burden shifting scheme. 2021As Justice Borden explained in his concurring opinion in Ireland v. Ireland, 246 Conn. 413 , 717 A.2d 676 (1998), applying a preponderance of the evidence standard is sufficient in a burden shifting scheme. | 1 | 1 |
Bobcar Media, LLC v. Aardvark Event Logistics, Inc.green1 sentence2021Application of the preponderance of the evidence standard is particularly apt in this case, in which the defendant sought to establish the existence of a lost or destroyed document or recording, the admissibility of which is governed by § 10-3 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence; authority applying similar rules of evidence generally requires such proof to be by at least a prepon- derance of the evidence.78 See, e.g., Bobcar Media, LLC v. Aardvark Event Logistics, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 3d 375, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (applying Federal Rules of Evidence to claimed loss of assignment of patents); Kleen | 1 | 1 |
| Guardianship of David C.green | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Guardianship of Barrosgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re DISgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sonepar Distribution New England, Inc. v. T & T Electrical Contractor's, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Rickettsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Winn v. Posadesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Skakel v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cynthia JONES, for Ivory B. JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appelleegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Collins Securities Corporation and Timothy Collins v. Securities and Exchange Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| El Paso Refining, Inc. v. Scurlock Permian Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Viejas Band of Kumeyaay Indians v. Lorinskygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Madigan v. Madigangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Curciogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Herman & MacLean v. Huddlestongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Schulz v. Syvertsengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lego v. Twomeygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Coleman v. Rickgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ronald Allen Smith v. Jack McCormick Warden, Montana State Prisongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stuart v. Stuart
green
2 sentences2024Moreover, in deciding to apply the preponderance of the evidence standard, the court expressly relied on Stuart v. Stuart, 297 Conn. 26 , 38–40, 996 A.2d 259 (2010). 2024Moreover, in deciding to apply the preponderance of the evidence standard, the court expressly relied on Stuart v. Stuart, 297 Conn. 26 , 38–40, 996 A.2d 259 (2010). | 4 | 2012–2024 |
Goldstar Medical Services, Inc. v. Department of Social Services
green
2 sentences2019Goldstar Medical Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Social Services, 288 Conn. 790, 819 , 955 A.2d 15 (2008) (‘‘in this state, proof by preponderance of the evidence is the ordinary civil standard of proof’’ [internal quota- tion marks omitted]); see State v. Davis, 229 Conn. 285 , 295–96, 641 A.2d 370 (1994) (‘‘our determination is guided by the general rule that when a civil statute is silent as to the applicable standard of proof, the preponderance of the evidence standard governs fac- tual determinations required by that statute’’). 2019Goldstar Medical Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Social Services, 288 Conn. 790, 819 , 955 A.2d 15 (2008) (‘‘in this state, proof by preponderance of the evidence is the ordinary civil standard of proof’’ [internal quota- tion marks omitted]); see State v. Davis, 229 Conn. 285 , 295–96, 641 A.2d 370 (1994) (‘‘our determination is guided by the general rule that when a civil statute is silent as to the applicable standard of proof, the preponderance of the evidence standard governs fac- tual determinations required by that statute’’). | 3 | 2011–2019 |
O'Dea v. Amodeo
green
2 sentences2010O’Dea v. Amodeo, 118 Conn. 58, 60 , 170 A. 486 (1934); Water Commissioners v. Robbins, supra [ 82 Conn. 640 ], Moreover, this rule was part of our law [whereas] the preponderance of the evidence standard was still the burden of proof in fraud actions. 2010O’Dea v. Amodeo, 118 Conn. 58, 60 , 170 A. 486 (1934); Water Commissioners v. Robbins, supra [ 82 Conn. 640 ], Moreover, this rule was part of our law [whereas] the preponderance of the evidence standard was still the burden of proof in fraud actions. | 2 | 1991–2010 |
Schaffer v. Lindy
green
2 sentences1993The axiom that, if a trial court does not state or imply it is using that proper standard of proof, a new trial is necessary; Schaffer v. Lindy, 8 Conn. App. 96, 105 , 511 A.2d 1022 (1986); applies only when the standard of proof that should have been used is higher than the preponderance of the evidence standard. 1993The axiom that, if a trial court does not state or imply it is using that proper standard of proof, a new trial is necessary; Schaffer v. Lindy, 8 Conn. App. 96, 105 , 511 A.2d 1022 (1986); applies only when the standard of proof that should have been used is higher than the preponderance of the evidence standard. | 2 | 1993–2010 |
State v. Staples
green
2 sentences2007Because the defendant had failed to present a "valid reason why proof by [a preponderance of the evidence], with a judge making a positive finding on voluntariness, does not provide a fair and workable test which affords a criminal defendant those rights guaranteed him by both the United States and Connecticut [c]onstitution[s]"; id., at 406 , 399 A.2d 1269 ; we concluded that, "a trial court should follow the preponderance of the evidence standard and not the reasonable doubt standard in determining whether or not the state has sustained its burden of proving voluntariness when a confession o 2007Because the defendant had failed to present a "valid reason why proof by [a preponderance of the evidence], with a judge making a positive finding on voluntariness, does not provide a fair and workable test which affords a criminal defendant those rights guaranteed him by both the United States and Connecticut [c]onstitution[s]"; id., at 406 , 399 A.2d 1269 ; we concluded that, "a trial court should follow the preponderance of the evidence standard and not the reasonable doubt standard in determining whether or not the state has sustained its burden of proving voluntariness when a confession o | 2 | 1996–2007 |
State v. Warren
green
2 sentences2002Our Supreme Court has stated that the preponderance of the evidence test "means simply that the evidence must, when considered fairly and impartially, induce a reasonable belief that the fact in issue is true." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Warren , 169 Conn. 207 , 213 , 363 A.2d 91 (1975). 2002Our Supreme Court has stated that the preponderance of the evidence test "means simply that the evidence must, when considered fairly and impartially, induce a reasonable belief that the fact in issue is true." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Warren , 169 Conn. 207 , 213 , 363 A.2d 91 (1975). | 2 | 1993–2002 |
Cookson v. Cookson
green
2 sentences1994The preponderance of the evidence standard “indicates that the litigants should share equally the risk of error . . . because the interests at stake have roughly equal societal importance. . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. 1987Surely, if the preponderance of the evidence standard is sufficient to satisfy the important issue of modification of custody; Cookson v. Cookson, 201 Conn. 229, 240 , 514 A.2d 323 (1986); that standard also satisfies the degree of proof which is necessary for financial orders. | 2 | 1987–1994 |
Beckwith v. Town of Stratford
green
2 sentences1993Our Supreme Court has stated that the preponderance of the evidence test “means simply that ‘the evidence must, when considered fairly and impartially, induce a reasonable belief that the fact in issue is true.’ Conley v. Board of Education, 143 Conn. 488, 497 , 123 A.2d 547 [1956]; Beckwith v. Stratford, 129 Conn. 506, 507 , 29 A.2d 775 [1942]; Darrow v. Fleischner, 117 Conn. 518, 520 , 169 A. 197 [1933].” State v. Warren, 169 Conn. 207, 213 , 363 A.2d 91 (1975). 1993Our Supreme Court has stated that the preponderance of the evidence test “means simply that ‘the evidence must, when considered fairly and impartially, induce a reasonable belief that the fact in issue is true.’ Conley v. Board of Education, 143 Conn. 488, 497 , 123 A.2d 547 [1956]; Beckwith v. Stratford, 129 Conn. 506, 507 , 29 A.2d 775 [1942]; Darrow v. Fleischner, 117 Conn. 518, 520 , 169 A. 197 [1933].” State v. Warren, 169 Conn. 207, 213 , 363 A.2d 91 (1975). | 2 | 1975–1993 |
Darrow v. Fleischner
green
2 sentences1993Our Supreme Court has stated that the preponderance of the evidence test “means simply that ‘the evidence must, when considered fairly and impartially, induce a reasonable belief that the fact in issue is true.’ Conley v. Board of Education, 143 Conn. 488, 497 , 123 A.2d 547 [1956]; Beckwith v. Stratford, 129 Conn. 506, 507 , 29 A.2d 775 [1942]; Darrow v. Fleischner, 117 Conn. 518, 520 , 169 A. 197 [1933].” State v. Warren, 169 Conn. 207, 213 , 363 A.2d 91 (1975). 1993Our Supreme Court has stated that the preponderance of the evidence test “means simply that ‘the evidence must, when considered fairly and impartially, induce a reasonable belief that the fact in issue is true.’ Conley v. Board of Education, 143 Conn. 488, 497 , 123 A.2d 547 [1956]; Beckwith v. Stratford, 129 Conn. 506, 507 , 29 A.2d 775 [1942]; Darrow v. Fleischner, 117 Conn. 518, 520 , 169 A. 197 [1933].” State v. Warren, 169 Conn. 207, 213 , 363 A.2d 91 (1975). | 2 | 1975–1993 |
Conley v. Board of Education
green
2 sentences1993Our Supreme Court has stated that the preponderance of the evidence test “means simply that ‘the evidence must, when considered fairly and impartially, induce a reasonable belief that the fact in issue is true.’ Conley v. Board of Education, 143 Conn. 488, 497 , 123 A.2d 547 [1956]; Beckwith v. Stratford, 129 Conn. 506, 507 , 29 A.2d 775 [1942]; Darrow v. Fleischner, 117 Conn. 518, 520 , 169 A. 197 [1933].” State v. Warren, 169 Conn. 207, 213 , 363 A.2d 91 (1975). 1975The defendant next claims error in the following ruling made by the trial court: “The defendant is ordered confined to the Connecticut Valley Hospital until such time as he is no longer mentally ill, to the extent that his release would constitute a danger to himself or others, provided that the total period of his confinement shall not exceed twenty-five years, all in conformity with § 53a-47 of the Connecticut Greneral Statutes.” The basis of the defendant’s claim is that such a ruling is not supported by the facts of the case and that the proof offered by the state did not meet the burden o | 2 | 1975–1993 |
Rice v. Rice
green
2 sentences2026Compare, e.g., McCann ex rel. 12 See, e.g., Jizmejian v. Jizmejian, 16 Ariz. App. 270, 274, 492 P.2d 1208 (1972); In re Estate of Rodgers, 149 So. 2d 391, 392 (Fla. App. 1963); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, 679, 535 P.2d 53 (1975), overruled in part on other grounds by Rice v. Rice, 103 Idaho 85, 645 P.2d 319 (1982); In re Estate of Banks, 258 Ill. 2026Compare, e.g., McCann ex rel. 12 See, e.g., Jizmejian v. Jizmejian, 16 Ariz. App. 270, 274, 492 P.2d 1208 (1972); In re Estate of Rodgers, 149 So. 2d 391, 392 (Fla. App. 1963); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, 679, 535 P.2d 53 (1975), overruled in part on other grounds by Rice v. Rice, 103 Idaho 85, 645 P.2d 319 (1982); In re Estate of Banks, 258 Ill. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Cutler
green
1 sentence2022Id., 315 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Kleenit, Inc. v. Sentry Insurance
green
1 sentence2021Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 121 , 125–26 (D. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Washington v. Comm'r of Corr. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Interest of G.L. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Juvenile Appeal v. Commissioner of Children & Youth Services green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Mathews v. Eldridge green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Fernwood Realty, LLC v. Aerocision, LLC. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Busker v. United Illuminating Co. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Weldy v. Northbrook Condominium Ass'n green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| United States v. Arvizu green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Gilbert v. Beaver Dam Ass'n of Stratford, Inc. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Dent v. Lovejoy green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Barber v. Skip Barber Racing School, LLC green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Gilbert v. Beaver Dam Ass'n of Stratford, Inc. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Labow v. Labow green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Mcauley v. Southington Savings Bank green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Labow v. Labow green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Baldwin v. Miles green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Friends of Animals, Inc. v. United Illuminating Co. green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Grant green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Smith green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Smith green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Howard v. MacDonald green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Croce v. Gaynor neutral | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Aaron L. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Rollar Construction & Demolition, Inc. v. Granite Rock Associates, LLC green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| In Re Ryan R. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Pauling green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD) green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.