preponderance of the evidence standard in Arizona

2025“The preponderance of the evidence standard requires that the fact-finder determine whether a fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.” Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279 , 284 ¶ 25 (2005).

2018A preponderance of the evidence standard allocates the risk of error equally between parties and requires that the juvenile court “determine whether a fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.” Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 25 (2005). ¶22 At the hearing, the forensic interviewer and the DCS investigator testified that V.C. stated that Father physically abused him and C.C.

2023Here, no party disputes ANSAC’s segmentation. ¶75 “In reviewing the superior court’s ruling affirming an agency’s order, [this court] ‘independently examines the record to determine whether the evidence supports the judgment,’ under a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Parsons v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., 242 Ariz. 320, 322, ¶ 10 (App. 2017) (quoting Webb v. State ex rel.

2018"In reviewing the superior court's ruling affirming an agency's order, we 'independently examine the record to determine whether the evidence supports the judgment,' under a preponderance of the evidence standard." Id. (quoting Webb v. State ex rel.

2005Section 8-537.B, including its preponderance standard, remained unchanged until 1983. ¶ 19 Responding to the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), that “due process requires that the State support its allegations [in parental termination proceedings] by at least clear and convincing evidence,” id. at 748 , 102 *284 S.Ct. 1388, and this court’s acknowledgement of that rule in Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-919, 132 Ariz. 377 , 646 P.2d 262 (1982), the legislature amended A.R.S. § 8-537.B in 1983 to replace the prep

2005Section 8-537.B, including its preponderance standard, remained unchanged until 1983. ¶ 19 Responding to the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), that “due process requires that the State support its allegations [in parental termination proceedings] by at least clear and convincing evidence,” id. at 748 , 102 *284 S.Ct. 1388, and this court’s acknowledgement of that rule in Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-919, 132 Ariz. 377 , 646 P.2d 262 (1982), the legislature amended A.R.S. § 8-537.B in 1983 to replace the prep

1994See, e.g., Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 , 802 P.2d 1000, 1008 (1990) (summary judgment appropriate if "reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced").

1994See, e.g., Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 , 802 P.2d 1000, 1008 (1990) (summary judgment appropriate if "reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced").

2025See, e.g., Koshko v. Haining, 921 A.2d 171, 192-93 (Md.

2023See Oscar O., 209 Ariz. at 334, ¶ 4 (noting that the juvenile court is in the best position to "judge the credibility of witnesses"). ¶17 The superior court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the negative inference, combined with A.Y. and G.Y.'s first-hand observations of substance abuse, were enough to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard. ¶18 Because we affirm the superior court's dependency order based on Father's substance abuse, we need not reach Father's challenge to the court's finding of neglect based on the failure to procure A.Y. and G.Y. adequate shelter.

2022See id. at 288, ¶ 41 (holding "because the best interests inquiry requires a delicate balancing of the child's interests, along with the parens patriae interest of the state, against the interests of an unfit parent, we hold that the preponderance of the evidence standard adequately allocates the risk of error between these competing interests"); see also Jennifer B., 189 Ariz. at 557 (applying best interest analysis from termination proceedings in a guardianship revocation). ¶13 Similarly, the phrase "by clear and convincing evidence" in A.R.S. § 8-873(C) modifies only the preceding phrase "c

2022See id. at 288, ¶ 41 (holding "because the best interests inquiry requires a delicate balancing of the child's interests, along with the parens patriae interest of the state, against the interests of an unfit parent, we hold that the preponderance of the evidence standard adequately allocates the risk of error between these competing interests"); see also Jennifer B., 189 Ariz. at 557 (applying best interest analysis from termination proceedings in a guardianship revocation). ¶13 Similarly, the phrase "by clear and convincing evidence" in A.R.S. § 8-873(C) modifies only the preceding phrase "c

2022See Andrew R., 223 Ariz. at 457, ¶ 16 . ¶14 Thus, we hold that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies to the best interest inquiry in permanent guardianship revocations under A.R.S. § 8-873.

2019State v. Medina, 193 Ariz. 504, 510, ¶ 11 (1999) (quotation omitted).

2019In re Stephanie B., 204 Ariz. at 470, ¶ 15 . ¶10 With the constitutional import of victims’ rights in mind, we broadly construe the statutes governing restitution to expand, rather than limit, a court’s jurisdiction.

2018The inevitable discovery doctrine applies “if the evidence would have been lawfully discovered despite the unlawful behavior and independent of it.” Brown, 239 Ariz. at 525, ¶ 14 . ¶21 The evidence should not be suppressed despite the improper Terry frisk.

2017The court responded that Young could testify and deny the existence of a sale, but could not offer any legal opinion that her conduct was lawful under the AMMA. ¶10 Citing State v. Fields, 232 Ariz. 265 (App. 2013), Young argues the trial court erred by failing to have the jury determine whether a sale occurred, under a preponderance of the evidence standard, before the court evaluated whether statutory immunity applied and submitted the charges to the jury.

2017The court responded that Young could testify and deny the existence of a sale, but could not offer any legal opinion that her conduct was lawful under the AMMA. ¶10 Citing State v. Fields, 232 Ariz. 265 (App. 2013), Young argues the trial court erred by failing to have the jury determine whether a sale occurred, under a preponderance of the evidence standard, before the court evaluated whether statutory immunity applied and submitted the charges to the jury.

2015See, e.g., Native Vill. of Tununak v. Alaska, 303 P.3d 431, 448, 453 (Alaska 2013) (overruling earlier precedent regarding adoptive placements and concluding a preponderance of the evidence standard does not sufficiently ensure “courts will properly consider ICWA’s policy mandates in making § 1915(a) good cause determinations.”), vacated, in part on other grounds by 334 P.3d 165 (Alaska 2014); Alexandria P., 176 Cal.Rptr.3d at 490 (“ICWA’s policy goal of promoting the stability and security of Indian tribes and families persuades us to join the growing number of state courts ... that apply the

2015See, e.g., Native Vill. of Tununak v. Alaska, 303 P.3d 431, 448, 453 (Alaska 2013) (overruling earlier precedent regarding adoptive placements and concluding a preponderance of the evidence standard does not sufficiently ensure “courts will properly consider ICWA’s policy mandates in making § 1915(a) good cause determinations.”), vacated, in part on other grounds by 334 P.3d 165 (Alaska 2014); Alexandria P., 176 Cal.Rptr.3d at 490 (“ICWA’s policy goal of promoting the stability and security of Indian tribes and families persuades us to join the growing number of state courts ... that apply the

2015See, e.g., Native Vill. of Tununak v. Alaska, 303 P.3d 431, 448, 453 (Alaska 2013) (overruling earlier precedent regarding adoptive placements and concluding a preponderance of the evidence standard does not sufficiently ensure “courts will properly consider ICWA’s policy mandates in making § 1915(a) good cause determinations.”), vacated, in part on other grounds by 334 P.3d 165 (Alaska 2014); Alexandria P., 176 Cal.Rptr.3d at 490 (“ICWA’s policy goal of promoting the stability and security of Indian tribes and families persuades us to join the growing number of state courts ... that apply the

2015See, e.g., Native Vill. of Tununak v. Alaska, 303 P.3d 431, 448, 453 (Alaska 2013) (overruling earlier precedent regarding adoptive placements and concluding a preponderance of the evidence standard does not sufficiently ensure “courts will properly consider ICWA’s policy mandates in making § 1915(a) good cause determinations.”), vacated, in part on other grounds by 334 P.3d 165 (Alaska 2014); Alexandria P., 176 Cal.Rptr.3d at 490 (“ICWA’s policy goal of promoting the stability and security of Indian tribes and families persuades us to join the growing number of state courts ... that apply the

2006Phrased differently, King’s misconduct tips the scales against admission at the outset, thereby requiring him to produce an extraordinary amount or quality of evidence to meet his burden of proof. ¶ 13 To prove complete rehabilitation, King must establish that he has both (1) accepted responsibility for his past criminal conduct, Hamm, 211 Ariz. at 464, ¶ 23 , 123 P.3d at 658 , and (2) identified and overcome the weakness that led to the unlawful conduct, In re Arrotta, 208 Ariz. 509, 513, ¶ 17 , 96 P.3d 213, 217 (2004).

2006Phrased differently, King’s misconduct tips the scales against admission at the outset, thereby requiring him to produce an extraordinary amount or quality of evidence to meet his burden of proof. ¶ 13 To prove complete rehabilitation, King must establish that he has both (1) accepted responsibility for his past criminal conduct, Hamm, 211 Ariz. at 464, ¶ 23 , 123 P.3d at 658 , and (2) identified and overcome the weakness that led to the unlawful conduct, In re Arrotta, 208 Ariz. 509, 513, ¶ 17 , 96 P.3d 213, 217 (2004).

2006Phrased differently, King’s misconduct tips the scales against admission at the outset, thereby requiring him to produce an extraordinary amount or quality of evidence to meet his burden of proof. ¶ 13 To prove complete rehabilitation, King must establish that he has both (1) accepted responsibility for his past criminal conduct, Hamm, 211 Ariz. at 464, ¶ 23 , 123 P.3d at 658 , and (2) identified and overcome the weakness that led to the unlawful conduct, In re Arrotta, 208 Ariz. 509, 513, ¶ 17 , 96 P.3d 213, 217 (2004).

2006Phrased differently, King’s misconduct tips the scales against admission at the outset, thereby requiring him to produce an extraordinary amount or quality of evidence to meet his burden of proof. ¶ 13 To prove complete rehabilitation, King must establish that he has both (1) accepted responsibility for his past criminal conduct, Hamm, 211 Ariz. at 464, ¶ 23 , 123 P.3d at 658 , and (2) identified and overcome the weakness that led to the unlawful conduct, In re Arrotta, 208 Ariz. 509, 513, ¶ 17 , 96 P.3d 213, 217 (2004).

2006Although neither victim died, King inflicted serious injuries upon them while holding a position of public trust as a peace officer. 9 See Barlow v. Blackburn, 165 Ariz. 351, 357 , 798 P.2d 1360, 1366 (App.1990) (recognizing society demands much from law enforcement officers as state “entrusts them with power to enforce the laws upon which society depends”); Seide v. Comm, of Bar Exam’rs of the State Bar of Cal., 49 Cal.3d 933 , 264 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 782 P.2d 602, 604 (1989) (finding applicant’s criminal history “all the more reprehensible [because] committed by a former law enforcement officer

2006Although neither victim died, King inflicted serious injuries upon them while holding a position of public trust as a peace officer. 9 See Barlow v. Blackburn, 165 Ariz. 351, 357 , 798 P.2d 1360, 1366 (App.1990) (recognizing society demands much from law enforcement officers as state “entrusts them with power to enforce the laws upon which society depends”); Seide v. Comm, of Bar Exam’rs of the State Bar of Cal., 49 Cal.3d 933 , 264 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 782 P.2d 602, 604 (1989) (finding applicant’s criminal history “all the more reprehensible [because] committed by a former law enforcement officer

2006Although neither victim died, King inflicted serious injuries upon them while holding a position of public trust as a peace officer. 9 See Barlow v. Blackburn, 165 Ariz. 351, 357 , 798 P.2d 1360, 1366 (App.1990) (recognizing society demands much from law enforcement officers as state “entrusts them with power to enforce the laws upon which society depends”); Seide v. Comm, of Bar Exam’rs of the State Bar of Cal., 49 Cal.3d 933 , 264 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 782 P.2d 602, 604 (1989) (finding applicant’s criminal history “all the more reprehensible [because] committed by a former law enforcement officer

2006Although neither victim died, King inflicted serious injuries upon them while holding a position of public trust as a peace officer. 9 See Barlow v. Blackburn, 165 Ariz. 351, 357 , 798 P.2d 1360, 1366 (App.1990) (recognizing society demands much from law enforcement officers as state “entrusts them with power to enforce the laws upon which society depends”); Seide v. Comm, of Bar Exam’rs of the State Bar of Cal., 49 Cal.3d 933 , 264 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 782 P.2d 602, 604 (1989) (finding applicant’s criminal history “all the more reprehensible [because] committed by a former law enforcement officer