preponderance of the evidence standard in Florida

2021See Singletary v. State, 322 So. 2d 551, 552 (Fla. 1975) (“[C]ourts should not pass upon the - 30 - constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds.”).

2018See Singletary v. State, 322 So. 2d 551, 552 (Fla. 1975) (“[C]ourts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds.”).

1989See Denehy v. State, 400 So.2d 1216 (Fla.1980); Elsleger v. State, 503 So.2d 1367 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987).

1988See Denehy v. State, 400 So.2d 1216 (Fla. 1980); State v. Blan, 489 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

2026See RLI Live Oak, 139 So. 3d at 872 (“Traditionally, a preponderance of the evidence standard is the applicable burden of proof in civil cases.”).

2022Dist. v. RLI Live Oak, LLC, 139 So. 3d 869, 872 (Fla. 2014), the more stringent clear and convincing evidence standard must be met.

2025See Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So. 2d 1109, 1113 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) ("The proof required to show that a transfer is fraudulent is the preponderance of the evidence standard.").

2018“The proof required to show that a transfer is fraudulent is the preponderance of the evidence standard.” Mejia, 985 So. 2d at 1113 (citation omitted); see also Wieczoreck v. H & H Builders, Inc., 475 So. 2d 227, 228 (Fla. 1985).

2014Tobacco Co. v. State, 697 So.2d 1249, 1254 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (quoting Bourjaily v. U.S., 483 U.S. 171, 175 , 107 S.Ct. 2775 , 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987))). 1 “Because the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard results in a roughly equal allocation of the risk of error between litigants, we presume that this standard is applicable in civil actions between private litigants unless ‘particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake.’ ” Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 , 111 S.Ct. 654 , 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991) (quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389-90 , 103 S.Ct

2001These predicate factual questions fall to the trial court for decision under a preponderance of the evidence standard. [10] See § 90.105(1), Fla. Stat. (1999) ("[T]he court shall determine preliminary questions concerning... the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence."); Romani v. State, 542 So.2d 984 , 985 & n. 3 (Fla.1989); American Tobacco Co., 697 So.2d at 1256 ("When a finder of fact `weighs' evidence, we know of no lesser burden to apply to the proof than a preponderance of evidence...."); see also Brooks v. State, 787 So.2d 765, 778 (Fla.2001) (holding that the state

2010See Nixon, 2 So.3d at 145 (“We need not address this claim because the circuit court held that Nixon could not establish his mental retardation under either the clear and convincing evidence standard or the preponderance of the evidence standard.”) (citing Jones v. State, 966 So.2d 319, 329-30 (Fla.2007)).

2010See Nixon, 2 So.3d at 145 ("We need not address this claim because the circuit court held that Nixon could not establish his mental retardation under either the clear and convincing evidence standard or the preponderance of the evidence standard.") (citing Jones v. State, 966 So.2d 319, 329-30 (Fla. 2007)).

2010See Nixon, 2 So.3d at 145 (“We need not address this claim because the circuit court held that Nixon could not establish his mental retardation under either the clear and convincing evidence standard or the preponderance of the evidence standard.”) (citing Jones v. State, 966 So.2d 319, 329-30 (Fla.2007)).

2010See Nixon, 2 So.3d at 145 ("We need not address this claim because the circuit court held that Nixon could not establish his mental retardation under either the clear and convincing evidence standard or the preponderance of the evidence standard.") (citing Jones v. State, 966 So.2d 319, 329-30 (Fla. 2007)).

2008See § 90.802, Fla. Stat. (2004) ("Except as provided by statute, hearsay evidence is inadmissible."); Lowenthal v. State, 699 So.2d 319, 320 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) ("[T]he state must furnish proof of ... the date that the defendant was released from prison imposed for the last felony conviction...."); § 775.084(3)(a)(4), Fla. Stat. (2001) (mandating a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard).

2008See § 90.802, Fla. Stat. (2004) (“Except as provided by statute, hearsay evidence is inadmissible.”); Lowenthal v. State, 699 So.2d 319, 320 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (“[T]he state must furnish proof of ... the date that the defendant was released from prison imposed for the last felony conviction .... ”); § 775.084(3)(a)(4), Fla. Stat. (2001) (mandating a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard).

2014Dennis, 51 So.3d at 459 -60 (quoting Peterson, 983 So.2d at 29 ); see Pages v. Seliman-Tapia, 134 So.3d 536 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (affirming the dismissal of a civil action under Florida’s Stand Your Ground Law, where the trial court referred the issue of immunity to a general magistrate for an evidentiary hearing, applying a preponderance of the evidence standard).

2010The parties agree that the trial court correctly utilized the preponderance of the evidence standard in deciding the issue of immunity, as set forth in Peterson v. State, 983 So.2d 27 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). 4 But Montanez argues the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law when the trial court commented in its order that “[t]he events in this case did not occur in a house or a vehicle which is where this Court believes immunity is intended to apply.” We do not read the trial court’s comment to be the basis for its holding that immunity did not apply to Montanez.

2018“The proof required to show that a transfer is fraudulent is the preponderance of the evidence standard.” Mejia, 985 So. 2d at 1113 (citation omitted); see also Wieczoreck v. H & H Builders, Inc., 475 So. 2d 227, 228 (Fla. 1985).

2008Kapila v. Plave (In re Paul), 217 B.R. 336 , 337 n. 2 (S.D.Fla.1997) (citing Wieczoreck v. H & H Builders, Inc., 475 So.2d 227 (Fla.1985)).

1988Substantial evidence has been defined as evidence "which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion and consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance." Black's Law Dictionary 1281 (5th ed. 1979); Marker v. Finch, 322 F. Supp. 905, 910 (D.Del. 1971); State v. Morales, 460 So.2d 410, 415 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). [4] The Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted in 1975, subsequent to a number of the Supreme Court decisions dealing with admissibility of coconspirator statements.

1988This issue was addressed by the second district court, in State v. Morales, 460 So.2d 410 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), which adopted the entire two-part test proposed in James for handling the admissibility of coconspirator statements.

2025The question presented in Erlinger was “whether a judge may decide that a defendant’s past offenses were committed on separate occasions under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, or whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a unanimous jury that Hurst does not apply retroactively to cases in which the death sentence became final before the issuance of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), Asay, 210 So. 3d at 22 , nor does Hurst v. State, Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 216, 217 (Fla. 2017).

2025In denying the requested relief, the circuit court found that Hutchinson could not prevail under the clear-and-convincing standard or the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. -7- illness makes him unable to ‘reach a rational understanding of the reason for [his] execution.’ ” Madison v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 265, 274 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 958 (2007)).

2025But the distinction between the Strickland prejudice standard and the preponderance of the evidence standard is “slight and matters ‘only in the rarest case.’” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 ).

2025In denying the requested relief, the circuit court found that Hutchinson could not prevail under the clear-and-convincing standard or the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. -7- illness makes him unable to ‘reach a rational understanding of the reason for [his] execution.’ ” Madison v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 265, 274 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 958 (2007)).

2024See Francois v. State, 923 So. 2d 1219, 1220 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (“Willfulness may be proven by circumstantial evidence.”).

2019See Guardian ad Litem Program v. C.H., 204 So. 3d 122, 124 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ("A child may be adjudicated dependent if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the child is abused, abandoned, or neglected or that the child is 'at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect.' " (citing § 39.01(15)(a), (f), Fla. Stat. (2015))).

2017Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

2015In Davis, the Second District certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the First District Court of Appeal’s decision in Comprehensive Medical Access, Inc. v. Office of Insurance Regulation, 983 So.2d 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), regarding the evidentiary standard of proof that applies in an initial license application proceeding under Florida’s Administrative Procedure Act. 1 For the reasons below, we quash the Second District’s decision in Davis holding that the clear and convincing evidence standard applies and hold that the preponderance of the evidence standard applies.

2015See Comprehensive Medical Access, 983 So.2d at 46-47 (reversing because the agency’s basis for denying the application was not supported by competent substantial evidence and the applicant was otherwise qualified).

2014We rely on the Second District’s decision in Rios v. State, a strikingly similar factual scenario, in which the court held that the officers did not have a reasonable suspicion to support their investigatory stop. 975 So.2d 488, 491 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).