knowing and intelligent waiver in Maryland

2004See also Vincenti v. State, 309 Md. 601, 604 , 525 A.2d 1072, 1074 (1987)("[T]he rule implements the constitutional mandates for waiver of counsel, detailing a specific procedure that must be followed by the trial court in order for there to be a knowing and intelligent waiver.").

2004See also Vincenti v. State, 309 Md. 601, 604 , 525 A.2d 1072, 1074 (1987)("[T]he rule implements the constitutional mandates for waiver of counsel, detailing a specific procedure that must be followed by the trial court in order for there to be a knowing and intelligent waiver.").

2023See State v. Wischhusen, 342 Md. 530, 540 , 677 A.2d 595, 600 (1996).

2023See State v. Wischhusen, 342 Md. 530, 540 , 677 A.2d 595, 600 (1996).

2011See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 611-12 , 124 S.Ct. at 2610 , 159 L.Ed.2d at 655 ("The threshold issue when interrogators question first and warn later is thus whether it would be reasonable to find that in these circumstances the warnings could function ‘effectively’ as Miranda requires.”).

2005Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 (stating that, when the government seeks to rely on a waiver of rights, it carries “a heavy burden” to show “that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination ____”); see Seibert, 124 S.Ct. at 2609-10 (“Miranda addressed ‘interrogation practices ... likely ... to disable [an individual] from making a free and rational choice’ about speaking, and held that a suspect must be ‘adequately and effectively’ advised of the choice the Constitution guarantees.”) (citations omitted; alteration and omissions in Seibert)

1983However, in State v. Renshaw, 276 Md. 259 , 347 A.2d 219 (1975), we did observe that “[competency to stand trial and competency to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel are not necessarily the same.” Id. at 267 n. 3, 347 A.2d at 225 [citing Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150 , 86 S.Ct. 1320 , 16 L.Ed.2d 429 (1966); Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 , 75 S.Ct. 145 , 99 L.Ed. 135 (1954).] In Westbrook, supra, the Supreme Court imposed a “protecting duty,” id. at 151 , 86 S.Ct. at 1320 , upon the trial court.

1983However, in State v. Renshaw, 276 Md. 259 , 347 A.2d 219 (1975), we did observe that “[competency to stand trial and competency to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel are not necessarily the same.” Id. at 267 n. 3, 347 A.2d at 225 [citing Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150 , 86 S.Ct. 1320 , 16 L.Ed.2d 429 (1966); Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 , 75 S.Ct. 145 , 99 L.Ed. 135 (1954).] In Westbrook, supra, the Supreme Court imposed a “protecting duty,” id. at 151 , 86 S.Ct. at 1320 , upon the trial court.

1979App. 399, 407 , 392 A. 2d 100, 104 (1978), the appellant argues that: “ ... the trial court [may not] proceed with the trial on the merits until there has been compliance with Rule 735 d, i.e., a determination on the record of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to trial by jury.

1979App. 399, 407 , 392 A. 2d 100, 104 (1978), the appellants argue that: “... the trial court [may not] proceed with trial on the merits until there has been compliance with Rule 735 d, i. e., a determination on the record of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to a trial by jury.

1975See Towers v. Director, 16 Md.

1973See Towers v. Director, 16 Md.

1999See also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 , 92 S.Ct. 2006, 2012 , 32 L.Ed.2d 530, 538 (1972)(“[A]b-sent a knowing and intelligent waiver [of counsel], no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.”)(emphasis added)(footnote omitted); Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 279 , 63 S.Ct. 236, 242 , 87 L.Ed. 268, 275 (1942)(“[A defendant] may waive his Constitutional right to assistance of counsel if he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.”).

1999See also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 , 92 S.Ct. 2006, 2012 , 32 L.Ed.2d 530, 538 (1972)(“[A]b-sent a knowing and intelligent waiver [of counsel], no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.”)(emphasis added)(footnote omitted); Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 279 , 63 S.Ct. 236, 242 , 87 L.Ed. 268, 275 (1942)(“[A defendant] may waive his Constitutional right to assistance of counsel if he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.”).

2006The Supreme Court further explored the heightened standard of waiver in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), in which the Court held that a knowing and intelligent waiver was not required for the defendant to consent to a search of his vehicle because: It would be unrealistic to expect that in the informal, unstructured context of a consent search, a policeman, upon pain of tainting the evidence obtained, could make the detailed type of examination demanded by Johnson .

2006The Supreme Court further explored the heightened standard of waiver in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), in which the Court held that a knowing and intelligent waiver was not required for the defendant to consent to a search of his vehicle because: It would be unrealistic to expect that in the informal, unstructured context of a consent search, a policeman, upon pain of tainting the evidence obtained, could make the detailed type of examination demanded by Johnson .

2004To address these concerns, Maryland adopted Rule 4-215. [11] See Johnson v. State, 355 Md. 420, 444 , 735 A.2d 1003, 1016 (1999), in which this Court observed: "Maryland Rule 4-215(a) implements the constitutional mandates for waiver of counsel, detailing a specific procedure that must be followed by the trial court in order for there to be a knowing and intelligent waiver.

2004To address these concerns, Maryland adopted Rule 4-215. [11] See Johnson v. State, 355 Md. 420, 444 , 735 A.2d 1003, 1016 (1999), in which this Court observed: "Maryland Rule 4-215(a) implements the constitutional mandates for waiver of counsel, detailing a specific procedure that must be followed by the trial court in order for there to be a knowing and intelligent waiver.

2014The Court explained first that “an ambiguity in an on-the-record colloquy between the defendant and his counsel concerning the right to testify will not necessarily undermine a knowing and intelligent waiver of that right[.]” Id. at 91, 622 A.2d at 733 .

2003The intermediate appellate court, relying on Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 77, 85 , 622 A.2d 727, 730 (1993), held that, although Gregg had engaged in certain "strange" behavior, the record supported the conclusion that he (1) understood the proceedings to which he was a party and (2) was able to assert "his rights as they arose throughout the proceedings." The court further concluded that Gregg was competent to, and did, affect a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.

2011In reviewing the record in Parren and pointing to some factors possibly indicating a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel, the Pairen opinion continued ( 309 Md. at 275-276 , 523 A.2d at 604-605 , footnote omitted): “What gives pause in a determination of whether the constitutional standard was satisfied is that the record does not conclusively show that the defendants had ‘an apprehension of ... the range of allowable punishments,’ Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 724 , 68 S.Ct. at 323 , for the crimes charged.

2011In reviewing the record in Parren and pointing to some factors possibly indicating a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel, the Pairen opinion continued ( 309 Md. at 275-276 , 523 A.2d at 604-605 , footnote omitted): “What gives pause in a determination of whether the constitutional standard was satisfied is that the record does not conclusively show that the defendants had ‘an apprehension of ... the range of allowable punishments,’ Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 724 , 68 S.Ct. at 323 , for the crimes charged.

2005See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 , 120 S.Ct. 2326 (noting that “statements which may be by no means involuntary, made by a defendant who is aware of his ‘rights,’ may nonetheless be excluded” because of a Miranda violation); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 483, 484 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (holding that state court erroneously concluded that defendant’s admission was voluntary, without deciding whether defendant “had knowingly and intelligently relinquished” his Miranda rights, and noting that “the voluntariness of ... an admission on the one hand, and a knowing and intelligent

2005See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 , 120 S.Ct. 2326 (noting that “statements which may be by no means involuntary, made by a defendant who is aware of his ‘rights,’ may nonetheless be excluded” because of a Miranda violation); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 483, 484 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (holding that state court erroneously concluded that defendant’s admission was voluntary, without deciding whether defendant “had knowingly and intelligently relinquished” his Miranda rights, and noting that “the voluntariness of ... an admission on the one hand, and a knowing and intelligent

2009See also In re Blessen H., 163 Md.App. 1, 12 [ 877 A.2d 161 ] (2005) (stating that a “guilty plea ... requires a defendant’s knowing and intelligent waiver of the trial-related constitutional rights,” which include “privilege against compelled self-incrimination”) (citing Hersch v. Cleary [State], 317 Md. 200, 206 [ 562 A.2d 1254 ] (1989)).

2009See also In re Blessen H., 163 Md.App. 1, 12 [ 877 A.2d 161 ] (2005) (stating that a “guilty plea ... requires a defendant’s knowing and intelligent waiver of the trial-related constitutional rights,” which include “privilege against compelled self-incrimination”) (citing Hersch v. Cleary [State], 317 Md. 200, 206 [ 562 A.2d 1254 ] (1989)).

1998In Williams, 292 Md. at 219 , 438 A.2d at 1310 , we expressly emphasized this distinction by holding that a criminal defendant could ordinarily waive the right to be present, either through counsel or by inaction, if such a waiver did not implicate the right to confrontation or any other right requiring a knowing and intelligent waiver.

1998In Williams, 292 Md. at 219 , 438 A.2d at 1310 , we expressly emphasized this distinction by holding that a criminal defendant could ordinarily waive the right to be present, either through counsel or by inaction, if such a waiver did not implicate the right to confrontation or any other right requiring a knowing and intelligent waiver.

1983However, in State v. Renshaw, 276 Md. 259 , 347 A.2d 219 (1975), we did observe that “[competency to stand trial and competency to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel are not necessarily the same.” Id. at 267 n. 3, 347 A.2d at 225 [citing Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150 , 86 S.Ct. 1320 , 16 L.Ed.2d 429 (1966); Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 , 75 S.Ct. 145 , 99 L.Ed. 135 (1954).] In Westbrook, supra, the Supreme Court imposed a “protecting duty,” id. at 151 , 86 S.Ct. at 1320 , upon the trial court.

1983However, in State v. Renshaw, 276 Md. 259 , 347 A.2d 219 (1975), we did observe that “[competency to stand trial and competency to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel are not necessarily the same.” Id. at 267 n. 3, 347 A.2d at 225 [citing Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150 , 86 S.Ct. 1320 , 16 L.Ed.2d 429 (1966); Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 , 75 S.Ct. 145 , 99 L.Ed. 135 (1954).] In Westbrook, supra, the Supreme Court imposed a “protecting duty,” id. at 151 , 86 S.Ct. at 1320 , upon the trial court.

1968See Cummings v. Warden, 243 Md. 702 ; Ware v. State, 235 Md. 131 .

1968Cummings v. Warden, 243 Md. 702 ; Ware v. State, 235 Md. 131 ; Montgomery v. Warden, supra. The classic definition of waiver of a federal constitutional right is that contained in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 , i.e., “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” In Manning v. State, supra, the Maryland Court of Appeals gave explicit recognition to the holding of the Supreme Court in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 516 , viz.: “Presuming waiver [of the right to counsel] from a silent record is impermissible.

2019See also McElroy v. State , 329 Md. 136 , 140, 617 A.2d 1068 , 1070 (1993) (A knowing and intelligent waiver of fundamental constitutional rights will be found on post-conviction only if the defendant's knowledge of the right and personal waiver were reflected in the record.).

2019See also McElroy v. State , 329 Md. 136 , 140, 617 A.2d 1068 , 1070 (1993) (A knowing and intelligent waiver of fundamental constitutional rights will be found on post-conviction only if the defendant's knowledge of the right and personal waiver were reflected in the record.).

2018Rule 8- 131(a); see also Conyers v. State, 367 Md. 571, 593-95 (2001) (“Ordinarily, an argument not raised in the proceedings below is not preserved for appellate review.”). 43 Where the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel has been raised and decided in a previous post-conviction proceeding, does a petitioner, absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, have the right to raise such issue again but on a different ground in a reopening of that proceeding?