preponderance of the evidence standard in Tennessee

2022The clear and convincing standard is more exacting than the preponderance of the evidence standard and requires the evidence to demonstrate “that the truth of the facts asserted is ‘highly probable.’” Id. at *6 (citing Lettner v. Plummer, 559 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tenn. 1977)).

2018Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-33-213 provides that judicial review of forfeiture proceedings “shall be conducted in the same manner as is provided in § 4-5-322,” but reviewing courts “shall use the preponderance of evidence standard” rather than the substantial and material evidence standard “in determining whether to sustain or reverse the final order of the applicable agency.” To satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard, the proof must “show[] that the truth of the matter asserted is more probable than not.” Urquhart, 2008 WL 2019458 , *5 (citing Lettner v. Plummer, 559 S.W.2

2020Unlike the preponderance of the evidence standard, “[e]vidence satisfying the clear and convincing standard establishes that the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

2020Unlike the preponderance of the evidence standard, “[e]vidence satisfying the clear and convincing standard establishes that the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

2017Lettner v. Plummer, 559 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tenn. 1977); Goldsmith v. Roberts, 622 S.W.2d 438, 441 (Tenn. App. 1981); Brandon v. Wright, 838 S.W.2d at 536 .

2005“In contrast to the preponderance of the evidence standard, clear and convincing evidence should demonstrate that the truth of the facts asserted is ‘highly probable’ as opposed to merely ‘more probable’ than not.” In re C.W.W., 37 S.W.3d at 474 (citing Lettner v. Plummer, 559 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tenn. 1977); Brandon v. Wright, 838 S.W.2d 532, 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Goldsmith v. Roberts, 622 S.W.2d 438, 441 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981)).

2021Brandon v. Wright, 838 S.W.2d 532, 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Groves, 735 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tenn. Crim.

2005“In contrast to the preponderance of the evidence standard, clear and convincing evidence should demonstrate that the truth of the facts asserted is ‘highly probable’ as opposed to merely ‘more probable’ than not.” In re C.W.W., 37 S.W.3d at 474 (citing Lettner v. Plummer, 559 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tenn. 1977); Brandon v. Wright, 838 S.W.2d 532, 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Goldsmith v. Roberts, 622 S.W.2d 438, 441 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981)).

2021This Court has previously explained the clear and convincing evidence standard as follows: While it is more exacting than the preponderance of the evidence standard, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. [745,] 766, 102 S.Ct. [1388,] 1401 [(1982)]; Rentenbach Eng’g Co. v. General Realty Ltd., 707 S.W.2d 524, 527 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985), it does not require such certainty as the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.

2016While it is more exacting than the preponderance of the evidence standard, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. at 766, 102 S. Ct. at 1401; Rentenbach Eng'g Co. v. General Realty Ltd., 707 S.W.2d 524, 527 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985), it does -2- not require such certainty as the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.

2021“In contrast to the preponderance of the evidence standard, clear and convincing evidence should demonstrate that the truth of the facts asserted is ‘highly probable’ as opposed to merely ‘more probable’ than not.” In re M.A.R., 183 S.W.3d 652, 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting In re C.W.W., 37 S.W.3d 467, 474 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)).

2019“In contrast to the preponderance of the evidence standard, clear and convincing evidence should demonstrate that the truth of the facts asserted is ‘highly probable’ as opposed to merely ‘more probable than not.’” Id. (quoting In re M.A.R., 183 S.W.3d 652, 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)).

2021United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).

2020App. Oct. 26, 2016) (The likelihood of criminal activity required for reasonable suspicion is not as great as that required for probable cause and is “considerably less” than that required to satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard. (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). “‘Reasonable suspicion is a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the subject of a stop of criminal activity[.]’” Smith, 484 S.W.3d at 401 (quoting Binette, 33 S.W.3d at 218 ). “[O]fficers must have some reasonable basis to warrant investigation” and “a mere ‘inchoate and unparticulari

2021“In contrast to the preponderance of the evidence standard, clear and convincing evidence should demonstrate that the truth of the facts asserted is ‘highly probable’ as opposed to merely ‘more probable’ than not.” In re M.A.R., 183 S.W.3d 652, 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting In re C.W.W., 37 S.W.3d 467, 474 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)).

2018Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-33-213 provides that judicial review of forfeiture proceedings “shall be conducted in the same manner as is provided in § 4-5-322,” but reviewing courts “shall use the preponderance of evidence standard” rather than the substantial and material evidence standard “in determining whether to sustain or reverse the final order of the applicable agency.” To satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard, the proof must “show[] that the truth of the matter asserted is more probable than not.” Urquhart, 2008 WL 2019458 , *5 (citing Lettner v. Plummer, 559 S.W.2

2021Brandon v. Wright, 838 S.W.2d 532, 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Groves, 735 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tenn. Crim.

2016Brandon v. Wright, 838 S.W.2d 532, 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Groves, 735 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tenn. Crim.

2014United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); see also State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d 861, 867 (Tenn. 1998).

2013United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); see also State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d 861, 867 (Tenn. 1998).

2019We “review the underlying factual findings using the preponderance of the evidence standard . . . and . . . the lower court’s legal determinations de novo without any presumption of correctness.” Id. at 525 .

2017We “review the underlying factual findings using the preponderance of the evidence standard . . . and . . . the lower court’s legal determinations de novo without any presumption of correctness.” Id. at 525 .

2017“In contrast to the preponderance of the evidence standard, clear and convincing evidence should demonstrate that the truth of the facts asserted is ‘highly probable’ as opposed to merely ‘more probable’ than not.” In re S.J., 387 S.W.3d 576, 587 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (internal citations omitted).

2017“In contrast to the preponderance of the evidence standard, clear and convincing evidence should demonstrate that the truth of the facts asserted is ‘highly probable’ as opposed to merely ‘more probable’ than not.” In re S.J., 387 S.W.3d 576, 587 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (internal citations omitted).

2015“When called upon to review a lower court‟s discretionary decision, the reviewing court should review the underlying factual findings using the preponderance of the evidence standard contained in Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(d) and should review the lower court‟s legal determinations de novo without any presumption of correctness.” Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 525 (Tenn. 2010) (citing Johnson v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 146 S.W.3d 600, 604 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004); Boyd v. Comdata Network, Inc., 88 S.W.3d 203, 212 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)).

2015See Boyd v. Comdata Network, Inc., 88 S.W.3d 203, 212 (Tenn.Ct.App.2002) ("When called upon to review a discretionary decision, we will review the trial court's underlying factual findings' using the preponderance of the evidence' standard in Tenn. R.App.

2023The clear and convincing evidence standard, a higher level of proof than the preponderance of the evidence standard, “eliminates any serious or substantial doubt concerning the correctness of the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence” and “should produce in the fact-finder’s mind a firm belief or conviction with regard to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” O’Daniel v. Messier, 905 S.W.2d 182, 188 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

2022The clear and convincing standard is more exacting than the preponderance of the evidence standard and requires the evidence to demonstrate “that the truth of the facts asserted is ‘highly probable.’” Id. at *6 (citing Lettner v. Plummer, 559 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tenn. 1977)).

2016This court has further explained its application of the clear and convincing evidence standard as follows: Under this standard of proof, the appellate court must “distinguish between the specific facts found by the trial court and the combined weight of those facts.” In re Tiffany B., 228 S.W.3d 148, 156 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).

2014The appellate court applies the clear and convincing evidence standard as follows: Under this standard of proof, the appellate court must “distinguish between the specific facts found by the trial court and the combined weight of those facts.” In re Tiffany B., 228 S.W.3d 148, 156 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).

2018“In contrast to the preponderance of the evidence standard, clear and convincing evidence should demonstrate that the truth of the facts asserted is ‘highly probable’ as opposed to merely ‘more probable’ than not.” In re M.A.R., 183 S.W.3d 652, 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting In re C.W.W., 37 S.W.3d 467, 474 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)); see Teter v. Republic Parking Sys., Inc., 181 S.W.3d 330, 341 (Tenn. 2005) (noting that the clear and convincing standard “is used to promote important public policy and preserve prior judicial orders” and “in circumstances involving extraordinary remedies”).

2012“In contrast to the preponderance of the evidence standard, clear and convincing evidence should demonstrate that the truth of the facts asserted is ‘highly probable’ as opposed to merely ‘more probable’ than not.” In re M.A.R., 183 S.W.3d 652, 660 (Tenn.Ct.App.2005) (quoting In re C.W.W., 37 S.W.3d 467, 474 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000)); see Teter v. Republic Parking Sys., Inc., 181 S.W.3d 330, 341 (Tenn.2005) (noting that the clear and convincing standard “is used to promote important public policy and preserve prior judicial orders” and “in circumstances involving extraordinary remedies”).

2011Id. (stating if the plaintiffs are seeking damages only, not to reform or rescind a contract due to the alleged fraud or intentional misrepresentation, the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof applies); see also Estate of Acuff v. O’Linger, 56 S.W.3d 527, 530-31 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

2010The “clear, cogent, and convincing” standard is “an intermediate standard more exacting than a preponderance of the evidence standard while at the same time not requiring the kind of certainty inherent in the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Estate of Acuff v. O’Linger, 56 S.W.3d 527, 535 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

2021App. P. 13(d)” and the “legal determinations de novo without any presumption of correctness.” Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 525 (Tenn. 2010) (citing Johnson v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 146 S.W.3d 600, 604 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004); Boyd v. Comdata Network, Inc., 88 S.W.3d 203, 212 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)).

2015“When called upon to review a lower court‟s discretionary decision, the reviewing court should review the underlying factual findings using the preponderance of the evidence standard contained in Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(d) and should review the lower court‟s legal determinations de novo without any presumption of correctness.” Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 525 (Tenn. 2010) (citing Johnson v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 146 S.W.3d 600, 604 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004); Boyd v. Comdata Network, Inc., 88 S.W.3d 203, 212 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)).

1999See State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn.1996) (proper standard of review in suppression cases is the preponderance of the evidence standard).

1997In State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18 (Tenn. 1996), our supreme court was confronted with findings of the trial court under a preponderance of the evidence standard resulting from a motion to suppress hearing.

2019Town of Bartlett v. Beaty, 59 Tenn. App. 406, 417-19 , 440 S.W.2d 831, 837 (1967); Estes v. Morris, 4 Tenn. App. 120, 122 (1926). *** Decisions regarding the proper application of the doctrine of unclean hands are heavily fact-dependent and are addressed to the considerable discretion of the trial court.

2012Town of Bartlett v. Beaty, 59 Tenn. App. 406, 417-19 , 440 S.W.2d 831, 837 (1967); Estes v. Morris, 4 Tenn. App. 120, 122 (1926). *** Decisions regarding the proper application of the doctrine of unclean hands are heavily fact-dependent and are addressed to the considerable discretion of the trial court. -3- In re: Estate of Boote, 265 S.W.3d 402, 417-18 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (footnotes omitted).

2019Town of Bartlett v. Beaty, 59 Tenn. App. 406, 417-19 , 440 S.W.2d 831, 837 (1967); Estes v. Morris, 4 Tenn. App. 120, 122 (1926). *** Decisions regarding the proper application of the doctrine of unclean hands are heavily fact-dependent and are addressed to the considerable discretion of the trial court.

2019Town of Bartlett v. Beaty, 59 Tenn. App. 406, 417-19 , 440 S.W.2d 831, 837 (1967); Estes v. Morris, 4 Tenn. App. 120, 122 (1926). *** Decisions regarding the proper application of the doctrine of unclean hands are heavily fact-dependent and are addressed to the considerable discretion of the trial court.

2016Id.; see also Estate of Brock, 63 S.W.3d at 732 . “[T]he reviewing court should review the underlying factual findings using the preponderance of the evidence standard contained in Tenn. R.

2015Id.; see also Estate of Brock, 63 S.W.3d at 732 . “[T]he reviewing court should review the underlying factual findings using the preponderance of the evidence standard contained in Tenn. R.

2014“In contrast to the preponderance of the evidence standard, clear and convincing evidence should demonstrate that the truth of the facts asserted is ‘highly probable’ as opposed to merely ‘more probable’ than not.” In re M.A.R., 183 S.W.3d 652, 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting In re C.W.W., 37 S.W.3d 467, 474 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)); see also In re Samaria S., 347 S.W.3d 188, 200 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011).

2012See also In re Samaria S., 347 S.W.3d at 200 .

2002See State v. Carter, 908 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Tenn. Crim.

2000See State v. Carter, 908 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995).

2008It is more exacting than the preponderance of the evidence standard, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982); Rentenbach Eng’g Co. v. General Realty Ltd., 707 S.W.2d 524, 527 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985), yet it does not require such certainty as the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.

2007It is more exacting than the preponderance of the evidence standard, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982); Rentenbach Eng’g Co. v. General Realty Ltd., 707 S.W.2d 524, 527 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985), yet it does not require such certainty as the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.

2016“Clear and convincing evidence eliminates any serious substantial doubt concerning the correctness of the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

2016The clear and convincing standard is “more exacting than the preponderance of the evidence standard, [but] it does not require such certainty as beyond a reasonable doubt standard.” O’Daniel v. Messier, 905 S.W.2d 182, 188 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (internal citations omitted) (see also Hughes v. Bd. of Professional Responsibility of Supreme Court of Tennessee, 259 S.W.3d 631, 642 (Tenn. 2008)).

2022See id. § 40-33-213(b); McEwen v. Tenn. Dep’t of Safety, 173 S.W.3d 815, 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

2020McEwen, 173 S.W.3d at 820-21 (2005) (additional footnotes omitted).

2008Curry, 988 S.W.2d at 158 .

2002In State v. Curry, our supreme court applied the preponderance of the evidence standard to the review of the trial court’s decision regarding the prosecutor’s abuse of discretion, rather than limiting this standard to the trial court’s factual findings. 988 S.W.2d 153, 158 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Pinkham, 955 S.W.2d at 960 ).