preponderance of the evidence standard in Pennsylvania

2020A21044/20 sentence based on a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108, 117 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc) (footnotes omitted), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 277 (Pa. 2014).

2019The Alleyne decision, therefore, renders those Pennsylvania mandatory minimum sentencing statutes that do not pertain to prior convictions constitutionally infirm insofar as they permit a judge to automatically increase a defendant’s sentence based on a preponderance of the evidence standard. ____________________________________________ 4 Welsh does not dispute that he was previously convicted of qualifying offenses under subsection 9718.2(a)(2), including involuntary deviate sexual intercourse and indecent assault. -4- J-S51041-19 Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108, 117 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en

2025A preponderance of the evidence standard is defined simply as the greater weight of the evidence which would be enough to slightly tip a scale. [ Raker, supra at 724 ].

2020The preponderance of the evidence standard is “defined as the greater weight of the evidence, i.e., to tip a scale slightly is the criteria or requirement for preponderance of the evidence.” Raker v. Raker, 847 A.2d 720, 724 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).

2017U.S. 2151 (2013), and its progeny, Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86 (2014), including Commonwealth v. Wolfe, [ 140 A.3d 651 ] (Pa. 2016), does not the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s state law conclusion pursuant to 1 Pa. C.S. § 1925 Constitutional Construction of Statutes, extrapolates from the holding in Alleyne rendering those Pennsylvania mandatory sentencing statutes that do not pertain to prior convictions constitutionally infirm insofar as they permit a judge to automatically increase a defendant’s sentence based -6- J-S34026-17 on a preponderance of the evidence standard, constitute tha

2017The Rivera panel further espoused: Indeed, it was not until our decision in Newman, supra, filed in August of 2014, that an en banc panel held Pennsylvania’s mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, which permitted a trial court to increase a defendant’s minimum sentence based upon a preponderance of the evidence standard, were unconstitutional under Alleyne and incapable of severance.

2026Thus, the clear and convincing evidence test “has been described as an ‘intermediate’ test, which is more exacting than a preponderance of the evidence test, but less exacting than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Meals, 912 A.2d 213, 219 (Pa. 2006).

2021Thus, the clear and convincing evidence test “has been described as an ‘intermediate’ test, which is more exacting than a preponderance of the evidence test, but less exacting than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Meals, [ 590 Pa. 110 ,] 912 A.2d 213, 219 (2006).

2025“A preponderance of the evidence standard, the lowest evidentiary standard, is tantamount to a more likely than not inquiry.” Borough of Pottstown v. Suber-Aponte, 202 A.3d 173 , 180 n.11 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (quoting Delaware County v. Schaefer, 45 A.3d 1149, 1156 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012)).

2021Inquirer, 45 A.3d 1149, 1156 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (“A preponderance of the evidence standard, the lowest evidentiary standard, is tantamount to a more likely than not inquiry.”).

2023Commonwealth v. Bragg, 133 A.3d 328 , 332–333 (Pa. Super. 2016), aff'd sub nom., Commonwealth v. Bragg, 169 A.3d 1024 (Pa. 2017); see also Commonwealth v. Valentine, 101 A.3d 801 , 804 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2014) (emphasis in original) (“The Alleyne decision ... renders those Pennsylvania mandatory minimum sentencing statutes that do not pertain to prior convictions constitutionally infirm insofar as they permit a judge to automatically increase a defendant's sentence based on a preponderance of the evidence standard.”).

2017In addressing Alleyne, Watley stated, "[t]he Alleyne decision renders those convictions co stitutionally infirm insofar as they permit a judge to automatically increase a defer dant's sentence based on a preponderance of the evidence standard." Id., 81 A.3d at 117 In Commonwealth v. Vale11tine, 101 A.3d 801, 809 (Pa. Super. 2014), Pa.C.S.A. §971 ' were not severable, thus rendering §9712 unconstitutional on its face, regardless of ho v the predicate fact is determined.

2025“A preponderance of the evidence standard, the lowest evidentiary standard, is tantamount to ‘a more likely than not’ inquiry.” Carey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 61 A.3d 367, 374 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). 8 provisions of this act shall not apply.” Section 3101.1 of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.3101.1.

2024“A preponderance of the evidence standard, the lowest evidentiary standard, is tantamount to ‘a more likely than not’ inquiry.” Id. at 374 .

2024A preponderance of the evidence standard is defined as the greater weight of the evidence, i.e., enough to tip a scale slightly. -5- J-S13017-24 E.K. v. J.R.A., 237 A.3d 509, 519 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). “[W]e review the evidence of record in the light most favorable to, and grant all reasonable inferences to, the party that prevailed before the PFA court.” Kaur v. Singh, 259 A.3d 505, 509 (Pa. Super. 2021).

2024“A preponderance of the evidence standard is defined as the greater weight of the evidence, i.e., enough to tip a scale slightly.” Id. (citation, original quotation marks, and original brackets omitted).

2019The Alleyne decision, therefore, renders those Pennsylvania mandatory minimum sentencing statutes that do not pertain to prior convictions constitutionally infirm insofar as they permit a judge to automatically increase a defendant’s sentence based on a preponderance of the evidence standard. ____________________________________________ 4 Welsh does not dispute that he was previously convicted of qualifying offenses under subsection 9718.2(a)(2), including involuntary deviate sexual intercourse and indecent assault. -4- J-S51041-19 Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108, 117 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en

2017Claiming that his pro se petition meets the newly recognized constitutional right timeliness exception, Appellant argues his sentence of life imprisonment is unconstitutional pursuant to Alleyne v. U.S., ___U.S.___, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013), in which the United States Supreme Court held “[a]ny fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” Based on Alleyne, our courts have invalidated Pennsylvania statutes setting forth mandatory minimum sentences allowing a trial court to increase a defendant’s m

2024In re Vencil, 152 A.3d at 242 (citation omitted). “[T]he appropriate standard of proof applicable to the physician’s record findings is a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Id. at 246.

2024In re Vencil, 152 A.3d at 242 (citation omitted). “[T]he appropriate standard of proof applicable to the physician’s record findings is a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Id. at 246.

2025The preponderance of the evidence standard “is defined as the greater weight of the evidence, i.e., to tip a scale slightly is the criteria or -4- J-S13017-25 requirement for preponderance of the evidence.” Ferri v. Ferri, 854 A.2d 600, 603 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 786 A.2d 961, 968 (Pa. 2001)).

2024The preponderance of the evidence standard “is defined as the greater weight of the evidence, i.e., to tip a scale slightly is the criteria or requirement for preponderance of the evidence.” Ferri v. Ferri, 854 A.2d 600, 603 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 786 A.2d 961, 968 (Pa. 2001)).

2015See Annenberg v. Commonwealth, 757 A.2d 338, 347 (Pa. 2000) (“Section 1925 funnels our inquiry to examining what the enacting legislature would have done had it known that the [provision in question] was unconstitutional.”); see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005).

2014The proper query, however, is what the legislature would have done had it known that a judge could not decide such facts by a preponderance of the evidence standard. -7- J-S38045-14 See Annenberg, supra at 347 ; see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005).

2018The preponderance of the evidence standard is "defined as the greater weight of the evidence, i.e., to tip a scale slightly is the criteria or requirement for preponderance of the evidence." Mescanti v. Mescanti, 956 A2d 1017, 1020 (Pa. Super. 2008).

2018The preponderance of the evidence standard is “defined as the greater weight of the evidence, i.e., to tip a scale slightly is the criteria or requirement for preponderance of the evidence.” Raker v. Raker, 847 A.2d 720, 724 (Pa.Super.2004) (citation omitted). -8- J-S35037-18 Mescanti v. Mescanti, 956 A.2d 1017, 1020 (Pa. Super. 2008).

2023The standard of proof governing the determination of SVP status, i.e., “clear and convincing evidence,” has been described as an “intermediate” test, which is more exacting than a preponderance of the evidence test, but less exacting than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. *** The clear and convincing standard requires evidence that is “so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the [trier of fact] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts [in] issue.” Commonwealth v. Fuentes, 991 A.2d 935 , 941–42 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc) (citations omitt

2015The standard of proof governing the determination of SVP status, i.e., “clear and convincing evidence,” has been described as an “intermediate” test, which is more exacting than a preponderance of the evidence test, but less exacting than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. *** The clear and convincing standard requires evidence that is “so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the [trier of fact] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts [in] issue.” Commonwealth v. Fuentes, 991 A.2d 935, 942 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc), appeal denied, 12 A

2025See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) (stating a police officer has reasonable suspicion when he is “able to articulate something more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch’” that criminal activity is afoot)); accord Commonwealth v. Hughes, 908 A.2d 924, 927 (Pa. Super. 2006). -6- J-A25040-24 Although reasonable suspicion requires something more than an observation of a person doing something many people can do legally, see Garcia, 311 A.3d at 1145 , the likelihood of criminal activity sufficient to establish reasonable

2025Although reasonable suspicion requires something more than an observation of a person doing something many people can do legally, see -8- J-A12034-25 Garcia, 311 A.3d at 1145 , the likelihood of criminal activity sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion "falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002).

2025The preponderance of the evidence standard “is defined as the greater weight of the evidence, i.e., to tip a scale slightly is the criteria or -4- J-S13017-25 requirement for preponderance of the evidence.” Ferri v. Ferri, 854 A.2d 600, 603 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 786 A.2d 961, 968 (Pa. 2001)).

2024The preponderance of the evidence standard “is defined as the greater weight of the evidence, i.e., to tip a scale slightly is the criteria or requirement for preponderance of the evidence.” Ferri v. Ferri, 854 A.2d 600, 603 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 786 A.2d 961, 968 (Pa. 2001)).

2025E.K. v. J.R.A., 237 A.3d 509, 519 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). “[W]e review the evidence of record in the light most favorable to, and grant all reasonable inferences to, the party that prevailed before the PFA court.” Kaur v. Singh, 259 A.3d 505 , 509 (Pa. Super. 2021).

2024A preponderance of the evidence standard is defined as the greater weight of the evidence, i.e., enough to tip a scale slightly. -5- J-S13017-24 E.K. v. J.R.A., 237 A.3d 509, 519 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). “[W]e review the evidence of record in the light most favorable to, and grant all reasonable inferences to, the party that prevailed before the PFA court.” Kaur v. Singh, 259 A.3d 505, 509 (Pa. Super. 2021).

2024Clear and convincing evidence is an intermediate standard of proof, “falling below the highest level of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, but above the preponderance of the evidence standard.” Commonwealth v. Stephens, 74 A.3d 1034, 1039 (Pa. Super. 2013).

2024The Commonwealth’s burden of proof “has been described as an intermediate test, falling below the highest level of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, but above the preponderance of the evidence standard.” Commonwealth v. Stephens, 74 A.3d 1034 , 1039 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).

2021See Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 636 Pa. 37 , 140 A.3d 651 (2016) (prior version of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718(a)(1), imposing mandatory minimum when victim of sexual assault is less than 16 years old);[] Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa. 36 , 117 A.3d 247 (2015) (18 Pa.C.S. § 6317, imposing mandatory minimum for delivery of drugs within 1,000 feet of school); Commonwealth v. Cardwell, 105 A.3d 748 (Pa. Super. 2014) (18 Pa.C.S. § 7508, imposing mandatory minimum based upon weight of controlled substances); Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (42 Pa.C.S. § 9712.1, imposing mandatory

2017U.S. 2151 (2013), and its progeny, Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86 (2014), including Commonwealth v. Wolfe, [ 140 A.3d 651 ] (Pa. 2016), does not the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s state law conclusion pursuant to 1 Pa. C.S. § 1925 Constitutional Construction of Statutes, extrapolates from the holding in Alleyne rendering those Pennsylvania mandatory sentencing statutes that do not pertain to prior convictions constitutionally infirm insofar as they permit a judge to automatically increase a defendant’s sentence based -6- J-S34026-17 on a preponderance of the evidence standard, constitute tha

2015See Annenberg v. Commonwealth, 757 A.2d 338, 347 (Pa. 2000) (“Section 1925 funnels our inquiry to examining what the enacting legislature would have done had it known that the [provision in question] was unconstitutional.”); see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005).

2014The proper query, however, is what the legislature would have done had it known that a judge could not decide such facts by a preponderance of the evidence standard. -7- J-S38045-14 See Annenberg, supra at 347 ; see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005).

2025“A preponderance of the evidence standard is defined as the greater weight of the evidence, i.e., to tip a scale slightly is the criteria or requirement for preponderance of the evidence.” K.B., 208 A.3d at 128 (citation omitted).

2024However, “[i]n determining whether to transfer a case charging murder or any of the offenses excluded from the definition of ‘delinquent act’ in [42 Pa.C.S.A. §] 6302, the child shall be required to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the transfer will serve the public interest.” Id.; see also K.B. v. Tinsley, 208 A.3d 123, 128 (Pa. Super. 2019) (“A preponderance of the evidence standard is defined as the greater -8- J-A03042-24 weight of the evidence, i.e., to tip a scale slightly is the criteria or requirement for preponderance of the evidence.” (citation omitted)).

2016“The Alleyne decision, therefore, renders those Pennsylvania mandatory minimum sentencing statutes that do not pertain to prior convictions constitutionally infirm insofar as they permit a judge to automatically increase a defendant’s sentence based on a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108, 117 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 277 (Pa. 2014) (footnote omitted). -6- J-S10041-16 In his first issue, Appellant argues that his sentence is illegal 5 because Commonwealth v. Fennell, 105 A.3d 13 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 121 A.3d 494

2015Severability of 42 Pa.C.S.A.§9718 Based on the recent Pennsylvania Superior Court decisions of Com. v. Watley, 81 AJd 108 (Pa. Super. 2013) and Coin. v. Thompson, 2014 WL 2131965 (Pa. Super. 2014), subsection ( c) of §9718 is unconstitutional because it allows the sentencing court to apply the mandatory minimum sentences based on a preponderance of the evidence standard, as opposed to being determined beyond a reasonable doubt by the finder of'fact, as required by Alleyne.

2025“Clear and convincing evidence is testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the - 10 - J-S26032-25 trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” S.M., 176 A.3d at 937 (citation omitted). “[T]he clear and convincing evidence test has been described as an intermediate test, which is more exacting than a preponderance of the evidence test, but less exacting than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2025“Clear and convincing evidence is testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the - 10 - J-S26032-25 trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” S.M., 176 A.3d at 937 (citation omitted). “[T]he clear and convincing evidence test has been described as an intermediate test, which is more exacting than a preponderance of the evidence test, but less exacting than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2025Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 34-35 (Pa. 2011) (cleaned up).

2020Whether a claim was established under a preponderance of the evidence standard is “tantamount to a ‘more likely than not’ inquiry.” Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 34-35 (Pa. 2011) (citations omitted).