knowing and intelligent waiver in New Jersey

2026In State v. A.G.D., 178 N.J. 56, 68 (2003), the Court held "[t]he government's failure to inform a suspect that a criminal complaint or arrest warrant has been filed or issued deprives that person of information indispensable to a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights." It stated, "a criminal complaint and arrest warrant signify that a veil of suspicion is about to be draped on the person, heightening his risk of criminal liability." Ibid.

2026In State v. A.G.D., 178 N.J. 56, 68 (2003), the Court held "[t]he government's failure to inform a suspect that a criminal complaint or arrest warrant has been filed or issued deprives that person of information indispensable to a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights." It stated, "a criminal complaint and arrest warrant signify that a veil of suspicion is about to be draped on the person, heightening his risk of criminal liability." Ibid.

2022The detectives purposely withheld from Sims “critically important information” -- “information indispensable to a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights.” A.G.D., 178 N.J. at 68 ; see also Vincenty, 237 N.J. at 135 .

2022The detectives purposely withheld from Sims “critically important information” -- “information indispensable to a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights.” A.G.D., 178 N.J. at 68 ; see also Vincenty, 237 N.J. at 135 .

2022This case is unlike State v. Nyhammer, where the defendant was merely a suspect -- and not under arrest -- before the police began questioning him. 197 N.J. 383, 404-05 (2009).

2019No doubt mindful of its holding in State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 404 (2009) – that "[t]he issuance of a criminal complaint and arrest warrant by a judge is an objectively verifiable and distinctive step, a bright line, when the forces of the state stand arrayed against the individual" – the Court reiterated the basis for suppression as enunciated in A.G.D.: This Court held that the defendant's confession should have been suppressed, A.G.D., 178 N.J. at 69 , because the "government's failure to inform a suspect that a criminal complaint or arrest warrant has been filed or issued deprives tha

2021A-2495-17 10 Under the requirements set out in Faretta, 422 U.S. 806 , State v. Crisafi, 128 N.J. 499 (1992), and Reddish, 181 N.J. 553 , the Court explained that a knowing and intelligent waiver requires a defendant to show "an understanding of the risks and consequences" of pro se representation "after he has been fully apprised—by the court—of those risks and consequences, as well of certain fundamental information about the offenses charged." Ibid.

2020A knowing and intelligent waiver means that the defendant understands the implications of his waiver and that the "choice is made with eyes open." Id. at 592 (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 ).

2022See Reddish, 181 N.J. at 594-95 (explaining a court must make credibility determinations concerning a defendant's statements during the inquiry required to determine if there is a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel).

2021A-2495-17 10 Under the requirements set out in Faretta, 422 U.S. 806 , State v. Crisafi, 128 N.J. 499 (1992), and Reddish, 181 N.J. 553 , the Court explained that a knowing and intelligent waiver requires a defendant to show "an understanding of the risks and consequences" of pro se representation "after he has been fully apprised—by the court—of those risks and consequences, as well of certain fundamental information about the offenses charged." Ibid.

2019The Martin court cites Schneckloth v. Bustamonte , 412 U.S. 218 , 237, 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) for the proposition that, "[a]lmost without exception, the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver has been applied only to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair trial." Schneckloth identifies the right to counsel, confrontation, a jury trial, a speedy trial, and freedom from double-jeopardy.

2019The Martin court cites Schneckloth v. Bustamonte , 412 U.S. 218 , 237, 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) for the proposition that, "[a]lmost without exception, the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver has been applied only to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair trial." Schneckloth identifies the right to counsel, confrontation, a jury trial, a speedy trial, and freedom from double-jeopardy.

2021As defendant suggests, "the competence necessary to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel is different from the competence to conduct a defense." Reddish, 181 N.J. at 592 (citing Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399 (1993)).

2009Moreover, our Supreme Court expressly noted, as the United States Supreme Court made clear in Edwards , that "the competence necessary to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel is different from the competence to conduct a defense." See id. at 592, 859 A. 2d 1173 (citing Godinez, supra, 509 U.S. at 399 , 113 S.Ct. at 2686-87 , 125 L.Ed. 2d at 332 ).

2021In State v. Henderson, we rejected the defendant's argument that, under A.G.D., his waiver was not made knowingly "because he was not specifically informed that a warrant for his arrest for the murder of [the victim] had been issued." 397 N.J.

2021In State v. Henderson, we rejected the defendant's argument that, under A.G.D., his waiver was not made knowingly "because he was not specifically informed that a warrant for his arrest for the murder of [the victim] had been issued." 397 N.J.

2009The Court has held with respect to those thirteen or younger that the juvenile’s “immaturity so limits [their] ability to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights that an added layer of protection [afforded by the presence of a parent] is required.” State v. A.G.D. 178 N.J. 56, 67-68 , 835 A.2d 291 (2003); see also Q.N., supra, 179 N.J. at 172-73 , 843 A.2d 1140 .

2009The Court has held with respect to those thirteen or younger that the juvenile’s “immaturity so limits [their] ability to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights that an added layer of protection [afforded by the presence of a parent] is required.” State v. A.G.D. 178 N.J. 56, 67-68 , 835 A.2d 291 (2003); see also Q.N., supra, 179 N.J. at 172-73 , 843 A.2d 1140 .

2006See State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553, 587 , 859 A.2d 1173 (2004) (“A defendant may invoke the right to self-representation only if he makes a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel.”); State v. Crisafi, 128 N.J. 499, 509 , 608 A.2d 317 (1992) ("A defendant can exercise the right to self-representation only by first knowingly and intelligently waiving the right to counsel.”) (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 173 , 104 S.Ct. 944, 948 , 79 L.Ed.2d 122, 130 (1984)).

2006See State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553, 587 , 859 A.2d 1173 (2004) (“A defendant may invoke the right to self-representation only if he makes a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel.”); State v. Crisafi, 128 N.J. 499, 509 , 608 A.2d 317 (1992) ("A defendant can exercise the right to self-representation only by first knowingly and intelligently waiving the right to counsel.”) (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 173 , 104 S.Ct. 944, 948 , 79 L.Ed.2d 122, 130 (1984)).

1987With respect to his federal constitutional rights, defendant relies principally upon Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36 , 92 S.Ct. 2006, 2012 , 32 L.Ed. 2d 530, 538 (1972), in which the United States Supreme Court held that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at trial." Regarding his rights under the New Jersey Constitution, defendant points to our Supreme Court's holding in Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281, 295 (1971), that "no indigent defendant

1987With respect to his federal constitutional rights, defendant relies principally upon Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36 , 92 S.Ct. 2006, 2012 , 32 L.Ed. 2d 530, 538 (1972), in which the United States Supreme Court held that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at trial." Regarding his rights under the New Jersey Constitution, defendant points to our Supreme Court's holding in Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281, 295 (1971), that "no indigent defendant

2021Failure to do so denies the person of "information indispensable to a knowing and intelligent waiver." Id. at 179 (quoting A.G.D., 178 N.J. at 68 ).

2021Failure to do so denies the person of "information indispensable to a knowing and intelligent waiver." Id. at 179 (quoting A.G.D., 178 N.J. at 68 ).

2012Although we do not hold that the far greater protections required in the criminal arena apply to complex, commercial transactions, see, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 726 (1966) (outlining procedure for valid waiver of right against self-incrimination); Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at 835 , 95 S.Ct. at 2541 , 45 L.Ed.2d at 581 (same for waiver of right to counsel); State v. Crisafi, 128 N.J. 499, 510-12 , 608 A.2d 317 (1992) (same), it is unclear that the approach in this case can result in a knowing and intelligent waiver of fundamental cons

2012Although we do not hold that the far greater protections required in the criminal arena apply to complex, commercial transactions, see, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 726 (1966) (outlining procedure for valid waiver of right against self-incrimination); Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at 835 , 95 S.Ct. at 2541 , 45 L.Ed.2d at 581 (same for waiver of right to counsel); State v. Crisafi, 128 N.J. 499, 510-12 , 608 A.2d 317 (1992) (same), it is unclear that the approach in this case can result in a knowing and intelligent waiver of fundamental cons

2019I. par. 7, voluntary consent to a search requires a knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes "knowledge of the right to refuse consent." State v. Johnson , 68 N.J. 349 , 353-54, 346 A.2d 65 (1975).

2019I. par. 7, voluntary consent to a search requires a knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes "knowledge of the right to refuse consent." State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 348, 353-54 (1975).

2019I. par. 7, voluntary consent to a search requires a knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes "knowledge of the right to refuse consent." State v. Johnson , 68 N.J. 349 , 353-54, 346 A.2d 65 (1975).

2019I. par. 7, voluntary consent to a search requires a knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes "knowledge of the right to refuse consent." State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 353-54 (1975).

1993State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 134 , 548 A. 2d 887 (1988); State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 404-05 , 388 A. 2d 218 (1978).

1993State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 134 , 548 A. 2d 887 (1988); State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 404-05 , 388 A. 2d 218 (1978).

1987With respect to his federal constitutional rights, defendant relies principally upon Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36 , 92 S.Ct. 2006, 2012 , 32 L.Ed. 2d 530, 538 (1972), in which the United States Supreme Court held that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at trial." Regarding his rights under the New Jersey Constitution, defendant points to our Supreme Court's holding in Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281, 295 (1971), that "no indigent defendant

1974Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 , 92 S.Ct. 2006 , 32 L.Ed. 2d 530 (1972), held that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial." Although under Rodriguez , "whenever the particular nature of the charge is such that * * * other consequence of magnitude is actually threatened or is a likelihood on conviction, the indigent defendant should have counsel assigned to him unless he chooses to proceed pro se with his plea of guilty or his defense at tria

2022The government's failure to inform a suspect that a criminal complaint or arrest warrant has been filed or issued deprives that person of information indispensable to a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights. [ 178 N.J. at 68 .] Our Supreme Court's decision in State v. Cooper underscores the reason for our concern. 151 N.J. 326 (1997).

2022The Court in that case explained that although courts should consider misrepresentations made by police officers when analyzing the totality of the circumstances, "misrepresentations alone are usually insufficient to justify a determination of involuntariness or lack of knowledge." Id. at 355 (citation omitted).