preponderance of the evidence standard in Texas

2025In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980); Porter v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul.

1980The trial judge, who heard this case prior to the decision in In Re G_ M_, 596 S.W.2d 846 (1980), applied the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof, as required by § 11.15 of the Tex. Family Code Ann., and rendered judgment on the jury verdict.

2026“Although a much lower standard than ‘beyond a reasonable doubt,’ the preponderance of the evidence standard is a much higher standard than the search-and-seizure 3 standards of ‘probable cause’ and ‘reasonable suspicion.’” Id. (quoting York v. State, 342 S.W.3d 528 , 543 n.86 (Tex. Crim.

2021This preponderance-of-the-evidence standard is met “when the greater weight of credible evidence before the trial court supports a reasonable belief that a condition of 6 community supervision has been violated.” Davis, 591 S.W.3d at 189 (citing Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 764 (Tex. Crim.

2025Code Ann. § 153.131 (a). “[A] finding that appointment of a parent as managing 7 conservator would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development is governed by a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.” In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007); see Tex. Fam.

2025See id. (“[A] finding that appointment of a parent as managing conservator would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development is governed by a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.”).

2019“This intermediate standard falls between the preponderance of the evidence standard in civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt 7 standard of criminal proceedings.” In re L.J.N., 329 S.W.3d 667 , 671 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2010, no pet.).

2019“This intermediate standard falls between the preponderance of the evidence standard in civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings.” In re L.J.N., 329 S.W.3d 667 , 671 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2010, no pet.).

2024State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979); In re A.B.B., 482 S.W.3d 135, 139 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, pet. dism’d w.o.j.).

2024State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979); In re A.B.B., 482 S.W.3d 135, 139 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) A single ground under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(V) is sufficient to uphold termination of a parent’s rights.

2024Reasonable suspicion is a lower measure of suspicion than probable cause, and probable cause “falls far short of a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Baldwin v. State, 278 S.W.3d 367, 371 (Tex. Crim.

2024Reasonable suspicion is a lower measure of suspicion than probable cause, and probable cause “falls far short of a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Baldwin v. State, 278 S.W.3d 367, 371 (Tex. Crim.

2023In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980); In re C.S., 208 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied); Porter v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul.

2015In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980); In re C.S., 208 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied); 34 Porter v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 105 S.W.3d 52, 57 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.).

2018This “intermediate standard falls between the preponderance of the evidence standard of civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings.” Id. (citing In re E.M.E., 234 S.W.3d at 73 ).

2018This “intermediate standard falls between the preponderance of the evidence standard of civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings.” Id. (citing In re E.M.E., 234 S.W.3d at 73 ).

2015G.M., 596 S.W.2d at 847 ; In the Interest of J.N.R., 982 S.W.2d 137, 141 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.); Harris, 838 S.W.2d at 941 .

2015G.M., 596 S.W.2d at 847 ; In the Interest of J.N.R., 982 S.W.2d 137, 141 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.); Harris, 838 S.W.2d at 941 .

2024In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ means a ‘measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.’” In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting Tex. Fam.

2024In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ means a ‘measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.’” In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting Tex. Fam.

2021Porter v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Reg. Servs., 105 S.W.3d 52, 57 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.).

2017Porter v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 105 S.W.3d 52, 57 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.).

2013In the context of civil legal-sufficiency review involving a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, that statement must be modified slightly after City of Keller to read: "The jury may accept or reject any or all of the testimony of any witness if a reasonable juror could do so” or, more generally, "Evidence can be disregarded whenever reasonable jurors could do so.” City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 811 (Tex.2005).

2013In the context of civil legal-sufficiency review involving a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, that statement must be modified slightly after City of Keller to read: "The jury may accept or reject any or all of the testimony of any witness if a reasonable juror could do so" or, more generally, "Evidence can be disregarded whenever reasonable jurors could do so." City of Keller v. Wilson , 168 S.W.3d 802, 811 (Tex. 2005).

2015The Supreme Court reiterated this point in Williams v. Taylor, expressly noting that a state court’s use of a preponderance of the evidence standard rather than the lesser reasonable probability standard would result in a decision that was contrary to federal law as determined by that Court. 529 U.S. at 405-06 . 1 In Bouchillon, 907 F.2d 589 , the Fifth Circuit recognized that the prejudice prong imposes “a lower burden of proof than the preponderance standard.” Id. at 595 .

2015The Supreme Court reiterated this point in Williams v. Taylor, expressly noting that a state court’s use of a preponderance of the evidence standard rather than the lesser reasonable probability standard would result in a decision that was contrary to federal law as determined by that Court. 529 U.S. at 405-06 . 1 In Bouchillon, 907 F.2d 589 , the Fifth Circuit recognized that the prejudice prong imposes “a lower burden of proof than the preponderance standard.” Id. at 595 .

2024An officer may not act solely on a hunch, but his determination of “the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls 10 considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Tanner v. State, 228 S.W.3d 852, 856 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.) (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 , 122 S. Ct. 744, 751 (2002)).

2024An officer may not act solely on a hunch, but his determination of “the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls 10 considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Tanner v. State, 228 S.W.3d 852, 856 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.) (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 , 122 S. Ct. 744, 751 (2002)).

2020See id. §§ 105.005, 153.131(a); In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d at 616 (stating that “finding that appointment of a parent as managing conservator would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development is governed by a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard”); Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d at 167 (observing that “strong presumption” in favor of parental custody imposes “heavy burden on a nonparent” and that “[i]t is no longer adequate to offer evidence that the nonparent would be a better custodian of the child”); In re M.J.C.B., 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 12387 , at *3 (same).

2009Termination findings must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, while A a finding that appointment of a parent as managing conservator would significantly impair the child = s physical health or emotional development is governed by a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. @ Id. ; Lewelling v. Lewelling , 796 S.W.2d 164, 167 (Tex. 1990).

2024An officer may not act solely on a hunch, but his determination of “the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls 10 considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Tanner v. State, 228 S.W.3d 852, 856 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.) (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 , 122 S. Ct. 744, 751 (2002)).

2021Courts require only a “minimal level of objective justification” on the part of the officers, and “the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause” and “falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Tanner v. State, 228 S.W.3d 852, 855, 856 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.) (citations omitted).

2010See Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 436-37 (Cochran, J., dissenting).

2010See Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 436-37 (Cochran, J., dissenting).

2023The preponderance of the evidence standard “has been described as a review for whether there is ‘more than a scintilla’ of evidence.” Holcomb v. State, No. 14-21-00718-CR, 2023 WL 415862 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 26, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (quoting Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865 ).

2016While probable cause requires “a relatively high level of suspicion,” it is “far short of a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Baldwin, 278 S.W.3d at 371 ; accord Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) (preponderance of the evidence “is a much higher standard” than probable cause).

1981Even applying the preponderance of the evidence standard applicable to revocation of probation matters under Scamardo v. State, Tex. Cr.App., 517 S.W.2d 293 , we find that we must sustain this contention.

1978Using the preponderance of the evidence test applicable to revocation of probation hearings, Scamardo v. State, 517 S.W.2d 293 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), we find the evidence, without the oral confession testimony, to be sufficient to support the revocation order in that appellant did communicate a false bomb report at Lamesa High School.

2023“It is a greater level of suspicion than ‘reasonable suspicion’ but falls far short of a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Ford, 537 S.W.3d at 23–24; accord Baldwin, 278 S.W.3d at 371 . “[I]t is clear that ‘only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause.’” Gates, 462 U.S. at 235 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969), abrogated on other grounds by Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 ).

2023“It is a greater level of suspicion than ‘reasonable suspicion’ but falls far short of a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Ford, 537 S.W.3d at 23–24; accord Baldwin, 278 S.W.3d at 371 . “[I]t is clear that ‘only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause.’” Gates, 462 U.S. at 235 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969), abrogated on other grounds by Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 ).

2010Seideneck v. Cal Bayreuther Assocs., 451 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Tex. 1970).

2010Seideneck v. Cal Bayreuther Assocs., 451 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Tex. 1970).

2004The court explicated that in cases in which the burden is to establish a right to judgment by "clear and convincing evidence" rather than the preponderance of the evidence standard traditionally used in civil cases, "the appellate standard for reviewing termination findings is whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State's allegations." Id. at 25 .

2003It explicated that in cases such as this in which the burden is to establish a right to judgment by “clear and convincing evidence” rather than the preponderance of the evidence standard traditionally used in civil cases, “the appellate standard for reviewing termination findings is whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State’s allegations.” Id. at 25 .

2022The preponderance of the evidence standard, which the trial court applied here, “indicates both society’s ‘minimal concern with the outcome,’ and a conclusion that the litigants should ‘share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion.’” Id. at 755 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 423 ).

2022The preponderance of the evidence standard, which the trial court applied here, “indicates both society’s ‘minimal concern with the outcome,’ and a conclusion that the litigants should ‘share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion.’” Id. at 755 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 423 ).

2015See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (“The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome.”); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 , 405–06 (2000) (explaining that a preponderance of the evidence standard would be “opposed to our clearly established precedent ... that the prisoner need only demonstrate a reasonable probability that ... the result of the proceeding would have been different” (quotation omitted)).

2015See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ; Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813 .

2007An officer may not act solely on a hunch, but his determination of "the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002); see Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 (reasonable suspicion requires "minimal level of objective justification").

2007An officer may not act solely on a hunch, but his determination of "the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002); see Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 (reasonable suspicion requires "minimal level of objective justification").