knowing and intelligent waiver in Texas

2020A court reviewing a defendant’s election of self-representation is not required to engage in any “formulaic questioning to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver” nor follow some “script for courtroom recitation by trial judges faced with this dilemma.” Blankenship v. State, 673 S.W.2d 578, 583 (Tex. Crim.

2015Moreover, Blankenship makes clear that “no formulaic questioning” or “script” is required to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver. 673 S.W.2d at 583 .

2007See Monreal, 99 S.W.3d at 622 ; Ex parte Tabor , 565 S.W.2d 945, 946 (Tex. Crim.

2005Ex parte Tabor, 565 S.W.2d 945, 946 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (op. on reh'g).

2007See Blanco v. State , 18 S.W.3d 218, 219 (Tex. Crim.

2003See Monreal v. State, 99 S.W.3d 615, 622 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Blanco, 18 S.W.3d at 219-20 .

2018Ex parte Acker, 949 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex. 1997) (court’s failure to admonish party of her right to counsel rendered the commitment arising from the contempt order void); In re Marks, 365 S.W.3d 843 , 845–46 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, orig. proceeding) (citing Ex parte Gunther, 758 S.W.2d 226 , 226–27 (Tex. 1988) (orig. proceeding) (granting petition for writ of habeas corpus relief in part because absent knowing waiver of rights, trial court was without authority to hold Gunther in contempt)).

2010See Ex parte Keene , 909 S.W.2d, 507, 508 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (“In the absence of a knowing and intelligent waiver by Keene of his right to counsel, made on the record, the trial court had no authority to hold him in contempt.”); Ex parte Gunther , 758 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. 1988) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (same); see also In re Lehr , No. 04-05-00934-CV, 2006 WL 228941 , at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, Feb. 1, 2006, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (“There is nothing in the record to support the recitation in the judgment that [relator] knowingly and intelligently waived his

2007In Smith v. State, 858 S.W.2d 609, 611 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1993, pet. ref'd), we held that a defendant may waive the right to appeal and that a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to appeal will prevent a defendant from appealing without the consent of the trial court.

2002In Smith v. State, 858 S.W.2d 609, 611 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1993, pet. ref'd), we held that a defendant may waive the right to appeal and that a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to appeal will prevent a defendant from appealing without the consent of the trial court.

2002Blanco v. State, 18 S.W.3d 218, 219-20 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Ex parte Tabor, 565 S.W.2d 945, 946 (Tex.Crim.App.1978); Lacy v. State, 56 S.W.3d 287, 288 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.); Littleton v. State, 33 S.W.3d 41, 43 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. ref'd); Freeman v. State, 913 S.W.2d 714, 717 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1995, no pet.).

2002Freeman v. State , 913 S.W.2d 714, 718 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1995, no pet.).

2025We agree. 6 The Texas Supreme Court has long held that, “[i]n the absence of a knowing and intelligent waiver by [a party] of [the party’s] right to counsel, made on the record, the trial court [has] no authority to hold [the party] in contempt.” Ex parte Keene, 909 S.W.2d 507, 508 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding) (applying predecessor statute to Family Code Section 157.163); see also Ex parte Acker, 949 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding) (“[S]ection 157.163 requires courts to admonish pro se litigants of their right to counsel, regardless of whether they are indigent or not.”); In r

2025See In re Lehr, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 809 , at *7–8 (explaining that when evaluating due process issues in contempt proceeding, “recitations in a judgment that are unsupported by the record are not controlling” and concluding that order holding relator in contempt was void because nothing in record supported that relator was informed of right to be represented by counsel and nothing in record supported recitation in judgment that relator “knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel” (citing Ex parte Caldwell, 416 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. 1967) (orig. proceeding))); see also Ex parte Ke

2007See also Perez v. State, 989 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.).

2002See also Perez v. State, 989 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.).

2005Williams v. State , 925 S.W.2d 272, 274 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, no pet.) (citing Geeslin v. State , 600 S.W.2d 309, 313 (Tex. Crim.

1982Under his first ground of error, appellant argues that his waiver of assistance of counsel was invalid because the record does not reflect either that appellant made a knowing and intelligent waiver or that he was adequately made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, citing Geeslin v. State, 600 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.Cr.App.1980).

2025We agree. 6 The Texas Supreme Court has long held that, “[i]n the absence of a knowing and intelligent waiver by [a party] of [the party’s] right to counsel, made on the record, the trial court [has] no authority to hold [the party] in contempt.” Ex parte Keene, 909 S.W.2d 507, 508 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding) (applying predecessor statute to Family Code Section 157.163); see also Ex parte Acker, 949 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding) (“[S]ection 157.163 requires courts to admonish pro se litigants of their right to counsel, regardless of whether they are indigent or not.”); In r

2018Ex parte Acker, 949 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex. 1997) (court’s failure to admonish party of her right to counsel rendered the commitment arising from the contempt order void); In re Marks, 365 S.W.3d 843 , 845–46 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, orig. proceeding) (citing Ex parte Gunther, 758 S.W.2d 226 , 226–27 (Tex. 1988) (orig. proceeding) (granting petition for writ of habeas corpus relief in part because absent knowing waiver of rights, trial court was without authority to hold Gunther in contempt)).

2015Calcarone v. State, 675 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex.App.-- Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no pet.).

2014Calcarone v. State, 675 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no pet.).

2011Webb v. State, 533 S.W.2d 780, 785 (Tex.Crim.App. 1976) (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 , 92 S.Ct. 2006, 2012 , 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972) (holding "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at trial")).

2011Webb v. State, 533 S.W.2d 780, 785 (Tex.Crim.App. 1976) (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 , 92 S.Ct. 2006, 2012 , 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972) (holding “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at trial”)).

2007See Monreal, 99 S.W.3d at 622 ; Ex parte Tabor , 565 S.W.2d 945, 946 (Tex. Crim.

2003See Monreal v. State, 99 S.W.3d 615, 622 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Blanco, 18 S.W.3d at 219-20 .

2005See Burgess v. State , 816 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tex. Crim.

2004Cf. Collier, 959 S.W.2d at 626 (admonishment sufficient where the trial *78 court elicited the accused’s educational background, and explained the granting of his request, the charges against him, and the possible range of punishment, that he would not be granted special consideration respecting the technical rules of evidence and procedure, and that he might be disadvantaged at trial and appeal); Burgess v. State, 816 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991) (admonishment sufficient where the trial court elicited the accused’s educational background and previous self-representation, and advised t

2023If the trial court is aware the defendant does not understand English, there is “an independent duty to ensure that the proceedings are interpreted for the 7 defendant, absent the defendant’s knowing and intelligent waiver.” Garcia, 149 S.W.3d at 144 .

2014As I observed in my dissenting opinion in this case, because he was aware of appellant’s language barrier, “ ‘the judge has an independent duty to ensure that the proceedings are interpreted for the defendant, absent the defendant’s knowing and intelligent waiver.’ ” See Garcia, 2014 WL 1375457, at *6 (Alcala, J., dissenting) (quoting Garcia, 149 S.W.3d at 144 ).

2022Cir. 1983) (“The type of information . . . which the defendant must possess in order to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to a jury trial relates to his knowledge of his constitutional rights,” not strategy); Haliym v. Mitchell, 492 F.3d 680, 698 (6th Cir. 2007) (agreeing that the Williams formulation is sufficient to show a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver); Louisiana v. Bazile, 114 So.3d 719, 17 (La. 2013) (quoting Williams, 715 F.2d at 1180 ) (adopting Williams).

2022Cir. 1983) (“The type of information . . . which the defendant must possess in order to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to a jury trial relates to his knowledge of his constitutional rights,” not strategy); Haliym v. Mitchell, 492 F.3d 680, 698 (6th Cir. 2007) (agreeing that the Williams formulation is sufficient to show a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver); Louisiana v. Bazile, 114 So.3d 719, 17 (La. 2013) (quoting Williams, 715 F.2d at 1180 ) (adopting Williams).

2022Cir. 1983) (“The type of information . . . which the defendant must possess in order to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to a jury trial relates to his knowledge of his constitutional rights,” not strategy); Haliym v. Mitchell, 492 F.3d 680, 698 (6th Cir. 2007) (agreeing that the Williams formulation is sufficient to show a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver); Louisiana v. Bazile, 114 So.3d 719, 17 (La. 2013) (quoting Williams, 715 F.2d at 1180 ) (adopting Williams).

2022Cir. 1983) (“The type of information . . . which the defendant must possess in order to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to a jury trial relates to his knowledge of his constitutional rights,” not strategy); Haliym v. Mitchell, 492 F.3d 680, 698 (6th Cir. 2007) (agreeing that the Williams formulation is sufficient to show a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver); Louisiana v. Bazile, 114 So.3d 719, 17 (La. 2013) (quoting Williams, 715 F.2d at 1180 ) (adopting Williams).

2011Webb v. State, 533 S.W.2d 780, 785 (Tex.Crim.App. 1976) (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 , 92 S.Ct. 2006, 2012 , 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972) (holding "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at trial")).

2011Webb v. State, 533 S.W.2d 780, 785 (Tex.Crim.App. 1976) (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 , 92 S.Ct. 2006, 2012 , 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972) (holding "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at trial")).

2024A knowing and intelligent waiver requires a showing that the defendant was warned of the “dangers and disadvantages of self-representation,” and “his choice [was] made with eyes open.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 ); Osorio-Lopez, 663 S.W.3d at 756.

2005App. 1984)(en banc), it is sufficient if the record shows that the defendant "knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open." Faretta , 422 U.S. at 835 .

1968At the top of Miranda’s statement was a typed paragraph stating that the confession was made voluntarily, without threats or promises of immunity and “with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against me.” In rejecting the validity of the alleged “waiver” contained in Miranda’s written statement, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he mere fact that he signed a statement which contained a typed-in clause stating that he had ‘full knowledge’ of his ‘legal rights’ does not approach the knowing and intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional r

1968At the top of Miranda’s statement was a typed paragraph stating that the confession was made voluntarily, without threats or promises of immunity and “with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against me.” In rejecting the validity of the alleged “waiver” contained in Miranda’s written statement, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he mere fact that he signed a statement which contained a typed-in clause stating that he had ‘full knowledge’ of his ‘legal rights’ does not approach the knowing and intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional r

1978When an appellant makes a voluntary and intelligent waiver of his right to appeal at the time of sentencing, such waiver is effective unless and until a timely notice of appeal is filed. . . . ” In Ex parte Dickey, 543 S.W.2d 99 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), we adopted the statement in Reed v. State, 516 S.W.2d 680 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), to the effect that a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to appeal will prevent a defendant from appealing without consent of the trial court.

1977In Reed v. State, 516 S.W.2d 680 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974), we stated that “a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to appeal would only prevent him (a defendant in a criminal case) from appealing without consent of the trial court.” Later, in Abron v. State, 531 S.W.2d 643 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976), this court wrote that the waiver of the right to appeal at the time of sentencing “is effective unless and until a timely notice of appeal is filed.” In Ex parte Dickey, 543 S.W.2d 99 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976), we adopted the statement in Reed to the effect that a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to a

1978When an appellant makes a voluntary and intelligent waiver of his right to appeal at the time of sentencing, such waiver is effective unless and until a timely notice of appeal is filed. . . . ” In Ex parte Dickey, 543 S.W.2d 99 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), we adopted the statement in Reed v. State, 516 S.W.2d 680 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), to the effect that a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to appeal will prevent a defendant from appealing without consent of the trial court.

1977In Reed v. State, 516 S.W.2d 680 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974), we stated that “a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to appeal would only prevent him (a defendant in a criminal case) from appealing without consent of the trial court.” Later, in Abron v. State, 531 S.W.2d 643 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976), this court wrote that the waiver of the right to appeal at the time of sentencing “is effective unless and until a timely notice of appeal is filed.” In Ex parte Dickey, 543 S.W.2d 99 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976), we adopted the statement in Reed to the effect that a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to a

2024App. 2022) (citing Hobbs v. State, 298 S.W.3d 193, 197 (Tex. Crim.

2022Hobbs, 298 S.W.3d at 197 .