preponderance of the evidence standard in California

2022(People v. Superior Court (Kaulick) (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1305, fn. 28 [Requiring proof that something is ‘“more likely than not’” is a preponderance of the evidence standard].) Employing such a construction, without assigning the burden of proof to either side, would be problematic if the jury could not decide which of the two options was more likely than the other.

2016The court ordered “[t]he matter . . . remanded for a hearing to determine whether, under a preponderance of the evidence standard, Arevalo would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety such that he should not be resentenced.” (Arevalo, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 854 .) In so doing, the court relied on its earlier decision in People v. Superior Court (Kaulick) (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1279 [ 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 856 ], in which that court held the People bore the burden of establishing dangerousness by a preponderance of the evidence, because no Sixth Amendment issues were implicated, a

2024In any event, the rule stated in Kaulick does not, as defendant suggests, obligate a resentencing court to apply a preponderance of the evidence standard before using an aggravating factor or obligate a reviewing court to apply a substantial evidence standard on appeal.9 As explained in People v. Buford (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 886 (Buford), a trial court’s ultimate determination that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors “ ‘is not equivalent to a factual finding.’ ” (Id. at pp. 900–901, citing People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 814, fn. 4 [noting a jury trial is required only on a “

2024In any event, the rule stated in Kaulick does not, as defendant suggests, obligate a resentencing court to apply a preponderance of the evidence standard before using an aggravating factor or obligate a reviewing court to apply a substantial evidence standard on appeal.9 As explained in People v. Buford (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 886 (Buford), a trial court’s ultimate determination that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors “ ‘is not equivalent to a factual finding.’ ” (Id. at pp. 900–901, citing People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 814, fn. 4 [noting a jury trial is required only on a “

2025(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [California Supreme Court decisions are binding on lower courts under the principle of stare decisis].) Specifically, the California Supreme Court has held that CALJIC No. 2.50.01, the predecessor instruction to former CALCRIM No. 1191, was a correct statement of the law, explaining: “Nothing in the instructions authorized the jury to use the preponderance-of- the-evidence standard for anything other than the preliminary determination whether defendant committed a prior sexual offense . . . .” (People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Ca

2025(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [California Supreme Court decisions are binding on lower courts under the principle of stare decisis].) Specifically, the California Supreme Court has held that CALJIC No. 2.50.01, the predecessor instruction to former CALCRIM No. 1191, was a correct statement of the law, explaining: “Nothing in the instructions authorized the jury to use the preponderance-of- the-evidence standard for anything other than the preliminary determination whether defendant committed a prior sexual offense . . . .” (People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Ca

2010(Id. at p. 754; Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 335 .) In addition, the courts consider the purpose underlying the proof standard, which is to delineate “ ‘ “the degree of confidence our society thinks [a fact finder] should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.” ’ ” (Santosky, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 755 ; see Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 546 [ 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 28 P.3d 151 ] (Wendland).) The required minimum standard reflects a “societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the li

2010(Id. at p. 754; Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 335 .) In addition, the courts consider the purpose underlying the proof standard, which is to delineate “ ‘ “the degree of confidence our society thinks [a fact finder] should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.” ’ ” (Santosky, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 755 ; see Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 546 [ 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 28 P.3d 151 ] (Wendland).) The required minimum standard reflects a “societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the li

2026(See People v. Jasso (2025) 17 Cal.5th 646 , 685 [Corroborating evidence is evidence that “tends to connect the defendant with the crime.”]; People v. Baskins (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 728, 731 [Corroborating evidence “need not be strong.”]; In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 919 [“Clear and convincing” evidence requires a finding of high probability]; Conservatorship of Maria B. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 514, 529 [“the clear and convincing evidence standard is higher than the preponderance of the evidence standard”]; and CALCRIM 19 Nos. 334, 335, 376, 441, 1111, 2240, 2241, 3450, 3453.) Thus, the

2023(See People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 195 (Gonzalez) [“We evaluate nonstructural state law error under the harmlessness standard set forth in Watson . . . .”]; Conservatorship of Maria B. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 514, 533 [in a different context, applying Watson to erroneous use of the preponderance of the evidence standard instead of clear and convincing evidence, where the higher standard was required by state law].) “[The Watson] standard requires us to evaluate whether the defendant has demonstrated that it is ‘“reasonably probable that a result more 1 Of course, our use of the term

2026(See People v. Jasso (2025) 17 Cal.5th 646 , 685 [Corroborating evidence is evidence that “tends to connect the defendant with the crime.”]; People v. Baskins (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 728, 731 [Corroborating evidence “need not be strong.”]; In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 919 [“Clear and convincing” evidence requires a finding of high probability]; Conservatorship of Maria B. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 514, 529 [“the clear and convincing evidence standard is higher than the preponderance of the evidence standard”]; and CALCRIM 19 Nos. 334, 335, 376, 441, 1111, 2240, 2241, 3450, 3453.) Thus, the

2005A preponderance of the evidence standard . . . simply requires the trier of fact “to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 918 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 637 , 623 P.2d 198 ].) “ ‘Clear and convincing’ evidence requires a finding of high probability[, or] evidence . . . ‘ “so clear as to leave no substantial doubt”; “sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 919.) We are required to consider the pertinent statutes—section 366.21, which sets forth procedures for status revie

2026(See Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 594 [“When a statute is silent on the standard of proof, the preponderance of the evidence standard ordinarily applies.”].) 30 reasonable services.” (In re Monica C. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 296, 306 .) “ ‘The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.’ [Citation.] Thus, while ‘ “services need not be perfect,’ ” they ‘ “should be tailored to the specific needs of the particular family.” ’ [Citation.] In this regard

2021(Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 594 [“When a statute is silent on the standard of proof, the preponderance of the evidence standard ordinarily applies,” citing Evidence Code section 115]; see also Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. City of Pasadena (1990) 51 Cal.3d 564, 575 [courts should strive to harmonize statutory sections relating to the same subject to the extent possible].) The question still remains, however, whether a Schlup innocence finding coupled with a later grant of habeas relief that results in the permanent release of a prisoner from custody satisfies se

2025(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [California Supreme Court decisions are binding on lower courts under the principle of stare decisis].) Specifically, the California Supreme Court has held that CALJIC No. 2.50.01, the predecessor instruction to former CALCRIM No. 1191, was a correct statement of the law, explaining: “Nothing in the instructions authorized the jury to use the preponderance-of- the-evidence standard for anything other than the preliminary determination whether defendant committed a prior sexual offense . . . .” (People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Ca

2025(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [California Supreme Court decisions are binding on lower courts under the principle of stare decisis].) Specifically, the California Supreme Court has held that CALJIC No. 2.50.01, the predecessor instruction to former CALCRIM No. 1191, was a correct statement of the law, explaining: “Nothing in the instructions authorized the jury to use the preponderance-of- the-evidence standard for anything other than the preliminary determination whether defendant committed a prior sexual offense . . . .” (People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Ca

2009The standard of proof must satisfy "`the constitutional minimum of "fundamental fairness."'" ( Santosky v. Kramer, supra, at p. 756, fn. 8.) As explained in Santosky : "[T]he minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the . . . interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants." ( Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 755 .) When the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof is used, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest is shared "in roughly e

2009The standard of proof must satisfy "`the constitutional minimum of "fundamental fairness."'" ( Santosky v. Kramer, supra, at p. 756, fn. 8.) As explained in Santosky : "[T]he minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the . . . interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants." ( Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 755 .) When the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof is used, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest is shared "in roughly e

2021(Chamberlain v. Ventura County Civil Service Com. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 362, 368-369 (Chamberlain); accord, Ettinger v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 853, 858 (Ettinger).) That rule was born out of the appellate court’s interpretation that the weight of the evidence phrase in subdivision (c) of section 1094.5 is synonymous with the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof.

2021(Chamberlain v. Ventura County Civil Service Com. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 362, 368-369 (Chamberlain); accord, Ettinger v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 853, 858 (Ettinger).) That rule was born out of the appellate court’s interpretation that the weight of the evidence phrase in subdivision (c) of section 1094.5 is synonymous with the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof.

2025(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [California Supreme Court decisions are binding on lower courts under the principle of stare decisis].) Specifically, the California Supreme Court has held that CALJIC No. 2.50.01, the predecessor instruction to former CALCRIM No. 1191, was a correct statement of the law, explaining: “Nothing in the instructions authorized the jury to use the preponderance-of- the-evidence standard for anything other than the preliminary determination whether defendant committed a prior sexual offense . . . .” (People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Ca

2025(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [California Supreme Court decisions are binding on lower courts under the principle of stare decisis].) Specifically, the California Supreme Court has held that CALJIC No. 2.50.01, the predecessor instruction to former CALCRIM No. 1191, was a correct statement of the law, explaining: “Nothing in the instructions authorized the jury to use the preponderance-of- the-evidence standard for anything other than the preliminary determination whether defendant committed a prior sexual offense . . . .” (People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Ca

2016The court ordered “[t]he matter . . . remanded for a hearing to determine whether, under a preponderance of the evidence standard, Arevalo would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety such that he should not be resentenced.” (Arevalo, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 854 .) In so doing, the court relied on its earlier decision in People v. Superior Court (Kaulick) (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1279 [ 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 856 ], in which that court held the People bore the burden of establishing dangerousness by a preponderance of the evidence, because no Sixth Amendment issues were implicated, a

2016He claims that recent decision by the Court of Appeal, People v. Arevalo (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 836 (Arevalo), shows that the correct standard is beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than the preponderance of the evidence standard espoused in People v. Osuna (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1020 (Osuna).

2014(See United States v. O’Brien (2010) 560 U.S. 218, 224 [ 176 L.Ed.2d 979, 986-987 ]; People v. Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63, 86 ; People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 349 .) Additionally, the appellate court in Kaulick, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at pages 1301-1305 held that the preponderance of the evidence standard governs the subsequent, 3 Further undesignated section references are to the Penal Code. 2 discretionary determination at a Proposition 36 proceeding of whether the petitioner poses a current risk of danger.4 Petitioner, by contrast, urges the court to apply a requirement of proof beyo

2014(See United States v. O’Brien (2010) 560 U.S. 218, 224 [ 176 L.Ed.2d 979, 986-987 , 130 S.Ct. 2169 ]; People v. Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63, 86 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 530 , 186 P.3d 10 ]; People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 349 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 ].) Additionally, the appellate court in Kaulick, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at pages 1301-1305 held that the preponderance of the evidence standard governs the subsequent discretionary determination at a Proposition 36 proceeding of whether the petitioner poses a current risk of danger. 4 Petitioner, by contrast, urges the court to apply a r

2020(People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 728 .) When giving the reasons for the sentencing choice, the court must “state in simple language the primary factor or factors that support the exercise of discretion.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.406(a); see People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 850-851 .) However, the court “is not required to identify aggravating and mitigating factors, apply a preponderance of the evidence standard, or specify the ‘ultimate facts’ that ‘justify[] the term selected.’ ” ( Sandoval, supra, at pp. 850-851 .) “The court may give a single statement explaining the r

2020(People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 728 .) When giving the reasons for the sentencing choice, the court must “state in simple language the primary factor or factors that support the exercise of discretion.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.406(a); see People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 850-851 .) However, the court “is not required to identify aggravating and mitigating factors, apply a preponderance of the evidence standard, or specify the ‘ultimate facts’ that ‘justify[] the term selected.’ ” ( Sandoval, supra, at pp. 850-851 .) “The court may give a single statement explaining the r

2016(See In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, 557-558 [ 146 Cal.Rptr.3d 382 , 283 P.3d 1252 ],) 18 In People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 850-851 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 161 P.3d 1146 ], the California Supreme Court stated that, in making its discretionary sentencing choices post-Cunningham, “the trial court need only ‘state [its] reasons’ [citation]; it is not required to identify aggravating and mitigating factors, apply a preponderance of the evidence standard, or specify the ‘ultimate facts’ that ‘justify[] the term selected.’ [Citations.] Rather, the court must ‘state in simple language th

2016(See In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, 557-558 .)18 In People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 850-851 , the California Supreme Court stated that, in making its discretionary sentencing choices post-Cunningham, “the trial court need only ‘state [its] reasons’ [citation]; it is not required to identify aggravating and mitigating factors, apply a preponderance of the evidence standard, or specify the ‘ultimate facts’ that ‘justify[] the term selected.’ [Citations.] Rather, the court must ‘state in simple language the primary factor or factors that support the exercise of discretion.’ [Citatio

2020(Doolittle v. Exchange Bank, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 545 .) “The default standard of proof in civil cases is the preponderance of the evidence. [Citation.] Nevertheless, courts have applied the clear and convincing evidence standard when necessary to protect important rights.” (Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 546 .) We need not resolve the parties’ dispute as to the standard of proof because, even if the preponderance of the evidence standard applies, Tammy did not meet her burden of proving mental incapacity, as explained post. 27 C Substantial Evidence Supports The Tr

2020First, use of the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof is appropriate because it is the “default standard of proof in civil cases” (Conservatorship of Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 546 ) and use of a higher standard of proof “occurs only when interests ‘ “more substantial than mere loss of money’ ” are at 28. stake.” (Ettefagh, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 1590 .) Wife’s legal malpractice action involves a claim to recover money as compensation for damages suffered.

2021(Chamberlain v. Ventura County Civil Service Com. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 362, 368-369 (Chamberlain); accord, Ettinger v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 853, 858 (Ettinger).) That rule was born out of the appellate court’s interpretation that the weight of the evidence phrase in subdivision (c) of section 1094.5 is synonymous with the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof.

2021(Chamberlain v. Ventura County Civil Service Com. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 362, 368-369 (Chamberlain); accord, Ettinger v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 853, 858 (Ettinger).) That rule was born out of the appellate court’s interpretation that the weight of the evidence phrase in subdivision (c) of section 1094.5 is synonymous with the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof.

2025(People v. Butler (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 150, 160 .) “Although an officer’s reliance on a mere ‘ “hunch” ’ is insufficient to justify a stop, [citation], the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard[.]” (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 274 .) B.

2024(People v. Butler (2003) 6. 111 Cal.App.4th 150, 160 .) “Although an officer’s reliance on a mere ‘ “hunch” ’ is insufficient to justify a stop, [citation], the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 274 .) If the stop does not meet this test, any resulting search or seizure violates the detainee’s Fourth Amendment rights and a motion to suppress any evidence obtained pursuant thereto must be granted.