29 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Santosky v. Kramergreen2 sentences2002See id. at 759 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 A proceeding employing a preponderance of the evidence standard has an inherent risk of erroneous fact-finding because “the court possesses unusual discretion to un-derweigh probative facts that might favor the parent.” Id. 2002See id. at 759 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 A proceeding employing a preponderance of the evidence standard has an inherent risk of erroneous fact-finding because “the court possesses unusual discretion to un-derweigh probative facts that might favor the parent.” Id. | 3 | 4 |
Trans Coastal Corp. v. Curtisgreen2 sentences2019"General unsubstantiated allegations of [plaintiffs], without more, are inadequate to establish grounds for an attachment under a preponderance of the evidence standard." Trans Coastal Corp. v. Curtis, 622 A.2d 1186, 1189 (Me. 1993); see also Wyman, 819 F. Supp. at 89 ("Specificity is required in the showing for the amount of the attachment."). 1996Trans Coastal Corp. v. Curtis, 622 A.2d 1186, 1189 (Me.1993). | 2 | 2 |
Guardianship of David C.green2 sentences2017See Guardianship of David C., 2010 ME 136, ¶ 7 , 10 A.3d 684 ; see also Guardianship of Chamberlain, 2015 ME 76, ¶ 28 , 118 A.3d 229 ; Guardianship of Stevens, 2014 ME 25, ¶ 14 , 86 A.3d 1197 . 2017See Guardianship of David C., 2010 ME 136, ¶ 7 , 10 A.3d 684 ; see also Guardianship of Chamberlain, 2015 ME 76, ¶ 28 , 118 A.3d 229 ; Guardianship of Stevens, 2014 ME 25, ¶ 14 , 86 A.3d 1197 . | 2 | 2 |
Guardianship of Sebastien Chamberlaingreen2 sentences2017See Guardianship of David C., 2010 ME 136, ¶ 7 , 10 A.3d 684 ; see also Guardianship of Chamberlain, 2015 ME 76, ¶ 28 , 118 A.3d 229 ; Guardianship of Stevens, 2014 ME 25, ¶ 14 , 86 A.3d 1197 . 2017See Guardianship of David C., 2010 ME 136, ¶ 7 , 10 A.3d 684 ; see also Guardianship of Chamberlain, 2015 ME 76, ¶ 28 , 118 A.3d 229 ; Guardianship of Stevens, 2014 ME 25, ¶ 14 , 86 A.3d 1197 . | 2 | 2 |
Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Lefebvregreen2 sentences2019White appeals, advancing arguments regarding procedural due process, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting some of the court's findings, and arguing that the sanction was overly harsh. [¶2] Contrary to White's contentions, we discern no due process violations in the court's consideration of ethical rules that were not pleaded in the Board's information, see Bd. of Overseers of the Bar v. Lefebvre , 1998 ME 24 , ¶¶ 14-15, 707 A.2d 69 ; Bd. of Overseers of the Bar v. Rodway , 461 A.2d 1062 , 1064 (Me. 1983), or in the court's application of the preponderance of the evidence stan 2019White appeals, advancing arguments regarding procedural due process, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting some of the court's findings, and arguing that the sanction was overly harsh. [¶2] Contrary to White's contentions, we discern no due process violations in the court's consideration of ethical rules that were not pleaded in the Board's information, see Bd. of Overseers of the Bar v. Lefebvre , 1998 ME 24 , ¶¶ 14-15, 707 A.2d 69 ; Bd. of Overseers of the Bar v. Rodway , 461 A.2d 1062 , 1064 (Me. 1983), or in the court's application of the preponderance of the evidence stan | 1 | 2 |
In Re Christmas C.green2 sentences2001See 22 M.R.S.A. § 4035 (1992 & Supp.2000) (requiring a preponderance of the evidence standard in jeopardy hearings); In re Christmas C., 1998 ME 258, ¶ 7 , 721 A.2d 629, 631 (holding that cease reunification orders require the preponderance of the evidence standard). 2001See 22 M.R.S.A. § 4035 (1992 & Supp.2000) (requiring a preponderance of the evidence standard in jeopardy hearings); In re Christmas C., 1998 ME 258, ¶ 7 , 721 A.2d 629, 631 (holding that cease reunification orders require the preponderance of the evidence standard). | 1 | 2 |
Ornelas v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2022The concept of reasonable suspicion is “fluid” and “take[s] [its] substantive content from the particular contexts in which the standards are being assessed.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Wyman v. Prime Discount Securitiesgreen1 sentence2019"General unsubstantiated allegations of [plaintiffs], without more, are inadequate to establish grounds for an attachment under a preponderance of the evidence standard." Trans Coastal Corp. v. Curtis, 622 A.2d 1186, 1189 (Me. 1993); see also Wyman, 819 F. Supp. at 89 ("Specificity is required in the showing for the amount of the attachment."). | 1 | 1 |
Hamlin v. Niednergreen2 sentences2018See Hamlin v. Nieder, 2008 ME 130 , i 11, 955 A.2d 251 . 2018See Hamlin v. Nieder, 2008 ME 130 , i 11, 955 A.2d 251 . | 1 | 1 |
Tourison v. Peppergreen1 sentence2017See Guardianship of Reena D., 35 A.3d 509 , 514-15 (N.H. 2011) (collecting cases and holding that where a guardianship was established by consent, for the court to order continuation of the guardianship over the petitioning parent’s objection, the guardian must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the guardianship is “necessary to provide for the essential physical and safety needs of the minor” and that terminating it would “adversely affect the child’s psychological well-being” (quotation marks omitted)); see also Tourison v. Pepper, 51 A.3d 470, 473-74 (Del. 2012) (holding that on | 1 | 1 |
Hatch v. Andersongreen2 sentences2014See Hatch v. Anderson, 2010 ME 94, ¶ 12 , 4 A.3d 904 . 27 [¶38] At the heart of the determination of a de facto parent’s rights and responsibilities, as with any other award of parental rights and responsibilities, is the best interest of the child, which is defined with reference to nineteen factors in 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3). 2014See Hatch v. Anderson, 2010 ME 94, ¶ 12 , 4 A.3d 904 . 27 [¶38] At the heart of the determination of a de facto parent’s rights and responsibilities, as with any other award of parental rights and responsibilities, is the best interest of the child, which is defined with reference to nineteen factors in 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Baby Duncangreen2 sentences2010See In re Baby Duncan, 2009 ME 85, ¶ 12 , 976 A.2d at 939 ; In re Brianna K., 675 A.2d 980, 982 (Me.1996) (“A ‘mere flicker of interest’ is not sufficient to bar a finding of abandonment.”). 5 [¶ 30] Second, the Probate Court did not, in effect, order the termination of his parental rights based on a “preponderance of the evidence” standard by finding that the father had abandoned the child as a result of his compliance with protection from abuse orders, which were entered based on a preponderance of the evidence standard. 2010See In re Baby Duncan, 2009 ME 85, ¶ 12 , 976 A.2d at 939 ; In re Brianna K., 675 A.2d 980, 982 (Me.1996) (“A ‘mere flicker of interest’ is not sufficient to bar a finding of abandonment.”). 5 [¶ 30] Second, the Probate Court did not, in effect, order the termination of his parental rights based on a “preponderance of the evidence” standard by finding that the father had abandoned the child as a result of his compliance with protection from abuse orders, which were entered based on a preponderance of the evidence standard. | 1 | 1 |
In re Brianna K.green1 sentence2010See In re Baby Duncan, 2009 ME 85, ¶ 12 , 976 A.2d at 939 ; In re Brianna K., 675 A.2d 980, 982 (Me.1996) (“A ‘mere flicker of interest’ is not sufficient to bar a finding of abandonment.”). 5 [¶ 30] Second, the Probate Court did not, in effect, order the termination of his parental rights based on a “preponderance of the evidence” standard by finding that the father had abandoned the child as a result of his compliance with protection from abuse orders, which were entered based on a preponderance of the evidence standard. | 1 | 1 |
Harmon v. Harmongreen1 sentence2009The Maine Eye Care court did, however, state that an independent claim of fraudulent misrepresentation requires proofby clear and convincing evidence (stating that the Law Court does "not require clear and convincing evidence to prove the element of fraud in a claim of tortious interference with an advantageous economic relationship, [and it] acknowledge[s] that fraudulent misrepresentation claims do require proof by clear and convincing evidence"). 4 (Me. 1996) (rejecting the application of the dear and convincing standard in an action for wrongful interference with an advantageous existing v | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Jose M. Cabassagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bowman v. Dussaultgreen | 1 | 1 |
| ATLANTIC HEATING COMPANY, INC. v. Lavingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cyr v. Cyrgreen | 1 | 1 |
| McKinnon v. Tibbettsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Graybar Electric Co. v. Sawyergreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD)green | 1 | 1 |
| Tucker v. Marion County Department of Public Welfaregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Guardianship of Zacharia Hartley Stevens
green
2 sentences2017See Guardianship of David C., 2010 ME 136, ¶ 7 , 10 A.3d 684 ; see also Guardianship of Chamberlain, 2015 ME 76, ¶ 28 , 118 A.3d 229 ; Guardianship of Stevens, 2014 ME 25, ¶ 14 , 86 A.3d 1197 . 2017See Guardianship of David C., 2010 ME 136, ¶ 7 , 10 A.3d 684 ; see also Guardianship of Chamberlain, 2015 ME 76, ¶ 28 , 118 A.3d 229 ; Guardianship of Stevens, 2014 ME 25, ¶ 14 , 86 A.3d 1197 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Porrazzo v. Karofsky
green
2 sentences2023Germain, 2019 ME 80 , ,r 5 n.3, 208 A.3d 772 (reaffirming application of the preponderance of the evidence standard in considering prejudgment motions for approval of attachment and attachment on trustee process). 5 To determine whether it is more likely than not that a plaintiff will recover judgment in an aggregate sum at least in the amount sought for attachment, courts assess "the merits of the complaint and the weight and credibility of the supporting affidavits." Porrazzo v. Karofsky, 1998 ME 182 , ,r 7, 714 A.2d 826 . 2023Germain, 2019 ME 80 , ,r 5 n.3, 208 A.3d 772 (reaffirming application of the preponderance of the evidence standard in considering prejudgment motions for approval of attachment and attachment on trustee process). 5 To determine whether it is more likely than not that a plaintiff will recover judgment in an aggregate sum at least in the amount sought for attachment, courts assess "the merits of the complaint and the weight and credibility of the supporting affidavits." Porrazzo v. Karofsky, 1998 ME 182 , ,r 7, 714 A.2d 826 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Portland Museum of Art v. Annemarie Germain
neutral
2 sentences2023Germain, 2019 ME 80 , ,r 5 n.3, 208 A.3d 772 (reaffirming application of the preponderance of the evidence standard in considering prejudgment motions for approval of attachment and attachment on trustee process). 5 To determine whether it is more likely than not that a plaintiff will recover judgment in an aggregate sum at least in the amount sought for attachment, courts assess "the merits of the complaint and the weight and credibility of the supporting affidavits." Porrazzo v. Karofsky, 1998 ME 182 , ,r 7, 714 A.2d 826 . 2023Germain, 2019 ME 80 , ,r 5 n.3, 208 A.3d 772 (reaffirming application of the preponderance of the evidence standard in considering prejudgment motions for approval of attachment and attachment on trustee process). 5 To determine whether it is more likely than not that a plaintiff will recover judgment in an aggregate sum at least in the amount sought for attachment, courts assess "the merits of the complaint and the weight and credibility of the supporting affidavits." Porrazzo v. Karofsky, 1998 ME 182 , ,r 7, 714 A.2d 826 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
United States v. Arvizu
green
1 sentence2022The likelihood of criminal activity does not have to “rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Id. at 274 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
In Re the Revocation of the License of Polk
green
1 sentence2021In re Polk, 449 A.2d 7 (N.J. 1981 ); Jones v. Conn. Med. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Steadman v. Securities & Exchange Commission
green
1 sentence2021Several of the courts that have upheld the preponderance of the evidence standard have pointed to the United State Supreme Court's decision in Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981) as recognizing that the clear and convincing evidence standard is not required in a proceeding to revoke a license to practice a profession. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In re Child of Ryan F.
green
2 sentences2020The court, in determining a juvenile disposition, must decide whether “continuation [in the juvenile’s home] would be contrary to the welfare of the juvenile.” 15 M.R.S. § 3314(1)(C-1) (2020). [¶12] Instructively, however, “we have held that judicial decisions affecting parenting rights fall on a continuum based on the nature and extent of the interests and rights affected, and the degree of finality of the different types of decisions.” In re Child of Ryan F., 2020 ME 21, ¶ 21 , 224 A.3d 1051 (quotation marks omitted). 2020The court, in determining a juvenile disposition, must decide whether “continuation [in the juvenile’s home] would be contrary to the welfare of the juvenile.” 15 M.R.S. § 3314(1)(C-1) (2020). [¶12] Instructively, however, “we have held that judicial decisions affecting parenting rights fall on a continuum based on the nature and extent of the interests and rights affected, and the degree of finality of the different types of decisions.” In re Child of Ryan F., 2020 ME 21, ¶ 21 , 224 A.3d 1051 (quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
In Re Barach
green
1 sentence2019Bar R. 14(b)(4); In re Barach , 540 F.3d 82 , 85-86 (1st Cir. 2008) (per curiam). [¶3] Although White correctly asserts that the court made several factual errors in its decision, including by relying on evidence that was not admitted and making findings that have no record support, 1 see Lefebvre , 1998 ME 24 , ¶ 11, 707 A.2d 69 , we conclude that the factual errors, even when viewed together, do not undermine the reasonableness of the sanction the court imposed as to those findings that are supported by the record. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Rodway
green
1 sentence2019White appeals, advancing arguments regarding procedural due process, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting some of the court's findings, and arguing that the sanction was overly harsh. [¶2] Contrary to White's contentions, we discern no due process violations in the court's consideration of ethical rules that were not pleaded in the Board's information, see Bd. of Overseers of the Bar v. Lefebvre , 1998 ME 24 , ¶¶ 14-15, 707 A.2d 69 ; Bd. of Overseers of the Bar v. Rodway , 461 A.2d 1062 , 1064 (Me. 1983), or in the court's application of the preponderance of the evidence stan | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Dowling v. United States
green
2 sentences2018Dowling , 493 U.S. at 349 , 110 S.Ct. 668 ; One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States , 409 U.S. 232 , 235-36, 93 S.Ct. 489 , 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972) (per curiam). 2018Dowling , 493 U.S. at 349 , 110 S.Ct. 668 ; One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States , 409 U.S. 232 , 235-36, 93 S.Ct. 489 , 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972) (per curiam). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Anton
green
1 sentence2018The Secretary of State applied the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in accordance with the administrative hearing procedure statute, 29-A M.R.S. § 2484(3) (2017). [¶ 9] The question of whether an offense defined by statute is civil or criminal is a matter of statutory construction, see State v. Anton , 463 A.2d 703 , 705 (Me. 1983), and we first look to the plain language of the statute to determine the Legislature's intent. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States
green
2 sentences2018Dowling , 493 U.S. at 349 , 110 S.Ct. 668 ; One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States , 409 U.S. 232 , 235-36, 93 S.Ct. 489 , 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972) (per curiam). 2018Dowling , 493 U.S. at 349 , 110 S.Ct. 668 ; One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States , 409 U.S. 232 , 235-36, 93 S.Ct. 489 , 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972) (per curiam). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Guardianship of Hughes
green
2 sentences2010Guardianship of Hughes, 1998 ME 186, ¶ 15 , 715 A.2d 919, 923 . 2010Guardianship of Hughes, 1998 ME 186, ¶ 15 , 715 A.2d 919, 923 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Maine Eye Care Associates P.A. v. Gorman
green
2 sentences2009Id. ~ 16, 890 A.2d at 717 . 2009Id. ~ 16, 890 A.2d at 717 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Petit v. Key Bank of Maine
green
1 sentence2009Petit, 688 A.2d at 433 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
United States v. Jerrell Heath
green
2 sentences2007This derives from the conceptual difficulty of proving inevitability to a probability. 11 Thus, while recognizing Nix , the Second Circuit has held that “the government cannot prevail under the inevitable discovery doctrine merely by establishing that it is more probable than not that the disputed evidence would have been obtained without the constitutional violation.” Heath, 455 F.3d at 58 -59 & n. 6 (citing United States v. Cabassa, 62 F.3d 470, 472-73 (2nd Cir.1995)). 2007This derives from the conceptual difficulty of proving inevitability to a probability. [11] Thus, while recognizing Nix , the Second Circuit has held that "the government cannot prevail under the inevitable discovery doctrine merely by establishing that it is more probable than not that the disputed evidence would have been obtained without the constitutional violation." Heath, 455 F.3d at 58 -59 & n. 6 (citing United States v. Cabassa, 62 F.3d 470, 472-73 (2nd Cir. 1995)). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Boisvert v. Boisvert green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Salamone v. City of Portland green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Teel v. Colson green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Custody of a Minor green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| In Re WINSHIP green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| People v. Gurley green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.