preponderance of the evidence standard in Georgia

2020“The trial court determines the admissibility of a defendant’s statement under the preponderance of the evidence standard considering the totality of the circumstances.” (Citation omitted.) Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 176 ( 657 SE2d 863 ) (2008).

2020“The trial court determines the admissibility of a defendant’s statement under the preponderance of the evidence standard considering the totality of the circumstances.” (Citation omitted.) Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 176 ( 657 SE2d 863 ) (2008).

2021Although we defer to the trial court’s findings of disputed facts, we review de novo the trial court’s application of the law to the facts.” Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 822-23 (1) (725 SE2d 260) (2012) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2021Although we defer to the trial court’s findings of disputed facts, we review de novo the trial court’s application of the law to the facts.” Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 822-23 (1) (725 SE2d 260) (2012) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2018Preliminary questions shall be resolved by a preponderance of the evidence standard."); Anglin v. State , 302 Ga. 333 , 335 (2), 806 S.E.2d 573 (2017) ("The admission of evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's decision whether to admit or exclude evidence will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.") (citation omitted).

2018Preliminary questions shall be resolved by a preponderance of the evidence standard."); Anglin v. State , 302 Ga. 333 , 335 (2), 806 S.E.2d 573 (2017) ("The admission of evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's decision whether to admit or exclude evidence will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.") (citation omitted).

2017See Sosniak v. State, 287 Ga. 279, 279 (1) ( 695 SE2d 604 ) (2010) (“‘The trial court determines the admissibility of a defendant’s statement under the preponderance of the evidence standard considering the totality of the 2 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 ( 84 SCt 1774 , 12 LE2d 908) (1964). 3 At trial, before having a law enforcement officer testify about the April 15 interview with appellant, the prosecutor stated that he thought that the defense was waiving appellant’s right to a Jackson-Denno hearing.

2017See Sosniak v. State, 287 Ga. 279, 279 (1) ( 695 SE2d 604 ) (2010) (“‘The trial court determines the admissibility of a defendant’s statement under the preponderance of the evidence standard considering the totality of the 2 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 ( 84 SCt 1774 , 12 LE2d 908) (1964). 3 At trial, before having a law enforcement officer testify about the April 15 interview with appellant, the prosecutor stated that he thought that the defense was waiving appellant’s right to a Jackson-Denno hearing.

1985See Brooks v. State, 244 Ga. 574, 581 (2) ( 261 SE2d 379 ).

1985See Brooks v. State, 244 Ga. 574, 581 (2) ( 261 SE2d 379 ).

2021See Hill, 269 Ga. at 303-304 (4). 40 standard of proof has been challenged several times in this Court on constitutional grounds, particularly in light of the fact that some other states impose only a clear and convincing evidence standard on defendants seeking to prove their intellectual disability and the majority of states that still have the death penalty impose only a preponderance of the evidence standard on defendants.

2021See Hill, 269 Ga. at 303-304 (4). 41 Head v. Hill, 277 Ga. 255, 260-263 (II) (B) ( 587 SE2d 613 ) (2003)).

2005Techwerks contends the jury’s award of punitive damages was not authorized because the evidence of willful misconduct on the part of the defendants was not “clear and convincing,” as required by OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (b). “[Cjlear and convincing evidence is an intermediate standard of proof, requiring a higher minimum level of proof than the preponderance of the evidence standard, but less than that required for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Clarke v. Cotton, 263 Ga. 861, 862, n. 1 ( 440 SE2d 165 ) (1994).

2005Techwerks contends the jury’s award of punitive damages was not authorized because the evidence of willful misconduct on the part of the defendants was not “clear and convincing,” as required by OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (b). “[Cjlear and convincing evidence is an intermediate standard of proof, requiring a higher minimum level of proof than the preponderance of the evidence standard, but less than that required for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Clarke v. Cotton, 263 Ga. 861, 862, n. 1 ( 440 SE2d 165 ) (1994).

2021See Hill, 269 Ga. at 303-304 (4). 41 Head v. Hill, 277 Ga. 255, 260-263 (II) (B) ( 587 SE2d 613 ) (2003)).

2021See Hill, 269 Ga. at 303-304 (4). 41 Head v. Hill, 277 Ga. 255, 260-263 (II) (B) ( 587 SE2d 613 ) (2003)).

2021See Raulerson v. Warden, 928 F3d 987, 1013-1014 (I) (B) (11th Cir. 2019) (Jordan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the varying standards of proof applied).

2021See Raulerson v. Warden, 928 F3d 987, 1013-1014 (I) (B) (11th Cir. 2019) (Jordan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the varying standards of proof applied).

2018We agree that the current record contains no clear and convincing evidence that termination of the guardianship would cause K.M. physical or long-term emotional harm. 8 See Clarke v. Cotton , 207 Ga.App. 883 , 884, 429 S.E.2d 291 (1993) (under Georgia law, " 'clear and convincing evidence' is 'an intermediate standard of proof' ... which is greater than the preponderance of the evidence standard ordinarily employed in civil proceedings, but less than the reasonable doubt standard applicable in criminal proceedings"), quoting Santosky v. Kramer , 455 U.S. 745 , 756, 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d

2018We agree that the current record contains no clear and convincing evidence that termination of the guardianship would cause K.M. physical or long-term emotional harm. 8 See Clarke v. Cotton , 207 Ga.App. 883 , 884, 429 S.E.2d 291 (1993) (under Georgia law, " 'clear and convincing evidence' is 'an intermediate standard of proof' ... which is greater than the preponderance of the evidence standard ordinarily employed in civil proceedings, but less than the reasonable doubt standard applicable in criminal proceedings"), quoting Santosky v. Kramer , 455 U.S. 745 , 756, 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d

2026D., 346 Ga. App. at 259 (1) (punctuation omitted). “[C]lear and convincing evidence is an intermediate standard of proof which is greater than the preponderance of the evidence standard ordinarily employed in civil proceedings, but less than the reasonable doubt standard applicable in criminal proceedings.” In the Interest of K.

2019D., 346 Ga. App. 257, 259 (1) ( 816 SE2d 132 ) (2018) (punctuation and footnote omitted). “[Under] Georgia law, clear and convincing evidence is an intermediate standard of proof which is greater than the preponderance of the evidence standard ordinarily employed in civil proceedings, but less than the reasonable doubt standard applicable in criminal proceedings.” In the Interest of K. 16 M., 344 Ga. App. 838, 847 (2) ( 811 SE2d 505 ) (2018) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2022“In deciding the admissibility of a statement during a Jackson- Denno[ 9] hearing, the trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances and must determine the admissibility of the statement under the preponderance of the evidence standard.” Munn v. State, 313 Ga. 716, 726-27 (7) (873 SE2d 166) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2022“In deciding the admissibility of a statement during a Jackson- Denno[ 9] hearing, the trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances and must determine the admissibility of the statement under the preponderance of the evidence standard.” Munn v. State, 313 Ga. 716, 726-27 (7) (873 SE2d 166) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2024See also Reid v. State, 306 Ga. 769, 778-779 ( 833 SE2d 100 ) (2019).

2024See also Reid v. State, 306 Ga. 769, 778-779 ( 833 SE2d 100 ) (2019).

2024See Westbrook v. State, 308 Ga. 92, 100-101 ( 839 SE2d 620 ) (2020) (rejecting, under plain error review, argument that audio recording of jail call was not properly authenticated where the State presented similar testimony as to the recording process); OCGA § 24-1-104 (a) (“Preliminary questions shall be resolved by a preponderance of the evidence standard.”).

2024See Westbrook v. State, 308 Ga. 92, 100-101 ( 839 SE2d 620 ) (2020) (rejecting, under plain error review, argument that audio recording of jail call was not properly authenticated where the State presented similar testimony as to the recording process); OCGA § 24-1-104 (a) (“Preliminary questions shall be resolved by a preponderance of the evidence standard.”).

2024Thus, on appeal from an order of restitution, “we determine whether the evidence was sufficient, under the preponderance of the evidence standard, to support that order, including the amount of restitution.” Watts v. State, 321 Ga. App. 289, 295 (3) ( 739 SE2d 129 ) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2024Thus, on appeal from an order of restitution, “we determine whether the evidence was sufficient, under the preponderance of the evidence standard, to support that order, including the amount of restitution.” Watts v. State, 321 Ga. App. 289, 295 (3) ( 739 SE2d 129 ) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2024A primary goal of restitution is, “as nearly as possible, to make the victim whole.” Barnes v. State, 239 Ga. App. 495, 500 (2) ( 521 SE2d 425 ) (1999) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2024A primary goal of restitution is, “as nearly as possible, to make the victim whole.” Barnes v. State, 239 Ga. App. 495, 500 (2) ( 521 SE2d 425 ) (1999) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2024See Bradshaw v. State, 296 Ga. 650, 656 n.4 (3) (769 SE2d 892) (2015) (“Our new Evidence Code . . . adopted the preponderance of the evidence standard for preliminary factual questions regarding the admissibility of evidence.” (citation omitted)); Rule 104 (a).17 Under 17 In full, Rule 104 provides: (a) Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this Code section.

2024See Bradshaw v. State, 296 Ga. 650, 656 n.4 (3) (769 SE2d 892) (2015) (“Our new Evidence Code . . . adopted the preponderance of the evidence standard for preliminary factual questions regarding the admissibility of evidence.” (citation omitted)); Rule 104 (a).17 Under 17 In full, Rule 104 provides: (a) Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this Code section.

2019See Yarbrough v. Decatur Housing Authority , 905 F.3d 1222 , 1226-1227 (11 th Cir. 2018) (William Pryor, J., concurring).

2019See Yarbrough v. Decatur Housing Auth., 905 F3d 1222, 1226-1227 (11th Cir. 2018) (William Pryor, J., concurring).

2015The Court also noted that, although the petitioner initially argued that the government was required to prove the other crime by clear and convincing evidence, the petitioner properly conceded at oral argument that his position was wrong in light of the Court’s decision in Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U. S. 171 ( 107 SCt 2775 , 97 LE2d 144) (1987), in which the Court held that “preliminary factual findings under Rule 104 (a) are subject to the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.” Huddleston, 485 U. S. at 687, n. 5 .

2015With regard to intent, “[a] defendant who enters a not guilty plea makes intent a material issue which imposes a substantial burden on the government to prove intent, which it may prove by qualifying Rule 404 (b) evidence absent affirmative steps by the defendant to remove intent evidence, the petitioner properly conceded at oral argument that his position was wrong in light of the Court’s decision in Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U. S. 171 ( 107 SCt 2775 , 97 LE2d 144) (1987), in which the Court held that “preliminary factual findings under Rule 104 (a) are subject to the preponderance-of-t

2014Davis, 547 U. S. at 833 (TV) (“We take no position on the standards necessary to demonstrate such forfeiture, but federal courts using Federal Rule of Evidence 804 (b) (6), which codifies the forfeiture doctrine, have generally held the Government to the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.

2014The friend then went to Jones’s house around 2:30 p.m., just as Jones’s older daughter was returning home 26 Davis, 547 U.S. at 833 (IV) (“We take no position on the standards necessary to demonstrate such forfeiture, but federal courts using Federal Rule of Evidence 804 (b) (6), which codifies the forfeiture doctrine, have generally held the Government to the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.

2014Wright v. State, 297 Ga. App. 813, 816 ( 678 SE2d 506 ) (2009).

2014Wright v. State, 297 Ga. App. 813, 816 ( 678 SE2d 506 ) (2009).

2013“On appeal, when we review the denial of a motion to suppress a statement, we owe no deference to the way in which the trial court resolved questions of law, but we generally accept its findings about questions of fact and credibility unless clearly erroneous.” (Citation and footnote omitted.) Edenfield v. State, 293 Ga. 370, 374 ( 744 SE2d 738 ) (2013).

2013“On appeal, when we review the denial of a motion to suppress a statement, we owe no deference to the way in which the trial court resolved questions of law, but we generally accept its findings about questions of fact and credibility unless clearly erroneous.” (Citation and footnote omitted.) Edenfield v. State, 293 Ga. 370, 374 ( 744 SE2d 738 ) (2013).

2020“The trial court determines the admissibility of a defendant’s statement under the preponderance of the evidence standard 4 378 U. S. 368 ( 84 SCt 1774 , 12 LE2d 908) (1964). considering the totality of the circumstances.” Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 176 ( 657 SE2d 863 ) (2008).

2020“The trial court determines the admissibility of a defendant’s statement under the preponderance of the evidence standard 4 378 U. S. 368 ( 84 SCt 1774 , 12 LE2d 908) (1964). considering the totality of the circumstances.” Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 176 ( 657 SE2d 863 ) (2008).

2020Such arguments are not evidence, and the trial court erred to the extent it relied on such arguments in making its ruling.” (emphasis omitted)). 8 See Overby v. State, 315 Ga. App. 735, 738-39 ( 728 SE2d 278 ) (2012) (holding that vague testimony was insufficient to meet preponderance of the evidence standard of proof); Anderson v. State, 212 Ga. App. 329, 330 ( 442 SE2d 268 ) (1994) (“There was ‘slight’ evidence that defendant committed the alleged violation; but there was not a ‘preponderance’ of evidence.”); see also In re Nora, 581 BR 870 , 879 (1) (USBC D Minn. 2018) (explaining, in the c

2005Anderson v. State, 212 Ga. App. 329 ( 442 SE2d 268 ) (1994) (slight evidence that defendant committed the alleged violation, but not a preponderance of the evidence).