knowing and intelligent waiver in District of Columbia

1980See In re W.B.W., Jr., supra, 397 A.2d at 146 ; In re F.D.P., D.C.App., 352 A.2d 378, 380-81 (1976); In re J.F.T., D.C.App., 320 A.2d 322, 324 (1974). 6 See also North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979).

1980See In re W.B.W., Jr., supra, 397 A.2d at 146 ; In re F.D.P., D.C.App., 352 A.2d 378, 380-81 (1976); In re J.F.T., D.C.App., 320 A.2d 322, 324 (1974). [6] See also North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979).

1980See In re W.B.W., Jr., supra, 397 A.2d at 146 ; In re F.D.P., D.C.App., 352 A.2d 378, 380-81 (1976); In re J.F.T., D.C.App., 320 A.2d 322, 324 (1974). 6 See also North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979).

1980See In re W.B.W., Jr., supra, 397 A.2d at 146 ; In re F.D.P., D.C.App., 352 A.2d 378, 380-81 (1976); In re J.F.T., D.C.App., 320 A.2d 322, 324 (1974). [6] See also North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979).

1980See In re W.B.W., Jr., supra, 397 A.2d at 146 ; In re F.D.P., D.C.App., 352 A.2d 378, 380-81 (1976); In re J.F.T., D.C.App., 320 A.2d 322, 324 (1974). 6 See also North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979).

1980See In re W.B.W., Jr., supra, 397 A.2d at 146 ; In re F.D.P., D.C.App., 352 A.2d 378, 380-81 (1976); In re J.F.T., D.C.App., 320 A.2d 322, 324 (1974). [6] See also North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979).

2021Nonetheless, the judge then stated, “I don’t think there’s any self-defense on this record, and I’m not going to permit any self-defense testimony because I don’t think the [officer’s] use of force as a matter of law on these facts was excessive.” The judge told appellant that he could testify “about anything else,” but “if he doesn’t want to testify, I’ll do the Boyd inquiry.”5 5 Boyd v. United States, 586 A.2d 670 , 678–79 (D.C. 1991) (suggesting that a trial court should “make . . . an on-the-record inquiry” to determine whether a criminal defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of

1998Indeed, in Boyd itself we held that the trial court in the circumstances there had “a duty to determine whether” the defendant “had made a knowing and intelligent waiver” of her right to testify. 586 A.2d at 677 .

1997See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 235 , 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2052 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (“Our eases do not reflect an uncritical demand for a knowing and intelligent waiver in every situation where a person has failed to invoke a constitutional protection_ [Overmyer ] explicitly [left] open the question whether a knowing and intelligent waiver need be shown.”).

1997See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 235 , 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2052 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (“Our eases do not reflect an uncritical demand for a knowing and intelligent waiver in every situation where a person has failed to invoke a constitutional protection_ [Overmyer ] explicitly [left] open the question whether a knowing and intelligent waiver need be shown.”).

2018See Di Giovanni , 810 A.2d at 892 (stating that "a knowing and intelligent waiver [of Miranda rights] does not necessitate an understanding of the tactical advantages of having an attorney present or otherwise invoking Miranda rights").

2007Id.

2015See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).

1977We are of the opinion, however, that this infringement of appellant’s right to counsel is subject to the “harmless error” rule of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).

2015Detective How-land’s pr e-Miranda remarks are “but one factor to be considered in the determination of whether the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights and that the waiver was voluntary.” See United States v. Rawls, 322 A.2d 903, 907-08 (D.C.1974) (.concluding that a police officer’s “unnecessary, embellishment on the Miranda warning” that “a lawyer would not be provided until the next day” did not, in itself, invalidate the warning).

2015We conclude that Detective Howland accurately and comprehensively apprised appellant of his rights, see Fare, supra, 442 U.S. at 726 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 and that Detective How-land’s pre-Miranda remarks, while relevant to our continued inquiry, did not prevent appellant from making a knowing and intelligent waiver, see Rawls, supra, 322 A.2d at 907-08 .

1976Under these particular circumstances, appellant’s decision to tell the officer what happened can only be interpreted as a knowing and intelligent waiver of her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, 5 since it constituted as “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). 6 *502 We conclude that the trial court’s decision that appellant’s statements were admissible does not lack “substantial support in the evidence.” United States v. McNeil, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 3, 6 , 433 F.2d 1109, 1112 (1969

1976Under these particular circumstances, appellant’s decision to tell the officer what happened can only be interpreted as a knowing and intelligent waiver of her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, 5 since it constituted as “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). 6 *502 We conclude that the trial court’s decision that appellant’s statements were admissible does not lack “substantial support in the evidence.” United States v. McNeil, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 3, 6 , 433 F.2d 1109, 1112 (1969

2025See United States v. Montgomery, 998 F.3d 693, 697-98 (6th Cir. 2021) (describing invited error as when a litigant “contributes in some way to the [trial] court’s error without intentionally relinquishing” their rights, or when a 10 on the factors in the determinate sentencing scheme when analyzing the interests of justice.

2013Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 , 86 S.Ct. 836 , 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966); see also Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 450 , 112 S.Ct. 2572 , 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992) (”[I]t is impossible to say whether a defendant whose competence is in doubt has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a competency hearing.”). .

2013Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 , 86 S.Ct. 836 , 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966); see also Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 450 , 112 S.Ct. 2572 , 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992) (”[I]t is impossible to say whether a defendant whose competence is in doubt has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a competency hearing.”). .

2013But, if a valid initiation (and, as I discuss below, a knowing and intelligent waiver) cannot be shown on the facts of this case, then I fear we have gone "a long way toward establishing the proposition that police misconduct creates a per se violation ... that subsequent voluntary acts of the accused can never render harmless.” Collazo, 940 F.2d at 433 (O’Scannlain, J, dissenting).

2013Kibert v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 566, 569 (4th Cir.1967); In re Fleming, 142 Wash.2d 853 , 16 P.3d 610, 616-17 (2001); State v. Johnson, 133 Wis.2d 207 , 395 N.W.2d 176 , 182 n. 1, 183 (1986). .

2013Kibert v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 566, 569 (4th Cir.1967); In re Fleming, 142 Wash.2d 853 , 16 P.3d 610, 616-17 (2001); State v. Johnson, 133 Wis.2d 207 , 395 N.W.2d 176 , 182 n. 1, 183 (1986). .

1996Id. at 314.

1992If the testimony at the suppression hearing was voluntary, it is admissible; “an individual may lose the benefit of the privilege without making a knowing and intelligent waiver.” Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 , 653-54 & n. 9, 96 S.Ct. 1178 , 1182 *1283 & n. 9, 47 L.Ed.2d 370 (1976); see also Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426-28 , 104 S.Ct. 1136, 1141-43 , 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984); 1 John W.

1992If the testimony at the suppression hearing was voluntary, it is admissible; “an individual may lose the benefit of the privilege without making a knowing and intelligent waiver.” Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 , 653-54 & n. 9, 96 S.Ct. 1178 , 1182 *1283 & n. 9, 47 L.Ed.2d 370 (1976); see also Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426-28 , 104 S.Ct. 1136, 1141-43 , 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984); 1 John W.

1991If the trial judge finds that Boyd did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver, then she is entitled to a new trial. [13] We take this occasion, however, to advise the trial court and the Bar, [14] that while we do not today hold that the trial court has a sua sponte obligation to inquire of a non-testifying defendant before the defendant rests whether the defendant has waived the right to testify, it behooves the trial court to make such an on-the-record inquiry in order to avoid issues on appeal and collateral attacks. [15] See LaVigne v. Alaska, *679 supra, 788 P.2d at 54-55 (the "only cl

1991If the trial judge finds that Boyd did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver, then she is entitled to a new trial. 13 We take this occasion, however, to advise the trial court and the Bar, 14 that while we do not today hold that the trial court has a sua sponte obligation to inquire of a non-testifying defendant before the defendant rests whether the defendant has waived the right to testify, it behooves the trial court to make such an on-the-record inquiry in order to avoid issues on appeal and collateral attacks. 15 See LaVigne v. Alaska, supra, 788 P.2d at 54-55 (the “only clear way to

1991If the trial judge finds that Boyd did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver, then she is entitled to a new trial. [13] We take this occasion, however, to advise the trial court and the Bar, [14] that while we do not today hold that the trial court has a sua sponte obligation to inquire of a non-testifying defendant before the defendant rests whether the defendant has waived the right to testify, it behooves the trial court to make such an on-the-record inquiry in order to avoid issues on appeal and collateral attacks. [15] See LaVigne v. Alaska, *679 supra, 788 P.2d at 54-55 (the "only cl

1991If the trial judge finds that Boyd did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver, then she is entitled to a new trial. 13 We take this occasion, however, to advise the trial court and the Bar, 14 that while we do not today hold that the trial court has a sua sponte obligation to inquire of a non-testifying defendant before the defendant rests whether the defendant has waived the right to testify, it behooves the trial court to make such an on-the-record inquiry in order to avoid issues on appeal and collateral attacks. 15 See LaVigne v. Alaska, supra, 788 P.2d at 54-55 (the “only clear way to

1989See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 , 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2158 , 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) ("[I]t is the defendant's interest in personal freedom, and not simply the special Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments right to counsel in criminal cases, which triggers the right to appointed counsel . . .").

1989See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 , 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2158 , 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) ("[I]t is the defendant's interest in personal freedom, and not simply the special Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments right to counsel in criminal cases, which triggers the right to appointed counsel . . .").