16 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1992–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
West v. Founders Life Assur. Co. of Floridagreen2 sentences2006The lead opinion contains the following statement: “It is well settled that when the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies to a particular workers’ compensation claim, such as one arising from an injury caused by a sudden trauma, an appellate court will not reverse a judgment based upon a particular finding of fact ‘if that finding is supported by substantial evidence — if that finding is supported by “evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.” ’ Ex parte Trinit 2006The lead opinion contains the following statement: "It is well settled that when the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies to a particular workers' compensation claim, such as one arising from an injury caused by a sudden trauma, an appellate court will not reverse a judgment based upon a particular finding of fact `if that finding is supported by substantial evidence if that finding is supported by "evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved."' Ex parte Trinity | 2 | 2 |
Ex Parte Trinity Industries, Inc.green2 sentences2008Discussion In reversing the trial court’s decision, the Court of Civil Appeals applied the following standard of review: “It is well settled that when the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies to a particular workers’ compensation claim, such as one arising from an injury caused by a sudden trauma, an appellate court will not reverse a judgment based upon a particular finding of fact ‘if that finding is supported by substantial evidence — if that finding is supported by “evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably i 2008Discussion In reversing the trial court's decision, the Court of Civil Appeals applied the following standard of review: "It is well settled that when the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies to a particular workers' compensation claim, such as one arising from an injury caused by a sudden trauma, an appellate court will not reverse a judgment based upon a particular finding of fact `if that finding is supported by substantial evidenceif that finding is supported by "evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably inf | 2 | 2 |
Jwj v. Pkrgreen2 sentences2008See 976 So.2d at 1042 n. 4; and 976 So.2d at 1043 (Pittman, J., joined by Thompson, P.J., concurring in part and concurring in the result). 2008See 976 So.2d at 1042 n. 4; and 976 So.2d at 1043 (Pittman, J., joined by Thompson, P.J., concurring in part and concurring in the result). | 2 | 2 |
Butler Cotton Oil Co. v. Brooksgreen2 sentences2007Butler Cotton Oil Co. v. Brooks , 204 Ala. 195 , 197 , 85 So. 778 , 779 (1920) ("Appellant's motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the transcript was not filed in the office of the clerk within 60 days after the signing of the bill of exceptions . . . is waived by the failure to submit the motion at the time of submission on the merits."). 2007Butler Cotton Oil Co. v. Brooks , 204 Ala. 195 , 197 , 85 So. 778 , 779 (1920) ("Appellant's motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the transcript was not filed in the office of the clerk within 60 days after the signing of the bill of exceptions . . . is waived by the failure to submit the motion at the time of submission on the merits."). | 1 | 1 |
Morrison v. Stategreen2 sentences2005Cf. Morrison v. State , 267 Ala. 1 , 2 , 100 So.2d 744 , 745 (1957) (citing the differences in the burden of proof as a reason that "`"it is generally held that a judgment or opinion in a civil action, or the record of proceedings therein, is not admissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution [employing the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard] involving the same matter"'") (quoting Helms v. State 35 Ala.App. 187 , 188 , 45 So.2d 170 , 171 (1950), quoting in turn 22 C.J.S. 2005Cf. Morrison v. State , 267 Ala. 1 , 2 , 100 So.2d 744 , 745 (1957) (citing the differences in the burden of proof as a reason that "`"it is generally held that a judgment or opinion in a civil action, or the record of proceedings therein, is not admissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution [employing the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard] involving the same matter"'") (quoting Helms v. State 35 Ala.App. 187 , 188 , 45 So.2d 170 , 171 (1950), quoting in turn 22 C.J.S. | 1 | 1 |
Helms v. Stategreen2 sentences2005Cf. Morrison v. State , 267 Ala. 1 , 2 , 100 So.2d 744 , 745 (1957) (citing the differences in the burden of proof as a reason that "`"it is generally held that a judgment or opinion in a civil action, or the record of proceedings therein, is not admissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution [employing the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard] involving the same matter"'") (quoting Helms v. State 35 Ala.App. 187 , 188 , 45 So.2d 170 , 171 (1950), quoting in turn 22 C.J.S. 2005Cf. Morrison v. State , 267 Ala. 1 , 2 , 100 So.2d 744 , 745 (1957) (citing the differences in the burden of proof as a reason that "`"it is generally held that a judgment or opinion in a civil action, or the record of proceedings therein, is not admissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution [employing the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard] involving the same matter"'") (quoting Helms v. State 35 Ala.App. 187 , 188 , 45 So.2d 170 , 171 (1950), quoting in turn 22 C.J.S. | 1 | 1 |
McMillan v. Pennsylvaniared2 sentences1992See McMillan v. Pennsylvania , 477 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 2411 , 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986). 1992See McMillan v. Pennsylvania , 477 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 2411 , 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Sokolow
green
2 sentences2010Although an officer’s reliance on a *633 mere ‘ “hunch” ’ is insufficient to justify a stop, Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 ] at 27 [(1968)], the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard, [United States v.] Sokolow, [ 490 U.S. 1 ] at 7 [(1989)]. [[Image here]] “ ‘ “We think that the approach taken by the Court of Appeals here departs sharply from the teachings of these cases. 2008Although an officer's reliance on a mere "`hunch'" is insufficient to justify a stop, Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 ] at 27 [(1968)], the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard, [ United States v. ] Sokolow, [ 490 U.S. 1 ] at 7 [(1989)]. "`.... "`We think that the approach taken by the Court of Appeals here departs sharply from the teachings of these cases. | 7 | 2002–2010 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2010Although an officer’s reliance on a *633 mere ‘ “hunch” ’ is insufficient to justify a stop, Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 ] at 27 [(1968)], the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard, [United States v.] Sokolow, [ 490 U.S. 1 ] at 7 [(1989)]. [[Image here]] “ ‘ “We think that the approach taken by the Court of Appeals here departs sharply from the teachings of these cases. 2008Although an officer's reliance on a mere "`hunch'" is insufficient to justify a stop, Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 ] at 27 [(1968)], the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard, [ United States v. ] Sokolow, [ 490 U.S. 1 ] at 7 [(1989)]. "`.... "`We think that the approach taken by the Court of Appeals here departs sharply from the teachings of these cases. | 7 | 2002–2010 |
Hobart Corp. v. Scoggins
green
1 sentence2017Cf. Hobart Corp. v. Scoggins , 776 So.2d 56 (Ala. 2000) (leaving in place those portions of the trial court's judgment adjudicating AEMLD liability and awarding compensatory damages under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, even while concluding that the record did not support a finding of clear and convincing evidence of wantonness, thus necessitating reversal of the punitive-damages award under the same count). 3. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Ex Parte Showers
green
1 sentence2007CNH does not cite any statute or caselaw that demonstrates that the standard of proof in unemployment-compensation proceedings is higher than the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in civil cases. 6 "`When an appellant fails to cite any authority for *Page 923 an argument on a particular issue, this Court may affirm the judgment as to that issue, for it is neither this Court's duty nor its function to perform an appellant's legal research.'" Ex parte Showers , 812 So.2d 277 , 281 (Ala. 2001) (citing City of Birmingham v. Business Realty Inv. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
City of Birmingham v. Business Realty Inv. Co.
green
1 sentence2007Co. , 722 So.2d 747 , 752 (Ala. 1998)). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Ex Parte Southern Energy Homes, Inc.
green
2 sentences2006Section 12 — 21—12(d), Ala.Code 1975, defines “substantial evidence” as “evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions as to the existence of the fact sought to be proven.” This has long been explained as “evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.” E.g., West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989) (quoted with approval in Ex parte Southe 2006Section 12-21-12(d), Ala.Code 1975, defines "substantial evidence" as "evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions as to the existence of the fact sought to be proven." This has long been explained as "evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." E.g., West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d *759 870, 871 (Ala.1989) (quoted with approval in Ex parte Sou | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Ex Parte Russell Corporation
green
2 sentences2006However, as the main opinion in Ex parte Russell Corp., 725 So.2d 264 (Ala.1998), indicates, a mere ‘substantial evidence’ standard of appellate review is not to be applied if the ‘clear-and-convincing-proof standard was applicable at trial. 2006However, as the main opinion in Ex parte Russell Corp., 725 So.2d 264 (Ala. 1998), indicates, a mere `substantial evidence' standard of appellate review is not to be applied if the `clear-and-convincing-proof' standard was applicable at trial. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
United States v. Arvizu
green
2 sentences2005United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273-74 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). 2005United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273-74 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Ogden Aviation Services v. Saghy
green
2 sentences2003Ogden Aviation , 32 Va.App. at 96 -100 , 526 S.E.2d at 759 -61 . 2003Ogden Aviation , 32 Va.App. at 96 -100 , 526 S.E.2d at 759 -61 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.