48 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hansen v. Hansengreen2 sentences2009See id. ("The plaintiff must prove all three elements to sustain a claim of unjust enrichment."); Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 931, 934 (Utah Ct.App.1998) ("[TJhe standard of proof generally applied in civil proceedings is the preponderance of the evidence standard."). 2006See generally State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994) (“Legal determinations ... are defined as those which are not of fact but are essentially of rules or principles uniformly applied to persons of similar qualities and status in similar circumstances.”); see also Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 931, 933 (Utah Ct.App. 1998) (reviewing a trial court's invocation of a clear and convincing standard of proof for correctness); In re R.N.J., 908 P.2d 345, 349 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (stating that whether a trial court applied the appropriate standard of proof is a question reviewed for correctness) supe | 4 | 4 |
United States v. Arvizugreen2 sentences2020“Reasonable suspicion requires a particularized and objective basis, supported by specific and articulable facts.” State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶ 23 , 164 P.3d 397 (cleaned up). ¶14 “Although an officer’s reliance on a mere ‘hunch’ is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of [a traffic violation] need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)); see also State v. Applegate, 2008 UT 63, ¶ 10 , 194 P.3d 925 (“[A]n off 2020See id. ¶17 Moreover, the likelihood that the vehicle was not insured could “fall[] considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard” and still constitute reasonable articulable suspicion. | 2 | 8 |
State v. Marklandgreen2 sentences2019To support reasonable suspicion, "the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard." State v. Markland , 2005 UT 26 , ¶ 10, 112 P.3d 507 (quotation simplified). 2019To support reasonable suspicion, "the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard." State v. Markland , 2005 UT 26 , ¶ 10, 112 P.3d 507 (quotation simplified). | 2 | 5 |
Harken Southwest Corp. v. Board of Oil, Gas & Mininggreen2 sentences2020Corp. v. Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, 920 P.2d 1176, 1182 (Utah 1996); see also Alvarado v. Tucker, 268 P.2d 986, 988 (Utah 1954) (defining preponderance of the evidence as the “greater weight of the evidence” in favor of the prevailing party). 2019Corp. v. Board of Oil, Gas & Mining , 920 P.2d 1176 , 1182 (Utah 1996) ; see also T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n , 2011 UT 28 , ¶ 17, 254 P.3d 752 . ¶18 Here, "the correct focus for review is whether Kilgore satisfied its burden of proof relative to the request for additional height [of the silos], and not the number of silos or overall operation of [the Plant]" because it is undisputed that there is no limit to the number of 40-foot silos Kilgore could install. ¶19 With respect to the public health, safety, and welfare, Kilgore presented testimony from its representatives, includ | 2 | 3 |
State v. Archuletagreen2 sentences2018See State v. Archuleta , 812 P.2d 80 , 82-83 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (outlining the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof in the context of a probation violation). ¶21 Here, Stewart testified the district court did not "inform [him] about [his] right to a have an attorney represent [him] on appeal," and that he would have asked for one to be appointed had he been informed of that right. 2001See Finlayson v. Brady, 121 Utah 204, 206 , 240 P.2d 491, 492 (1952); see also State v. Archuleta, 812 P.2d 80, 82-83 (Utah Ct.App.1991). | 2 | 2 |
V.M. v. DCFSgreen2 sentences2025See V.M. v. Division of Child & Family Services, 2020 UT App 35, ¶ 21 , 461 P.3d 326 (defining the preponderance of the evidence standard). 2020The court gave “little to no weight” to the fact that criminal charges against V.M. ultimately were dismissed and expunged, noting that the preponderance of the evidence standard applicable in the juvenile court proceeding is “lower than the beyond a reasonable doubt evidentiary standard used in the district court’s criminal trial.” 20180906-CA 5 2020 UT App 35 V.M. v. DCFS ¶18 Similarly, the court gave “little weight” to the BYU investigation because it was “conducted for a different purpose” than the DCFS investigation and because the BYU investigator considered only information provided by | 1 | 2 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2020“Reasonable suspicion requires a particularized and objective basis, supported by specific and articulable facts.” State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶ 23 , 164 P.3d 397 (cleaned up). ¶14 “Although an officer’s reliance on a mere ‘hunch’ is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of [a traffic violation] need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)); see also State v. Applegate, 2008 UT 63, ¶ 10 , 194 P.3d 925 (“[A]n off 2006When determining whether police officers had a reasonable and articulable suspicion, courts may not use a "divide-and-conquer analysis." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Andersongreen2 sentences2001Thus, our case law to this point places the level of proof necessary to support a preliminary hearing bindover somewhere between the reasonable belief necessary to support a warrant and the preponderance of the evidence standard applicable in the civil context. [ 12 In a number of cases, we have equated the preliminary hearing probable cause standard with the motion for directed verdict standard, ie., "to survive a motion to quash a bindover, the State must produce enough evidence sufficient to survive a motion for directed verdict with respect to each element of the crime." State v. Talbot, 9 1998This probable cause standard “is lower, even, than a preponderance of the evidence standard applicable to civil cases.” Id. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Talbotgreen2 sentences2001Thus, our case law to this point places the level of proof necessary to support a preliminary hearing bindover somewhere between the reasonable belief necessary to support a warrant and the preponderance of the evidence standard applicable in the civil context. [ 12 In a number of cases, we have equated the preliminary hearing probable cause standard with the motion for directed verdict standard, ie., "to survive a motion to quash a bindover, the State must produce enough evidence sufficient to survive a motion for directed verdict with respect to each element of the crime." State v. Talbot, 9 2000"This probable cause standard `is lower, even, than a preponderance of the evidence standard applicable to civil cases.'" Id. (citations omitted). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Olivergreen2 sentences2022See generally State v. Oliver, 2018 UT App 101 , ¶ 22 n.4, 427 P.3d 495 (recognizing the silence of appellate opinions and the act on the appropriate burden of proof, but also recognizing that “in federal courts, and in other state jurisdictions of which we are aware, the government (continued…) 20200675-CA 7 2022 UT App 104 State v. Blake ¶14 The State resists this conclusion, arguing that a more forthcoming statement of medical costs was not necessary because the court may make “a reasonable estimate of the loss,” see State v. Ogden, 2018 UT 8, ¶ 53 , 416 P.3d 1132 (cleaned up). 2022See generally State v. Oliver, 2018 UT App 101 , ¶ 22 n.4, 427 P.3d 495 (recognizing the silence of appellate opinions and the act on the appropriate burden of proof, but also recognizing that “in federal courts, and in other state jurisdictions of which we are aware, the government (continued…) 20200675-CA 7 2022 UT App 104 State v. Blake ¶14 The State resists this conclusion, arguing that a more forthcoming statement of medical costs was not necessary because the court may make “a reasonable estimate of the loss,” see State v. Ogden, 2018 UT 8, ¶ 53 , 416 P.3d 1132 (cleaned up). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ogdengreen2 sentences2022See generally State v. Oliver, 2018 UT App 101 , ¶ 22 n.4, 427 P.3d 495 (recognizing the silence of appellate opinions and the act on the appropriate burden of proof, but also recognizing that “in federal courts, and in other state jurisdictions of which we are aware, the government (continued…) 20200675-CA 7 2022 UT App 104 State v. Blake ¶14 The State resists this conclusion, arguing that a more forthcoming statement of medical costs was not necessary because the court may make “a reasonable estimate of the loss,” see State v. Ogden, 2018 UT 8, ¶ 53 , 416 P.3d 1132 (cleaned up). 2022See generally State v. Oliver, 2018 UT App 101 , ¶ 22 n.4, 427 P.3d 495 (recognizing the silence of appellate opinions and the act on the appropriate burden of proof, but also recognizing that “in federal courts, and in other state jurisdictions of which we are aware, the government (continued…) 20200675-CA 7 2022 UT App 104 State v. Blake ¶14 The State resists this conclusion, arguing that a more forthcoming statement of medical costs was not necessary because the court may make “a reasonable estimate of the loss,” see State v. Ogden, 2018 UT 8, ¶ 53 , 416 P.3d 1132 (cleaned up). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Blakegreen1 sentence2022See generally State v. Oliver, 2018 UT App 101 , ¶ 22 n.4, 427 P.3d 495 (recognizing the silence of appellate opinions and the act on the appropriate burden of proof, but also recognizing that “in federal courts, and in other state jurisdictions of which we are aware, the government (continued…) 20200675-CA 7 2022 UT App 104 State v. Blake ¶14 The State resists this conclusion, arguing that a more forthcoming statement of medical costs was not necessary because the court may make “a reasonable estimate of the loss,” see State v. Ogden, 2018 UT 8, ¶ 53 , 416 P.3d 1132 (cleaned up). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Applegategreen2 sentences2020“Reasonable suspicion requires a particularized and objective basis, supported by specific and articulable facts.” State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶ 23 , 164 P.3d 397 (cleaned up). ¶14 “Although an officer’s reliance on a mere ‘hunch’ is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of [a traffic violation] need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)); see also State v. Applegate, 2008 UT 63, ¶ 10 , 194 P.3d 925 (“[A]n off 2020“Reasonable suspicion requires a particularized and objective basis, supported by specific and articulable facts.” State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶ 23 , 164 P.3d 397 (cleaned up). ¶14 “Although an officer’s reliance on a mere ‘hunch’ is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of [a traffic violation] need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)); see also State v. Applegate, 2008 UT 63, ¶ 10 , 194 P.3d 925 (“[A]n off | 1 | 1 |
Alvarado v. Tuckergreen1 sentence2020Corp. v. Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, 920 P.2d 1176, 1182 (Utah 1996); see also Alvarado v. Tucker, 268 P.2d 986, 988 (Utah 1954) (defining preponderance of the evidence as the “greater weight of the evidence” in favor of the prevailing party). | 1 | 1 |
T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commissiongreen2 sentences2019Corp. v. Board of Oil, Gas & Mining , 920 P.2d 1176 , 1182 (Utah 1996) ; see also T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n , 2011 UT 28 , ¶ 17, 254 P.3d 752 . ¶18 Here, "the correct focus for review is whether Kilgore satisfied its burden of proof relative to the request for additional height [of the silos], and not the number of silos or overall operation of [the Plant]" because it is undisputed that there is no limit to the number of 40-foot silos Kilgore could install. ¶19 With respect to the public health, safety, and welfare, Kilgore presented testimony from its representatives, includ 2019Corp. v. Board of Oil, Gas & Mining , 920 P.2d 1176 , 1182 (Utah 1996) ; see also T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n , 2011 UT 28 , ¶ 17, 254 P.3d 752 . ¶18 Here, "the correct focus for review is whether Kilgore satisfied its burden of proof relative to the request for additional height [of the silos], and not the number of silos or overall operation of [the Plant]" because it is undisputed that there is no limit to the number of 40-foot silos Kilgore could install. ¶19 With respect to the public health, safety, and welfare, Kilgore presented testimony from its representatives, includ | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Tibbettsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Illinois v. Wardlowgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Cunninghamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Richardsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Biggsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Harris v. RUSSELL PETROLEUM CORP.green | 1 | 1 |
| Nix v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Edwardsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. Washingtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jamesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Topanotesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Vasquez v. Peoplegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lopezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & L AUTO, INC.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Penagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State in Interest of RNJgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Warrengreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| John Michael Hughes v. Robert Rainesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Vernoil Cantley, AKA Joe Joe Cantleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| James Quinn v. William S. Haynes, Warden, Huttonsville Correctional Center Darrell v. McGraw Jr., Attorney General of the State of West Virginiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lego v. Twomeygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gorostieta v. Parkinsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Westgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Morgan v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Morris
green
2 sentences2018Indeed, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard." State v. Morris , 2011 UT 40 , ¶ 29, 259 P.3d 116 (cleaned up). ¶52 Here, the officer was instructed, based on eyewitness accounts, to look for Hispanic males wearing white clothes in a Toyota Camry on a specific dead-end street. 2018Indeed, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard." State v. Morris , 2011 UT 40 , ¶ 29, 259 P.3d 116 (cleaned up). ¶52 Here, the officer was instructed, based on eyewitness accounts, to look for Hispanic males wearing white clothes in a Toyota Camry on a specific dead-end street. | 2 | 2017–2018 |
State v. Baker
green
2 sentences2013Indeed, the likelihood of eriminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 1 28 Our holding that Deputy Luke's question of Simons was supported by reasonable suspicion likewise aligns with our conclusion that there was reasonable suspicion of drug activity in our recent opinion in State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18 , 229 P.3d 650 . 2013Indeed, the likelihood of eriminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 1 28 Our holding that Deputy Luke's question of Simons was supported by reasonable suspicion likewise aligns with our conclusion that there was reasonable suspicion of drug activity in our recent opinion in State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18 , 229 P.3d 650 . | 2 | 2013–2013 |
United States v. Matlock
green
2 sentences2005See Lego, 404 U.S. at 488-89 , 92 S.Ct. 619 ; Matlock, 415 U.S. at 177 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 988 . ¶ 18 We find support for this conclusion in the fact that the preponderance of the evidence standard applies in evaluating the standing of an individual seeking to challenge the validity of a search. 2005See Lego, 404 U.S. at 488-89 , 92 S.Ct. 619 ; Matlock, 415 U.S. at 177 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 988 . ¶ 18 We find support for this conclusion in the fact that the preponderance of the evidence standard applies in evaluating the standing of an individual seeking to challenge the validity of a search. | 2 | 1994–2005 |
Schmidt v. Petersen
green
1 sentence2025The Court is persuaded by [Kyle’s] counsel’s argument that, at best, the . . . evidence is evenly balanced, that it was either [Kyle] or his wife that did this, and evenly balanced is not sufficient to carry the burden under a preponderance of the evidence standard. 20230287-CA 8 2025 UT App 12 Schmidt v. Petersen ¶19 The court later issued a written order revoking the ex parte civil stalking injunction. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
J.J. v. State
green
1 sentence2024And the burden of proof employed in imposing “any of the dispositional choices” available to the juvenile court, In re M.J., 2011 UT App 398, ¶ 56 , is the preponderance of the evidence standard, cf. Utah R. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
In re R.D...
green
1 sentence2024The 20220798-CA 17 2024 UT App 91 In re R.D. juvenile court recognized that modifications to custodial orders are generally “treated as disposition hearings and subject to the preponderance of the evidence standard.” However, because DCFS was no longer a party to this case at this point, the juvenile court determined that it was “more similar to a custody dispute between a parent and non-parent.” And given this circumstance, the court concluded that the dispute “should proceed at the clear and convincing standard of proof for all parties.” ¶44 It appears that the juvenile court applied the wro | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Worwood
green
2 sentences2020“Reasonable suspicion requires a particularized and objective basis, supported by specific and articulable facts.” State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶ 23 , 164 P.3d 397 (cleaned up). ¶14 “Although an officer’s reliance on a mere ‘hunch’ is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of [a traffic violation] need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)); see also State v. Applegate, 2008 UT 63, ¶ 10 , 194 P.3d 925 (“[A]n off 2020“Reasonable suspicion requires a particularized and objective basis, supported by specific and articulable facts.” State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶ 23 , 164 P.3d 397 (cleaned up). ¶14 “Although an officer’s reliance on a mere ‘hunch’ is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of [a traffic violation] need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)); see also State v. Applegate, 2008 UT 63, ¶ 10 , 194 P.3d 925 (“[A]n off | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Navarro
neutral
2 sentences2019Thus, although officers may not extend the scope of a traffic stop based on "merely an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch," "a determination that reasonable suspicion exists need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct." Id. (quotations simplified). ¶31 Essentially, "reasonable suspicion requires an objectively reasonable belief that an individual is engaged in ... criminal activity," Gurule , 2013 UT 58 , ¶ 31, 321 P.3d 1039 (quotation simplified), "based on specific, articulable facts drawn from the totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the time of the st 2019Thus, although officers may not extend the scope of a traffic stop based on "merely an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch," "a determination that reasonable suspicion exists need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct." Id. (quotations simplified). ¶31 Essentially, "reasonable suspicion requires an objectively reasonable belief that an individual is engaged in ... criminal activity," Gurule , 2013 UT 58 , ¶ 31, 321 P.3d 1039 (quotation simplified), "based on specific, articulable facts drawn from the totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the time of the st | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Simons
green
2 sentences2019Under these circumstances, " 'the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.' " State v. Simons , 2013 UT 3 , ¶ 21, 296 P.3d 721 (quoting United States v. Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266 , 274, 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) ). ¶19 Perkins's argument that the stop was unlawful at its inception focuses almost exclusively on whether the information provided by the concerned citizen was sufficiently reliable and timely to give rise to reasonable suspicion that Perkins 2019Under these circumstances, " 'the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.' " State v. Simons , 2013 UT 3 , ¶ 21, 296 P.3d 721 (quoting United States v. Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266 , 274, 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) ). ¶19 Perkins's argument that the stop was unlawful at its inception focuses almost exclusively on whether the information provided by the concerned citizen was sufficiently reliable and timely to give rise to reasonable suspicion that Perkins | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Gurule
green
2 sentences2019Thus, although officers may not extend the scope of a traffic stop based on "merely an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch," "a determination that reasonable suspicion exists need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct." Id. (quotations simplified). ¶31 Essentially, "reasonable suspicion requires an objectively reasonable belief that an individual is engaged in ... criminal activity," Gurule , 2013 UT 58 , ¶ 31, 321 P.3d 1039 (quotation simplified), "based on specific, articulable facts drawn from the totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the time of the st 2019Thus, although officers may not extend the scope of a traffic stop based on "merely an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch," "a determination that reasonable suspicion exists need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct." Id. (quotations simplified). ¶31 Essentially, "reasonable suspicion requires an objectively reasonable belief that an individual is engaged in ... criminal activity," Gurule , 2013 UT 58 , ¶ 31, 321 P.3d 1039 (quotation simplified), "based on specific, articulable facts drawn from the totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the time of the st | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Kabor
green
2 sentences2018Specifically, the court ruled that a "mere claim by Mr. Stewart, 11 years after sentencing, that he is quite sure the sentencing judge did not inform [him] of his right to the appointment of appellate counsel is simply insufficient" to meet the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard required by rule 4(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. ¶20 We give deference to the court's factual findings and will "not overturn them unless they are clearly erroneous." State v. Kabor , 2013 UT App 12 , ¶ 8, 295 P.3d 193 . 2018Specifically, the court ruled that a "mere claim by Mr. Stewart, 11 years after sentencing, that he is quite sure the sentencing judge did not inform [him] of his right to the appointment of appellate counsel is simply insufficient" to meet the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard required by rule 4(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. ¶20 We give deference to the court's factual findings and will "not overturn them unless they are clearly erroneous." State v. Kabor , 2013 UT App 12 , ¶ 8, 295 P.3d 193 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Christensen v. Rolfe
neutral
2 sentences2018On review, we presume "legislative enactments ... to be constitutional," Christensen v. Rolfe , 2014 UT App 223 , ¶ 7, 336 P.3d 40 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and, consequently, "the party challenging a statute's constitutionality bears a heavy burden of proving its invalidity," Jones v. Utah Board of Pardons & Parole , 2004 UT 53 , ¶ 10, 94 P.3d 283 . ¶22 In sweeping fashion, Father invites us to opine on the constitutionality of conceptual standards written into statute, including the "best interests of the child" standard, child support ordered beyond the child's minima 2018On review, we presume "legislative enactments ... to be constitutional," Christensen v. Rolfe , 2014 UT App 223 , ¶ 7, 336 P.3d 40 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and, consequently, "the party challenging a statute's constitutionality bears a heavy burden of proving its invalidity," Jones v. Utah Board of Pardons & Parole , 2004 UT 53 , ¶ 10, 94 P.3d 283 . ¶22 In sweeping fashion, Father invites us to opine on the constitutionality of conceptual standards written into statute, including the "best interests of the child" standard, child support ordered beyond the child's minima | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Jones v. Utah Board of Pardons & Parole
green
2 sentences2018On review, we presume "legislative enactments ... to be constitutional," Christensen v. Rolfe , 2014 UT App 223 , ¶ 7, 336 P.3d 40 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and, consequently, "the party challenging a statute's constitutionality bears a heavy burden of proving its invalidity," Jones v. Utah Board of Pardons & Parole , 2004 UT 53 , ¶ 10, 94 P.3d 283 . ¶22 In sweeping fashion, Father invites us to opine on the constitutionality of conceptual standards written into statute, including the "best interests of the child" standard, child support ordered beyond the child's minima 2018On review, we presume "legislative enactments ... to be constitutional," Christensen v. Rolfe , 2014 UT App 223 , ¶ 7, 336 P.3d 40 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and, consequently, "the party challenging a statute's constitutionality bears a heavy burden of proving its invalidity," Jones v. Utah Board of Pardons & Parole , 2004 UT 53 , ¶ 10, 94 P.3d 283 . ¶22 In sweeping fashion, Father invites us to opine on the constitutionality of conceptual standards written into statute, including the "best interests of the child" standard, child support ordered beyond the child's minima | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Mathews v. Eldridge
green
2 sentences2018Father also generally argues that Utah's custody and child support statutes violate the due process protections as outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319 , 334, 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). 8 ¶23 Despite his reliance on Eldridge , Father expressly limits this appeal to Utah law, "particularly the Due Process and Uniform Operations of Laws clauses of the Utah Constitution." Although he provides some citation to Utah constitutional provisions, Father presents no reasoned analysis in his briefing of these issues on appeal. 2018Father also generally argues that Utah's custody and child support statutes violate the due process protections as outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319 , 334, 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). 8 ¶23 Despite his reliance on Eldridge , Father expressly limits this appeal to Utah law, "particularly the Due Process and Uniform Operations of Laws clauses of the Utah Constitution." Although he provides some citation to Utah constitutional provisions, Father presents no reasoned analysis in his briefing of these issues on appeal. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Reece
green
1 sentence2018Our supreme court added that "matters of conditional relevance must also meet the preponderance of the evidence standard under rule 104(b)." Id. (cleaned up). ¶27 The trial court's analysis of the evidence sufficiently met these standards. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| In re F.L. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Sommerville green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Carpena green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Alverez green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Clark green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Virgin green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| In Re EHH green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Department of Human Services, Division of Child & Family Services v. B.R. neutral | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Verrastro v. Middlesex Insurance green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.