preponderance of the evidence standard in Kentucky

2026“The preponderance of the evidence standard is satisfied when sufficient evidence establishes the alleged victim was more likely than not to have been a victim of domestic violence.” Caudill v. Caudill, 318 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Ky. App. 2010) (citing Baird v. Baird, 234 S.W.3d 385, 387 (Ky. App. 2007)).

2025“The preponderance of the evidence standard is satisfied when sufficient evidence establishes the alleged victim was more likely than not to have been a victim of domestic violence.” Caudill v. Caudill, 318 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Ky. App. 2010) (citing Baird v. Baird, 234 S.W.3d 385, 387 (Ky. App. 2007)).

2026“The preponderance of the evidence standard is satisfied when sufficient evidence establishes the alleged victim was more likely than not to have been a victim of domestic violence.” Caudill v. Caudill, 318 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Ky. App. 2010) (citing Baird v. Baird, 234 S.W.3d 385, 387 (Ky. App. 2007)).

2026“The preponderance of the evidence standard is satisfied when sufficient evidence establishes the alleged victim was more likely than not to have been a victim of domestic violence.” Johnston v. Johnston, 639 S.W.3d 428 , 431 (Ky. App. 2021) (quoting Caudill v. Caudill, 318 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Ky. App. 2010)).

2024The preponderance of the evidence standard is met when sufficient evidence establishes that the alleged victim “was more likely than not to have been a victim of domestic violence.” Commonwealth v. Anderson, 934 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Ky. 1996).

2023“The preponderance of the evidence standard is met when sufficient evidence establishes that the alleged victim ‘was more likely than not to have been a victim of domestic violence.’” Baird v. Baird, 234 S.W.3d 385, 387 (Ky. App. 2007) (quoting Commonwealth v. Anderson, 934 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Ky. 1996)).

2026“The preponderance of the evidence standard is satisfied when sufficient evidence establishes the alleged victim was more likely than not to have been a victim of domestic violence.” Dunn, 546 S.W.3d at 580 .

2026“The preponderance of the evidence standard is satisfied when sufficient evidence establishes the alleged victim was more likely than not to have been a victim of domestic violence.” Dunn v. Thacker, supra, at 580 .

2025“The preponderance of the evidence standard is met when sufficient evidence establishes that the alleged victim was more likely than not to have been a victim of domestic violence.” Gomez, 254 S.W.3d at 842 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2022The preponderance of the evidence standard is met when sufficient evidence establishes that the alleged victim was “more likely than not to have been a victim of domestic violence.” Gomez v. Gomez, 254 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Ky. App. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2026“A competency determination is based on the preponderance of the evidence standard.” Keeling v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 248, 262 (Ky. 2012) (citing Chapman v. Commonwealth, 265 S.W.3d 156, 174 (Ky. 2007)). “[A trial] court’s determination of competency is a factual finding.” United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 855 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Bishop v. Caudill, 118 S.W.3d 159, 161 (Ky. 2003).

2025“A competency determination is based on the preponderance of the evidence standard.” Keeling v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 248, 262 (Ky. 2012) (citing Chapman v. Commonwealth, 265 S.W.3d 156, 174 (Ky. 2007)); see Alley, 160 S.W.3d at 739; Dunlap v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.3d 537, 554-57 (Ky. 2013). “[A trial] court’s determination of competency is a factual finding.” United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 855 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Bishop v. Caudill, 118 S.W.3d 159, 161 (Ky. 2003) (discussing the trial court’s discretion to determine competency).

2025“The definition of domestic violence and abuse, found in KRS 403.720(1) [now KRS 403.720(2)], includes ‘physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, -6- or assault between family members.’” Abdur-Rahman v. Peterson, 338 S.W.3d 823, 825 (Ky. App. 2011).

2025“The definition of domestic violence and abuse, found in KRS 403.720(1) [now KRS 403.720(2)], includes ‘physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, or assault between family members.’” Abdur-Rahman v. Peterson, 338 S.W.3d 823, 825 (Ky. App. 2011).

2022Additionally, CR 52.01 provides that a trial court’s “[f]indings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” See also Reichle v. Reichle, 719 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Ky. 1986).

2022Additionally, CR 2 52.01 provides that a trial court’s “[f]indings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” See also Reichle v. Reichle, 719 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Ky. 1986).

2026“A competency determination is based on the preponderance of the evidence standard.” Keeling v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 248, 262 (Ky. 2012) (citing Chapman v. Commonwealth, 265 S.W.3d 156, 174 (Ky. 2007)). “[A trial] court’s determination of competency is a factual finding.” United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 855 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Bishop v. Caudill, 118 S.W.3d 159, 161 (Ky. 2003).

2025“A competency determination is based on the preponderance of the evidence standard.” Keeling v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 248, 262 (Ky. 2012) (citing Chapman v. Commonwealth, 265 S.W.3d 156, 174 (Ky. 2007)); see Alley, 160 S.W.3d at 739; Dunlap v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.3d 537, 554-57 (Ky. 2013). “[A trial] court’s determination of competency is a factual finding.” United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 855 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Bishop v. Caudill, 118 S.W.3d 159, 161 (Ky. 2003) (discussing the trial court’s discretion to determine competency).

2023Pettingill v. Pettingill, 480 S.W.3d 920, 925 (Ky. 2015) (holding that a complete and accurate AOC Form 275.3 with a box checked under the “Additional Findings” section along with factual findings made on a docket sheet is sufficient); Smith v. McCoy, 635 S.W.3d 811 , 813-17 (Ky. 2021) (stating that a complete and accurate AOC Form 275.3 with a box checked under the “Additional Findings” section along with a pre-typed regularly used Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law form incorporating oral findings made on the record was sufficient); cf. Thurman v. Thurman, 560 S.W.3d 884, 887 (Ky. App.

2023“The predictive nature of the standard requires the family court to consider the totality of the circumstances and weigh the risk of future violence against issuing a protective order.” Pettingill v. Pettingill, 480 S.W.3d 920, 925 (Ky. 2015).

2026“The preponderance of the evidence standard is satisfied when sufficient evidence establishes the alleged victim was more likely than not to have been a victim of domestic violence.” Johnston v. Johnston, 639 S.W.3d 428 , 431 (Ky. App. 2021) (quoting Caudill v. Caudill, 318 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Ky. App. 2010)). 3 Kentucky Revised Statutes. -4- However, a DVO “cannot be granted solely on the basis of the contents of the petition.” Rankin v. Criswell, 277 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Ky. App. 2008).

2026A domestic violence order, however, “cannot be granted solely on the basis of the contents of the petition.” Rankin v. Criswell, 277 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Ky. App. 2008).

2025See id. (quoting Thompson v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 22, 32 (Ky. 2004)) (“Competency determinations are made based on a preponderance of the evidence standard.”).

2012“A competency determination is based on the preponderance of the evidence standard.” Chapman v. Commonwealth, 265 S.W.3d 156, 174 (Ky.2007) (citing Thompson, 147 S.W.3d at 32 ).

2026“A competency determination is based on the preponderance of the evidence standard.” Keeling v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 248, 262 (Ky. 2012) (citing Chapman v. Commonwealth, 265 S.W.3d 156, 174 (Ky. 2007)). “[A trial] court’s determination of competency is a factual finding.” United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 855 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Bishop v. Caudill, 118 S.W.3d 159, 161 (Ky. 2003).

2025“A competency determination is based on the preponderance of the evidence standard.” Keeling v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 248, 262 (Ky. 2012) (citing Chapman v. Commonwealth, 265 S.W.3d 156, 174 (Ky. 2007)); see Alley, 160 S.W.3d at 739; Dunlap v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.3d 537, 554-57 (Ky. 2013). “[A trial] court’s determination of competency is a factual finding.” United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 855 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Bishop v. Caudill, 118 S.W.3d 159, 161 (Ky. 2003) (discussing the trial court’s discretion to determine competency).

2026“A competency determination is based on the preponderance of the evidence standard.” Keeling v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 248, 262 (Ky. 2012) (citing Chapman v. Commonwealth, 265 S.W.3d 156, 174 (Ky. 2007)). “[A trial] court’s determination of competency is a factual finding.” United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 855 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Bishop v. Caudill, 118 S.W.3d 159, 161 (Ky. 2003).

2025“A competency determination is based on the preponderance of the evidence standard.” Keeling v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 248, 262 (Ky. 2012) (citing Chapman v. Commonwealth, 265 S.W.3d 156, 174 (Ky. 2007)); see Alley, 160 S.W.3d at 739; Dunlap v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.3d 537, 554-57 (Ky. 2013). “[A trial] court’s determination of competency is a factual finding.” United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 855 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Bishop v. Caudill, 118 S.W.3d 159, 161 (Ky. 2003) (discussing the trial court’s discretion to determine competency).

2025A family court’s findings are not clearly erroneous if they are “supported by substantial evidence.” Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003) (citation omitted).

2025A family court’s findings are not clearly erroneous if they are “supported by substantial evidence.” Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003) (citation omitted).

2023KRS 403.720(1) defines “[d]omestic violence and abuse” as “physical injury, serious physical injury, stalking, sexual abuse, strangulation, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, strangulation, or assault between family members or members of an unmarried couple[.]” As an appellate court, we review the Family Court’s issuance of a DVO to determine “whether the court's findings were clearly erroneous or . . . it abused its discretion.” Holt v. Holt, 458 S.W.3d 806, 812 (Ky. App. 2015) (citation omitted).

2021KRS 403.720(1) defines “[d]omestic violence and abuse” as “physical injury, serious physical injury, stalking, sexual abuse, strangulation, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, strangulation, or assault between family members or members of an unmarried couple[.]” As an 2 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 Kentucky Revised Statutes. -4- appellate court, we review the family court’s issuance of a DVO to determine “whether the court’s findings were clearly erroneous or . . . it abused its discretion.” Holt v. Holt, 458 S.W.3d 806

2023“A [family] court’s findings of fact will only be disturbed if clearly erroneous.” Halloway v. Simmons, 532 S.W.3d 158, 161 (Ky. App. 2017) (citations omitted).

2021“A [family] court’s findings of fact will only be disturbed if clearly erroneous.” Halloway v. Simmons, 532 S.W.3d 158, 161 (Ky. App. 2017) (citations omitted).

2020“While a mere ‘hunch’ is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of -9- satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Commonwealth v. Marr, 250 S.W.3d 624, 627 (Ky. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2020Furthermore, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause and “it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” -6- Commonwealth v. Marr, 250 S.W.3d 624, 627 (Ky. 2008) (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 , 122 S. Ct. at 751 ).

2012See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (holding that a preponderance of the evidence standard to allow termination "violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" and that termination must be justified by at least clear and convincing evidence).

2012See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (holding that a preponderance of the evidence standard to allow termination "violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" and that termination must be justified by at least clear and convincing evidence).

2024However, “the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard[.]” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 , 122 S. Ct. 744, 751 , 151 L.

2024However, “the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard[.]” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 , 122 S. Ct. 744, 751 , 151 L.

2026Id. at 427, 431 .

2019“The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754-55 (1982) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

2024“Reasonable, articulable suspicion” is a much lower burden for the Commonwealth than that of “probable cause.” “Although an officer’s reliance on a mere hunch is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Baltimore v. Commonwealth, 119 S.W.3d 532, 539 (Ky. App. 2003) (internal quotation marks, footnotes and citations omitted).

2006Furthermore, the court held that “ ‘the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 , 122 S.Ct. 744, 751 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002)); see also Commonwealth v. Banks, 68 S.W.3d 347, 351 (Ky.2001) (“Thus, if nonthreatening contraband is immediately apparent to the officer from the sense of touch while the officer is conducting a lawful pat-down search, the officer is not required to ignore the contraband and c

2020“Reasonable suspicion is the lowest tier of the pyramid comprised of probable cause (level two) and preponderance of the evidence (level three): ‘the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying the preponderance of the evidence standard.’” Baker v. Commonwealth, 475 S.W.3d 633, 634 (Ky. App. 2015) (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 122 S. Ct. 744 , 151 L.

2018"Reasonable suspicion is the lowest tier of the pyramid comprised of probable cause (level two) and preponderance of the evidence (level three): 'the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying the preponderance of the evidence standard.' " Baker v. Commonwealth , 475 S.W.3d 633 , 634 (Ky. App. 2015) (quoting United States v. Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266 , 274, 122 S.Ct. 744 , 751, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) ).

2026Ashley v. Ashley, 520 S.W.3d 400, 404 (Ky. App. 2017).

2025“A competency determination is based on the preponderance of the evidence standard.” Keeling v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 248, 262 (Ky. 2012) (citing Chapman v. Commonwealth, 265 S.W.3d 156, 174 (Ky. 2007)); see Alley, 160 S.W.3d at 739; Dunlap v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.3d 537, 554-57 (Ky. 2013). “[A trial] court’s determination of competency is a factual finding.” United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 855 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Bishop v. Caudill, 118 S.W.3d 159, 161 (Ky. 2003) (discussing the trial court’s discretion to determine competency).