preponderance of the evidence standard in Nebraska

2020See, State v. Hall, 270 Neb. 669 , 708 N.W.2d 209 (2005); State v. Hurbenca, 266 Neb. 853 , 669 N.W.2d 668 (2003).

2020See, State v. Hall, 270 Neb. 669 , 708 N.W.2d 209 (2005); State v. Hurbenca, 266 Neb. 853 , 669 N.W.2d 668 (2003).

2023DORANTES Cite as 314 Neb. 905 [13] Our cases generally recognize that “[u]nless an excep- tion applies, the burden of proof in civil cases requires only the greater weight of the evidence.” 27 Therefore, absent a statute requiring application of a different evidentiary standard, we agree that when SIJ findings are requested in a dissolution action, it is ordinarily appropriate to apply the preponderance of the evidence standard. 28 We apply this familiar standard to our de novo review in this appeal. 3.

2019In the case of State v. Card,14 cited by Agee, the Washington Court of Appeals explained the State had the burden to prove a greater right of possession than the one from whom property was seized, and was thus required to prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is stolen property.”15 Similarly, in the case of DeLoge 9 Agee, supra note 4 , 274 Neb. at 450 , 741 N.W.2d at 166 . 10 Id. 11 Neb.

2019In the case of State v. Card,14 cited by Agee, the Washington Court of Appeals explained the State had the burden to prove a greater right of possession than the one from whom property was seized, and was thus required to prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is stolen property.”15 Similarly, in the case of DeLoge 9 Agee, supra note 4 , 274 Neb. at 450 , 741 N.W.2d at 166 . 10 Id. 11 Neb.

2019Stat. § 27-301 (Reissue 2016). 12 State v. Taylor, 286 Neb. 966 , 840 N.W.2d 526 (2013). 13 See State v. Bain, 292 Neb. 398 , 872 N.W.2d 777 (2016). 14 State v. Card, 48 Wash. App. 781 , 741 P.2d 65 (1987). 15 Id. at 790 , 741 P.2d at 71 . - 403 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 303 Nebraska R eports STATE v. EBERT Cite as 303 Neb. 394 v. State,16 cited by this court in both Agee and McGuire, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that postconviction motions for the return of seized property are civil proceedings to which a preponderance of the evidence standard would apply. [8] We have consist

2019Stat. § 27-301 (Reissue 2016). 12 State v. Taylor, 286 Neb. 966 , 840 N.W.2d 526 (2013). 13 See State v. Bain, 292 Neb. 398 , 872 N.W.2d 777 (2016). 14 State v. Card, 48 Wash. App. 781 , 741 P.2d 65 (1987). 15 Id. at 790 , 741 P.2d at 71 . - 403 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 303 Nebraska R eports STATE v. EBERT Cite as 303 Neb. 394 v. State,16 cited by this court in both Agee and McGuire, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that postconviction motions for the return of seized property are civil proceedings to which a preponderance of the evidence standard would apply. [8] We have consist

2019Stat. § 27-301 (Reissue 2016). 12 State v. Taylor, 286 Neb. 966 , 840 N.W.2d 526 (2013). 13 See State v. Bain, 292 Neb. 398 , 872 N.W.2d 777 (2016). 14 State v. Card, 48 Wash. App. 781 , 741 P.2d 65 (1987). 15 Id. at 790 , 741 P.2d at 71 . - 403 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 303 Nebraska R eports STATE v. EBERT Cite as 303 Neb. 394 v. State,16 cited by this court in both Agee and McGuire, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that postconviction motions for the return of seized property are civil proceedings to which a preponderance of the evidence standard would apply. [8] We have consist

2019Stat. § 27-301 (Reissue 2016). 12 State v. Taylor, 286 Neb. 966 , 840 N.W.2d 526 (2013). 13 See State v. Bain, 292 Neb. 398 , 872 N.W.2d 777 (2016). 14 State v. Card, 48 Wash. App. 781 , 741 P.2d 65 (1987). 15 Id. at 790 , 741 P.2d at 71 . - 403 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 303 Nebraska R eports STATE v. EBERT Cite as 303 Neb. 394 v. State,16 cited by this court in both Agee and McGuire, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that postconviction motions for the return of seized property are civil proceedings to which a preponderance of the evidence standard would apply. [8] We have consist

2018No Due Process R ight to Oral A rgument Cain assigns that the TERC violated his due process rights by not permitting him to argue how the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof applied to the adduced evidence. [8-11] Due process principles protect individuals from arbi- trary deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.12 A party appearing in an adjudication hearing before an agency or tribunal is entitled to due process protections similar to those given to litigants in a judicial proceeding.13 8 Blakely v. Lancaster County, 284 Neb. 659 , 825 N.W.2d 149 (201

2018No Due Process R ight to Oral A rgument Cain assigns that the TERC violated his due process rights by not permitting him to argue how the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof applied to the adduced evidence. [8-11] Due process principles protect individuals from arbi- trary deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.12 A party appearing in an adjudication hearing before an agency or tribunal is entitled to due process protections similar to those given to litigants in a judicial proceeding.13 8 Blakely v. Lancaster County, 284 Neb. 659 , 825 N.W.2d 149 (201

2018No Due Process R ight to Oral A rgument Cain assigns that the TERC violated his due process rights by not permitting him to argue how the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof applied to the adduced evidence. [8-11] Due process principles protect individuals from arbi- trary deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.12 A party appearing in an adjudication hearing before an agency or tribunal is entitled to due process protections similar to those given to litigants in a judicial proceeding.13 8 Blakely v. Lancaster County, 284 Neb. 659 , 825 N.W.2d 149 (201

2018No Due Process R ight to Oral A rgument Cain assigns that the TERC violated his due process rights by not permitting him to argue how the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof applied to the adduced evidence. [8-11] Due process principles protect individuals from arbi- trary deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.12 A party appearing in an adjudication hearing before an agency or tribunal is entitled to due process protections similar to those given to litigants in a judicial proceeding.13 8 Blakely v. Lancaster County, 284 Neb. 659 , 825 N.W.2d 149 (201

2018App. 35 , 624 N.W.2d 328 (2001). - 841 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 298 Nebraska R eports CAIN v. CUSTER CTY.

2018No Due Process R ight to Oral A rgument Cain assigns that the TERC violated his due process rights by not permitting him to argue how the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof applied to the adduced evidence. [8-11] Due process principles protect individuals from arbi- trary deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.12 A party appearing in an adjudication hearing before an agency or tribunal is entitled to due process protections similar to those given to litigants in a judicial proceeding.13 8 Blakely v. Lancaster County, 284 Neb. 659 , 825 N.W.2d 149 (201

2018No Due Process R ight to Oral A rgument Cain assigns that the TERC violated his due process rights by not permitting him to argue how the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof applied to the adduced evidence. [8-11] Due process principles protect individuals from arbi- trary deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.12 A party appearing in an adjudication hearing before an agency or tribunal is entitled to due process protections similar to those given to litigants in a judicial proceeding.13 8 Blakely v. Lancaster County, 284 Neb. 659 , 825 N.W.2d 149 (201

2018No Due Process R ight to Oral A rgument Cain assigns that the TERC violated his due process rights by not permitting him to argue how the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof applied to the adduced evidence. [8-11] Due process principles protect individuals from arbi- trary deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.12 A party appearing in an adjudication hearing before an agency or tribunal is entitled to due process protections similar to those given to litigants in a judicial proceeding.13 8 Blakely v. Lancaster County, 284 Neb. 659 , 825 N.W.2d 149 (201

2018No Due Process R ight to Oral A rgument Cain assigns that the TERC violated his due process rights by not permitting him to argue how the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof applied to the adduced evidence. [8-11] Due process principles protect individuals from arbi- trary deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.12 A party appearing in an adjudication hearing before an agency or tribunal is entitled to due process protections similar to those given to litigants in a judicial proceeding.13 8 Blakely v. Lancaster County, 284 Neb. 659 , 825 N.W.2d 149 (201

2018No Due Process R ight to Oral A rgument Cain assigns that the TERC violated his due process rights by not permitting him to argue how the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof applied to the adduced evidence. [8-11] Due process principles protect individuals from arbi- trary deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.12 A party appearing in an adjudication hearing before an agency or tribunal is entitled to due process protections similar to those given to litigants in a judicial proceeding.13 8 Blakely v. Lancaster County, 284 Neb. 659 , 825 N.W.2d 149 (201

2018No Due Process R ight to Oral A rgument Cain assigns that the TERC violated his due process rights by not permitting him to argue how the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof applied to the adduced evidence. [8-11] Due process principles protect individuals from arbi- trary deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.12 A party appearing in an adjudication hearing before an agency or tribunal is entitled to due process protections similar to those given to litigants in a judicial proceeding.13 8 Blakely v. Lancaster County, 284 Neb. 659 , 825 N.W.2d 149 (201

2018No Due Process R ight to Oral A rgument Cain assigns that the TERC violated his due process rights by not permitting him to argue how the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof applied to the adduced evidence. [8-11] Due process principles protect individuals from arbi- trary deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.12 A party appearing in an adjudication hearing before an agency or tribunal is entitled to due process protections similar to those given to litigants in a judicial proceeding.13 8 Blakely v. Lancaster County, 284 Neb. 659 , 825 N.W.2d 149 (201

2018No Due Process R ight to Oral A rgument Cain assigns that the TERC violated his due process rights by not permitting him to argue how the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof applied to the adduced evidence. [8-11] Due process principles protect individuals from arbi- trary deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.12 A party appearing in an adjudication hearing before an agency or tribunal is entitled to due process protections similar to those given to litigants in a judicial proceeding.13 8 Blakely v. Lancaster County, 284 Neb. 659 , 825 N.W.2d 149 (201

2018No Due Process R ight to Oral A rgument Cain assigns that the TERC violated his due process rights by not permitting him to argue how the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof applied to the adduced evidence. [8-11] Due process principles protect individuals from arbi- trary deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.12 A party appearing in an adjudication hearing before an agency or tribunal is entitled to due process protections similar to those given to litigants in a judicial proceeding.13 8 Blakely v. Lancaster County, 284 Neb. 659 , 825 N.W.2d 149 (201

2005Hurbenca, supra. We have also stated that “in order to establish evidence’s sufficient probative force to prove an earlier conviction for the purpose of sentence enhancement, the evidence must, with some trustworthiness, reflect a court’s act of rendering judgment.” State v. Gales, 269 Neb. 443, 478, 694 N.W.2d 124, 157 (2005), citing State v. Linn, 248 Neb. 809 , 539 N.W.2d 435 (1995).

2005Hurbenca, supra. We have also stated that “in order to establish evidence’s sufficient probative force to prove an earlier conviction for the purpose of sentence enhancement, the evidence must, with some trustworthiness, reflect a court’s act of rendering judgment.” State v. Gales, 269 Neb. 443, 478, 694 N.W.2d 124, 157 (2005), citing State v. Linn, 248 Neb. 809 , 539 N.W.2d 435 (1995).

1999Just as the improper allocation of the burden of proof "will create the danger that the legitimate utterance will be penalized" and may therefore cause persons to "steer far wider of the unlawful zone," Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 , 78 S.Ct. 1332 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958), the application of a preponderance of the evidence standard, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could cause affected persons to be overly careful about the material in which they deal.

1999Just as the improper allocation of the burden of proof "will create the danger that the legitimate utterance will be penalized" and may therefore cause persons to "steer far wider of the unlawful zone," Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 , 78 S.Ct. 1332 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958), the application of a preponderance of the evidence standard, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could cause affected persons to be overly careful about the material in which they deal.

1999Having determined that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the most appropriate standard in civil obscenity cases, instituted pursuant to § 28-820, we proceed in analyzing the works in question under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 , 93 S. Ct. 2607 , 37 L.

1999Having determined that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the most appropriate standard in civil obscenity cases, instituted pursuant to § 28-820, we proceed in analyzing the works in question under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 , 93 S. Ct. 2607 , 37 L.

1993In Gandhi v. Medical Examining Board, 168 Wis. 2d 299 , 483 N.W.2d 295 (Wis. App. 1992), the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin held that application of the preponderance of the evidence standard to physicians did not violate due process or equal protection.

1993In Gandhi v. Medical Examining Board, 168 Wis. 2d 299 , 483 N.W.2d 295 (Wis. App. 1992), the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin held that application of the preponderance of the evidence standard to physicians did not violate due process or equal protection.

1993The court reasoned as follows: In Ettinger v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 853, 856 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 601 , the court held the “clear and convincing proof to a reasonable certainty” standard of proof applies at Board administrative proceedings to revoke or suspend a medical license.

1993The court reasoned as follows: In Ettinger v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 853, 856 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 601 , the court held the “clear and convincing proof to a reasonable certainty” standard of proof applies at Board administrative proceedings to revoke or suspend a medical license.

1993Recently, the California Court of Appeal, in Silva v. Superior Court (Heerhartz), 14 Cal. App. 4th 562 , 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 577 (1993), held that the clear and convincing evidence standard, rather than the preponderance of the evidence standard, applies at hearings on applications for interim orders suspending or imposing restrictions on licenses of medical care professionals.

1993Recently, the California Court of Appeal, in Silva v. Superior Court (Heerhartz), 14 Cal. App. 4th 562 , 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 577 (1993), held that the clear and convincing evidence standard, rather than the preponderance of the evidence standard, applies at hearings on applications for interim orders suspending or imposing restrictions on licenses of medical care professionals.

1985For a discussion of the difference between proving *263 fraud in equity as distinguished from fraud at law, see Peters v. Woodman Accident & Life Co., 170 Neb. 861 , 104 N.W.2d 490 (1960).

1985For a discussion of the difference between proving *263 fraud in equity as distinguished from fraud at law, see Peters v. Woodman Accident & Life Co., 170 Neb. 861 , 104 N.W.2d 490 (1960).