knowing and intelligent waiver in Mississippi

2011“Absent a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights, statements made by a suspect while under ‘custodial interrogation’ are inadmissible at trial where pri- or to making the statements, the suspect was not Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) ] warned.” Moore v. State, 933 So.2d 910, 919 (¶ 30) (Miss.2006).

2011“Absent a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights, statements made by a suspect while under ‘custodial interrogation’ are inadmissible at trial where pri- or to making the statements, the suspect was not Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) ] warned.” Moore v. State, 933 So.2d 910, 919 (¶ 30) (Miss.2006).

2006"Absent a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights, statements made by a suspect while under `custodial interrogation' are inadmissible at trial where prior to making the statements, the suspect was not Miranda warned." Tolbert v. State, 511 So.2d 1368, 1374 (Miss. 1987) ( citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45, 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602 ).

2005“Absent a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights, statements made by a suspect while under ‘custodial interrogation’ are inadmissible at trial where prior to making the statements, the suspect was not Miranda warned.” Tolbert v. State, 511 So.2d 1368, 1374 (Miss. 1987) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45, 478-79 ).

2025“When an accused makes an in- custody inculpatory statement without the advice or presence of counsel, even though warnings and advice regarding his privilege against self-incrimination have been fully and fairly given, the State shoulders a heavy burden to show a knowing and intelligent waiver.” Neal v. State, 451 So. 2d 743, 753 (Miss. 1984). ¶18.

2013In addition to a confession being voluntary, waiver of one’s rights in making that confession must be knowing and intelligent. ‘When an accused makes an in-custody inculpatory statement without the advice or presence of counsel, even though warnings and advice regarding his privilege against self-incrimination have been fully and fairly given, the State shoulders a heavy burden to show a knowing and intelligent waiver.” Neal, 451 So.2d at 753 (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724 , 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2571 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197, 212 (1979); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628; Abston v. S

2013In addition to a confession being voluntary, waiver of one’s rights in making that confession must be knowing and intelligent. ‘When an accused makes an in-custody inculpatory statement without the advice or presence of counsel, even though warnings and advice regarding his privilege against self-incrimination have been fully and fairly given, the State shoulders a heavy burden to show a knowing and intelligent waiver.” Neal, 451 So.2d at 753 (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724 , 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2571 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197, 212 (1979); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628; Abston v. S

2013In addition to a confession being voluntary, waiver of one’s rights in making that confession must be knowing and intelligent. ‘When an accused makes an in-custody inculpatory statement without the advice or presence of counsel, even though warnings and advice regarding his privilege against self-incrimination have been fully and fairly given, the State shoulders a heavy burden to show a knowing and intelligent waiver.” Neal, 451 So.2d at 753 (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724 , 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2571 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197, 212 (1979); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628; Abston v. S

2013In addition to a confession being voluntary, waiver of one’s rights in making that confession must be knowing and intelligent. ‘When an accused makes an in-custody inculpatory statement without the advice or presence of counsel, even though warnings and advice regarding his privilege against self-incrimination have been fully and fairly given, the State shoulders a heavy burden to show a knowing and intelligent waiver.” Neal, 451 So.2d at 753 (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724 , 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2571 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197, 212 (1979); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628; Abston v. S

2010Ed. 2d 197, 212 (1979); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 , 86 S. Ct. at 1628 ; Abston v. State, 361 So. 2d 1384, 1391 (Miss. 1978)). ¶13.

1998See Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1281 (Miss.1994) (affirming trial court's determination regarding admissibility of seventeen-year-old's confessions where evidence and testimony showed they were voluntarily given with a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights). ¶ 23.

1997After weighing all of the evidence and testimony given by both sides, the trial judge concluded that Foster's confession was voluntarily given "with a knowing and intelligent waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination." Id.

2015A-defendant may waive his or her right to a , speedy trial if the defendant makes a knowing and intelligent waiver of this right, See Berry v. State, 728 So.2d 568, 570 (Miss.1999) ("[T]he right to a speedy trial is a fundamental constitutional right, and a defendant may only waive her speedy trial right by knowing and intelligent waiver.").

2015See Berry v. State, 728 So. 2d 568, 570 (Miss. 1999) (“[T]he right to a speedy trial is a fundamental constitutional right, and a defendant may only waive her speedy trial right by knowing and intelligent waiver.”).

2013Jones, 841 So.2d at 130 (¶ 38); Neal, 451 So.2d at 753 .

2010Jones, 841 So. 2d at 130 (¶ 38); Neal, 451 So. 2d at 753 .

2006"The general rule is that for a confession to be admissible it must have been given voluntarily and not given because of promises, threats or inducements." Dancer v. State, 721 So.2d 583, 587 (Miss.1998). "[T]he prosecution shoulders the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary." Morgan v. State, 681 So.2d 82, 86 (Miss.1996).

2005“The general rule is that for a confession to be admissible it must have been given voluntarily and not given because of promises, threats or inducements.” Dancer v. State, 721 So.2d 583, 587 (Miss. 1998). “[T]he prosecution shoulders the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary.” Morgan v. State, 681 So.2d 82, 86 (Miss. 1996).

2006Although a Texas trial court held the defendant's question reinitiated conversation with the officer, the Texas Court of Appeals held otherwise: "[i]nquiries about bail are the type of necessary inquiries arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship, distinguished in Edwards from conversations evincing a desire to open up more generalized discussion relating to the investigation." Id. at 172 (emphasis added). [1] The court went on to find that the State failed to show a knowing and intelligent waiver of Kraft's Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during interrogation be

2005Although a Texas trial court held the defendant’s question reinitiated conversation with the officer, the Texas Court of Appeals held otherwise: “[i]nquiries about bail are the type of necessary inquiries arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship, distinguished in Edwards from conversations evincing a desire to open up more generalized 9 discussion relating to the investigation.” Id. at 172 (emphasis added).1 The court went on to find that the State failed to show a knowing and intelligent waiver of Kraft’s Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during interrogation bec

2006"The general rule is that for a confession to be admissible it must have been given voluntarily and not given because of promises, threats or inducements." Dancer v. State, 721 So.2d 583, 587 (Miss.1998). "[T]he prosecution shoulders the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary." Morgan v. State, 681 So.2d 82, 86 (Miss.1996).

2005“The general rule is that for a confession to be admissible it must have been given voluntarily and not given because of promises, threats or inducements.” Dancer v. State, 721 So.2d 583, 587 (Miss. 1998). “[T]he prosecution shoulders the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary.” Morgan v. State, 681 So.2d 82, 86 (Miss. 1996).

2003Butler v. State, 608 So.2d 314, 322 (Miss.1992). "[C]oercive police action is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not `voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.

2003Butler v. State, 608 So.2d 314, 322 (Miss.1992). "[C]oercive police action is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not `voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.

2002Vickery v State, 535 So.2d 1371, 1377 .

1992Vickery, 535 So.2d at 1377 .

1994Jones v. State, 461 So.2d 686 (Miss. 1984); Frost v. State, 483 So.2d 1345 (Miss. 1986).

1987Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 478-79 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 1630 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 706-07, 726 (1966); Jones v. State, 461 So.2d 686, 696-701 (Miss. 1984); see Rule 1.03, Miss.

2008"At all critical stages thereafter, the accused is of right entitled to access to counsel, absent a specific knowing and intelligent waiver tied to that stage." Brooks v. State, 903 So.2d 691, 694-95 (¶ 7) (Miss.2005) (quoting Coleman v. State, 592 So.2d 517, 520 (Miss. 1991)) (emphasis added). ¶ 9.

2001Id. at 520 . ¶8.

1990In Beavers we said "the right to a speedy trial" "is subject to a knowing and intelligent waiver." Beavers v. State, 498 So.2d at 791 .

1988Beavers v. State, 498 So.2d 788, 791 (Miss. 1986).

2019See Bostic, 531 So. 2d at 1213 (“If a defendant . . . persists in his disruptive conduct [after being warned of the consequences of his actions], he has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to be present at trial.”).

2015“In the absence of a knowing and intelligent waiver from [the defendant], prejudice is presumed....” Kiker, 55 So.3d at 1068 -(¶ 23).

2015“In the absence of a knowing and intelligent waiver from [the defendant], prejudice is presumed. . . .” Kiker, 55 So. 3d at 1068 (¶ 23).

2015Davis, 512 U.S. at 458 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 483 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 )_ The applicability of the “ ‘rigid’ prophylactic rule” of Edwards requires courts to “determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel.” Smith v. Illinois, supra, 469 U.S. at 95 , 105 S.Ct. at 492 (emphasis added), quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 , 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2569 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979).

2015Davis, 512 U.S. at 458 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 483 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 )_ The applicability of the “ ‘rigid’ prophylactic rule” of Edwards requires courts to “determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel.” Smith v. Illinois, supra, 469 U.S. at 95 , 105 S.Ct. at 492 (emphasis added), quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 , 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2569 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979).

2014See Littlejohn v. State, 593 So.2d 20, 25 (Miss.1992).

2014Those federal courts have held: Once the court “has been informed that the defendant has recently ingested drugs or other substances capable of impairing his ability to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights, it must broaden its [plea] inquiry with a view to assessing the impact of the ingested substances on the defendant’s capacity to understand the change-of-plea process and intelligently determine a proper course of action.” Carey v. United States, 50 F.3d 1097, 1099 (1st Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Parra-Ibáñez, 936 F.2d 588, 595 (1st Cir.1991)); see als

2014“The privilege [against self-incrimination] is not ordinarily self-executing[;3 it must be affirmatively claimed when self-incrimination is threatened, and a defendant may lose its benefit inadvertently, without making a knowing and intelligent waiver, simply by failing to invoke it.” State v. Richard, 697 A.2d 410, 415 (Me.1997) (emphasis added) (citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427-28 , 104 S.Ct. 1136 , 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984)). 7 ¶ 15.

2014Those federal courts have held: Once the court “has been informed that the defendant has recently ingested drugs or other substances capable of impairing his ability to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights, it must broaden its [plea] inquiry with a view to assessing the impact of the ingested substances on the defendant’s capacity to understand the change-of-plea process and intelligently determine a proper course of action.” Carey v. United States, 50 F.3d 1097, 1099 (1st Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Parra-Ibáñez, 936 F.2d 588, 595 (1st Cir.1991)); see als

2014Those federal courts have held: Once the court “has been informed that the defendant has recently ingested drugs or other substances capable of impairing his ability to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights, it must broaden its [plea] inquiry with a view to assessing the impact of the ingested substances on the defendant’s capacity to understand the change-of-plea process and intelligently determine a proper course of action.” Carey v. United States, 50 F.3d 1097, 1099 (1st Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Parra-Ibáñez, 936 F.2d 588, 595 (1st Cir.1991)); see als