31 Oregon opinions name it 3 courts 1975–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Jimenezgreen2 sentences2024See Jimenez, 318 Or App at 222 (discussing the substantial and compelling reasons test). 2024See Jimenez, 318 Or App at 222 (discussing the substantial and compelling reasons test). | 2 | 2 |
Gallant v. Board of Medical Examinersgreen2 sentences2018See Gallant , 159 Or.App. at 185 , 974 P.2d 814 (concluding that the preponderance of the evidence standard satisfied due process in a proceeding to revoke a physician's license). 2018See Gallant , 159 Or.App. at 185 , 974 P.2d 814 (concluding that the preponderance of the evidence standard satisfied due process in a proceeding to revoke a physician's license). | 1 | 3 |
Martin v. Department of Revenuegreen1 sentence2022Martin v. Dept. of Rev., 8 OTR 141, 144-45 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
Bice v. Board of Psychologist Examinersgreen2 sentences2020See Bice v. Board of Psychologist Examiners, 281 Or App 623, 629 , 383 P3d 913 (2016). 2020See Bice v. Board of Psychologist Examiners, 281 Or App 623, 629 , 383 P3d 913 (2016). | 1 | 1 |
Corcoran v. Board of Nursinggreen2 sentences2014Specifically, that review changed from determining whether the agency’s finding of historical fact was “supported by substantial evidence in the record viewed as a whole,” id. at 525 , to one in which, under subsection (4), we find the disputed historical fact de novo, under a preponderance of the evidence standard, id. 2014Specifically, that review changed from determining whether the agency’s finding of historical fact was “supported by substantial evidence in the record viewed as a whole,” id. at 525 , to one in which, under subsection (4), we find the disputed historical fact de novo, under a preponderance of the evidence standard, id. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kennedygreen2 sentences2006See State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260,264-65 , 666 P2d 1316 (1983) (counseling against reaching federal constitutional issues unnecessarily). 5 It follows that the board did not err in using a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard and that the Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the board’s order, albeit for different reasons from those on which the court relied. 2006See State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260,264-65 , 666 P2d 1316 (1983) (counseling against reaching federal constitutional issues unnecessarily). 5 It follows that the board did not err in using a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard and that the Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the board’s order, albeit for different reasons from those on which the court relied. | 1 | 1 |
Wilkinson v. Austingreen2 sentences2005Accord Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 US_, _, 125 S Ct 2384 , 162 L Ed 2d 174 (2005) (acknowledging abrogation of Greenholtz, but stating that Greenholtz remains “instructive for [its] discussion of the appropriate level of procedural safeguards”). 5 Petitioner raises a second assignment of error challenging the board’s decision on the ground that it is not supported by substantial evidence. 2005Accord Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 US_, _, 125 S Ct 2384 , 162 L Ed 2d 174 (2005) (acknowledging abrogation of Greenholtz, but stating that Greenholtz remains “instructive for [its] discussion of the appropriate level of procedural safeguards”). 5 Petitioner raises a second assignment of error challenging the board’s decision on the ground that it is not supported by substantial evidence. | 1 | 1 |
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complexgreen1 sentence2005Given the volume of information that the board must consider before reaching a determination, imposing a clear and convincing standard of proof “would only incrementally increase the safeguards against erroneous factfinding in this proceeding.” Gallant v. Board of Medical Examiners, 159 Or App 175, 185 , 974 P2d 814 (1999); accord Greenholtz, 442 US at 16 (level of process due for inmates being considered for release on parole includes opportunity to be heard and notice of any adverse decision). *373 Thus, balancing the three factors, we conclude that the Due Process Clause requires no more th | 1 | 1 |
State v. Brenhubergreen2 sentences2002As the state now argues, the clear and convincing evidence standard does not apply when the court determines whether an individual is willing and able to cooperate and benefit from voluntary treatment. 1 See State v. Brenhuber, 146 Or App 719, 722 , 934 P2d 550 (1997) (“The trial court did not err in applying a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in the dispositional phase of appellant’s mental commitment proceeding.”). 2002As the state now argues, the clear and convincing evidence standard does not apply when the court determines whether an individual is willing and able to cooperate and benefit from voluntary treatment. 1 See State v. Brenhuber, 146 Or App 719, 722 , 934 P2d 550 (1997) (“The trial court did not err in applying a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in the dispositional phase of appellant’s mental commitment proceeding.”). | 1 | 1 |
Bay v. State Board of Educationgreen2 sentences1994Cook v. Employment Division, 47 Or.App. 437 , 614 P.2d 1193 (1980); Metcalf v. AFSD, 65 Or.App. 761 , 672 P.2d 379 (1983), rev. den. 296 Or. 411 , 675 P.2d 493 (1984); Automotive Technology, Inc. v. Employment Division, 97 Or.App. 320 , 775 P.2d 916 (1989); OSCI v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 98 Or.App. 548, 555 , 780 P.2d 743 , rev. den. 308 Or. 660 , 784 P.2d 1101 (1989); see Bay v. State Board of Education, 233 Or. 601 , 378 P.2d 558 (1963). 1994Cook v. Employment Division, 47 Or.App. 437 , 614 P.2d 1193 (1980); Metcalf v. AFSD, 65 Or.App. 761 , 672 P.2d 379 (1983), rev. den. 296 Or. 411 , 675 P.2d 493 (1984); Automotive Technology, Inc. v. Employment Division, 97 Or.App. 320 , 775 P.2d 916 (1989); OSCI v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 98 Or.App. 548, 555 , 780 P.2d 743 , rev. den. 308 Or. 660 , 784 P.2d 1101 (1989); see Bay v. State Board of Education, 233 Or. 601 , 378 P.2d 558 (1963). | 1 | 1 |
Bernard v. Board of Dental Examinersgreen2 sentences1994In Bernard v. Board of Dental Examiners, 2 Or.App. 22, 36 , 465 P.2d 917 (1970), we required that fraud be shown by clear and convincing evidence when the Board of Dental Examiners revoked a dentist's license on the ground that the practitioner had engaged in fraudulent billing practices. 1994In Bernard v. Board of Dental Examiners, 2 Or.App. 22, 36 , 465 P.2d 917 (1970), we required that fraud be shown by clear and convincing evidence when the Board of Dental Examiners revoked a dentist's license on the ground that the practitioner had engaged in fraudulent billing practices. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Carlson
green
2 sentences2019In State v. Carlson, 311 Or 201, 208 , 808 P2d 1002 (1991), the court held that preliminary questions of fact under OEC 104(1), which address competency, privilege, and other eviden- tiary admissibility issues, are decided by the judge based on a preponderance of the evidence standard in which the judge determines the credibility and weight of the evidence. 2019In State v. Carlson, 311 Or 201, 208 , 808 P2d 1002 (1991), the court held that preliminary questions of fact under OEC 104(1), which address competency, privilege, and other eviden- tiary admissibility issues, are decided by the judge based on a preponderance of the evidence standard in which the judge determines the credibility and weight of the evidence. | 2 | 2015–2019 |
State v. Lott
green
2 sentences2007State v. Lott, 202 Or App 329, 337 , 122 P3d 97 (2005), rev den, 340 Or 308 (2006). 2007State v. Lott, 202 Or App 329, 337 , 122 P3d 97 (2005), rev den, 340 Or 308 (2006). | 2 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Gamboa
green
2 sentences2007State v. Lott, 202 Or.App. 329, 337 , 122 P.3d 97 (2005), rev. den., 340 Or. 308 , 132 P.3d 28 (2006). 2007State v. Lott, 202 Or App 329, 337 , 122 P3d 97 (2005), rev den, 340 Or 308 (2006). | 2 | 2007–2007 |
State Ex Rel. Juvenile Department v. Farrell
green
2 sentences1996Dept. v. Farrell, 58 Or App 258 , 648 P2d 401 , rev den 293 Or 521 (1982), cert den 460 US 1087 (1983), we held that the preponderance of the evidence standard for termination cases, set forth in former ORS 419.525(2), repealed by Or Laws 1993, ch 33, § 373, was unconstitutional in the light oiSantosky. 1996Dept. v. Farrell, 58 Or App 258 , 648 P2d 401 , rev den 293 Or 521 (1982), cert den 460 US 1087 (1983), we held that the preponderance of the evidence standard for termination cases, set forth in former ORS 419.525(2), repealed by Or Laws 1993, ch 33, § 373, was unconstitutional in the light oiSantosky. | 2 | 1982–1996 |
Dixon v. Or. State Bd. of Nursing
green
1 sentence2018App. 207 , 212, 419 P.3d 774 (2018), concluding that, under Oregon's Administrative Procedures Act, the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Llewellyn v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners
green
1 sentence2018Pursuant to ORS 183.650(3), an "agency conducting a contested case hearing may modify a finding of historical fact made by the administrative law judge assigned from the Office of Administrative Hearings only if the agency determines that there is clear and convincing evidence in the record that the finding was wrong." An ALJ "makes a finding of historical fact if the administrative law judge determines that an event did or did not occur in the past *376 or that a circumstance or status did or did not exist *643 either before the hearing or at the time of the hearing." Id. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Sobel v. Board of Pharmacy
green
1 sentence2018Id. at 379, 882 P.2d 606 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Holland v. Jackson
green
2 sentences2013Id. at 650 . 2013Id. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Pantano v. Obbiso
green
1 sentence2010After citing the “strong, clear and convincing evidence” standard, the court rejected the plaintiffs claim on the ground that the plaintiff could not show “by even a preponderance of the evidence standard that *223 any specific or definite amount of his money was deposited by [his wife] into the sisters’joint accounts.” 283 Or at 87 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Miller v. Department of Revenue
green
1 sentence2006ORS 305.437 (stating the preponderance of the evidence standard); Miller v. Dept. of Rev., 16 OTR 4 , 5 (2001) (same). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Rainbolt
green
2 sentences2005State v. Rainbolt, 184 Or.App. 661 , 57 P.3d 902 (2002). 2005State v. Rainbolt, 184 Or.App. 661 , 57 P.3d 902 (2002). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Cook v. Michael
green
1 sentence1999Cook, 214 Or at 526-27 , which was consistent with Oregon’s current statutory law. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Steadman v. Securities & Exchange Commission
green
1 sentence1999Further, that document authorized her daughter to act as her “health care representative” in situations where she was unable to communicate. 3 This term is defined as “[Relating to the process of dying or the moment of death[.]” Stedman’s Medical Dictionary, 34 (23rd ed 1976). 4 In Steadman , the United States Supreme Court interpreted precisely the language at issue here and determined that it “established * * * the traditional preponderance-of-the-evidence standard! ]” for proceedings under the federal APA. 450 US at 98-102 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Johnson
green
1 sentence1998Id. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Sung Suk Kim
green
2 sentences1998Defendant argues that this is a preliminary question of fact for the trial judge to decide using a preponderance of the evidence standard under OEC 104(1), 4 *408 citing State v. Kim, 111 Or App 1, 5 , 824 P2d 1161 , rev den 314 Or 176 (1992). 1998Defendant argues that this is a preliminary question of fact for the trial judge to decide using a preponderance of the evidence standard under OEC 104(1), 4 *408 citing State v. Kim, 111 Or App 1, 5 , 824 P2d 1161 , rev den 314 Or 176 (1992). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Goldsborough v. Eagle Crest Partners, Ltd.
green
1 sentence1997Ibid. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Swiatek v. United States
green
1 sentence1996Dept. v. Farrell, 58 Or App 258 , 648 P2d 401 , rev den 293 Or 521 (1982), cert den 460 US 1087 (1983), we held that the preponderance of the evidence standard for termination cases, set forth in former ORS 419.525(2), repealed by Or Laws 1993, ch 33, § 373, was unconstitutional in the light oiSantosky. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Metcalf v. Adult & Family Services Division neutral | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Cook v. Employment Division green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Oregon State Correctional Institution v. Bureau of Labor & Industries green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Riley Hill General Contractor, Inc. v. Tandy Corp.
green
2 sentences1994Riley Hill General Contractor, Inc. v. Tandy Corporation, 303 Or. 390, 407 , 737 P.2d 595 (1987). 1994Riley Hill General Contractor, Inc. v. Tandy Corporation, 303 Or. 390, 407 , 737 P.2d 595 (1987). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Automotive Technology, Inc. v. Employment Division
green
2 sentences1994We need not decide whether those cases remain viable in the light of subsequent APA cases, such as OSCI v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 98 Or.App. 548 , 780 P.2d 743 , rev. den. 308 Or. 660 , 784 P.2d 1101 (1989), and Automotive Technology v. Employment Division, 97 Or.App. 320 , 775 P.2d 916 (1989), that have applied the preponderance of the evidence standard articulated in Metcalf v. AFSD, supra . 1994We need not decide whether those cases remain viable in the light of subsequent APA cases, such as OSCI v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 98 Or.App. 548 , 780 P.2d 743 , rev. den. 308 Or. 660 , 784 P.2d 1101 (1989), and Automotive Technology v. Employment Division, 97 Or.App. 320 , 775 P.2d 916 (1989), that have applied the preponderance of the evidence standard articulated in Metcalf v. AFSD, supra . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| State v. Johnson green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Addington v. Texas green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty. green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| State v. McMaster green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Gagnon v. Scarpelli red | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| In Re WINSHIP green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.