preponderance of the evidence standard in New Jersey

2015See J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 474, 25 A.3d 1045 (2011) (noting that “the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act tests a victim’s entitlement to relief in accordance with the preponderance of the evidence standard, consistent with the lowered burden of proof in civil proceedings”); *535 see also Crespo v. Crespo, 408 N.J.Super. 25, 38-40 , 972 A.2d 1169 (App.Div.2009) (concluding that restraints under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act are essentially civil in nature), affd o.b., 201 N.J. 207 , 989 A.2d 827 (2010).

2015See J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 474, 25 A.3d 1045 (2011) (noting that “the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act tests a victim’s entitlement to relief in accordance with the preponderance of the evidence standard, consistent with the lowered burden of proof in civil proceedings”); *535 see also Crespo v. Crespo, 408 N.J.Super. 25, 38-40 , 972 A.2d 1169 (App.Div.2009) (concluding that restraints under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act are essentially civil in nature), affd o.b., 201 N.J. 207 , 989 A.2d 827 (2010).

2003To meet *144 due process demands, the standard has to inform the fact-finder that the proof must be greater than the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applicable to other categories of civil cases. [ Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432-33 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1812-13 , 60 L.Ed. 2d 323, 335 (1979).] "`[C]ivil commitment,' from a constitutional perspective, nonetheless remains civil." Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 380 , 117 S.Ct. 2072, 2091 , 138 L.Ed. 2d 501 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369-70 , 106 S.Ct. 2988 , 92 L.Ed. 2d 296 (1986)).

2003To meet *144 due process demands, the standard has to inform the fact-finder that the proof must be greater than the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applicable to other categories of civil cases. [ Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432-33 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1812-13 , 60 L.Ed. 2d 323, 335 (1979).] "`[C]ivil commitment,' from a constitutional perspective, nonetheless remains civil." Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 380 , 117 S.Ct. 2072, 2091 , 138 L.Ed. 2d 501 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369-70 , 106 S.Ct. 2988 , 92 L.Ed. 2d 296 (1986)).

2026The PDVA "tests a victim's entitlement to relief in accordance with the preponderance of the evidence standard, A-2092-24 8 consistent with the lowered burden of proof appropriate in a civil proceeding. " J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 474 (2011).

2022"Unlike a criminal prosecution, in which the state’s burden of proof is the familiar beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the [PDVA] tests a victim’s entitlement to relief in accordance with the preponderance of the evidence standard, consistent with the lowered burden of proof appropriate in a civil proceeding." J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 474 (2011).

2023Thus, courts will accept a “lower standard of proof” such as for instance, proof of “bulk processing and mailing.” Davis & Assocs., LLC v. Stafford Twp., 18 N.J.

2022This presumption may be demonstrated through the submission of evidence “of habit or routine practice,” but “evidence of office custom requires other corroboration that the custom was followed in a particular instance, in order to raise a presumption of mailing and receive and meet the preponderance of the evidence standard.” Davis & Assocs., LLC v. Stafford Twp., 18 N.J.

2025See Haynes, 87 N.J. at 177-78 (explaining the preponderance of the evidence standard generally applies to undue-influence claims arising from challenges to a will). 5 Applying the requisite standard, we are satisfied the court thoroughly reviewed the evidence and legal arguments in finding in plaintiff's favor and properly rejected defendants' assertions of undue influence and suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the 2016 codicil, finding defendants had failed to make a prima facie showing of undue influence.

2025As previously stated, the court found the credible testimony of plaintiff and McHugh 5 In Haynes, the Court otherwise noted the preponderance of the evidence standard does not apply, and instead, a "heavier burden of proof" applies to rebut a presumption of undue influence where "the presumption of undue influence is so heavily weighted with policy that the courts have demanded a sterner measure of proof than that usually obtaining upon civil issues." 87 N.J. at 178 (quoting In re Week's Est., 29 N.J.

2024See N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(b) (providing that if a court finds that a sex “offender’s conduct was characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive behavior and that the offender is amenable to sex offender treatment and is willing to participate in such treatment, the court shall” sentence the defendant to Avenel); State v. Howard, 110 N.J. 113, 126-27, 131 (1988) (applying a preponderance of the evidence standard to a finding under N.J.S.A. 2C:47- 3(a)).

2016See State v. Howard, 110 N.J. 113, 131 (1988) (for ADTC sentencing purposes, repetitive and compulsive behavior need only be proven 10 To ascertain with certainty what issues were raised in the Megan's Law hearing, we required the parties to provide us with their trial court briefs.

2015See J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 474, 25 A.3d 1045 (2011) (noting that “the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act tests a victim’s entitlement to relief in accordance with the preponderance of the evidence standard, consistent with the lowered burden of proof in civil proceedings”); *535 see also Crespo v. Crespo, 408 N.J.Super. 25, 38-40 , 972 A.2d 1169 (App.Div.2009) (concluding that restraints under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act are essentially civil in nature), affd o.b., 201 N.J. 207 , 989 A.2d 827 (2010).

2015See J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 474, 25 A.3d 1045 (2011) (noting that “the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act tests a victim’s entitlement to relief in accordance with the preponderance of the evidence standard, consistent with the lowered burden of proof in civil proceedings”); *535 see also Crespo v. Crespo, 408 N.J.Super. 25, 38-40 , 972 A.2d 1169 (App.Div.2009) (concluding that restraints under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act are essentially civil in nature), affd o.b., 201 N.J. 207 , 989 A.2d 827 (2010).

2025As previously stated, the court found the credible testimony of plaintiff and McHugh 5 In Haynes, the Court otherwise noted the preponderance of the evidence standard does not apply, and instead, a "heavier burden of proof" applies to rebut a presumption of undue influence where "the presumption of undue influence is so heavily weighted with policy that the courts have demanded a sterner measure of proof than that usually obtaining upon civil issues." 87 N.J. at 178 (quoting In re Week's Est., 29 N.J.

2024However, where "the will benefits one who stood in a confidential relationship to the [testator] and there are additional circumstances of a 'suspicious character present which require explanation,'" Rittenhouse's Will, 19 N.J. 376, 378-79 (1955), a presumption of undue influence arises, and the burden of proof shifts to the proponent of the will "to overcome the presumption," Stockdale, 196 N.J. at 303 , ordinarily by a preponderance of the evidence, see Haynes, 87 N.J. at 177-78 (explaining the preponderance of the evidence standard generally applies to undue influence claims arising from ch

1996Federal courts have enhanced criminal sentences based on nonconviction offenses whether the result of an acquittal, e.g., United States v. Manor, 936 F. 2d 1238, 1243 (11th Cir.1991) ("an acquittal based on a reasonable doubt standard should not preclude a contrary finding [at sentencing] using the preponderance of the evidence standard"); cf. State v. Megargel, 278 N.J.

1996Federal courts have enhanced criminal sentences based on nonconviction offenses whether the result of an acquittal, e.g., United States v. Manor, 936 F.2d 1238, 1243 (11th Cir.1991)(“an acquittal based on a reasonable doubt standard should not preclude a contrary finding [at sentencing] using the preponderance of the evidence standard”); cf. State v. Megargel, 278 N.J.Super. 557, 568 , 651 A.2d 1051 (App.Div.1995)(sustaining enhanced Graves Act sentence for weapons possession despite acquittal on weapons possession charge because, inter alia, “the judge’s findings were based on a lower standar

1996Super. 557, 568 , 651 A. 2d 1051 (App.Div. 1995)(sustaining enhanced Graves Act sentence for weapons possession despite acquittal on weapons possession charge because, inter alia, "the judge's findings were based on a lower standard of proof"), rev'd on other grounds, 143 N.J. 484 , 673 A. 2d 259 (1996), a dismissed count pursuant to a plea bargain, e.g., United States v. Camuti, 950 F. 2d 72, 74 (1st Cir.1991) (considering conduct involved in two counts dropped as result of plea bargain to enhance sentence), or conduct never charged, e.g., United States v. Andrews, 948 F. 2d 448, 448-450 (8th

1996Federal courts have enhanced criminal sentences based on nonconviction offenses whether the result of an acquittal, e.g., United States v. Manor, 936 F.2d 1238, 1243 (11th Cir.1991)(“an acquittal based on a reasonable doubt standard should not preclude a contrary finding [at sentencing] using the preponderance of the evidence standard”); cf. State v. Megargel, 278 N.J.Super. 557, 568 , 651 A.2d 1051 (App.Div.1995)(sustaining enhanced Graves Act sentence for weapons possession despite acquittal on weapons possession charge because, inter alia, “the judge’s findings were based on a lower standar

1996Super. 557, 568 , 651 A. 2d 1051 (App.Div. 1995)(sustaining enhanced Graves Act sentence for weapons possession despite acquittal on weapons possession charge because, inter alia, "the judge's findings were based on a lower standard of proof"), rev'd on other grounds, 143 N.J. 484 , 673 A. 2d 259 (1996), a dismissed count pursuant to a plea bargain, e.g., United States v. Camuti, 950 F. 2d 72, 74 (1st Cir.1991) (considering conduct involved in two counts dropped as result of plea bargain to enhance sentence), or conduct never charged, e.g., United States v. Andrews, 948 F. 2d 448, 448-450 (8th

1996Federal courts have enhanced criminal sentences based on nonconviction offenses whether the result of an acquittal, e.g., United States v. Manor, 936 F.2d 1238, 1243 (11th Cir.1991)(“an acquittal based on a reasonable doubt standard should not preclude a contrary finding [at sentencing] using the preponderance of the evidence standard”); cf. State v. Megargel, 278 N.J.Super. 557, 568 , 651 A.2d 1051 (App.Div.1995)(sustaining enhanced Graves Act sentence for weapons possession despite acquittal on weapons possession charge because, inter alia, “the judge’s findings were based on a lower standar

1994See Grady, supra, 85 N.J. at 265 , 426 A.2d 467 (holding that proponent of sterilization has burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that person to be sterilized lacks capacity to consent or withhold consent); In re Penny N., 120 N.H. 269 , 414 A.2d 541, 543 (1980) (same); In re Hayes, 93 Wash.2d 228 , 608 P.2d 635, 641 (1980) (finding that proponent of sterilization must show by “clear, cogent and convincing evidence” that procedure is in “retarded person’s best interest”); cf. Adding-ton v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1813 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323, 335 (1979) (holding that in

1994See Grady, supra, 85 N.J. at 265 , 426 A.2d 467 (holding that proponent of sterilization has burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that person to be sterilized lacks capacity to consent or withhold consent); In re Penny N., 120 N.H. 269 , 414 A.2d 541, 543 (1980) (same); In re Hayes, 93 Wash.2d 228 , 608 P.2d 635, 641 (1980) (finding that proponent of sterilization must show by “clear, cogent and convincing evidence” that procedure is in “retarded person’s best interest”); cf. Adding-ton v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1813 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323, 335 (1979) (holding that in

1994See Grady, supra, 85 N.J. at 265 , 426 A.2d 467 (holding that proponent of sterilization has burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that person to be sterilized lacks capacity to consent or withhold consent); In re Penny N., 120 N.H. 269 , 414 A.2d 541, 543 (1980) (same); In re Hayes, 93 Wash.2d 228 , 608 P.2d 635, 641 (1980) (finding that proponent of sterilization must show by “clear, cogent and convincing evidence” that procedure is in “retarded person’s best interest”); cf. Adding-ton v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1813 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323, 335 (1979) (holding that in

1994See Grady, supra, 85 N.J. at 265 , 426 A.2d 467 (holding that proponent of sterilization has burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that person to be sterilized lacks capacity to consent or withhold consent); In re Penny N., 120 N.H. 269 , 414 A.2d 541, 543 (1980) (same); In re Hayes, 93 Wash.2d 228 , 608 P.2d 635, 641 (1980) (finding that proponent of sterilization must show by “clear, cogent and convincing evidence” that procedure is in “retarded person’s best interest”); cf. Adding-ton v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1813 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323, 335 (1979) (holding that in

1994See Grady, supra, 85 N.J. at 265 , 426 A.2d 467 (holding that proponent of sterilization has burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that person to be sterilized lacks capacity to consent or withhold consent); In re Penny N., 120 N.H. 269 , 414 A.2d 541, 543 (1980) (same); In re Hayes, 93 Wash.2d 228 , 608 P.2d 635, 641 (1980) (finding that proponent of sterilization must show by “clear, cogent and convincing evidence” that procedure is in “retarded person’s best interest”); cf. Adding-ton v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1813 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323, 335 (1979) (holding that in

1994See Grady, supra, 85 N.J. at 265 , 426 A.2d 467 (holding that proponent of sterilization has burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that person to be sterilized lacks capacity to consent or withhold consent); In re Penny N., 120 N.H. 269 , 414 A.2d 541, 543 (1980) (same); In re Hayes, 93 Wash.2d 228 , 608 P.2d 635, 641 (1980) (finding that proponent of sterilization must show by “clear, cogent and convincing evidence” that procedure is in “retarded person’s best interest”); cf. Adding-ton v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1813 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323, 335 (1979) (holding that in

2021More specifically, Melvin contends that acquitted conduct evaluated under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard violated due process, contrary to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

2021More specifically, Melvin contends that acquitted conduct evaluated under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard violated due process, contrary to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

2010In Cummings, supra, the Court acknowledged both that the refusal statute by its terms requires proof only by the preponderance of the evidence standard and that historically the statute had been treated as a civil rather than penal remedy. 184 N.J. at 93-95 , 875 A. 2d 906 (citing State v. Wright, 107 N.J. 488, 503 , 527 A. 2d 379 (1987); State v. Todaro, 242 N.J.Super. 177, 179 , 576 A. 2d 307 (App. Div.1990); State v. Fahrer, 212 N.J.Super. 571, 577 , 515 A. 2d 1240 (App.Div.1986)).

2010In Cummings, supra, the Court acknowledged both that the refusal statute by its terms requires proof only by the preponderance of the evidence standard and that historically the statute had been treated as a civil rather than penal remedy. 184 N.J. at 93-95 , 875 A. 2d 906 (citing State v. Wright, 107 N.J. 488, 503 , 527 A. 2d 379 (1987); State v. Todaro, 242 N.J.Super. 177, 179 , 576 A. 2d 307 (App. Div.1990); State v. Fahrer, 212 N.J.Super. 571, 577 , 515 A. 2d 1240 (App.Div.1986)).

1989Appellant first argues that "[b]y amending the complaint to include a complaint for the guardianship, in the middle of the fact finding hearing based on a preponderance of the evidence standard, the procedure was established so that guardianship could only be established on a preponderance of the evidence standard, which is insufficient to terminate parental rights." The Supreme Court in Santosky, 455 U.S. 745, 757 , 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1396-97 , 71 L.Ed. 2d 599 , 609 stated: [F]undamental fairness may be maintained in parental rights termination proceedings even when some procedures are mandated

1989Appellant first argues that "[b]y amending the complaint to include a complaint for the guardianship, in the middle of the fact finding hearing based on a preponderance of the evidence standard, the procedure was established so that guardianship could only be established on a preponderance of the evidence standard, which is insufficient to terminate parental rights." The Supreme Court in Santosky, 455 U.S. 745, 757 , 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1396-97 , 71 L.Ed. 2d 599 , 609 stated: [F]undamental fairness may be maintained in parental rights termination proceedings even when some procedures are mandated

2025Finally, we decline to address the merits of Neil's third argument as it was not raised before the trial court, see State v. Galicia, 210 N.J. 364, 383 (2012) ("Generally, an appellate court will not consider issues, even constitutional ones, A-1113-23 13 which were not raised below"), except to note we have consistently found actions for the forfeiture of firearms that are rooted in statutory law are constitutional, pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard applied by the trial court.

2024See Stockdale, 196 N.J. at 303 . will may overcome the presumption "in accordance with the preponderance of the evidence standard," 196 N.J. at 303 (citation omitted).

2024However, where "the will benefits one who stood in a confidential relationship to the [testator] and there are additional circumstances of a 'suspicious character present which require explanation,'" Rittenhouse's Will, 19 N.J. 376, 378-79 (1955), a presumption of undue influence arises, and the burden of proof shifts to the proponent of the will "to overcome the presumption," Stockdale, 196 N.J. at 303 , ordinarily by a preponderance of the evidence, see Haynes, 87 N.J. at 177-78 (explaining the preponderance of the evidence standard generally applies to undue influence claims arising from ch