Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
59 West Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2026 26 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Albrecht v. Stategreen2 sentences2023Va. 268 , 314 S.E.2d 859 (“Where there is evidence reflecting that a driver was operating a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway, exhibited symptoms of intoxication, and had consumed alcoholic beverages, this is sufficient proof under a preponderance of the evidence standard to warrant the administrative revocation of his driver’s license for driving under the influence of alcohol.”). 10 McCusker] initially arrived at the scene [Mr. Gaither] had purportedly been injured but had walked away from the accident. 2023The OAH cited Syllabus point 2 of Albrecht v. State in support of its decision to uphold Mr. Casto’s license revocation: Where there is evidence reflecting that a driver was operating a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway, exhibited symptoms of intoxication, and had consumed alcoholic beverages, this is sufficient proof under a preponderance of the evidence standard to warrant the administrative revocation of his driver’s license for driving under the influence of alcohol. 173 W. | 3 | 28 |
JWCF, LP v. Steven Farruggiagreen2 sentences2026Va. 417, 428, 427 , 752 S.E.2d 571, 581 (2013).5 Here, the circuit court emphasized that the standard of clear and convincing evidence supporting a punitive damages claim differed from the preponderance of the evidence standard required to support claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process. 2026Va. 417, 428, 427 , 752 S.E.2d 571, 581 (2013).5 Here, the circuit court emphasized that the standard of clear and convincing evidence supporting a punitive damages claim differed from the preponderance of the evidence standard required to support claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process. | 2 | 2 |
In Re F.S. and Z.S.green2 sentences2026Va. 538, 546 , 759 S.E.2d 769, 777 (2014) (highlighting that the preponderance of the evidence standard is a lesser burden of proof than the clear and convincing evidence standard).3 Furthermore, the petitioner asserts that the circuit court erred in denying her second motion for reconsideration as the court failed to consider newly discovered evidence, that being the security footage video. 2026Va. 538, 546 , 759 S.E.2d 769, 777 (2014) (highlighting that the preponderance of the evidence standard is a lesser burden of proof than the clear and convincing evidence standard).3 Furthermore, the petitioner asserts that the circuit court erred in denying her second motion for reconsideration as the court failed to consider newly discovered evidence, that being the security footage video. | 2 | 2 |
Carte v. Clinegreen2 sentences2010See Cady, infra. 11 . "'Where there is evidence reflecting that a driver was operating a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway, exhibited symptoms of intoxication, and had consumed alcoholic beverages, this is sufficient proof under a preponderance of the evidence standard to warrant the administrative revocation of his driver’s license for driving under the influence of alcohol.’ Syllabus Point 2, Albrecht v. State, 173 W.Va. 268 , 314 S.E.2d 859 (1984).’’ Syllabus Point 2, Carte v. Cline, 200 W.Va. 162 , 488 S.E.2d 437 (1997). 12 . 2010See Cady, infra. 11 . "'Where there is evidence reflecting that a driver was operating a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway, exhibited symptoms of intoxication, and had consumed alcoholic beverages, this is sufficient proof under a preponderance of the evidence standard to warrant the administrative revocation of his driver’s license for driving under the influence of alcohol.’ Syllabus Point 2, Albrecht v. State, 173 W.Va. 268 , 314 S.E.2d 859 (1984).’’ Syllabus Point 2, Carte v. Cline, 200 W.Va. 162 , 488 S.E.2d 437 (1997). 12 . | 1 | 4 |
Davis v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2021Va. at 381 , 633 S.E.2d at 326 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 833 (stating that “federal courts using Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) . . . have generally held the Government to the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard . . . . 2006Davis , 547 U.S. at-- — , 126 S.Ct. 2266 (Slip Op. at 18-19). | 1 | 2 |
In Re Willisgreen1 sentence2025Va. 225 , 207 S.E.2d 129 (1973) (“The standard of proof required to support a court order limiting or terminating parental rights to the custody of minor children is clear, cogent and convincing proof.”). 13 taking private property by adverse possession.28 Less demanding than that is proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the general standard used in civil cases,29 which means “more likely than not.”30 Finally, the probable cause standard requires even less than a preponderance of the evidence standard. | 1 | 1 |
Keister v. Talbottgreen1 sentence2023Va. at 750 , 391 S.E.2d at 900 (internal quotations and citations omitted).While the OAH did not consider the negative blood test results for the reason it gave, 4 the OAH found petitioner DUI because (a) the evidence showing that petitioner consumed controlled substances and exhibited symptoms of intoxication constituted sufficient proof of DUI pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard utilized in administrative revocation proceedings; 5 and (b) there was no requirement that a chemical sobriety test show the presence of controlled substances in petitioner’s system. | 1 | 1 |
Carol Campbell v. Boston Scientific Corporationgreen1 sentence2021See also Campbell v. Boston Scientific Corp., 882 F.3d 70, 81 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding that “a correct statement of West Virginia [punitive damages] law at the time of trial” was that “[v]arious trial courts in West Virginia had applied the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, and the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had affirmed such decisions”). | 1 | 1 |
Patricia S. Reed, Comm. W. Va. Dept. of Motor Vehicles v. Dustin Hallgreen1 sentence2021See id. | 1 | 1 |
State ex rel. Smith v. Scottgreen2 sentences2013Smith v. Scott, 167 W.Va. 231, 233 , 280 S.E.2d 811, 813 (1981) (“The term ‘preponderance of the evidence’ does not refer exclusively to the quantity of testimony but to the quality of that testimony as well.”).6 The first assignment of error raised by the DOH alleges that the circuit court, in affirming the Administrative Law Judge, incorrectly required the DOH to present direct evidence to prove that Litten was the offending employee, thereby holding the DOH to a higher standard of proof than a preponderance of the evidence standard. 2013Smith v. Scott, 167 W.Va. 231, 233 , 280 S.E.2d 811, 813 (1981) (“The term ‘preponderance of the evidence’ does not refer exclusively to the quantity of testimony but to the quality of that testimony as well.”). 6 The first assignment of error raised by the DOH alleges that the circuit court, in affirming the Administrative Law Judge, incorrectly required the DOH to present direct evidence to prove that Litten was the offending employee, thereby holding the DOH to a higher standard of proof than a preponderance of the evidence standard. | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Smith v. Scottgreen2 sentences2013Smith v. Scott, 167 W.Va. 231, 233 , 280 S.E.2d 811, 813 (1981) (“The term ‘preponderance of the evidence’ does not refer exclusively to the quantity of testimony but to the quality of that testimony as well.”).6 The first assignment of error raised by the DOH alleges that the circuit court, in affirming the Administrative Law Judge, incorrectly required the DOH to present direct evidence to prove that Litten was the offending employee, thereby holding the DOH to a higher standard of proof than a preponderance of the evidence standard. 2013Smith v. Scott, 167 W.Va. 231, 233 , 280 S.E.2d 811, 813 (1981) (“The term ‘preponderance of the evidence’ does not refer exclusively to the quantity of testimony but to the quality of that testimony as well.”). 6 The first assignment of error raised by the DOH alleges that the circuit court, in affirming the Administrative Law Judge, incorrectly required the DOH to present direct evidence to prove that Litten was the offending employee, thereby holding the DOH to a higher standard of proof than a preponderance of the evidence standard. | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Medical Assurance of West Virginia, Inc. v. Rechtgreen2 sentences2004As mentioned above, the failure of the high court to quantify in Zolin the amount of proof required at either the threshold stage or during the actual in camera review has resulted in a scenario where some courts apply a preponderance of the evidence standard; some courts require clear and convincing evidence; and yet others view it akin to a probable cause hearing. 10 See Medical As surance, 213 W.Va. at 477-78 , 583 S.E.2d at 100-101 (Davis, J., concurring) (delineating divergence of authority on evidentiary standard required to establish application of crime-fraud exception including prepon 2004As mentioned above, the failure of the high court to quantify in Zolin the amount of proof required at either the threshold stage or during the actual in camera review has resulted in a scenario where some courts apply a preponderance of the evidence standard; some courts require clear and convincing evidence; and yet others view it akin to a probable cause hearing. [10] See Medical Assurance, 213 W.Va. at 477-78 , 583 S.E.2d at *47 100-101 (Davis, J., concurring) (delineating divergence of authority on evidentiary standard required to establish application of crime-fraud exception including p | 1 | 1 |
Purcell v. District Attorney for Suffolk Districtgreen2 sentences2003See American Tobacco Co. v. State, 697 So.2d 1249, 1256 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997) (preponderance of the evidence standard); Stidham v. Clark, 74 S.W.3d 719, 727 (Ky.2002); (same) Purcell v. District Attorney, 424 Mass. 109 , 676 N.E.2d 436, 439 (1997) (same). *101 Federal courts employ the prima facie evidence standard, but utilize a variety of different terminology to describe that standard of proof. 2003See American Tobacco Co. v. State, 697 So.2d 1249, 1256 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997) (preponderance of the evidence standard); Stidham v. Clark, 74 S.W.3d 719, 727 (Ky.2002); (same) Purcell v. District Attorney, 424 Mass. 109 , 676 N.E.2d 436, 439 (1997) (same). *101 Federal courts employ the prima facie evidence standard, but utilize a variety of different terminology to describe that standard of proof. | 1 | 1 |
Stidham v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2003See American Tobacco Co. v. State, 697 So.2d 1249, 1256 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997) (preponderance of the evidence standard); Stidham v. Clark, 74 S.W.3d 719, 727 (Ky.2002); (same) Purcell v. District Attorney, 424 Mass. 109 , 676 N.E.2d 436, 439 (1997) (same). *101 Federal courts employ the prima facie evidence standard, but utilize a variety of different terminology to describe that standard of proof. 2003See American Tobacco Co. v. State, 697 So.2d 1249, 1256 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997) (preponderance of the evidence standard); Stidham v. Clark, 74 S.W.3d 719, 727 (Ky.2002); (same) Purcell v. District Attorney, 424 Mass. 109 , 676 N.E.2d 436, 439 (1997) (same). | 1 | 1 |
American Tobacco Co. v. Stategreen2 sentences2003See American Tobacco Co. v. State, 697 So.2d 1249, 1256 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997) (preponderance of the evidence standard); Stidham v. Clark, 74 S.W.3d 719, 727 (Ky.2002); (same) Purcell v. District Attorney, 424 Mass. 109 , 676 N.E.2d 436, 439 (1997) (same). *101 Federal courts employ the prima facie evidence standard, but utilize a variety of different terminology to describe that standard of proof. 2003See American Tobacco Co. v. State, 697 So.2d 1249, 1256 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997) (preponderance of the evidence standard); Stidham v. Clark, 74 S.W.3d 719, 727 (Ky.2002); (same) Purcell v. District Attorney, 424 Mass. 109 , 676 N.E.2d 436, 439 (1997) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Nix v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2002See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 , 104 S.Ct. at 2509 . 2002See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 , 104 S.Ct. at 2509 . | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Balickigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Proferes v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Roccogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Vignegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lopezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Thompsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jamesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Schraderred | 1 | 1 |
| Norman v. Belchergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Addington v. Texasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. York
green
2 sentences2021Blood test results are scientific evidence which can cast significant doubt upon the arresting officer’s wholly subjective observations such as “glassy eyes” or “halting gait.” See, e.g., State v. York, 175 W. 2021Blood test results are scientific evidence which can cast significant doubt upon the arresting officer’s wholly subjective observations such as “glassy eyes” or “halting gait.” See, e.g., State v. York, 175 W. | 5 | 2021–2021 |
Coll v. Cline
green
2 sentences2022Va. 599 , 505 S.E.2d 662 (1998). 3. “‘“Where there is evidence reflecting that [1] a driver was operating a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway, [2] exhibited symptoms of intoxication, and [3] had consumed alcoholic beverages, this is sufficient proof under a preponderance of the evidence standard to warrant the administrative revocation of his driver’s license for driving under the influence of alcohol.” Syl. 2021Va. 559 , 505 S.E.2d 662 (1998). 4. “‘Where there is evidence reflecting that a driver was operating a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway, exhibited symptoms of intoxication, and had consumed alcoholic beverages, this is sufficient proof under a preponderance of the evidence standard to warrant the administrative revocation of his driver’s license for driving under the influence of alcohol.’ Syl. | 4 | 2020–2023 |
Western Pocahontas Properties, Ltd. v. County Commission of Wetzel County
green
2 sentences2025Va. 322 , 431 S.E.2d 661 (1993), which states the “burden is on the taxpayer challenging the assessment to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the tax assessment is erroneous.” However, as Ms. Mazgaj correctly points out, the Legislature altered the burden of proof in West Virginia Code § 11-3-24a(e), effective July 1, 2022, to a preponderance of the evidence standard.3 She argues that although the final decision does not explicitly state the burden of proof, because it found that Ms. Mazgaj did not meet her burden of proof and affirmed the valuation by the Tax Commissioner, OTA 2025Va. 322 , 431 S.E.2d 661 (1993), which states the “burden is on the taxpayer challenging the assessment to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the tax assessment is erroneous.” However, as Ms. Whetzel correctly points out, the Legislature altered the burden of proof in West Virginia Code § 11-3-24a(e), effective July 1, 2022, to a preponderance of the evidence standard.3 She argues that although the final decision does not explicitly state the burden of proof, because it found that Ms. Whetzel did not meet her burden of proof and affirmed the valuation by 3 The amended text state | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Caswell v. Caswell
green
1 sentence2023Pt. 5, Caswell v. Caswell, 84 W. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Hale v. West Virginia Office of the Insurance Commissioner
green
1 sentence2023Va. 781 , 724 S.E.2d 752 (2012), the Office of Judges found that the medical records of Dr. Jafary meet the criteria set forth in West Virginia Code of State Rules § 85- 20-12.4. 2 Genesis claims that, in doing so, the Office of Judges erred by circumventing and defeating the purpose of the rule, while allowing compensability to be determined under a preponderance of the evidence standard after the submission of additional evidence. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Mechling
green
1 sentence2021Va. at 381 , 633 S.E.2d at 326 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 833 (stating that “federal courts using Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) . . . have generally held the Government to the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard . . . . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In Re Burks
green
2 sentences2021I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that a remand for determining whether the other evidence is “sufficient proof under the preponderance of the evidence standard to warrant 4 In Bragg, where “the blood sample [Mr. Bragg] agreed to give at the request of the investigating officers was never tested and, as was disclosed at the administrative hearing, forever lost[,]” the Court held that because the blood was drawn upon the request of the arresting officer, not upon the demand of the driver, “[t]he absence of blood evidence . . . was simply not at issue in this case.” Id. at __, 851 S 2021Va. 429 , 525 S.E.2d 310 (1999), wherein it was held that “[t]he requirement that a driver arrested for DUI must be given a blood test on request does not include a requirement that the arresting officer obtain and furnish the results of that requested blood test.” Id. at 430 , 525 S.E.2d at 31 , Syl. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Post
green
1 sentence2021Conversely, the LDB, relying on authority from other jurisdictions, argues that imposition of reciprocal discipline in West Virginia is 11 We note that Mr. Zappin does not offer any argument concerning the HPS’s finding that he “failed to offer credible evidence that the imposition of disbarment as imposed by New York by the West Virginia Supreme Court would result in a grave injustice or that a substantially different type of discipline would be imposed in West Virginia for the proven misconduct.” See Post, 219 W. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2019To the extent that the evidence is conflicting regarding whether Ms. Grillot admitted to consuming alcohol, whether she asked for an additional secondary chemical test, and/or whether a video of the traffic stop existed and/or whether, if such a video did exist, it was lost, withheld, or destroyed, each of these queries involve credibility determinations within the purview of the trier of fact.3 Here, the trier of fact was the administrative law judge 2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L. 2019To the extent that the evidence is conflicting regarding whether Ms. Grillot admitted to consuming alcohol, whether she asked for an additional secondary chemical test, and/or whether a video of the traffic stop existed and/or whether, if such a video did exist, it was lost, withheld, or destroyed, each of these queries involve credibility determinations within the purview of the trier of fact.3 Here, the trier of fact was the administrative law judge 2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State Ex Rel. Richey v. Hill
green
1 sentence2019Richey v. Hill, 216 W. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Groves v. CICCHIRILLO
green
2 sentences2012In accord, syl. pt. 3, Groves v. Cicchirillo, 225 W.Va. 474 , 694 S.E.2d 639 (2010). 2012In accord, syl. pt. 3, Groves v. Cicchirillo, 225 W.Va. 474 , 694 S.E.2d 639 (2010). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Steele v. State Road Commission
neutral
2 sentences2010We observe that Syllabus Point 3 of Choma would appear to conflict with this Court’s time-honored precedent stating "[i]t is the general rule that a judgment of acquittal in a criminal action is not res judicata in a civil proceeding which involves the same facts.” Syllabus, Steele v. State Road Commission, 116 W.Va. 227 , 179 S.E. 810 (1935). 2010We observe that Syllabus Point 3 of Choma would appear to conflict with this Court’s time-honored precedent stating "[i]t is the general rule that a judgment of acquittal in a criminal action is not res judicata in a civil proceeding which involves the same facts.” Syllabus, Steele v. State Road Commission, 116 W.Va. 227 , 179 S.E. 810 (1935). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
In Re Tax Assessments Against Pocahontas Land Co.
green
2 sentences2009The very next year, this Court returned to the clear and convincing burden of proof in the case of In re Tax Assessments Against Pocahontas Land Co., 172 W.Va. 53 , 303 S.E.2d 691 (1983), by again adopting this standard in a syllabus point: "It is a general rule that valuations for taxation purposes fixed by an assessing officer are presumed to be correct. 2009The very next year, this Court returned to the clear and convincing burden of proof in the case of In re Tax Assessments Against Pocahontas Land Co., 172 W.Va. 53 , 303 S.E.2d 691 (1983), by again adopting this standard in a syllabus point: "It is a general rule that valuations for taxation purposes fixed by an assessing officer are presumed to be correct. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Sharon B.W. v. George B.W.
green
2 sentences2006Cf. Sharon B.W. v. George B.W., 203 W.Va. 300 , 507 S.E.2d 401 (1998) (per curiam) (holding that a preponderance of the evidence standard, as opposed to credible evidence, applies when a family court or circuit court is determining whether a third party sexually abused a child, such as in the case of a mother’s boyfriend). 2006Cf. Sharon B.W. v. George B.W., 203 W.Va. 300 , 507 S.E.2d 401 (1998) (per curiam) (holding that a preponderance of the evidence standard, as opposed to credible evidence, applies when a family court or circuit court is determining whether a third party sexually abused a child, such as in the case of a mother’s boyfriend). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Thompson green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| State v. Kirtley green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Muzelak v. King Chevrolet, Inc. green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Kirtley green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| MARY D. v. Watt green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. Taft green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. Byers green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Jones v. United States green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles v. Cline neutral | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Hawley v. State green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| United States v. Joseph M. Margiotta green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| United States v. James Martorano green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| United States v. James Martorano green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.