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33 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2023 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Chapmangreen2 sentences2023A district court may rely on and consider its knowledge from other proceedings, including the defendant’s “competency, understanding, background, education, training, experience, conduct and ability to observe procedures and protocol of the court.” State v. Chapman, 1986-NMSC-037 , ¶ 10, 104 N.M. 324 , 721 P.2d 392 (holding that denying the defendant a hearing or inquiry into whether his waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent was not a denial of due process because the court used the defendant’s performance during previous hearings to assess his inability to appreciate the risks of self 2023A district court may rely on and consider its knowledge from other proceedings, including the defendant’s “competency, understanding, background, education, training, experience, conduct and ability to observe procedures and protocol of the court.” State v. Chapman, 1986-NMSC-037 , ¶ 10, 104 N.M. 324 , 721 P.2d 392 (holding that denying the defendant a hearing or inquiry into whether his waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent was not a denial of due process because the court used the defendant’s performance during previous hearings to assess his inability to appreciate the risks of self | 3 | 6 |
State v. Castillogreen2 sentences2005Our Supreme Court followed Faretta in State v. Chapman, 104 N.M. 324, 327 , 721 P.2d 392, 395 (1986), by recognizing that a defendant must be “accorded the right of self-representation when he or she is able to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel.” Therefore, “[i]n a case where a defendant wishes to represent himself, the district court must determine if the defendant is making a ‘knowing and intelligent’ waiver of counsel and understands fully the dangers of self-representation.” State v. Rotibi 117 N.M. 108, 110 , 869 P.2d 296, 298 (Ct.App.1994) (quoting State v. Castillo, 110 N 2005Our Supreme Court followed Faretta in State v. Chapman, 104 N.M. 324, 327 , 721 P.2d 392, 395 (1986), by recognizing that a defendant must be “accorded the right of self-representation when he or she is able to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel.” Therefore, “[i]n a case where a defendant wishes to represent himself, the district court must determine if the defendant is making a ‘knowing and intelligent’ waiver of counsel and understands fully the dangers of self-representation.” State v. Rotibi 117 N.M. 108, 110 , 869 P.2d 296, 298 (Ct.App.1994) (quoting State v. Castillo, 110 N | 3 | 4 |
State v. Reyesgreen2 sentences2023See Castillo, 1990-NMCA-043 ¶ 12 (reversing where the “defendant was not advised of any of the hazards of self-representation . . . except that he would be expected to follow the rules of law and courtroom procedure”); cf. State v. Plouse, 2003-NMCA-048, ¶¶ 24-25 , 133 N.M. 495 , 64 P.3d 522 (finding a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel where the district court engaged in a lengthy and in-depth colloquy with the defendant regarding the hazards inherent in self- representation), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 48 , 146 N.M. 499 , 212 P.3d 387 ; 2022“Once a defendant makes a clear and unequivocal statement that can reasonably be understood to invoke the right to self- representation, the [district] court has a duty to inquire further into the defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel.” Id. ¶ 45; see, e.g., State v. Vincent, 2005-NMCA-064, ¶ 11 , 137 N.M. 462 , 112 P.3d 1119 (“Because [the d]efendant expressed a desire to represent himself, the district judge was required to determine if [the d]efendant was making a ‘knowing and intelligent’ waiver of his right to an attorney.” (citation omitted)); State v. Rotibi, 1994-NMCA-003 , ¶ 3, 11 | 2 | 4 |
State v. Vincentgreen2 sentences2022“Once a defendant makes a clear and unequivocal statement that can reasonably be understood to invoke the right to self- representation, the [district] court has a duty to inquire further into the defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel.” Id. ¶ 45; see, e.g., State v. Vincent, 2005-NMCA-064, ¶ 11 , 137 N.M. 462 , 112 P.3d 1119 (“Because [the d]efendant expressed a desire to represent himself, the district judge was required to determine if [the d]efendant was making a ‘knowing and intelligent’ waiver of his right to an attorney.” (citation omitted)); State v. Rotibi, 1994-NMCA-003 , ¶ 3, 11 2022“Once a defendant makes a clear and unequivocal statement that can reasonably be understood to invoke the right to self- representation, the [district] court has a duty to inquire further into the defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel.” Id. ¶ 45; see, e.g., State v. Vincent, 2005-NMCA-064, ¶ 11 , 137 N.M. 462 , 112 P.3d 1119 (“Because [the d]efendant expressed a desire to represent himself, the district judge was required to determine if [the d]efendant was making a ‘knowing and intelligent’ waiver of his right to an attorney.” (citation omitted)); State v. Rotibi, 1994-NMCA-003 , ¶ 3, 11 | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Herman Padillagreen2 sentences2020See, e.g., Padilla, 819 F.2d at 957 (“Because the record in this case fails to demonstrate the district court made the thorough and comprehensive examination of all the facts and circumstances contemplated by Von Moltke and its progeny, we cannot say [the defendant] made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.”); Castillo, 1990-NMCA-043 , ¶ 12; but see, e.g., United States v. Hill, 252 F.3d 919, 928 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent despite the district court’s failure to conduct an exhaustive Faretta colloquy). 2005Our Supreme Court followed Faretta in State v. Chapman, 104 N.M. 324, 327 , 721 P.2d 392, 395 (1986), by recognizing that a defendant must be “accorded the right of self-representation when he or she is able to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel.” Therefore, “[i]n a case where a defendant wishes to represent himself, the district court must determine if the defendant is making a ‘knowing and intelligent’ waiver of counsel and understands fully the dangers of self-representation.” State v. Rotibi 117 N.M. 108, 110 , 869 P.2d 296, 298 (Ct.App.1994) (quoting State v. Castillo, 110 N | 2 | 2 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2007That means the Miranda rights can only be waived by a defendant “[ajfter such warnings have been given.” Id.; see Dupont v. United States, 259 A.2d 355, 358-59 (D.C.1969) (holding that the State failed to meet its burden of demonstrating a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel during interrogation where defendant interrupted the officer before he was advised of his right to counsel by saying: “I know my rights, man”); see also Johnson v. Arkansas, 299 Ark. 223 , 772 S.W.2d 322, 324 (1989) (holding that warning was sufficient where police failed to advise the defendant of his right to have 2007That means the Miranda rights can only be waived by a defendant “[ajfter such warnings have been given.” Id.; see Dupont v. United States, 259 A.2d 355, 358-59 (D.C.1969) (holding that the State failed to meet its burden of demonstrating a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel during interrogation where defendant interrupted the officer before he was advised of his right to counsel by saying: “I know my rights, man”); see also Johnson v. Arkansas, 299 Ark. 223 , 772 S.W.2d 322, 324 (1989) (holding that warning was sufficient where police failed to advise the defendant of his right to have | 2 | 2 |
People v. Nitschmanngreen2 sentences2007That means the Miranda rights can only be waived by a defendant “[ajfter such warnings have been given.” Id.; see Dupont v. United States, 259 A.2d 355, 358-59 (D.C.1969) (holding that the State failed to meet its burden of demonstrating a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel during interrogation where defendant interrupted the officer before he was advised of his right to counsel by saying: “I know my rights, man”); see also Johnson v. Arkansas, 299 Ark. 223 , 772 S.W.2d 322, 324 (1989) (holding that warning was sufficient where police failed to advise the defendant of his right to have 2007That means the Miranda rights can only be waived by a defendant “[ajfter such warnings have been given.” Id.; see Dupont v. United States, 259 A.2d 355, 358-59 (D.C.1969) (holding that the State failed to meet its burden of demonstrating a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel during interrogation where defendant interrupted the officer before he was advised of his right to counsel by saying: “I know my rights, man”); see also Johnson v. Arkansas, 299 Ark. 223 , 772 S.W.2d 322, 324 (1989) (holding that warning was sufficient where police failed to advise the defendant of his right to have | 2 | 2 |
Dupont v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2007That means the Miranda rights can only be waived by a defendant “[ajfter such warnings have been given.” Id.; see Dupont v. United States, 259 A.2d 355, 358-59 (D.C.1969) (holding that the State failed to meet its burden of demonstrating a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel during interrogation where defendant interrupted the officer before he was advised of his right to counsel by saying: “I know my rights, man”); see also Johnson v. Arkansas, 299 Ark. 223 , 772 S.W.2d 322, 324 (1989) (holding that warning was sufficient where police failed to advise the defendant of his right to have 2007That means the Miranda rights can only be waived by a defendant "[a]fter such warnings have been given." Id.; see Dupont v. United States, 259 A.2d 355, 358-59 (D.C.1969) (holding that the State failed to meet its burden of demonstrating a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel during interrogation where defendant interrupted the officer before he was advised of his right to counsel by saying: "I know my rights, man"); see also Johnson v. Arkansas, 299 Ark. 223 , 772 S.W.2d 322, 324 (1989) (holding that warning was sufficient where police failed to advise the defendant of his right to have | 2 | 2 |
Argersinger v. Hamlingreen2 sentences1997See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 , 92 S.Ct. 2006, 2012 , 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972) (“[Ajbsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.”). 1997See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 , 92 S.Ct. 2006, 2012 , 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972) (“[Ajbsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.”). | 1 | 4 |
State v. Rotibigreen2 sentences2022“Once a defendant makes a clear and unequivocal statement that can reasonably be understood to invoke the right to self- representation, the [district] court has a duty to inquire further into the defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel.” Id. ¶ 45; see, e.g., State v. Vincent, 2005-NMCA-064, ¶ 11 , 137 N.M. 462 , 112 P.3d 1119 (“Because [the d]efendant expressed a desire to represent himself, the district judge was required to determine if [the d]efendant was making a ‘knowing and intelligent’ waiver of his right to an attorney.” (citation omitted)); State v. Rotibi, 1994-NMCA-003 , ¶ 3, 11 2022“Once a defendant makes a clear and unequivocal statement that can reasonably be understood to invoke the right to self- representation, the [district] court has a duty to inquire further into the defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel.” Id. ¶ 45; see, e.g., State v. Vincent, 2005-NMCA-064, ¶ 11 , 137 N.M. 462 , 112 P.3d 1119 (“Because [the d]efendant expressed a desire to represent himself, the district judge was required to determine if [the d]efendant was making a ‘knowing and intelligent’ waiver of his right to an attorney.” (citation omitted)); State v. Rotibi, 1994-NMCA-003 , ¶ 3, 11 | 1 | 3 |
Smith v. Maldonadogreen2 sentences2020Smith v. Maldonado, 1985-NMSC-115 , ¶¶ 11-12, 103 N.M. 570 , 711 P.2d 15 (“[W]hether waiver [of counsel] is legally sufficient depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case, including the background, experience and conduct of the accused. 2020Smith v. Maldonado, 1985-NMSC-115 , ¶¶ 11-12, 103 N.M. 570 , 711 P.2d 15 (“[W]hether waiver [of counsel] is legally sufficient depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case, including the background, experience and conduct of the accused. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Plousegreen2 sentences2023See Castillo, 1990-NMCA-043 ¶ 12 (reversing where the “defendant was not advised of any of the hazards of self-representation . . . except that he would be expected to follow the rules of law and courtroom procedure”); cf. State v. Plouse, 2003-NMCA-048, ¶¶ 24-25 , 133 N.M. 495 , 64 P.3d 522 (finding a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel where the district court engaged in a lengthy and in-depth colloquy with the defendant regarding the hazards inherent in self- representation), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 48 , 146 N.M. 499 , 212 P.3d 387 ; 2023See Castillo, 1990-NMCA-043 ¶ 12 (reversing where the “defendant was not advised of any of the hazards of self-representation . . . except that he would be expected to follow the rules of law and courtroom procedure”); cf. State v. Plouse, 2003-NMCA-048, ¶¶ 24-25 , 133 N.M. 495 , 64 P.3d 522 (finding a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel where the district court engaged in a lengthy and in-depth colloquy with the defendant regarding the hazards inherent in self- representation), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 48 , 146 N.M. 499 , 212 P.3d 387 ; | 1 | 2 |
Faretta v. Californiagreen2 sentences2019We find no error in Defendant’s first argument. {13} Defendant also claims that the district court erred in allowing him to dismiss his public defender and proceed pro se, arguing that he did not want to dismiss his attorney for the remainder of his trial, but rather only wanted to appear pro se to “assist in his defense” by presenting one issue regarding jurisdiction to the district court. “[A] defendant should be accorded the right of self-representation when he or she is able to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel.” State v. Chapman, 1986-NMSC-037 , ¶ 9, 104 N.M. 324 , 721 P.2d 1986Under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) a defendant should be accorded the right of self-representation when he or she is able to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2005Our Supreme Court followed Faretta in State v. Chapman, 104 N.M. 324, 327 , 721 P.2d 392, 395 (1986), by recognizing that a defendant must be “accorded the right of self-representation when he or she is able to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel.” Therefore, “[i]n a case where a defendant wishes to represent himself, the district court must determine if the defendant is making a ‘knowing and intelligent’ waiver of counsel and understands fully the dangers of self-representation.” State v. Rotibi 117 N.M. 108, 110 , 869 P.2d 296, 298 (Ct.App.1994) (quoting State v. Castillo, 110 N 2005Our Supreme Court followed Faretta in State v. Chapman, 104 N.M. 324, 327 , 721 P.2d 392, 395 (1986), by recognizing that a defendant must be “accorded the right of self-representation when he or she is able to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel.” Therefore, “[i]n a case where a defendant wishes to represent himself, the district court must determine if the defendant is making a ‘knowing and intelligent’ waiver of counsel and understands fully the dangers of self-representation.” State v. Rotibi 117 N.M. 108, 110 , 869 P.2d 296, 298 (Ct.App.1994) (quoting State v. Castillo, 110 N | 1 | 2 |
Moran v. Burbinegreen2 sentences2021The State’s claim that Defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver is precluded by our affirmance of the district court’s conclusions {41} The State also argues that the Defendant made a “knowing, intelligent voluntary waiver of rights[.]” The State cites to Martinez, 1999-NMSC-018, ¶ 19 , for the proposition that a valid waiver “need not be express, but may be determined implicitly from an evaluation of the facts and circumstances of the interrogation.” {42} However, our foregoing analysis affirms the district court’s conclusion that Defendant lacked the requisite awareness to make a vali 2021See id. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Martinezgreen1 sentence2021A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law {18} “‘Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.’” Martinez, 2018-NMSC-007, ¶ 8 (quoting State v. Ketelson, 2011-NMSC-023, ¶ 9 , 150 N.M. 137 , 257 P.3d 957 ). {19} “‘First, we look for substantial evidence to support the district court’s factual finding[s], with deference to the district court’s review of the testimony and other evidence presented.’” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting State v. Yazzie, 2016-NMSC- 026, ¶ 15, 376 P.3d 858 ). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Garciagreen1 sentence2020See id.; Garcia, 2011-NMSC-003, ¶ 30 (noting that a clear and unequivocal pro se request is properly denied where the defendant cannot make a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Ruel Frank Brown, Jr.green1 sentence2020See United States v. Brown, 591 F.2d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1979) (“[The defendant’s] persistence in refusing to accept any counsel except that of his own choosing and his insistence on proceeding [p]ro se can only be construed as a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gutierrezgreen2 sentences2016First we will address whether 17 Defendant’s waiver of his Miranda warnings was knowing and intelligent. 18 {11} A knowing and intelligent waiver is one that is “made with a full awareness of 19 both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to 6 1 abandon it.” State v. Gutierrez, 2011-NMSC-024, ¶ 13 , 150 N.M. 232 , 258 P.3d 1024 2 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2016First we will address whether 17 Defendant’s waiver of his Miranda warnings was knowing and intelligent. 18 {11} A knowing and intelligent waiver is one that is “made with a full awareness of 19 both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to 6 1 abandon it.” State v. Gutierrez, 2011-NMSC-024, ¶ 13 , 150 N.M. 232 , 258 P.3d 1024 2 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Rojogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Crandallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Sanchezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Saunders v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pitts v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Skolnick v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Nathan L. Hill and Cordell Jamesgreen1 sentence2020See, e.g., Padilla, 819 F.2d at 957 (“Because the record in this case fails to demonstrate the district court made the thorough and comprehensive examination of all the facts and circumstances contemplated by Von Moltke and its progeny, we cannot say [the defendant] made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.”); Castillo, 1990-NMCA-043 , ¶ 12; but see, e.g., United States v. Hill, 252 F.3d 919, 928 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent despite the district court’s failure to conduct an exhaustive Faretta colloquy). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Barrera
green
2 sentences2023A district court may rely on and consider its knowledge from other proceedings, including the defendant’s “competency, understanding, background, education, training, experience, conduct and ability to observe procedures and protocol of the court.” State v. Chapman, 1986-NMSC-037 , ¶ 10, 104 N.M. 324 , 721 P.2d 392 (holding that denying the defendant a hearing or inquiry into whether his waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent was not a denial of due process because the court used the defendant’s performance during previous hearings to assess his inability to appreciate the risks of self 2023A district court may rely on and consider its knowledge from other proceedings, including the defendant’s “competency, understanding, background, education, training, experience, conduct and ability to observe procedures and protocol of the court.” State v. Chapman, 1986-NMSC-037 , ¶ 10, 104 N.M. 324 , 721 P.2d 392 (holding that denying the defendant a hearing or inquiry into whether his waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent was not a denial of due process because the court used the defendant’s performance during previous hearings to assess his inability to appreciate the risks of self | 2 | 2021–2023 |
Marvin Martin v. James H. Rose William Leech
green
2 sentences2022Additionally, the court could “question the defendant to determine whether he [or she] understands the implications and consequences of the attorney’s proposed tactic and agrees to waive his [or her] right to effective assistance of counsel at trial.” Martin, 744 F.2d at 1251-52 ; see State v. Chapman, 1986-NMSC-037 , ¶ 10, 104 N.M. 324 , 721 P.2d 392 (“[T]he trial court must determine if a defendant is making a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel and fully understands the dangers of self-representation.”). 18 2. 2022Additionally, the court could “question the defendant to determine whether he [or she] understands the implications and consequences of the attorney’s proposed tactic and agrees to waive his [or her] right to effective assistance of counsel at trial.” Martin, 744 F.2d at 1251-52 ; see State v. Chapman, 1986-NMSC-037 , ¶ 10, 104 N.M. 324 , 721 P.2d 392 (“[T]he trial court must determine if a defendant is making a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel and fully understands the dangers of self-representation.”). 2. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Martinez
green
2 sentences2021The State’s claim that Defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver is precluded by our affirmance of the district court’s conclusions {41} The State also argues that the Defendant made a “knowing, intelligent voluntary waiver of rights[.]” The State cites to Martinez, 1999-NMSC-018, ¶ 19 , for the proposition that a valid waiver “need not be express, but may be determined implicitly from an evaluation of the facts and circumstances of the interrogation.” {42} However, our foregoing analysis affirms the district court’s conclusion that Defendant lacked the requisite awareness to make a vali 2015“In determining a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights, we ascertain whether [Child] was fully aware of the nature of the right he was waiving and the consequences of abandoning the right.” Martinez, 1999-NMSC-018, ¶ 21 . | 2 | 2015–2021 |
State v. Garza
green
2 sentences2023See Castillo, 1990-NMCA-043 ¶ 12 (reversing where the “defendant was not advised of any of the hazards of self-representation . . . except that he would be expected to follow the rules of law and courtroom procedure”); cf. State v. Plouse, 2003-NMCA-048, ¶¶ 24-25 , 133 N.M. 495 , 64 P.3d 522 (finding a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel where the district court engaged in a lengthy and in-depth colloquy with the defendant regarding the hazards inherent in self- representation), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 48 , 146 N.M. 499 , 212 P.3d 387 ; 2023See Castillo, 1990-NMCA-043 ¶ 12 (reversing where the “defendant was not advised of any of the hazards of self-representation . . . except that he would be expected to follow the rules of law and courtroom procedure”); cf. State v. Plouse, 2003-NMCA-048, ¶¶ 24-25 , 133 N.M. 495 , 64 P.3d 522 (finding a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel where the district court engaged in a lengthy and in-depth colloquy with the defendant regarding the hazards inherent in self- representation), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 48 , 146 N.M. 499 , 212 P.3d 387 ; | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Barela
green
1 sentence2022“Once a defendant makes a clear and unequivocal statement that can reasonably be understood to invoke the right to self- representation, the [district] court has a duty to inquire further into the defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel.” Id. ¶ 45; see, e.g., State v. Vincent, 2005-NMCA-064, ¶ 11 , 137 N.M. 462 , 112 P.3d 1119 (“Because [the d]efendant expressed a desire to represent himself, the district judge was required to determine if [the d]efendant was making a ‘knowing and intelligent’ waiver of his right to an attorney.” (citation omitted)); State v. Rotibi, 1994-NMCA-003 , ¶ 3, 11 | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Ketelson
green
2 sentences2021A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law {18} “‘Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.’” Martinez, 2018-NMSC-007, ¶ 8 (quoting State v. Ketelson, 2011-NMSC-023, ¶ 9 , 150 N.M. 137 , 257 P.3d 957 ). {19} “‘First, we look for substantial evidence to support the district court’s factual finding[s], with deference to the district court’s review of the testimony and other evidence presented.’” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting State v. Yazzie, 2016-NMSC- 026, ¶ 15, 376 P.3d 858 ). 2021A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law {18} “‘Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.’” Martinez, 2018-NMSC-007, ¶ 8 (quoting State v. Ketelson, 2011-NMSC-023, ¶ 9 , 150 N.M. 137 , 257 P.3d 957 ). {19} “‘First, we look for substantial evidence to support the district court’s factual finding[s], with deference to the district court’s review of the testimony and other evidence presented.’” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting State v. Yazzie, 2016-NMSC- 026, ¶ 15, 376 P.3d 858 ). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Von Moltke v. Gillies
green
1 sentence2020The focus of the inquiry is on the defendant’s understanding, not the judge’s ability to read.”); see also Chapman, 1986-NMSC-037 , ¶ 10 (holding that to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel “the court must inform itself” about numerous characteristics of the individual defendant, including the defendant’s “understanding, background, education, training, experience, [and] conduct”); State v. Reyes, 2005- NMCA-080, ¶ 8, 137 N.M. 727 , 114 P.3d 407 (characterizing the court’s role in establishing waiver of counsel as “the task of assessing the defendant’s understanding of the re | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Wyatt B.
green
1 sentence2019The defendant in Bramlett was taken into custody due to his intoxication because his “mental and physical functioning [was] so substantially impaired . . . that he ha[d] become . . . unable to care for his own safety.” Id. ¶ 21 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (referring to the statute that allows an intoxicated person to be restrained). {5} In contrast, in State v. Wyatt B., 2015-NMCA-110 , 359 P.3d 165 , this Court held that there was a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda despite a child’s voluntary intoxication. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Vigil-Giron
green
1 sentence2018Moreover, it 7 appears the district court, through competency proceedings, was informed of 8 Defendant’s ability or inability to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel, 9 notwithstanding the fact Defendant was ultimately found competent to stand trial. [CN 10 6] Defendant seems to argue the determination finding Defendant competent to stand 11 trial informs the district court’s decision regarding self-representation. [MIO 7] 12 However, Defendant does not cite any authority dictating a competency determination 13 and a determination of whether a defendant may represent himself are in | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Gutierrez
green
1 sentence2016First we will address whether 17 Defendant’s waiver of his Miranda warnings was knowing and intelligent. 18 {11} A knowing and intelligent waiver is one that is “made with a full awareness of 19 both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to 6 1 abandon it.” State v. Gutierrez, 2011-NMSC-024, ¶ 13 , 150 N.M. 232 , 258 P.3d 1024 2 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Aguirre green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Haskins green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Gilbert green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Boykin v. Alabama green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Westbrook v. Arizona green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Miranda v. Arizona green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Commonwealth v. Crawford green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| State v. Greene green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Martin P. Marston v. R. M. Oliver, Superintendent of the Virginia State Farm green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| State v. Sanchez green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| State v. Harrison green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.