72 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1979–2025 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fairchild v. Lockhartgreen2 sentences2019As one court has said, “no single factor, such as IQ, is necessarily determinative in deciding whether a person was capable of knowingly and intelligently waiving . . . the constitutional rights embraced in the Miranda rubric.” Id. (quoting Fairchild v. Lockhart, 744 F. Supp. 1429, 1453 (E.D. 2014As one court has said, “no single factor, such as IQ, is necessarily determinative in deciding whether a person was capable of knowingly and intelligently waiving, and do [sic] so waive, the constitutional rights embraced in the Miranda rubric.” Fairchild v. Lockhart, 744 F. Supp. 1429, 1453 (E.D. | 9 | 9 |
State v. Rogersgreen2 sentences2025“A valid waiver of Miranda rights remains valid unless the circumstances change so seriously that the suspect’s answers to interrogation are no longer voluntary or unless the suspect is no longer making a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights.” State v. Rogers, 188 S.W.3d 593, 606 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 47 (1982)). 2019See State v. Rogers, 188 S.W.3d 593, 606 (Tenn. 2006) (“A valid waiver of Miranda rights remains valid unless the circumstances change so seriously that the suspect’s answers to interrogation are no longer voluntary or unless the suspect is no longer making a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights.”). | 8 | 8 |
State v. Herrodgreen2 sentences2017App. Sept. 13, 2005) (quoting State v. Fritz, 585 P.2d 173,177 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978)). - 37 - In order to assert the right to self-representation: “(1) a defendant must make the request in a timely manner, (2) the assertion of the right of self-representation must be clear and unequivocal, and (3) the assertion of the right of self-representation must reflect a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.” State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 30-31 (Tenn. 2010); see State v. Herrod, 754 S.W.2d 627, 629-30 (Tenn. Crim. 2016In order to assert the right to self-representation: “(1) a defendant must make the request in a timely manner, (2) the assertion of the right of self-representation must be clear and unequivocal, and (3) the assertion of the right of self-representation must reflect a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.” Hester, 324 S.W.3d at 30-31 ; State v. Herrod, 754 S.W.2d 627, 629-30 (Tenn. Crim. | 8 | 8 |
Wyrick v. Fieldsgreen2 sentences2025“A valid waiver of Miranda rights remains valid unless the circumstances change so seriously that the suspect’s answers to interrogation are no longer voluntary or unless the suspect is no longer making a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights.” State v. Rogers, 188 S.W.3d 593, 606 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 47 (1982)). 2018“A valid waiver of Miranda rights remains valid unless the circumstances change so seriously that the suspect’s answers to interrogation are no longer voluntary or unless the suspect is no longer making a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights.” State v. Rogers, 188 S.W.3d 593, 606 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 47 (1982)). | 4 | 7 |
State v. McCarygreen2 sentences2024In order to exercise the right of self-representation, “(1) a defendant must make the request in a timely manner; (2) the assertion of the right of self-representation must be clear and unequivocal; and (3) the assertion of the right of self-representation must reflect a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.” Id. at 30-31 (citing State v. McCary, 119 S.W.3d 226, 256 (Tenn. Crim. 2020In order to exercise the right of self-representation, “(1) a defendant must make the request in a timely manner; (2) the assertion of the right of self-representation must be clear and unequivocal; and (3) the assertion of the right of self-representation must reflect a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.” Id. at 30-31 (citing State v. McCary, 119 S.W.3d 226, 256 (Tenn. Crim. | 4 | 4 |
State v. Lundygreen2 sentences2009The appropriate standard for determining admissibility is “whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the . . . confession was the result of a knowing and intelligent waiver of . . . constitutional rights.” State v. Lundy, 808 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tenn. 1991). 2005The appropriate standard for determining admissibility is "whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the . . . confession was the result of a knowing and intelligent waiver of . . . constitutional rights." State v. Lundy, 808 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tenn. 1991). | 4 | 4 |
State v. Hestergreen2 sentences2022Finally, “the assertion of the right of self-representation must reflect a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.” Id. at 30-31 . 2020In order to exercise the right of self-representation, “(1) a defendant must make the request in a timely manner; (2) the assertion of the right of self-representation must be clear and unequivocal; and (3) the assertion of the right of self-representation must reflect a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.” Id. at 30-31 (citing State v. McCary, 119 S.W.3d 226, 256 (Tenn. Crim. | 3 | 8 |
Argersinger v. Hamlingreen2 sentences2013In Argersinger v. Hamlin, the Supreme Court held that “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any -3- offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.” Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). 2011In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972), the Court held that “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.” In Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979), the Court clarified its ruling in Argersinger by holding that the Sixth and the Fourteenth Amendments require only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a period of imprisonment unless the State afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel. | 2 | 4 |
Lovin v. Stategreen2 sentences2023Lovin, 286 S.W.3d at 287-88 . 2020See Lovin, 286 S.W.3d at 287-88 . | 2 | 3 |
Paul Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences2021In Smith v. State, this court adopted those questions and recommended that in cases where a defendant aspires to proceed pro se, the trial court utilize the litany of questions, or ask similar questions, to those found therein. 987 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tenn. Crim. 2000Smith v. State, 987 S.W.2d 871, 877-878 (Tenn. Crim. | 2 | 3 |
United States v. William Stewart McDowellgreen2 sentences2021In United States v. McDowell, the Sixth Circuit suggested a series of questions as a means of assuring a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. 814 F.2d 245, 251-52 (6th Cir. 1987) (quoting “Guideline for District Judges” from1 Bench Book for United States District Judges 1.02-2 to -5 (3d ed. 1986). 1999In United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 251-52 (6th Cir. 1987) (quoting "Guideline for District Judges" from I Bench Book for United States District Judges, 1.02-2 to -5 (3d ed. 1986)), a series of questions was suggested as a means of assuring a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. | 2 | 2 |
Scott v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2013Later, in Scott v. Illinois, the Court held that “counsel need not be appointed” unless the defendant is actually “sentenced to a term of imprisonment.” Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979). 2011In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972), the Court held that “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.” In Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979), the Court clarified its ruling in Argersinger by holding that the Sixth and the Fourteenth Amendments require only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a period of imprisonment unless the State afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Gordongreen2 sentences1997State v. Gordan, 642 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tenn. Crim. 1991State v. Gordon, 642 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tenn.Crim.App.1982). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Blackstockgreen2 sentences2014In Blackstock, 19 S.W.3d at 208 , our supreme court observed: Although there is likely to be a level of deficiency so great that it renders a defendant unable to make a knowing and intelligent waiver, nearly every court to consider the issue has held that mental impairments or mental retardation are factors that must be considered along with the totality of the circumstances. 2009In Blackstock, 19 S.W.3d at 208 , our supreme court observed: Although there is likely to be a level of deficiency so great that it renders a defendant unable to make a knowing and intelligent waiver, nearly every court to consider the issue has held that mental impairments or mental retardation are factors that must be considered along with the totality of the circumstances. | 1 | 5 |
Miranda v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2008Because of the pressures inherent in custodial interrogations, “the Court in Miranda was impelled to adopt the extraordinary safeguard of excluding statements made without a knowing and intelligent waiver of the privilege [against self-incrimination].” Garner v. U.S., 424 U.S. at 657 , 96 S.Ct. at 1184 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)). “[T]he Miranda Court required the exclusion of incriminating statements obtained during custodial interrogation unless the suspect fails to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege after being suitably warned of his ri 2008Because of the pressures inherent in custodial interrogations, “the Court in Miranda was impelled to adopt the extraordinary safeguard of excluding statements made without a knowing and intelligent waiver of the privilege [against self-incrimination].” Garner v. U.S., 424 U.S. at 657 , 96 S.Ct. at 1184 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)). “[T]he Miranda Court required the exclusion of incriminating statements obtained during custodial interrogation unless the suspect fails to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege after being suitably warned of his ri | 1 | 3 |
State v. Northingtongreen2 sentences2009State v. Small, 988 S.W.2d at 673 ; State v. Northington, 667 S.W.2d at 60 . 2003Northington, 667 S.W.2d at 60 . | 1 | 3 |
State v. Odomgreen2 sentences2025More specifically, he argues that the statement was made without a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. “[A] trial court’s findings of fact in a suppression hearing will be upheld unless the evidence preponderates otherwise.” State v. Green, 697 S.W.3d 634 , 640 (Tenn. 2024) (quoting State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996)). 2025Questions about the “credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact.” Id. (quoting Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23 ). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Carruthersgreen1 sentence2025A knowing and intelligent waiver “occurs only after the trial judge advises a defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation and determines that the defendant knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 546 (Tenn. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Alredgreen1 sentence2024See, e.g., Lewis v. Mayle, 391 F.3d 989, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2004) (notwithstanding evidence that a defendant had signed a written waiver and discussed the potential conflict with his attorney, finding that the record was inadequate because the trial court “had only a cursory discussion” with the defendant and failed to establish that he “understood any of the specific ramifications of his waiver” (internal quotation omitted)); United States v. Alred, 144 F.3d 1405, 1411 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating that waivers of conflict-free counsel are “not to be lightly or casually inferred” and require a defe | 1 | 1 |
United States v. John H. Migliaccio, United States of America v. Bert M. Averygreen1 sentence2024See, e.g., Lewis v. Mayle, 391 F.3d 989, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2004) (notwithstanding evidence that a defendant had signed a written waiver and discussed the potential conflict with his attorney, finding that the record was inadequate because the trial court “had only a cursory discussion” with the defendant and failed to establish that he “understood any of the specific ramifications of his waiver” (internal quotation omitted)); United States v. Alred, 144 F.3d 1405, 1411 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating that waivers of conflict-free counsel are “not to be lightly or casually inferred” and require a defe | 1 | 1 |
Daniel Lee Lewis v. D.A. Maylegreen1 sentence2024See, e.g., Lewis v. Mayle, 391 F.3d 989, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2004) (notwithstanding evidence that a defendant had signed a written waiver and discussed the potential conflict with his attorney, finding that the record was inadequate because the trial court “had only a cursory discussion” with the defendant and failed to establish that he “understood any of the specific ramifications of his waiver” (internal quotation omitted)); United States v. Alred, 144 F.3d 1405, 1411 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating that waivers of conflict-free counsel are “not to be lightly or casually inferred” and require a defe | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Fritzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Larry Lamont Bushgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pryor v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Minnesota v. Murphygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Garner v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Roberts v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State Department of Children's Services v. M.P.green | 1 | 1 |
| Meadows v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Teague v. Lanegreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Dewayne F. Titusgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cummings v. Cummingsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Phillipsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Von Moltke v. Gilliesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| North Carolina v. Butlerred | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Armesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Joseph Wilson v. Walter Fogg, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facilitygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Illinoisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Baxter v. Rosegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Burkhart
green
2 sentences2011Id.; State v. Burkhart, 541 S.W.2d 365 (Tenn. 1976)); State v. Herrod, 754 S.W.2d 627, 629-630 (Tenn. Crim. 2002Id.; State v. Burkhart, 541 S.W.2d 365 (Tenn. 1976)); State v. Herrod, 754 S.W.2d 627, 629-630 (Tenn. Crim. | 3 | 2000–2011 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2022Because the test for voluntariness is the same regardless of whether the defendant was provided with Miranda warnings, see Smith, 933 S.W.2d at 455 , and because the question whether the defendant voluntarily provided a statement to the police is inextricably linked with the question whether the defendant voluntarily waived his constitutional right to remain silent by providing a statement after the warnings were given, we will consider those issues together to determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant’s statement was freely and voluntarily given after a knowing 2014Because the test for voluntariness is the same regardless of whether the defendant was provided with Miranda warnings, see Smith, 933 S.W.2d at 455 , and because the question whether the defendant voluntarily provided a statement to the police is inextricably linked with the question whether the defendant voluntarily waived his constitutional right to remain silent by providing a statement after the warnings were given, we will consider those issues together to determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant’s statement was freely and voluntarily given after a knowing | 2 | 2014–2022 |
State v. Small
green
2 sentences2017Id. (citing State v. McCary, 119 S.W.3d 226, 256 (Tenn. Crim. 2009State v. Small, 988 S.W.2d at 673 ; State v. Northington, 667 S.W.2d at 60 . | 2 | 2009–2017 |
Edwards v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1985See Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 490, 492-93 , 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). 1985See Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 490, 492-93 , 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). | 2 | 1982–1985 |
Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District
green
1 sentence2024In order to exercise the right of self-representation, “(1) a defendant must make the request in a timely manner; (2) the assertion of the right of self-representation must be clear and unequivocal; and (3) the assertion of the right of self-representation must reflect a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.” Id. at 30-31 (citing State v. McCary, 119 S.W.3d 226, 256 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Iowa v. Tovar
green
1 sentence2023Upon our review, we conclude that the trial court’s investigation of the factors bearing upon the Defendant’s knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel complied with Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), and Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Faretta v. California
green
1 sentence2023Upon our review, we conclude that the trial court’s investigation of the factors bearing upon the Defendant’s knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel complied with Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), and Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
United States v. Murgas
green
1 sentence2019As one court has said, “no single factor, such as IQ, is necessarily determinative in deciding whether a person was capable of knowingly and intelligently waiving . . . the constitutional rights embraced in the Miranda rubric.” Id. (quoting Fairchild v. Lockhart, 744 F. Supp. 1429, 1453 (E.D. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Van Tran
green
1 sentence2017There, the Vietnamese Van Tran argued that “his knowledge, understanding and comprehension of the English language is limited, and his understanding of legal terms is so poor that he was unable to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel.” Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d at 471 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Bush green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| United States v. John Vincent MacKovich green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Cole v. State green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Richard green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Rogers v. United States green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Smith green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 95,508 United States of America v. Norman Rubinson green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| United States v. George Daniel Gates green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| United States v. James B. Sparlin neutral | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Johnson v. Zerbst green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Oregon v. Bradshaw green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Gideon v. Wainwright green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Braziel v. State green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.