preponderance of the evidence standard in Colorado

2011Standard of Review The preponderance of the evidence standard applies to both the adjudicatory and dispositional stages of a dependency and neglect proceeding. §§ 19-3-505(1), 19-3-508(2), C.R.S.2010; L.L. v. People, 10 P.3d 1271, 1277 (Colo.2000); People in Interest of S.G.L., 214 P.3d 580, 583 (Colo.App.2009).

2011Standard of Review The preponderance of the evidence standard applies to both the adjudicatory and dispositional stages of a dependency and ne-gleet proceeding. §§ 19-3-505(1), 19-8-508(2), C.R.S.2010; L.L. v. People, 10 P.3d 1271, 1277 (Colo.2000); People in Interest of S.G.L., 214 P.Bd 580, 583 (Colo.App.2009).

2023D., 648 P.2d 625, 640 (Colo. 1982) (“[T]he application of the preponderance of the evidence standard for all purposes in the underlying dependency or neglect determination comports with due process of law.”); Z.P.S., ¶ 10, 369 P.3d at 816–17 (providing that the “preponderance of the evidence standard applies to both the adjudicatory and dispositional stages of a dependency and neglect proceeding” (quoting People in Int. of L.B., 254 P.3d 1203, 1208 (Colo. App. 2011))). ¶33 These different burdens exist because termination is the only disposition that permanently deprives parents of their funda

2023D., 648 P.2d 625, 640 (Colo. 1982) (“[T]he application of the preponderance of the evidence standard for all purposes in the underlying dependency or neglect determination comports with due process of law.”); Z.P.S., ¶ 10, 369 P.3d at 816–17 (providing that the “preponderance of the 17 evidence standard applies to both the adjudicatory and dispositional stages of a dependency and neglect proceeding” (quoting People in Int. of L.B., 254 P.3d 1203, 1208 (Colo. App. 2011))). ¶35 These different burdens exist because termination is the only disposition that permanently deprives parents of their fu

2023D., 648 P.2d 625, 640 (Colo. 1982) (“[T]he application of the preponderance of the evidence standard for all purposes in the underlying dependency or neglect determination comports with due process of law.”); Z.P.S., ¶ 10, 369 P.3d at 816–17 (providing that the “preponderance of the evidence standard applies to both the adjudicatory and dispositional stages of a dependency and neglect proceeding” (quoting People in Int. of L.B., 254 P.3d 1203, 1208 (Colo. App. 2011))). ¶33 These different burdens exist because termination is the only disposition that permanently deprives parents of their funda

2023D., 648 P.2d 625, 640 (Colo. 1982) (“[T]he application of the preponderance of the evidence standard for all purposes in the underlying dependency or neglect determination comports with due process of law.”); Z.P.S., ¶ 10, 369 P.3d at 816–17 (providing that the “preponderance of the 17 evidence standard applies to both the adjudicatory and dispositional stages of a dependency and neglect proceeding” (quoting People in Int. of L.B., 254 P.3d 1203, 1208 (Colo. App. 2011))). ¶35 These different burdens exist because termination is the only disposition that permanently deprives parents of their fu

2025Restriction of Father’s Parenting Time A. Standard of Proof ¶ 14 Citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), and Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), father contends that the district court erred by employing a preponderance of the evidence standard instead of the clear and convincing evidence standard.

2015In addressing whether the preponderance of the evidence standard was constitutionally sufficient, the Court noted that natural parents retain a fundamental liberty interest in their children even if they are not currently parenting those children: “If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs.” Id. at 753.

1982See People in the Interest of B.J.D., 626 P.2d 727 (Colo.App.1981).

1982See People in the Interest of B.J.D. , 626 P.2d 727 ( Colo.App. 1981 ) .

2018For example, we disagree with defendant’s reliance on Ortiz for the proposition that “first-hand knowledge” that the defendant caused the victim’s loss — such as seeing defendant stealing on the surveillance videos — is necessary to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard. ¶ 30 “A fact is established by a preponderance of the evidence when, upon consideration of all the evidence, the existence of that fact is more probable than its nonexistence.” People v. Garner, 806 P.2d 366, 370 (Colo. 1991). ¶ 31 Viewing the direct and circumstantial evidence in the light most favorable to the pros

2005In Garner, supra, 806 P.2d at 370 , the supreme court noted that the Colorado Rules of Evidence "are silent on the quantum of proof applicable to questions of admissibility," but that the preponderance of the evidence standard had been adopted as the controlling norm for determining preliminary questions relating to admissibility.

2023D., 648 P.2d 625, 640 (Colo. 1982) (“[T]he application of the preponderance of the evidence standard for all purposes in the underlying dependency or neglect determination comports with due process of law.”); Z.P.S., ¶ 10, 369 P.3d at 816–17 (providing that the “preponderance of the evidence standard applies to both the adjudicatory and dispositional stages of a dependency and neglect proceeding” (quoting People in Int. of L.B., 254 P.3d 1203, 1208 (Colo. App. 2011))). ¶33 These different burdens exist because termination is the only disposition that permanently deprives parents of their funda

2023D., 648 P.2d 625, 640 (Colo. 1982) (“[T]he application of the preponderance of the evidence standard for all purposes in the underlying dependency or neglect determination comports with due process of law.”); Z.P.S., ¶ 10, 369 P.3d at 816–17 (providing that the “preponderance of the 17 evidence standard applies to both the adjudicatory and dispositional stages of a dependency and neglect proceeding” (quoting People in Int. of L.B., 254 P.3d 1203, 1208 (Colo. App. 2011))). ¶35 These different burdens exist because termination is the only disposition that permanently deprives parents of their fu

2010See Page v. Clark, 197 Colo. 306, 319 , 592 P.2d 792, 801 (1979).

2010See Page v. Clark, 197 Colo. 306, 319 , 592 P.2d 792, 801 (1979).

2018Cf. In re Marriage of Farr, 228 P.3d 267, 269 (Colo. App. 2010) (the trial court’s finding that the wife’s testimony was more credible than the husband’s indicated that it applied a preponderance of the evidence standard).

2016And “the preponderance of the evidence standard applies when a party seeks to avoid a transaction on equitable grounds alleging . . . mistake.” In re Marriage of Farr , 228 P.3d 267, 269 (Colo. App. 2010); see also § 13-25-127(1), C.R.S. 2015 (noting that the preponderance of the evidence standard applies “in any civil action”).

2007While the prosecution must prove the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), the preponderance of the evidence standard controls for determining preliminary questions relating to the admissibility of evidence.

2007While the prosecution must prove the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), the preponderance of the evidence standard controls for determining preliminary questions relating to the admissibility of evidence.

2015See, e.g., Lengel, 347 P.2d at 146 (“Properly the court would require clear and convincing proof before concluding that a person abandoned an 1885 water right, one of the oldest on a river in an arid or semiarid area.”). ¶24       Regardless of the burden of proof applied, we spoke clearly in both cases about the relationship between undecreed diversions and abandonment—use of a water right at an undecreed point of diversion does not evidence intent to abandon. 5 Further, Colorado water law strongly disfavors findings of abandonment.

2015Seq, eg., Lengel, 347 P.2d at 146 ("Properly the court would require clear and convincing proof before concluding that a person abandoned an 1885 water right, one of the oldest on a river in an arid or semiarid area."). 124 Regardless of the burden of proof applied, we spoke clearly in both cases about the relationship between undecreed diversions and abandonment-use of a water right at an undecereed point of diversion does not evidence intent to abandon. 5 Further, Colorado water law strongly disfavors findings of abandonment.

2011Pension Fund (Local 66), 579 F.3d 401, 407 (5th Cir.2009); In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 320 (3d Cir.2009); Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier Inc., 546 F.3d 196, 202-04 (2d Cir.2008). [6] While we recognize that the preponderance of the evidence standard appears to be gaining momentum among the federal courts, we decline to follow this emerging trend due to the important differences between C.R.C.P. 23 and Fed.R.Civ.P. *883 23 and our view of C.R.C.P 23 as a case management tool.

2011See Local 66, 579 F.3d at 407 (5th Cir.2009); Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 320 (3d Cir.2009); Teamsters Local 445, 546 F.3d at 202-04 (2d Cir.2008). [7] Unocal attempts to argue that the 2003 amendments to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 had little effect on the federal circuit court decisions to adopt a preponderance of the evidence standard.

2011Pension Fund (Local 66), 579 F.3d 401, 407 (5th Cir.2009); In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 320 (3d Cir.2009); Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier Inc., 546 F.3d 196, 202-04 (2d Cir.2008). [6] While we recognize that the preponderance of the evidence standard appears to be gaining momentum among the federal courts, we decline to follow this emerging trend due to the important differences between C.R.C.P. 23 and Fed.R.Civ.P. *883 23 and our view of C.R.C.P 23 as a case management tool.

2011See Local 66, 579 F.3d at 407 (5th Cir.2009); Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 320 (3d Cir.2009); Teamsters Local 445, 546 F.3d at 202-04 (2d Cir.2008). [7] Unocal attempts to argue that the 2003 amendments to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 had little effect on the federal circuit court decisions to adopt a preponderance of the evidence standard.

2001See In re Custody of A.D.C., 969 P.2d 708 (Colo.App. 1998)(a custody determination is based upon the preponderance of the evidence standard because, unlike a termination case, it continues the biological parent's right to contact with the child and parenting).

2001See In re Custody of A.D.C., 969 P.2d 708 (Colo.App.1998)(a custody determination is based upon the preponderance of the evidence standard because, unlike a termination case, it continues the biological parent's right to contact with the child and parenting).

1982Because “a natural parent’s ‘desire for and right to “the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children” ’ is an interest far more precious than any property right,”-U.S. at-, 102 S.Ct. at 1397 , 71 L.Ed.2d at 610 , quoting from Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27 , 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2160 , 68 L.Ed.2d 640, 649 (1981), 5 the Court found that the parents’ interest weighed heavily against the use of the preponderance of the evidence standard.

1982Because “a natural parent’s ‘desire for and right to “the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children” ’ is an interest far more precious than any property right,”-U.S. at-, 102 S.Ct. at 1397 , 71 L.Ed.2d at 610 , quoting from Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27 , 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2160 , 68 L.Ed.2d 640, 649 (1981), 5 the Court found that the parents’ interest weighed heavily against the use of the preponderance of the evidence standard.

2011Indeed, the district court stated erroneously, "When a court does not articulate the standard used, it is assumed that a preponderance of the evidence standard was applied." In support of this proposition, the district court cited People in Interest of R.W., 989 P.2d 240, 248 (Colo.App.1999), aff'd sub nom.

2000People in Interest of R.W. and T.W., 989 P.2d 240 (Colo.App.1999)(Criswell, J., dissenting)(hereinafter R.W. and T.W.).

2025The preponderance of the evidence standard “directs the court to decide whether the existence of a contested fact is ‘more probable than its nonexistence.’” People v. Marx, 2019 COA 9 138, ¶ 49 (quoting People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127, 1135 (Colo. 1980)).

2024See, e.g., United States v. Cabassa, 62 F.3d 470, 474 (2d Cir. 1995) (recognizing the “semantic puzzle” created by “using the preponderance of the evidence standard to prove inevitability”).

2024But that standard is dictated by the holding in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), and has generally proved workable in the context of suppression rulings. 44 (observing that “reasonable probability” is used “to refer to a likelihood of occurrence which, although not insignificant, nevertheless need not rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence”); Krutsinger v. People, 219 P.3d 1054, 1060 (Colo. 2009) (“[T]he Supreme Court has made abundantly clear that it does not intend its use of the term ‘reasonable probability’ to require a showing that the defendant would more likely than n