preponderance of the evidence standard in New Hampshire

1999Because our State standard “is more stringent than the preponderance of the evidence standard required under the Federal Constitution, we need review the trial court’s decision only under the more demanding State constitutional standard.” Id. at 444-45, 606 A.2d at 1080 (citation omitted).

1994State v. Laurie, 135 N.H. 438, 444 , 606 A.2d 1077, 1080, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 245 (1992).

2021The preponderance of the evidence standard “requires the trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence”; “evidence that fails to meet this standard is at least as likely to be false as it is true.” State v. Addison (Capital Murder), 165 N.H. 381, 590 (2013) (quotation omitted).

2013Since the preponderance of the evidence standard “simply requires the trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence,” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J. concurring), evidence that fails to meet this standard is at least as likely to be false as it is true.

2011Compare In re D.I.S., 249 P.3d at 786 (preponderance of the evidence), In re Guardianship of David C., 10 A.3d at 686 (same), and In re Guardianship of Barros, 701 N.W.2d at 408-09 (same), with In re Guardianship of D.J., 682 N.W.2d at 246 (clear and convincing evidence), and Boddie v. Daniels, 702 S.E.2d 172, 175 (Ga. 2010) (same).

2011Compare In re D.I.S., 249 P.3d at 786 (preponderance of the evidence), In re Guardianship of David C., 10 A.3d at 686 (same), and In re Guardianship of Barros, 701 N.W.2d at 408-09 (same), with In re Guardianship of D.J., 682 N.W.2d at 246 (clear and convincing evidence), and Boddie v. Daniels, 702 S.E.2d 172, 175 (Ga. 2010) (same).

2011Compare In re D.I.S., 249 P.3d at 786 (preponderance of the evidence), In re Guardianship of David C., 10 A.3d at 686 (same), and In re Guardianship of Barros, 701 N.W.2d at 408-09 (same), with In re Guardianship of D.J., 682 N.W.2d at 246 (clear and convincing evidence), and Boddie v. Daniels, 702 S.E.2d 172, 175 (Ga. 2010) (same).

2011Compare In re D.I.S., 249 P.3d at 786 (preponderance of the evidence), In re Guardianship of David C., 10 A.3d at 686 (same), and In re Guardianship of Barros, 701 N.W.2d at 408-09 (same), with In re Guardianship of D.J., 682 N.W.2d at 246 (clear and convincing evidence), and Boddie v. Daniels, 702 S.E.2d 172, 175 (Ga. 2010) (same).

2011Compare In re D.I.S., 249 P.3d at 786 (preponderance of the evidence), In re Guardianship of David C., 10 A.3d at 686 (same), and In re Guardianship of Barros, 701 N.W.2d at 408-09 (same), with In re Guardianship of D.J., 682 N.W.2d at 246 (clear and convincing evidence), and Boddie v. Daniels, 702 S.E.2d 172, 175 (Ga. 2010) (same).

2007Because “it cannot be said that either set of interests is so clearly paramount as to require that the risk of error be allocated to one side or the other[,]” we conclude that it does not violate due process “that the risk of error should be borne in roughly equal fashion by use of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof.” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 791 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Preisendorfer, 143 N.H. at 55 (“Because proof by a preponderance of the evidence requires that the litigants share the risk of error in a roughly equal fashion, it applies only in situations where th

2007Because “it cannot be said that either set of interests is so clearly paramount as to require that the risk of error be allocated to one side or the other[,]” we conclude that it does not violate due process “that the risk of error should be borne in roughly equal fashion by use of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof.” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 791 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Preisendorfer, 143 N.H. at 55 (“Because proof by a preponderance of the evidence requires that the litigants share the risk of error in a roughly equal fashion, it applies only in situations where th

2003Appeal of Kelly, 129 N.H. 462, 466-67 (1987).

2001See, e.g., State v. McCluskie, 611 A.2d 975, 977 (Me. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1009 (1992); State v. Aversa, 501 A.2d 370, 376 (Conn. 1985) (applying the preponderance of the evidence standard to determine if the waiver was voluntary and intelligent).

2001This court has recognized that where there has been an express written waiver and an intervening polygraph test, the defendant’s subsequent statements are admissible because “there is no per se requirement to remind him of his rights continually.” State v. Monroe, 142 N.H. 857, 868 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1073 (1999).

2001See, e.g., State v. McCluskie, 611 A.2d 975, 977 (Me. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1009 (1992); State v. Aversa, 501 A.2d 370, 376 (Conn. 1985) (applying the preponderance of the evidence standard to determine if the waiver was voluntary and intelligent).

2001See, e.g., State v. McCluskie, 611 A.2d 975, 977 (Me. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1009 (1992); State v. Aversa, 501 A.2d 370, 376 (Conn. 1985) (applying the preponderance of the evidence standard to determine if the waiver was voluntary and intelligent).

1999Whether a confession is voluntary “is initially a question of fact for the trial court, whose decision will not be overturned unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, as viewed in the light most favorable to the State.” State v. Decker, 138 N.H. 432, 436 , 641 A.2d 226, 228 (1994).

1999Whether a confession is voluntary “is initially a question of fact for the trial court, whose decision will not be overturned unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, as viewed in the light most favorable to the State.” State v. Decker, 138 N.H. 432, 436 , 641 A.2d 226, 228 (1994).

1998See Bagley, 128 N.H. at 285 , 513 A.2d at 339 ; Lee TT, 664 N.E.2d at 1252 .

1998See Bagley, 128 N.H. at 285 , 513 A.2d at 339 ; Lee TT, 664 N.E.2d at 1252 .

1998We hold that due process requires that the preponderance of the evidence standard apply in any hearing to determine whether an individual’s name should be added to the central registry, RSA 169-C:35, where that individual would be excluded from working in his or her profession due to that listing, RSA 170-E:7, IV “[I]n the absence of full briefing and argument by the parties,” In re Tracy M., 137 N.H. at 122-23 , 624 A.2d at 965 , we decline to address the State’s argument that the use of a probable cause standard was harmless error.

1998We hold that due process requires that the preponderance of the evidence standard apply in any hearing to determine whether an individual’s name should be added to the central registry, RSA 169-C:35, where that individual would be excluded from working in his or her profession due to that listing, RSA 170-E:7, IV “[I]n the absence of full briefing and argument by the parties,” In re Tracy M., 137 N.H. at 122-23 , 624 A.2d at 965 , we decline to address the State’s argument that the use of a probable cause standard was harmless error.

1995At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case, the trial judge granted the defendants’ motion for a directed verdict, finding insufficient evidence to impose a constructive trust under the preponderance of the evidence standard enunciated in Renovest Co. v. Hodges Development Corp., 135 N.H. 72, 78 , 600 A.2d 448, 452 (1991).

1995At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case, the trial judge granted the defendants’ motion for a directed verdict, finding insufficient evidence to impose a constructive trust under the preponderance of the evidence standard enunciated in Renovest Co. v. Hodges Development Corp., 135 N.H. 72, 78 , 600 A.2d 448, 452 (1991).

1994In workers’ compensation cases, a claimant “has the burden of proving by competent evidence both the existence of a compensable accidental injury and the extent of his disability.” City of Rochester v. Smith, 119 N.H. 495, 496 , 403 A.2d 421, 422 (1979).

1994In workers’ compensation cases, a claimant “has the burden of proving by competent evidence both the existence of a compensable accidental injury and the extent of his disability.” City of Rochester v. Smith, 119 N.H. 495, 496 , 403 A.2d 421, 422 (1979).

1992Because this burden of proof, grounded in part I, article 15 of the State Constitution, is more stringent than the preponderance of the evidence standard required under the Federal Constitution, see Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986), we need review the trial court’s decision only under the more demanding State constitutional standard.

1987Regardless of which test of legal causation is appropriate in a given case, the test of medical causation remains the same: did the work-related stress or exertion probably cause or contribute to the employee’s heart attack as a matter of medical fact? (“Probably” in this context refers to the preponderance of the evidence standard.) Steinberg, 119 N.H. at 231 , 400 A.2d at 1109 ; Price River Co. v. Industrial Com’n, 731 P.2d 1079, 1082 (Utah 1986).