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117 Ohio opinions name it 5 courts 1984–2026 33 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Cortezgreen2 sentences2022This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that "might well elude an untrained person." Although an Stark County, Case No. 2022 CA 00020 7 officer's reliance on a mere “hunch” is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard. {¶ 16} United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed 2022This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that "might well elude an untrained person." Although an Stark County, Case No. 2022 CA 00020 7 officer's reliance on a mere “hunch” is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard. {¶ 16} United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed | 5 | 25 |
Felton v. Feltongreen2 sentences2025The Supreme Court reversed the trial court because it had denied the petitioner a civil protection order despite the fact “that the evidence presented by the appellant was sufficient to meet the preponderance-of-the- evidence standard.” Id. at 44 . 2022Citing Felton v. Felton, 79 Ohio St.3d 34 , 679 N.E.2d 672 (1997), Mother argues that M.M.’s testimony alone, if credible, was sufficient to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard, and the trial court did find M.M. to be credible. | 4 | 10 |
United States v. Arvizugreen2 sentences2024“Thus, ‘the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.’” State v. Cunningham, 2015-Ohio-4306, ¶ 17 (9th Dist.), quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002). 2022This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that "might well elude an untrained person." Although an Stark County, Case No. 2022 CA 00020 7 officer's reliance on a mere “hunch” is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard. {¶ 16} United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed | 2 | 26 |
City of Middletown v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2016As defined by R.C. 2903.211(A)(1), "menacing by stalking" means engaging in a pattern of conduct that knowingly causes another "to believe that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the other person or cause mental distress to the other person." In determining what constitutes a pattern of conduct, "courts must take every action of the respondent into consideration even if some of the actions in isolation do not seem particularly threatening." Opp, 2015-Ohio-3285 at ¶ 7 , citing Middletown v. Jones, 167 Ohio App.3d 679 , 2006-Ohio-3465, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.). {¶ 28} A preponderance of t 2016As defined by R.C. 2903.211(A)(1), "menacing by stalking" means engaging in a pattern of conduct that knowingly causes another "to believe that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the other person or cause mental distress to the other person." In determining what constitutes a pattern of conduct, "courts must take every action of the respondent into consideration even if some of the actions in isolation do not seem particularly threatening." Opp, 2015-Ohio-3285 at ¶ 7 , citing Middletown v. Jones, 167 Ohio App.3d 679 , 2006-Ohio-3465, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.). {¶ 28} A preponderance of t | 2 | 2 |
Richard Cotto v. Victor Herbert, Warden, Attica Correctional Facilitygreen2 sentences2006See Cotto v. Herbert (C.A.2, 2003), 331 F.3d 217, 235 ; United States v. Scott (C.A.7, 2002), 284 F.3d 758, 762 ; United States v. Cherry (C.A.10, 2000), 217 F.3d 811, 820 ; United States v. Zlatogur (C.A.11, 2001), 271 F.3d 1025, 1028 ; see, also, Steele v. Taylor (C.A.6, 1982), 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (preponderance standard in making preliminary findings in waiver-by-misconduct cases); State v. Boyes, Licking App. Nos. 2003CA0050 and 2003CA0051, 2004-Ohio-3528 , 2004 WL 1486333 , ¶ 54-56 (applying the preponderance standard in determining whether the foundational requirements for Evid.R. 804(B) 2004See, for example, United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811 , 820-21 (10th Cir. 2000) and Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217 , 235 (2d Cir. 2003) (requiring that "the government prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant procured the witness' unavailability"). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Cunninghamgreen2 sentences2024“Thus, ‘the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.’” State v. Cunningham, 2015-Ohio-4306, ¶ 17 (9th Dist.), quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002). 2023Medina No. 14CA0032-M, 2015-Ohio-4306, ¶ 17 , quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Bobogreen2 sentences2015The Supreme Court of Ohio has defined “reasonable articulable suspicion” as “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion [upon an individual's freedom of movement].” State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 178 (1988), quoting Terry at 21 . 2013United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 122 S.Ct.744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002), citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 , 417–418 (1981). {¶17} The Ohio Supreme Court in Bobo, supra, noted several factors in determining whether a totality of the circumstances support a finding of reasonable suspicion: the reputation of the area for criminal activity, the officer's experience with drug transactions, the officer's familiarity with the area and how drug transactions occurred there, the officer's perception of the scene, the officer's observation of furtive movements, and the fact that it | 1 | 2 |
United States v. MICHELLE CHERRYgreen2 sentences2006See Cotto v. Herbert (C.A.2, 2003), 331 F.3d 217, 235 ; United States v. Scott (C.A.7, 2002), 284 F.3d 758, 762 ; United States v. Cherry (C.A.10, 2000), 217 F.3d 811, 820 ; United States v. Zlatogur (C.A.11, 2001), 271 F.3d 1025, 1028 ; see, also, Steele v. Taylor (C.A.6, 1982), 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (preponderance standard in making preliminary findings in waiver-by-misconduct cases); State v. Boyes, Licking App. Nos. 2003CA0050 and 2003CA0051, 2004-Ohio-3528 , 2004 WL 1486333 , ¶ 54-56 (applying the preponderance standard in determining whether the foundational requirements for Evid.R. 804(B) 2004See, for example, United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811 , 820-21 (10th Cir. 2000) and Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217 , 235 (2d Cir. 2003) (requiring that "the government prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant procured the witness' unavailability"). | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Robert Scottgreen2 sentences2006See Cotto v. Herbert (C.A.2, 2003), 331 F.3d 217, 235 ; United States v. Scott (C.A.7, 2002), 284 F.3d 758, 762 ; United States v. Cherry (C.A.10, 2000), 217 F.3d 811, 820 ; United States v. Zlatogur (C.A.11, 2001), 271 F.3d 1025, 1028 ; see, also, Steele v. Taylor (C.A.6, 1982), 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (preponderance standard in making preliminary findings in waiver-by-misconduct cases); State v. Boyes, Licking App. Nos. 2003CA0050 and 2003CA0051, 2004-Ohio-3528 , 2004 WL 1486333 , ¶ 54-56 (applying the preponderance standard in determining whether the foundational requirements for Evid.R. 804(B) 2004See also United States v. Scott, 284 F.3d 758 , 762 (7th Cir. 2002) (applying a preponderance of the evidence standard); United States v. Zlatogur, 271 F.3d 1025 , 1028 (11th Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Price, 265 F.3d 1097 , 1103 (10th Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921 , 926 (8th Cir. 1999) (same); United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903 , 911 (D.C. | 1 | 2 |
In re S.T.green2 sentences2026See also Stevenson v. Kotnik, 2011-Ohio-2585 , ¶ 51 (11th Dist.); In re Z.l.A., 2025-Ohio-2355 ¶ 10 (2d Dist.); In re S.T., 2025-Ohio-1379 ¶ 17 (6th Dist.) (applying a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in reviewing a juvenile court’s ruling on a motion to modify legal custody under R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a)). 2026See also Stevenson v. Kotnik, 2011-Ohio-2585 , ¶ 51 (11th Dist.); In re Z.l.A., 2025-Ohio-2355 ¶ 10 (2d Dist.); In re S.T., 2025-Ohio-1379 ¶ 17 (6th Dist.) (applying a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in reviewing a juvenile court’s ruling on a motion to modify legal custody under R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a)). | 1 | 1 |
In re T.R.green1 sentence2026See In re T.R., 2015-Ohio-4177, ¶ 44 (8th Dist.) (A juvenile court awards legal custody following an adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency using a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.). | 1 | 1 |
In re Z.L.A.green2 sentences2026See also Stevenson v. Kotnik, 2011-Ohio-2585 , ¶ 51 (11th Dist.); In re Z.l.A., 2025-Ohio-2355 ¶ 10 (2d Dist.); In re S.T., 2025-Ohio-1379 ¶ 17 (6th Dist.) (applying a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in reviewing a juvenile court’s ruling on a motion to modify legal custody under R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a)). 2026See also Stevenson v. Kotnik, 2011-Ohio-2585 , ¶ 51 (11th Dist.); In re Z.l.A., 2025-Ohio-2355 ¶ 10 (2d Dist.); In re S.T., 2025-Ohio-1379 ¶ 17 (6th Dist.) (applying a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in reviewing a juvenile court’s ruling on a motion to modify legal custody under R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a)). | 1 | 1 |
Cheek v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2025Mango at ¶ 18 ; Braddy at ¶ 21 . {¶ 55} Respondents also argue that the lack of evidence demonstrating Jones was aware of Dr. Brown’s perceived duty to report Jones’s statements to Officer Robinette does not alter the outcome of the postrelease control violation proceeding because “mistake of law is not a defense in Ohio.” (Respondents’ Brief at 12.) It is a “well-known maxim that ‘ignorance of the law’ (or a ‘mistake of law’) is no excuse.” Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225, 234 (2019), citing Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
| Burre v. Uttgreen | 1 | 1 |
Rehaif v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2025Mango at ¶ 18 ; Braddy at ¶ 21 . {¶ 55} Respondents also argue that the lack of evidence demonstrating Jones was aware of Dr. Brown’s perceived duty to report Jones’s statements to Officer Robinette does not alter the outcome of the postrelease control violation proceeding because “mistake of law is not a defense in Ohio.” (Respondents’ Brief at 12.) It is a “well-known maxim that ‘ignorance of the law’ (or a ‘mistake of law’) is no excuse.” Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225, 234 (2019), citing Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
State ex rel. Doner v. Zodygreen1 sentence2025Doner v. Zody, 2011-Ohio-6117, ¶ 54 (a preponderance of evidence indicates that the existence of a fact “is more likely than its nonexistence”). {¶ 17} The preponderance of the evidence standard of proof is generally subject to the manifest weight standard of review. | 1 | 1 |
| State ex rel. Ellison v. Black (Slip Opinion)green | 1 | 1 |
| Scarberry v. Turnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Blair, 24208 (12-3-2008)green | 1 | 1 |
| Wilson v. Wardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. Flickingergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Board of Trustees of Miami Township v. Fraternal Order of Policegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Richard C. Levine v. Cmp Publications, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Gonyougreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re R.E.C.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Casalicchiogreen | 1 | 1 |
| David Schneider v. Michael Hardestygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. Widmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| Dice v. White Family Companies, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Schiebel
green
2 sentences2005The clear and convincing standard is a higher degree of proof than the preponderance of the evidence standard which is generally used in civil cases, but it is less stringent than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard applied in criminal cases, State v. Schiebel (1990), 55 Ohio St. 3d 71 . 2005The clear and convincing standard is a higher degree of proof than the preponderance of the evidence standard which is generally used in civil cases, but it is less stringent than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard applied in criminal cases, State v. Schiebel (1990), 55 Ohio St. 3d 71 . | 4 | 2005–2011 |
Eastley v. Volkman
green
2 sentences2026Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 19 . 2025Eastley, 2012-Ohio-2179 at ¶ 19 . | 3 | 2025–2026 |
Illinois v. Wardlow
green
2 sentences2019Thus, “the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 ; Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123 , 120 S.Ct. 673 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 . {¶33} Once an officer lawfully stops an individual, the officer must carefully tailor the scope of the stop “to its underlying justification.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); see, also, State v. Gonyou, 108 Ohio App.3d 369, 372 , 670 N.E.2d 1040 2019Thus, “the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 ; Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123 , 120 S.Ct. 673 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 . {¶33} Once an officer lawfully stops an individual, the officer must carefully tailor the scope of the stop “to its underlying justification.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); see, also, State v. Gonyou, 108 Ohio App.3d 369, 372 , 670 N.E.2d 1040 | 3 | 2002–2019 |
State v. Nicholas
green
2 sentences2023CROUSE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 27 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS CROUSE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. {¶72} I concur with the lead opinion’s holding regarding the preponderance- of-the-evidence standard and the burden of proof because those issues were recently conclusively decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Nicholas, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4276 . 2022SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-4276 THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. NICHOLAS, APPELLANT. [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State v. Nicholas, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4276 .] Juvenile procedure—R.C. 2152.12(B)—Discretionary transfer of a juvenile for prosecution in an adult court—R.C. 2152.12(B) by its terms establishes a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for deciding a juvenile’s amenability—R.C. 2152.12(C)—Amenability hearings—Facts presented to a juvenile court with respect to a discretionary transfer must persuade the court that | 2 | 2022–2023 |
Dayton v. Erickson
green
2 sentences2022Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 11–12, 1996-Ohio-431 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 . 2022Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 , 1996-Ohio-431 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 . | 2 | 2022–2022 |
City of Dayton v. Erickson
green
2 sentences2022Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 , 1996-Ohio-431 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 . 2022Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 , 1996-Ohio-431 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 . | 2 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Hand
green
2 sentences2018See id. ; Hand , 107 Ohio St.3d 378 , 2006-Ohio-18 , 840 N.E.2d 151 , at ¶ 87. 2018See id. ; Hand , 107 Ohio St.3d 378 , 2006-Ohio-18 , 840 N.E.2d 151 , at ¶ 87. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
In the Matter of Nice
green
2 sentences2011Bixler, 2006-Ohio-3533 at ¶24 , citing In re Nice (2001), 141 Ohio App.3d 445, 455 . 2006In re Nice, (2001), 141 Ohio App.3d 445 , 455 . | 2 | 2006–2011 |
United States v. Sokolow
green
2 sentences2009But we have deliberately avoided reducing it to `a neat set of legal rules.' In Sokolow , for example, we rejected a holding by the Court of Appeals that distinguished between evidence of ongoing criminal behavior and probabilistic evidence because it "create[d] unnecessary difficulty in dealing with one of the relatively simple concepts embodied in the Fourth Amendment." 490 U.S., at 7 -8 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 ." United States v. Arvizu (2002), 534 U.S. 266 , 273 , 122 S.Ct. 744 (internal citations and quotes omitted). {¶ 43} Although a reviewing court must look to the totality of circumstances as 2009But we have deliberately avoided reducing it to `a neat set of legal rules.' In Sokolow , for example, we rejected a holding by the Court of Appeals that distinguished between evidence of ongoing criminal behavior and probabilistic evidence because it "create[d] unnecessary difficulty in dealing with one of the relatively simple concepts embodied in the Fourth Amendment." 490 U.S., at 7 -8 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 ." United States v. Arvizu (2002), 534 U.S. 266 , 273 , 122 S.Ct. 744 (internal citations and quotes omitted). {¶ 43} Although a reviewing court must look to the totality of circumstances as | 2 | 2001–2009 |
United States v. Oleg Zlatogur
green
2 sentences2006See Cotto v. Herbert (C.A.2, 2003), 331 F.3d 217, 235 ; United States v. Scott (C.A.7, 2002), 284 F.3d 758, 762 ; United States v. Cherry (C.A.10, 2000), 217 F.3d 811, 820 ; United States v. Zlatogur (C.A.11, 2001), 271 F.3d 1025, 1028 ; see, also, Steele v. Taylor (C.A.6, 1982), 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (preponderance standard in making preliminary findings in waiver-by-misconduct cases); State v. Boyes, Licking App. Nos. 2003CA0050 and 2003CA0051, 2004-Ohio-3528 , 2004 WL 1486333 , ¶ 54-56 (applying the preponderance standard in determining whether the foundational requirements for Evid.R. 804(B) 2004See also United States v. Scott, 284 F.3d 758 , 762 (7th Cir. 2002) (applying a preponderance of the evidence standard); United States v. Zlatogur, 271 F.3d 1025 , 1028 (11th Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Price, 265 F.3d 1097 , 1103 (10th Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921 , 926 (8th Cir. 1999) (same); United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903 , 911 (D.C. | 2 | 2004–2006 |
In Re Wise
green
2 sentences2005This court may not reverse the trial court's judgment if it finds there is sufficient evidence in the record to satisfy the clear and convincing standard, In Re: Wise (1994), 96 Ohio App. 3d 619 . 2005This court may not reverse the trial court's judgment if it finds there is sufficient evidence in the record to satisfy the clear and convincing standard, In Re: Wise (1994), 96 Ohio App. 3d 619 . | 2 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Benner
green
2 sentences2003See Felton v. Felton (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 34 , 40-41 , 679 N.E.2d 672 ; State v. Benner (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 327 , 330-331 , 644 N.E.2d 1130 ; State v. Kent (Apr. 21, 2000), 1st Dist. 2003See Felton v. Felton (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 34 , 40-41 , 679 N.E.2d 672 ; State v. Benner (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 327 , 330-331 , 644 N.E.2d 1130 ; State v. Kent (Apr. 21, 2000), 1st Dist. | 2 | 2000–2003 |
State v. Boyd
neutral
2 sentences2000The following courts have determined that the burden of proof for consent is a preponderance of the evidence standard: State v. Trent (Dec. 23, 1999), Montgomery App. No. 17705, unreported; State v. Boyd (1998), 90 Ohio Misc.2d 20 ; State v. Guiterrez (1996), Medina App. No. 2515-M, unreported; State v. George (June 15, 1993), Clark App. No. 2967, unreported; State v. Mendlik (Sep. 9, 1988), Geauga App. No. 1419, unreported; State v. Moon (Feb. 14, 1986), Montgomery App. No. 9288, unreported; and State v. Elliot (May 6, 1983), Clark App. No. 1741, unreported. 2000The following courts have determined that the burden of proof for consent is a preponderance of the evidence standard: State v. Trent (Dec. 23, 1999), Montgomery App. No. 17705, unreported; State v. Boyd (1998), 90 Ohio Misc.2d 20 ; State v. Guiterrez (1996), Medina App. No. 2515-M, unreported; State v. George (June 15, 1993), Clark App. No. 2967, unreported; State v. Mendlik (Sep. 9, 1988), Geauga App. No. 1419, unreported; State v. Moon (Feb. 14, 1986), Montgomery App. No. 9288, unreported; and State v. Elliot (May 6, 1983), Clark App. No. 1741, unreported. | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Embers Supper Club, Inc. v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.
green
2 sentences1998Embers, 9 Ohio St.3d at 25 , 9 OBR at 117-118, 457 N.E.2d at 1167 . 1998Embers, 9 Ohio St.3d at 25 , 9 OBR at 117-118, 457 N.E.2d at 1167 . | 2 | 1987–1998 |
Eichenberger v. Eichenberger
green
1 sentence2026One is to the domestic violence statute, and the other to Eichenberger v. Eichenberger, 82 Ohio App.3d 809 (10th Dist. 1982), which stands for the proposition that any fear resulting from threats must be reasonable. {¶6} Appellant has not specifically addressed our standard of review in this appeal, but refers both to an abuse of discretion standard and a preponderance of the evidence standard. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| State v. Nigro green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. Gwynne green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Walden v. State green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| In re D.A. green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| State v. Nicholas green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Santosky v. Kramer green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| In re R.R.S. neutral | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| In Re D.S. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Stumpf green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Gath green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Peck v. Peck green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| City of Piqua v. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Duer v. Moonshower, Unpublished Decision (8-2-2004) green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Franklin neutral | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| In re D.M. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Perales v. Nino green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Lansdowne v. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| In re C.R. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Brown green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Florida v. Royer green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| cluster 750722 green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Barringer v. Barringer neutral | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Perfection Corp. v. Travelers Casualty & Surety green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Bates v. Bates, Unpublished Decision (6-30-2005) green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Linger v. Weiss green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.