knowing and intelligent waiver in Indiana

2020The trial court is in the best position to assess whether the defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver, and the trial court’s finding will most likely be upheld “where the judge has made the proper inquiries and conveyed the proper information, and reaches a reasoned conclusion.” Poynter v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1122, 1128 (Ind. 2001) (citations omitted).

2020Carter nevertheless insisted that because his attorney decided to withdraw and because he wanted to maintain his trial dates, he wanted to proceed pro se. [19] Generally, “[i]f a defendant’s decision to proceed without counsel appears tactical, then this factor weighs in favor of finding a knowing and intelligent waiver.” Drake, 895 N.E.2d at 395 (citing Poynter, 749 N.E.2d at 1128 n.6).

2020“Waiver of the right to assistance of counsel may be established based upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Taylor v. State, 944 N.E.2d 84, 89 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). [14] Because a trial court is best positioned to evaluate whether a defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, its finding on the matter will “most likely be upheld where the judge has made the proper inquiries and conveyed the proper information, and reaches a reasoned Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memo

2020Carter nevertheless insisted that because his attorney decided to withdraw and because he wanted to maintain his trial dates, he wanted to proceed pro se. [19] Generally, “[i]f a defendant’s decision to proceed without counsel appears tactical, then this factor weighs in favor of finding a knowing and intelligent waiver.” Drake, 895 N.E.2d at 395 (citing Poynter, 749 N.E.2d at 1128 n.6).

2009Our Supreme Court has adopted four factors to consider when determining whether a knowing and intelligent waiver occurred: "(1) the extent of the court's inquiry into the defendant's decision, (2) other evidence in the record that establishes whether the defendant understood the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, (3) the background and experience of the defendant, and (4) the context of the defendant's decision to proceed pro se." Id. at 1127-28 (quoting United States v. Hoskins, 243 F.3d 407, 410 (7th Cir. 2001)).

2009Our Supreme Court has adopted four factors to consider when determining whether a knowing and intelligent waiver occurred: "(1) the extent of the court's inquiry into the defendant's decision, (2) other evidence in the record that establishes whether the defendant understood the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, (8) the background and experience of the defendant, and (4) the context of the defendant's decision to proceed pro se." Id. at 1127-28 (quoting United States v. Hoskins, 243 F.3d 407, 410 (7th Cir.2001).

2003An individual may lose the benefit of the privilege without making a knowing and intelligent waiver." Id. (citing Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654, n. 9 , 96 S.Ct. 1178, 1182, n. 9 , 47 L.Ed.2d 370 (1976)).

2003An individual may lose the benefit of the privilege without making a knowing and intelligent waiver." Id. (citing Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654, n. 9 , 96 S.Ct. 1178, 1182, n. 9 , 47 L.Ed.2d 370 (1976)).

2016Although he concedes that he signed the waiver of rights form, he Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A02-1507-CR-895 | May 25, 2016 Page 7 of 14 argues that he did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to remain silent, as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).

1981Rogers argues that the statement was made without a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights as expressed in Miranda v. Arizona, (1966) 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 .

1990In Faretta v. California (1975), 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 , the United States Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant cannot be forced to have counsel and must be permitted to represent himself, provided he makes a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.

1990In Faretta v. California (1975), 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 , the United States Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant cannot be forced to have counsel and must be permitted to represent himself, provided he makes a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.

1975In Brimhall v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 153 , 279 N.E.2d 557 , we reversed the court’s judgment denying a post-conviction petition to withdraw a guilty plea, for failure of the record of the guilty plea proceeding to demonstrate an advice of rights and a knowing and intelligent waiver of them.

1975In Brimhall v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 153 , 279 N.E.2d 557 , we reversed the court’s judgment denying a post-conviction petition to withdraw a guilty plea, for failure of the record of the guilty plea proceeding to demonstrate an advice of rights and a knowing and intelligent waiver of them.

2008In Dowell v. State, this court set out guidelines for trial courts to follow in determining whether a defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. 557 N.E.2d 1063, 1066-67 (Ind.Ct.App.1990).

1991Id.

1981“Almost without exception, the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver has been applied only to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair trial.” Id. at 237 , 92 S.Ct. at 2053 , 36 L.Ed.2d at 868 .

1981“Almost without exception, the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver has been applied only to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair trial.” Id. at 237 , 92 S.Ct. at 2053 , 36 L.Ed.2d at 868 .

1981See Williams v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 165 , 325 N.E.2d 827 . 1 In partial response the state asserted an affirmative defense in the nature of laches, and the court found, inter alia, that Stutz-man was guilty of inexcusable delay which, under the circumstances, amounted to a waiver. 2 We agree. 3 In Langley; Richardson v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 199 , 267 N.E.2d 538 our Supreme Court discussed the fact that a showing of diligence is not a prerequisite to relief under Indiana Rules of Procedure, Post Conviction Rule 1.

1981See Williams v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 165 , 325 N.E.2d 827 . 1 In partial response the state asserted an affirmative defense in the nature of laches, and the court found, inter alia, that Stutz-man was guilty of inexcusable delay which, under the circumstances, amounted to a waiver. 2 We agree. 3 In Langley; Richardson v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 199 , 267 N.E.2d 538 our Supreme Court discussed the fact that a showing of diligence is not a prerequisite to relief under Indiana Rules of Procedure, Post Conviction Rule 1.

2020Jones’s argument is merely a request to reweigh the evidence, which we must decline. 5 The State cites Lowry, 971 F.2d at 60 , Gomez v. Ahitow, 29 F.3d 1128, 1135-36 (7th Cir. 1994), United States v. Martinez, 143 F.3d 1266, 1268-69 (9th Cir. 1998), Henderson v. Smith, 903 F.2d 534, 536 (8th Cir. 1990), and Duncan v. Alabama, 881 F.2d 1013 , 1017 n.5 (11th Cir. 1989).

2020Jones’s argument is merely a request to reweigh the evidence, which we must decline. 5 The State cites Lowry, 971 F.2d at 60 , Gomez v. Ahitow, 29 F.3d 1128, 1135-36 (7th Cir. 1994), United States v. Martinez, 143 F.3d 1266, 1268-69 (9th Cir. 1998), Henderson v. Smith, 903 F.2d 534, 536 (8th Cir. 1990), and Duncan v. Alabama, 881 F.2d 1013 , 1017 n.5 (11th Cir. 1989).

2020Jones’s argument is merely a request to reweigh the evidence, which we must decline. 5 The State cites Lowry, 971 F.2d at 60 , Gomez v. Ahitow, 29 F.3d 1128, 1135-36 (7th Cir. 1994), United States v. Martinez, 143 F.3d 1266, 1268-69 (9th Cir. 1998), Henderson v. Smith, 903 F.2d 534, 536 (8th Cir. 1990), and Duncan v. Alabama, 881 F.2d 1013 , 1017 n.5 (11th Cir. 1989).

2020“Waiver of the right to assistance of counsel may be established based upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Taylor v. State, 944 N.E.2d 84, 89 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). [14] Because a trial court is best positioned to evaluate whether a defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, its finding on the matter will “most likely be upheld where the judge has made the proper inquiries and conveyed the proper information, and reaches a reasoned Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memo

2018Hall v. State, 849 N.E.2d 466, 469 (Ind. 2006). [11] Collier contends that because the audio records and transcripts are missing, “the record is absolutely silent as to any determination by the trial judge that there was a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights” and, thus, that the post-conviction court erred “in concluding that the record is not silent.” Appellant’s Br. at 15.