preponderance of the evidence standard in Wisconsin

2024"The essential question is whether the action of the law enforcement officer was reasonable under all the facts and circumstances 7 No. 2021AP2105-CR.akz present." State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 139-40 , 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990); see also State v. Popke, 2009 WI 37, ¶23 , 317 Wis. 2d 118 , 765 N.W.2d 569 ("[A] police officer may still conduct a traffic stop when, under the totality of the circumstances, he or she has grounds to reasonably suspect that a crime or traffic violation has been or will be committed.") (citing State v. Gaulrapp, 207 Wis. 2d 600, 605 , 558 N.W.2d 696 (Ct. App. 199

2024"The essential question is whether the action of the law enforcement officer was reasonable under all the facts and circumstances 7 No. 2021AP2105-CR.akz present." State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 139-40 , 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990); see also State v. Popke, 2009 WI 37, ¶23 , 317 Wis. 2d 118 , 765 N.W.2d 569 ("[A] police officer may still conduct a traffic stop when, under the totality of the circumstances, he or she has grounds to reasonably suspect that a crime or traffic violation has been or will be committed.") (citing State v. Gaulrapp, 207 Wis. 2d 600, 605 , 558 N.W.2d 696 (Ct. App. 199

2025Nonetheless, the record reflects that the Licenses Committee and the Common Council applied a preponderance of the evidence standard when evaluating the evidence submitted in this case. 13 No. 2023AP1756 ¶34 “The determination of a basis for disqualification here is subjective.” Sharpley v. Sharpley, 2002 WI App 201, ¶16 , 257 Wis. 2d 152 , 653 N.W.2d 124 .

2025Nonetheless, the record reflects that the Licenses Committee and the Common Council applied a preponderance of the evidence standard when evaluating the evidence submitted in this case. 13 No. 2023AP1756 ¶34 “The determination of a basis for disqualification here is subjective.” Sharpley v. Sharpley, 2002 WI App 201, ¶16 , 257 Wis. 2d 152 , 653 N.W.2d 124 .

2024“As parens patriae, the State’s goal is to provide the child with a permanent home.” Id. at 766 .

2024Thus, we consider that this factor weighs in favor of applying a preponderance of the evidence standard at the dispositional phase. ¶31 Under the third and last factor, the Court in Santosky recognized “[t]wo state interests are at stake in parental rights termination proceedings—a parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child and a fiscal and administrative interest in reducing the cost and burden of such proceedings.” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766 . ¶32 As with the first two factors, we consider that preserving and promoting the welfare of the child changes at the

2024There is no controlling precedent on this question. 11 Marquez v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2012 WI 57, ¶¶36-37 , 341 Wis. 2d 119 , 815 N.W.2d 314 , clarified on denial of reconsideration, 2012 WI 74, ¶¶36-37 , 342 Wis. 2d 254 , 823 N.W.2d 266 , explained: (continued) 9 No. 2024AP1174 least satisfied the preponderance of the evidence standard, this court rejects K.R.K.’s request that she receive a new dispositional hearing applying that very same standard.12 III.

2024There is no controlling precedent on this question. 11 Marquez v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2012 WI 57, ¶¶36-37 , 341 Wis. 2d 119 , 815 N.W.2d 314 , clarified on denial of reconsideration, 2012 WI 74, ¶¶36-37 , 342 Wis. 2d 254 , 823 N.W.2d 266 , explained: (continued) 9 No. 2024AP1174 least satisfied the preponderance of the evidence standard, this court rejects K.R.K.’s request that she receive a new dispositional hearing applying that very same standard.12 III.

2024There is no controlling precedent on this question. 11 Marquez v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2012 WI 57, ¶¶36-37 , 341 Wis. 2d 119 , 815 N.W.2d 314 , clarified on denial of reconsideration, 2012 WI 74, ¶¶36-37 , 342 Wis. 2d 254 , 823 N.W.2d 266 , explained: (continued) 9 No. 2024AP1174 least satisfied the preponderance of the evidence standard, this court rejects K.R.K.’s request that she receive a new dispositional hearing applying that very same standard.12 III.

2024There is no controlling precedent on this question. 11 Marquez v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2012 WI 57, ¶¶36-37 , 341 Wis. 2d 119 , 815 N.W.2d 314 , clarified on denial of reconsideration, 2012 WI 74, ¶¶36-37 , 342 Wis. 2d 254 , 823 N.W.2d 266 , explained: (continued) 9 No. 2024AP1174 least satisfied the preponderance of the evidence standard, this court rejects K.R.K.’s request that she receive a new dispositional hearing applying that very same standard.12 III.

2023Co., 2009 WI 27 , ¶14 n.9, 316 Wis. 2d 47 , 762 N.W.2d 652 (“[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” (citation omitted)). ¶27 In most statutory situations governed by a preponderance of the evidence standard, the burden is on a party to demonstrate that something “was” or “is” true.

2023Co., 2009 WI 27 , ¶14 n.9, 316 Wis. 2d 47 , 762 N.W.2d 652 (“[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” (citation omitted)). ¶27 In most statutory situations governed by a preponderance of the evidence standard, the burden is on a party to demonstrate that something “was” or “is” true.

2022State v. Loayza, 2021 WI 11, ¶40 , 395 Wis. 2d 521 , 954 N.W.2d 358 . ¶22 In its other-acts motion, the State alleged that Dawkins and Pearson accepted responsibility for caring for Crystal’s children.

2022State v. Loayza, 2021 WI 11, ¶40 , 395 Wis. 2d 521 , 954 N.W.2d 358 . ¶22 In its other-acts motion, the State alleged that Dawkins and Pearson accepted responsibility for caring for Crystal’s children.

2022State v. Wiskerchen, 2019 WI 1, ¶16 , 385 Wis. 2d 120 , 921 N.W.2d 730 . 12 No. 2020AP1827-CR 140 (2019), the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applicable in restitution proceedings dictates that the circuit court could make its own factual findings and reach its own conclusions based upon the evidence presented. ¶30 Here, the parties stipulated the trial record would form the factual predicate for restitution.

2022State v. Wiskerchen, 2019 WI 1, ¶16 , 385 Wis. 2d 120 , 921 N.W.2d 730 . 12 No. 2020AP1827-CR 140 (2019), the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applicable in restitution proceedings dictates that the circuit court could make its own factual findings and reach its own conclusions based upon the evidence presented. ¶30 Here, the parties stipulated the trial record would form the factual predicate for restitution.

2019Id.

2019Id.

2019Second, he argues that the reasonable hypothesis verbiage shifts 30 No. 2017AP1206-CR the burden to the defense by focusing on the defendant's ability to produce alternatives to the government's case. ¶47 In support of his position, Trammell cites United States v. Khan, 821 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).

2019Second, he argues that the reasonable hypothesis verbiage shifts the burden to the defense by focusing on the defendant's ability to produce alternatives to the government's case. ¶47 In support of his position, Trammell cites United States v. Khan , 821 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).

2018See, e.g. , United States v. Lacouture , 835 F.3d 187 , 189-90 (1st Cir. 2016) ("It is the government's burden at sentencing to prove sentencing enhancement factors by a preponderance of the evidence ...."); United States v. Romans , 823 F.3d 299 , 316 (5th Cir. 2016) ("In general, facts relevant to sentencing need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence."); United States v. Mustafa , 695 F.3d 860 , 862 (8th Cir. 2012) (stating that "we have repeatedly held that due process never requires applying more than a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for finding sentencing facts"); Unit

2018See, e.g. , United States v. Lacouture , 835 F.3d 187 , 189-90 (1st Cir. 2016) ("It is the government's burden at sentencing to prove sentencing enhancement factors by a preponderance of the evidence ...."); United States v. Romans , 823 F.3d 299 , 316 (5th Cir. 2016) ("In general, facts relevant to sentencing need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence."); United States v. Mustafa , 695 F.3d 860 , 862 (8th Cir. 2012) (stating that "we have repeatedly held that due process never requires applying more than a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for finding sentencing facts"); Unit

2018Given the Wisconsin Statutes regarding PAC cases, courts may nonetheless decide to make a record of whether the burden of proof meets the beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard, although it is not required as the preponderance-of-the evidence standard applies. 19 Our conclusion is not in conflict with State v. Van Riper , 2003 WI App 237 , 267 Wis. 2d 759 , 672 N.W.2d 156 , and State v. Bonds , 2006 WI 83 , 292 Wis. 2d 344 , 717 N.W.2d 133 .

2018Given the Wisconsin Statutes regarding PAC cases, courts may nonetheless decide to make a record of whether the burden of proof meets the beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard, although it is not required as the preponderance-of-the evidence standard applies. 19 Our conclusion is not in conflict with State v. Van Riper , 2003 WI App 237 , 267 Wis. 2d 759 , 672 N.W.2d 156 , and State v. Bonds , 2006 WI 83 , 292 Wis. 2d 344 , 717 N.W.2d 133 .

2018Given the Wisconsin Statutes regarding PAC cases, courts may nonetheless decide to make a record of whether the burden of proof meets the beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard, although it is not required as the preponderance-of-the evidence standard applies. 19 Our conclusion is not in conflict with State v. Van Riper , 2003 WI App 237 , 267 Wis. 2d 759 , 672 N.W.2d 156 , and State v. Bonds , 2006 WI 83 , 292 Wis. 2d 344 , 717 N.W.2d 133 .

2018Given the Wisconsin Statutes regarding PAC cases, courts may nonetheless decide to make a record of whether the burden of proof meets the beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard, although it is not required as the preponderance-of-the evidence standard applies. 19 Our conclusion is not in conflict with State v. Van Riper , 2003 WI App 237 , 267 Wis. 2d 759 , 672 N.W.2d 156 , and State v. Bonds , 2006 WI 83 , 292 Wis. 2d 344 , 717 N.W.2d 133 .

2018In *765 McMillan v. Pennsylvania , the Court had "little difficulty concluding that in this case the preponderance standard satisfies due process" after determining "that States may treat 'visible possession of a firearm' as a sentencing consideration rather than an element of a particular offense." 477 U.S. 79 , 91, 106 S.Ct. 2411 , 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986). ¶ 38 In line with the United States Supreme Court, numerous federal circuits have consistently applied a preponderance of the evidence standard at sentencing.

2018In *765 McMillan v. Pennsylvania , the Court had "little difficulty concluding that in this case the preponderance standard satisfies due process" after determining "that States may treat 'visible possession of a firearm' as a sentencing consideration rather than an element of a particular offense." 477 U.S. 79 , 91, 106 S.Ct. 2411 , 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986). ¶ 38 In line with the United States Supreme Court, numerous federal circuits have consistently applied a preponderance of the evidence standard at sentencing.

2016Increasing the burden of proof has both practical and symbolic significance, 47 See majority op., ¶66. 48 In re Commitment of West, 2011 WI 83, ¶80 , 336 Wis. 2d 578 , 800 N.W.2d 929 . 49 Merriam-Webster's Learner's Dictionary, Inevitable (2008). 50 See United States v. Heath, 455 F.3d 52 , 59 n.6 (2d Cir. 2006) (describing the "semantic puzzle" of "using the preponderance of the evidence standard to prove inevitability" and concluding that it was sufficient to "note the difference between proving by a preponderance that something would have happened and proving by a preponderance of the evide

2016Increasing the burden of proof has both practical and symbolic significance, 47 See majority op., ¶66. 48 In re Commitment of West, 2011 WI 83, ¶80 , 336 Wis. 2d 578 , 800 N.W.2d 929 . 49 Merriam-Webster's Learner's Dictionary, Inevitable (2008). 50 See United States v. Heath, 455 F.3d 52 , 59 n.6 (2d Cir. 2006) (describing the "semantic puzzle" of "using the preponderance of the evidence standard to prove inevitability" and concluding that it was sufficient to "note the difference between proving by a preponderance that something would have happened and proving by a preponderance of the evide

2007VI ¶ 58 To conclude, we affirm the order of the circuit court as to its initial rulings on the admissibility of the various statements under Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 .

2007VI ¶ 58 To conclude, we affirm the order of the circuit court as to its initial rulings on the admissibility of the various statements under Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 .