64 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Dixongreen2 sentences2021See State v. Dixon, 269 S.C. 107, 109 , 236 S.E.2d 419, 420-21 (1977) (remanding "to the lower court for a determination of whether the waiver was intelligently made"); State v. Cash, 304 S.C. 223, 225 , 403 S.E.2d 632, 634 (1991) (stating "except in extraordinary cases where it is clear that a hearing on remand would serve no useful purpose, the remedy when a record fails to show a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel will be a remand for a Dixon hearing"); State v. Dial, 429 S.C. 128 , 135, 838 S.E.2d 501 , 505 (2020) (remanding the case to the circuit court to conduct an e 2021See State v. Dixon, 269 S.C. 107, 109 , 236 S.E.2d 419, 420-21 (1977) (remanding "to the lower court for a determination of whether the waiver was intelligently made"); State v. Cash, 304 S.C. 223, 225 , 403 S.E.2d 632, 634 (1991) (stating "except in extraordinary cases where it is clear that a hearing on remand would serve no useful purpose, the remedy when a record fails to show a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel will be a remand for a Dixon hearing"); State v. Dial, 429 S.C. 128 , 135, 838 S.E.2d 501 , 505 (2020) (remanding the case to the circuit court to conduct an e | 6 | 12 |
Prince v. Stategreen2 sentences2026See State v. Samuel, 422 S.C. 596, 602 , 813 S.E.2d 487, 490 (2018) ("Whether a defendant has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel is a mixed question of law and fact which appellate courts review de novo."); State v. Dial, 429 S.C. 128 , 133, 838 S.E.2d 501 , 504 (2020) ("A defendant may waive his right to counsel, but he must do so knowingly and intelligently."); id. ("For a knowing and intelligent waiver to occur, the defendant must be '(1) advised of his right to counsel; and (2) adequately warned of the dangers of self-representation.'" (quoting Prince v. 2026See State v. Samuel, 422 S.C. 596, 602 , 813 S.E.2d 487, 490 (2018) ("Whether a defendant has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel is a mixed question of law and fact which appellate courts review de novo."); State v. Dial, 429 S.C. 128 , 133, 838 S.E.2d 501 , 504 (2020) ("A defendant may waive his right to counsel, but he must do so knowingly and intelligently."); id. ("For a knowing and intelligent waiver to occur, the defendant must be '(1) advised of his right to counsel; and (2) adequately warned of the dangers of self-representation.'" (quoting Prince v. | 6 | 9 |
State v. Cashgreen2 sentences2026See State v. Samuel, 422 S.C. 596, 602 , 813 S.E.2d 487, 490 (2018) ("Whether a defendant has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel is a mixed question of law and fact which appellate courts review de novo."); State v. Dial, 429 S.C. 128 , 133, 838 S.E.2d 501 , 504 (2020) ("A defendant may waive his right to counsel, but he must do so knowingly and intelligently."); id. ("For a knowing and intelligent waiver to occur, the defendant must be '(1) advised of his right to counsel; and (2) adequately warned of the dangers of self-representation.'" (quoting Prince v. 2026See State v. Samuel, 422 S.C. 596, 602 , 813 S.E.2d 487, 490 (2018) ("Whether a defendant has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel is a mixed question of law and fact which appellate courts review de novo."); State v. Dial, 429 S.C. 128 , 133, 838 S.E.2d 501 , 504 (2020) ("A defendant may waive his right to counsel, but he must do so knowingly and intelligently."); id. ("For a knowing and intelligent waiver to occur, the defendant must be '(1) advised of his right to counsel; and (2) adequately warned of the dangers of self-representation.'" (quoting Prince v. | 6 | 6 |
State v. McLaurengreen2 sentences2025We find Garvin was sufficiently informed of her right to counsel because she signed a notice of her probation hearing less than three months before the hearing and the probation court confirmed she signed the notice that "included [her] right to have an attorney represent [her]." See State v. Bryant, 383 S.C. 410, 414 , 680 S.E.2d 11, 13 (Ct. App. 2009) ("It is the trial court's responsibility to determine whether there was a knowing and intelligent waiver [of the right to counsel] by the accused."); id. at 416 , 680 S.E.2d at 14 (finding the "probation court's colloquy adequately informed Bry 2025We find Garvin was sufficiently informed of her right to counsel because she signed a notice of her probation hearing less than three months before the hearing and the probation court confirmed she signed the notice that "included [her] right to have an attorney represent [her]." See State v. Bryant, 383 S.C. 410, 414 , 680 S.E.2d 11, 13 (Ct. App. 2009) ("It is the trial court's responsibility to determine whether there was a knowing and intelligent waiver [of the right to counsel] by the accused."); id. at 416 , 680 S.E.2d at 14 (finding the "probation court's colloquy adequately informed Bry | 4 | 4 |
Faretta v. Californiagreen2 sentences2020For a knowing and intelligent waiver to occur, the defendant must be "(1) advised of his right to counsel; and (2) adequately warned of the dangers of self- representation." Prince v. State, 301 S.C. 422, 423-24 , 392 S.E.2d 462, 463 (1990) (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 , 95 S. Ct. at 2541 , 45 L. 2020For a knowing and intelligent waiver to occur, the defendant must be "(1) advised of his right to counsel; and (2) adequately warned of the dangers of self- representation." Prince v. State, 301 S.C. 422, 423-24 , 392 S.E.2d 462, 463 (1990) (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 , 95 S. Ct. at 2541 , 45 L. | 3 | 10 |
State v. Cashgreen2 sentences2021See State v. Dixon, 269 S.C. 107, 109 , 236 S.E.2d 419, 420-21 (1977) (remanding "to the lower court for a determination of whether the waiver was intelligently made"); State v. Cash, 304 S.C. 223, 225 , 403 S.E.2d 632, 634 (1991) (stating "except in extraordinary cases where it is clear that a hearing on remand would serve no useful purpose, the remedy when a record fails to show a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel will be a remand for a Dixon hearing"); State v. Dial, 429 S.C. 128 , 135, 838 S.E.2d 501 , 505 (2020) (remanding the case to the circuit court to conduct an e 2021See State v. Dixon, 269 S.C. 107, 109 , 236 S.E.2d 419, 420-21 (1977) (remanding "to the lower court for a determination of whether the waiver was intelligently made"); State v. Cash, 304 S.C. 223, 225 , 403 S.E.2d 632, 634 (1991) (stating "except in extraordinary cases where it is clear that a hearing on remand would serve no useful purpose, the remedy when a record fails to show a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel will be a remand for a Dixon hearing"); State v. Dial, 429 S.C. 128 , 135, 838 S.E.2d 501 , 505 (2020) (remanding the case to the circuit court to conduct an e | 3 | 5 |
Johnson v. Zerbstgreen2 sentences2003State v. Dixon, 269 S.C. 107 , 236 S.E.2d 419 (1977) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). 2003State v. Dixon, 269 S.C. 107 , 236 S.E.2d 419 (1977) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). | 3 | 5 |
State v. Brewergreen2 sentences2021See Brewer, 328 S.C. at 119 , 492 S.E.2d at 98 ("The trial [court] has the responsibility to ensure that the accused is informed of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, and makes a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel."); id. ("The ultimate test of whether a defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel is not the trial [court]'s advice, but the defendant's understanding."); State v. Cash, 309 S.C. 40, 43 , 419 S.E.2d 811, 813 (Ct. App. 1992) ("Factors the courts have considered in determining if an accused had sufficient backgro 2021See Brewer, 328 S.C. at 119 , 492 S.E.2d at 98 ("The trial [court] has the responsibility to ensure that the accused is informed of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, and makes a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel."); id. ("The ultimate test of whether a defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel is not the trial [court]'s advice, but the defendant's understanding."); State v. Cash, 309 S.C. 40, 43 , 419 S.E.2d 811, 813 (Ct. App. 1992) ("Factors the courts have considered in determining if an accused had sufficient backgro | 3 | 4 |
State v. Samuelgreen2 sentences2026See State v. Samuel, 422 S.C. 596, 602 , 813 S.E.2d 487, 490 (2018) ("Whether a defendant has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel is a mixed question of law and fact which appellate courts review de novo."); State v. Dial, 429 S.C. 128 , 133, 838 S.E.2d 501 , 504 (2020) ("A defendant may waive his right to counsel, but he must do so knowingly and intelligently."); id. ("For a knowing and intelligent waiver to occur, the defendant must be '(1) advised of his right to counsel; and (2) adequately warned of the dangers of self-representation.'" (quoting Prince v. 2026See State v. Samuel, 422 S.C. 596, 602 , 813 S.E.2d 487, 490 (2018) ("Whether a defendant has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel is a mixed question of law and fact which appellate courts review de novo."); State v. Dial, 429 S.C. 128 , 133, 838 S.E.2d 501 , 504 (2020) ("A defendant may waive his right to counsel, but he must do so knowingly and intelligently."); id. ("For a knowing and intelligent waiver to occur, the defendant must be '(1) advised of his right to counsel; and (2) adequately warned of the dangers of self-representation.'" (quoting Prince v. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Bryantgreen2 sentences2025We find Garvin was sufficiently informed of her right to counsel because she signed a notice of her probation hearing less than three months before the hearing and the probation court confirmed she signed the notice that "included [her] right to have an attorney represent [her]." See State v. Bryant, 383 S.C. 410, 414 , 680 S.E.2d 11, 13 (Ct. App. 2009) ("It is the trial court's responsibility to determine whether there was a knowing and intelligent waiver [of the right to counsel] by the accused."); id. at 416 , 680 S.E.2d at 14 (finding the "probation court's colloquy adequately informed Bry 2025We find Garvin was sufficiently informed of her right to counsel because she signed a notice of her probation hearing less than three months before the hearing and the probation court confirmed she signed the notice that "included [her] right to have an attorney represent [her]." See State v. Bryant, 383 S.C. 410, 414 , 680 S.E.2d 11, 13 (Ct. App. 2009) ("It is the trial court's responsibility to determine whether there was a knowing and intelligent waiver [of the right to counsel] by the accused."); id. at 416 , 680 S.E.2d at 14 (finding the "probation court's colloquy adequately informed Bry | 3 | 3 |
State v. Reedgreen2 sentences2020McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942))); State v. Reed, 332 S.C. 35, 41 , 503 S.E.2d 747, 750 (1998) ("The trial [court] has the responsibility to ensure that the accused is informed of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, and makes a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel."); id. ("The ultimate test of whether a defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel is the defendant's understanding."). 2020McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942))); State v. Reed, 332 S.C. 35, 41 , 503 S.E.2d 747, 750 (1998) ("The trial [court] has the responsibility to ensure that the accused is informed of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, and makes a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel."); id. ("The ultimate test of whether a defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel is the defendant's understanding."). | 3 | 3 |
Argersinger v. Hamlingreen2 sentences2014See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 , 92 S.Ct. 2006 , 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972) (holding that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial”); see also Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 , 122 S.Ct. 1764 , 152 L.Ed.2d 888 (2002) (finding "a suspended sentence that may ‘end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty’ may not be imposed unless the defendant was accorded 'the guiding hand of counsel’ in the prosecution for the crime charged” 2014See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 , 92 S.Ct. 2006 , 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972) (holding that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial”); see also Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 , 122 S.Ct. 1764 , 152 L.Ed.2d 888 (2002) (finding "a suspended sentence that may ‘end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty’ may not be imposed unless the defendant was accorded 'the guiding hand of counsel’ in the prosecution for the crime charged” | 3 | 3 |
State v. Rochevillegreen2 sentences2008See State v. Rocheville , 310 S.C. 20 , 25 n.4, 425 S.E.2d 32 , 35 n.4 (1993) (stating an exception to the contemporaneous objection rule exists when the record lacks evidence of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel because a pro se defendant should not be expected to raise the issue without assistance of counsel); State v. White , 305 S.C. 455, 456 , 409 S.E.2d 397, 397 (1991) (holding because the defendant appeared pro se at his sentencing hearing, the first time the defendant could raise the issue of lack of knowing and intelligent waiver of right to counsel was on appea 2008See State v. Rocheville , 310 S.C. 20 , 25 n.4, 425 S.E.2d 32 , 35 n.4 (1993) (stating an exception to the contemporaneous objection rule exists when the record lacks evidence of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel because a pro se defendant should not be expected to raise the issue without assistance of counsel); State v. White , 305 S.C. 455, 456 , 409 S.E.2d 397, 397 (1991) (holding because the defendant appeared pro se at his sentencing hearing, the first time the defendant could raise the issue of lack of knowing and intelligent waiver of right to counsel was on appea | 2 | 6 |
Wroten v. Stategreen2 sentences2012As to whether the trial court erred in allowing Norris to proceed pro se, we find a valid waiver of the right to counsel: Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) ("The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of our Constitution guarantee that a person brought to trial in any state or federal court must be afforded the right to the assistance of counsel before he can be validly convicted and punished by imprisonment."); State v. Bryant, 383 S.C. 410, 414 , 680 S.E.2d 11, 13 (Ct. App. 2009) ("It is the trial court's responsibility to determine whether there was a knowing and intelligent waiver b 2012As to whether the trial court erred in allowing Norris to proceed pro se, we find a valid waiver of the right to counsel: Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) ("The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of our Constitution guarantee that a person brought to trial in any state or federal court must be afforded the right to the assistance of counsel before he can be validly convicted and punished by imprisonment."); State v. Bryant, 383 S.C. 410, 414 , 680 S.E.2d 11, 13 (Ct. App. 2009) ("It is the trial court's responsibility to determine whether there was a knowing and intelligent waiver b | 2 | 3 |
State v. Batemangreen2 sentences2001Our precedent requires the trial judge to conduct “a hearing to determine whether a request to proceed pro se was accompanied by a knowing and intelligent waiver.” State v. Bateman, 296 S.C. 367, 369 , 373 S.E.2d 470, 471 (1988). 2001Our precedent requires the trial judge to conduct “a hearing to determine whether a request to proceed pro se was accompanied by a knowing and intelligent waiver.” State v. Bateman, 296 S.C. 367, 369 , 373 S.E.2d 470, 471 (1988). | 2 | 3 |
Watts v. Stategreen2 sentences2012As to whether the trial court erred in allowing Norris to proceed pro se, we find a valid waiver of the right to counsel: Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) ("The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of our Constitution guarantee that a person brought to trial in any state or federal court must be afforded the right to the assistance of counsel before he can be validly convicted and punished by imprisonment."); State v. Bryant, 383 S.C. 410, 414 , 680 S.E.2d 11, 13 (Ct. App. 2009) ("It is the trial court's responsibility to determine whether there was a knowing and intelligent waiver b 2012As to whether the trial court erred in allowing Norris to proceed pro se, we find a valid waiver of the right to counsel: Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) ("The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of our Constitution guarantee that a person brought to trial in any state or federal court must be afforded the right to the assistance of counsel before he can be validly convicted and punished by imprisonment."); State v. Bryant, 383 S.C. 410, 414 , 680 S.E.2d 11, 13 (Ct. App. 2009) ("It is the trial court's responsibility to determine whether there was a knowing and intelligent waiver b | 2 | 2 |
State v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2012As to whether the trial court erred in allowing Norris to proceed pro se, we find a valid waiver of the right to counsel: Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) ("The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of our Constitution guarantee that a person brought to trial in any state or federal court must be afforded the right to the assistance of counsel before he can be validly convicted and punished by imprisonment."); State v. Bryant, 383 S.C. 410, 414 , 680 S.E.2d 11, 13 (Ct. App. 2009) ("It is the trial court's responsibility to determine whether there was a knowing and intelligent waiver b 2012As to whether the trial court erred in allowing Norris to proceed pro se, we find a valid waiver of the right to counsel: Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) ("The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of our Constitution guarantee that a person brought to trial in any state or federal court must be afforded the right to the assistance of counsel before he can be validly convicted and punished by imprisonment."); State v. Bryant, 383 S.C. 410, 414 , 680 S.E.2d 11, 13 (Ct. App. 2009) ("It is the trial court's responsibility to determine whether there was a knowing and intelligent waiver b | 1 | 3 |
Ex Parte Jacksongreen2 sentences2020The pro se defendant cannot be expected to raise this issue without the aid of counsel." State v. Rocheville, 310 S.C. 20 , 25 n.4, 425 S.E.2d 32 , 35 n.4 (1993) (citing Cash, 304 S.C. at 224 , 403 S.E.2d at 633 ); see Ex parte Jackson, 381 S.C. 253 , 261 n.3, 672 S.E.2d 585 , 589 n.3 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Rocheville and finding defendant was not required to preserve issue of whether she knowingly and intelligently waived her right to counsel); see also Brown v. State, 317 S.C. 270, 273 , 453 S.E.2d 251, 253 (1994) (Finney, J., concurring) (stating, "while this Court will not ordinarily con 2020The pro se defendant cannot be expected to raise this issue without the aid of counsel." State v. Rocheville, 310 S.C. 20 , 25 n.4, 425 S.E.2d 32 , 35 n.4 (1993) (citing Cash, 304 S.C. at 224 , 403 S.E.2d at 633 ); see Ex parte Jackson, 381 S.C. 253 , 261 n.3, 672 S.E.2d 585 , 589 n.3 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Rocheville and finding defendant was not required to preserve issue of whether she knowingly and intelligently waived her right to counsel); see also Brown v. State, 317 S.C. 270, 273 , 453 S.E.2d 251, 253 (1994) (Finney, J., concurring) (stating, "while this Court will not ordinarily con | 1 | 2 |
Elmore v. Stategreen2 sentences2020Nevertheless, in State v. White, 305 S.C. 455 , 409 S.E.2d 397 (1991), the State argued an unrepresented defendant failed to preserve the voluntariness of his waiver of counsel to the trial court, and "this issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." 305 S.C. at 455 , 409 S.E.2d at 397 . 2008See State v. Rocheville , 310 S.C. 20 , 25 n.4, 425 S.E.2d 32 , 35 n.4 (1993) (stating an exception to the contemporaneous objection rule exists when the record lacks evidence of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel because a pro se defendant should not be expected to raise the issue without assistance of counsel); State v. White , 305 S.C. 455, 456 , 409 S.E.2d 397, 397 (1991) (holding because the defendant appeared pro se at his sentencing hearing, the first time the defendant could raise the issue of lack of knowing and intelligent waiver of right to counsel was on appea | 1 | 2 |
Huckaby v. Stategreen2 sentences2008See Huckaby v. State , 305 S.C. 331, 335 , 408 S.E.2d 242, 244 (1991) (stating a defendant in a probation revocation hearing must be advised of his right to counsel, the hearing court must determine if a defendants request to proceed pro se constituted a knowing and intelligent waiver, and the hearing court must make defendant aware of the dangers of self-representation). 2008See Huckaby v. State , 305 S.C. 331, 335 , 408 S.E.2d 242, 244 (1991) (stating a defendant in a probation revocation hearing must be advised of his right to counsel, the hearing court must determine if a defendants request to proceed pro se constituted a knowing and intelligent waiver, and the hearing court must make defendant aware of the dangers of self-representation). | 1 | 2 |
Osbey v. Stategreen1 sentence2021See Osbey, 425 S.C. at 619, 825 S.E.2d at 50 ("For a knowing and intelligent waiver to occur, the defendant must be '(1) advised of his right to counsel; and (2) adequately warned of the dangers of self-representation.'" (quoting Prince, 301 S.C. at 423-24 , 392 S.E.2d at 463 )). | 1 | 1 |
Adams v. United States Ex Rel. McCanngreen1 sentence2020McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942))); State v. Reed, 332 S.C. 35, 41 , 503 S.E.2d 747, 750 (1998) ("The trial [court] has the responsibility to ensure that the accused is informed of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, and makes a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel."); id. ("The ultimate test of whether a defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel is the defendant's understanding."). | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences2020The pro se defendant cannot be expected to raise this issue without the aid of counsel." State v. Rocheville, 310 S.C. 20 , 25 n.4, 425 S.E.2d 32 , 35 n.4 (1993) (citing Cash, 304 S.C. at 224 , 403 S.E.2d at 633 ); see Ex parte Jackson, 381 S.C. 253 , 261 n.3, 672 S.E.2d 585 , 589 n.3 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Rocheville and finding defendant was not required to preserve issue of whether she knowingly and intelligently waived her right to counsel); see also Brown v. State, 317 S.C. 270, 273 , 453 S.E.2d 251, 253 (1994) (Finney, J., concurring) (stating, "while this Court will not ordinarily con 2020The pro se defendant cannot be expected to raise this issue without the aid of counsel." State v. Rocheville, 310 S.C. 20 , 25 n.4, 425 S.E.2d 32 , 35 n.4 (1993) (citing Cash, 304 S.C. at 224 , 403 S.E.2d at 633 ); see Ex parte Jackson, 381 S.C. 253 , 261 n.3, 672 S.E.2d 585 , 589 n.3 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Rocheville and finding defendant was not required to preserve issue of whether she knowingly and intelligently waived her right to counsel); see also Brown v. State, 317 S.C. 270, 273 , 453 S.E.2d 251, 253 (1994) (Finney, J., concurring) (stating, "while this Court will not ordinarily con | 1 | 1 |
| In the Interest of Christopher H.green | 1 | 1 |
| Richardson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Alabama v. Sheltongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Robertsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Fullergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bray v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Aiken v. David Michael Koontzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dearybury v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jacksongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Castineiragreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Truesdalegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gardner v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Reedgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Arthurgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Graves v. State
green
2 sentences2002“The ultimate test of whether a defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel is not the trial judge’s advice, but the defendant’s understanding.” Id. (citing Graves v. State, 309 S.C. 307 , 422 S.E.2d 125 (1992)). 2002“The ultimate test of whether a defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel is not the trial judge’s advice, but the defendant’s understanding.” Id. (citing Graves v. State, 309 S.C. 307 , 422 S.E.2d 125 (1992)). | 3 | 1997–2002 |
State v. White
green
2 sentences2020Nevertheless, in State v. White, 305 S.C. 455 , 409 S.E.2d 397 (1991), the State argued an unrepresented defendant failed to preserve the voluntariness of his waiver of counsel to the trial court, and "this issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." 305 S.C. at 455 , 409 S.E.2d at 397 . 2008See State v. Rocheville , 310 S.C. 20 , 25 n.4, 425 S.E.2d 32 , 35 n.4 (1993) (stating an exception to the contemporaneous objection rule exists when the record lacks evidence of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel because a pro se defendant should not be expected to raise the issue without assistance of counsel); State v. White , 305 S.C. 455, 456 , 409 S.E.2d 397, 397 (1991) (holding because the defendant appeared pro se at his sentencing hearing, the first time the defendant could raise the issue of lack of knowing and intelligent waiver of right to counsel was on appea | 2 | 2008–2020 |
Whitehead v. State
green
2 sentences2018We went on to hold in Whitehead that "when a PCR application is not dismissed before a hearing is held, the PCR judge must appoint counsel or obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of that right by the applicant." 310 S.C. at 535 , 426 S.E.2d at 316 . 2018We went on to hold in Whitehead that "when a PCR application is not dismissed before a hearing is held, the PCR judge must appoint counsel or obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of that right by the applicant." 310 S.C. at 535 , 426 S.E.2d at 316 . | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Scott v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2007Then in Scott , the Supreme Court noted "the central premise of Argersinger that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonmentis eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel." 440 U.S. at 373 , 99 S.Ct. at 1162, 59 L.Ed.2d at 389 . 2007Then in Scott , the Supreme Court noted "the central premise of Argersinger that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonmentis eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel." 440 U.S. at 373 , 99 S.Ct. at 1162, 59 L.Ed.2d at 389 . | 2 | 2005–2007 |
Salley v. State
green
2 sentences1994Assuming appellant was entitled to appellate counsel before the circuit, we hold the court was not required to make a second specific inquiry to determine whether he made his decision to continue proceeding pro se “with his eyes open.” Cf. Salley v. State, 306 S.C. 213 , 410 S.E. (2d) 921 (1991) (where the trial judge has a duty to ensure a defendant makes an intelligent and competent waiver of the right to counsel, but makes no specific inquiry of the defendant, the appellate court will look to the record to discern whether there are facts to show the defendant had sufficient background or wa 1994Assuming appellant was entitled to appellate counsel before the circuit, we hold the court was not required to make a second specific inquiry to determine whether he made his decision to continue proceeding pro se “with his eyes open.” Cf. Salley v. State, 306 S.C. 213 , 410 S.E. (2d) 921 (1991) (where the trial judge has a duty to ensure a defendant makes an intelligent and competent waiver of the right to counsel, but makes no specific inquiry of the defendant, the appellate court will look to the record to discern whether there are facts to show the defendant had sufficient background or wa | 2 | 1994–2006 |
Iowa v. Tovar
green
1 sentence2021In Tovar, which followed a guilty plea and was decided in 2004—after Gardner but before Osbey—the Court held two specific warnings required by the Iowa Supreme Court were not "mandated by the Sixth Amendment," adding that "[t]he constitutional requirement is satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the charges against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea." 541 U.S. at 81 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Barnes
green
2 sentences2021A defendant may waive his right to counsel, but he must do so knowingly and intelligently."); id. ("For a knowing and intelligent waiver to occur, the defendant must be '(1) advised of his right to counsel; and (2) adequately warned of the dangers of self- representation.'" (quoting Prince v. State, 301 S.C. 422, 423-24 , 392 S.E.2d 462, 463 (1990))); Samuel, 422 S.C. at 603-04 , 813 S.E.2d at 491 ("Although a defendant's decision to proceed pro se may ultimately be to his detriment, such requests 'must be honored out of that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.'") (qu 2021A defendant may waive his right to counsel, but he must do so knowingly and intelligently."); id. ("For a knowing and intelligent waiver to occur, the defendant must be '(1) advised of his right to counsel; and (2) adequately warned of the dangers of self- representation.'" (quoting Prince v. State, 301 S.C. 422, 423-24 , 392 S.E.2d 462, 463 (1990))); Samuel, 422 S.C. at 603-04 , 813 S.E.2d at 491 ("Although a defendant's decision to proceed pro se may ultimately be to his detriment, such requests 'must be honored out of that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.'") (qu | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Roberson green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. McClinton green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. H. Walter Hendrix, III and Jean K. Hendrix green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Gideon v. Wainwright green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Cabrera-Pena green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Patterson green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Woods v. Bivens green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Ritch green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Slayton v. State green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| United States v. Odell Bennett green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. Orr green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| State v. Hall green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| State v. Coto neutral | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Jacobs green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Cain green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Loftin green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| State v. Key green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Oregon v. Bradshaw green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| State v. Keith green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| State v. Hallock green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.