preponderance of the evidence standard in Montana

2017The standard of proof in a civil commitment proceeding is clear and convincing evidence. ¶25 In consideration of the foregoing, we do not accept the proposition in K.G.F. that Strickland “simply does not go far enough to protect the liberty interests of individuals” who may be involuntarily committed, K.G.F., ¶ 33, when the Strickland standard is sufficient to protect the interests of a criminal defendant which “are of such magnitude that historically and without any explicit constitutional requirement they have been protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the

2017The standard of proof in a civil commitment proceeding is clear and convincing evidence. ¶25 In consideration of the foregoing, we do not accept the proposition in K.G.F. that Strickland “simply does not go far enough to protect the liberty interests of individuals” who may be involuntarily committed, K.G.F., ¶ 33, when the Strickland standard is sufficient to protect the interests of a criminal defendant which “are of such magnitude that historically and without any explicit constitutional requirement they have been protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the

2022P. 47(a)(2). ¶19 In Cooper v. Hanson, we concluded that the reluctance of multiple jurors to apply the preponderance of the evidence standard, a juror’s statement that a guilty verdict would be like a “life sentence” for the defendant, and the defendant’s statement during closing that the verdict would be a “black mark” materially prejudiced the plaintiff’s substantial right to a fair trial. 2010 MT 113 , ¶ 37, 356 Mont. 309 , 234 P.3d 59 .

2022P. 47(a)(2). ¶19 In Cooper v. Hanson, we concluded that the reluctance of multiple jurors to apply the preponderance of the evidence standard, a juror’s statement that a guilty verdict would be like a “life sentence” for the defendant, and the defendant’s statement during closing that the verdict would be a “black mark” materially prejudiced the plaintiff’s substantial right to a fair trial. 2010 MT 113 , ¶ 37, 356 Mont. 309 , 234 P.3d 59 .

2022On the other hand, we held in Peterson-Tuell v. First Student Transportation, LLC, that a juror did not demonstrate actual bias when he stated that, without evidence of causation, he would conclude that the plaintiff had no injury; the statement “was essentially a lay person’s restatement of the burden of proof.” 2014 MT 307, ¶¶ 25-26 , 377 Mont. 113 , 339 P.3d 16 . ¶20 In this case, Mihelish’s tentatively affirmative answer to the hypothetical question, “would you want to see more evidence from us, hold us to a higher standard,” does not demonstrate a state of mind evincing bias against Reisb

2022On the other hand, we held in Peterson-Tuell v. First Student Transportation, LLC, that a juror did not demonstrate actual bias when he stated that, without evidence of causation, he would conclude that the plaintiff had no injury; the statement “was essentially a lay person’s restatement of the burden of proof.” 2014 MT 307, ¶¶ 25-26 , 377 Mont. 113 , 339 P.3d 16 . ¶20 In this case, Mihelish’s tentatively affirmative answer to the hypothetical question, “would you want to see more evidence from us, hold us to a higher standard,” does not demonstrate a state of mind evincing bias against Reisb

2021As the Water Court correctly acknowledged, the preponderance of the evidence standard is “relatively modest.” Hohenlohe v. State, 2010 MT 203, ¶ 33 , 357 Mont. 438 , 240 P.3d 628 . ¶39 However, that is not to say there remains no doubt about DNRC’s finding and, as explained above, the standards of review permit a broader judicial inquiry.

2021As the Water Court correctly acknowledged, the preponderance of the evidence standard is “relatively modest.” Hohenlohe v. State, 2010 MT 203, ¶ 33 , 357 Mont. 438 , 240 P.3d 628 . ¶39 However, that is not to say there remains no doubt about DNRC’s finding and, as explained above, the standards of review permit a broader judicial inquiry.

2010The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals rejected this interpretation of "reasonably clear liability." The Supreme Court of Appeals concluded that the lower court impermissibly equated reasonably clear liability with a preponderance of the evidence standard, and had concluded in essence that a claimant would only have to establish that liability for the accident was "more likely" or more "probable than not." Jackson, 600 S.E.2d at 352 .

2010The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals rejected this interpretation of “reasonably clear liability.” The Supreme Court of Appeals concluded that the lower court impermissibly equated reasonably clear liability with a preponderance of the evidence standard, and had concluded in essence that a claimant would only have to establish that liability for the accident was “more likely” or more “probable than not.” Jackson, 600 S.E.2d at 352 .

2001As for its evidentiary burden, the State contends that "there is no reason to suspect that Judge Mizner was unaware of that [clear and convincing] standard or did not correctly apply it in this case." ¶ 37 As a starting point, this Court is ever mindful of the declaration of policy that serves as a foundation for this State's child abuse and neglect statutes; and that inherent in this policy is an often times dynamic tension between the need to "protect, whenever possible, family unity" and yet still "provide for the protection of children whose health and welfare are or may be adversely affec

2001As for its evidentiary burden, the State contends that "there is no reason to suspect that Judge Mizner was unaware of that [clear and convincing] standard or did not correctly apply it in this case." ¶ 37 As a starting point, this Court is ever mindful of the declaration of policy that serves as a foundation for this State's child abuse and neglect statutes; and that inherent in this policy is an often times dynamic tension between the need to "protect, whenever possible, family unity" and yet still "provide for the protection of children whose health and welfare are or may be adversely affec

2001As for its evidentiary burden, the State contends that "there is no reason to suspect that Judge Mizner was unaware of that [clear and convincing] standard or did not correctly apply it in this case." ¶ 37 As a starting point, this Court is ever mindful of the declaration of policy that serves as a foundation for this State's child abuse and neglect statutes; and that inherent in this policy is an often times dynamic tension between the need to "protect, whenever possible, family unity" and yet still "provide for the protection of children whose health and welfare are or may be adversely affec

2001As for its evidentiary burden, the State contends that "there is no reason to suspect that Judge Mizner was unaware of that [clear and convincing] standard or did not correctly apply it in this case." ¶ 37 As a starting point, this Court is ever mindful of the declaration of policy that serves as a foundation for this State's child abuse and neglect statutes; and that inherent in this policy is an often times dynamic tension between the need to "protect, whenever possible, family unity" and yet still "provide for the protection of children whose health and welfare are or may be adversely affec

1995In turn, Vanderburg asserts that Magone v. Aul (1994), 269 Mont. 281 , 887 P.2d 1235 , controls the instant case.

1995In turn, Vanderburg asserts that Magone v. Aul (1994), 269 Mont. 281 , 887 P.2d 1235 , controls the instant case.

1973Thus, the prosecution must prove at least by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary.” The general rule set forth in both Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 , and Lego is that a determination relative to the voluntariness of a confession must, be made in a proceeding separate and distinct from the trial itself, and further, a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof is constitutionally sufficient.

1973Thus, the prosecution must prove at least by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary.” The general rule set forth in both Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 , and Lego is that a determination relative to the voluntariness of a confession must, be made in a proceeding separate and distinct from the trial itself, and further, a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof is constitutionally sufficient.