knowing and intelligent waiver in Connecticut

2019Edwards v. Arizona , [ 451 U.S. 477 , 483, 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) ]....

2019Edwards v. Arizona , [ 451 U.S. 477 , 483, 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) ]....

2017In each of those cases, we concluded that the defendant had validly *225 waived his right to counsel, although none of those decisions indicated that the defendant had been expressly apprised of the elements of the crimes charged." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bangulescu , 80 Conn.App. 26 , 45-46, 832 A.2d 1187 , cert. denied, 267 Conn. 907 , 840 A.2d 1171 (2003) ; accord State v. Wolff , 237 Conn. 633 , 656, 678 A.2d 1369 (1996) (" 'perfect comprehension of each element of a criminal charge does not appear to be necessary to a finding of a knowing and intelli

2006In fact . . . perfect comprehension of each element of a criminal charge does not appear to be necessary to a finding of a knowing and intelligent waiver.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bangulescu, 80 Conn. App. 26, 45 , 832 A.2d 1187 , cert. denied, 267 Conn. 907 , 840 A.2d 1171 (2003).

2017In each of those cases, we concluded that the defendant had validly *225 waived his right to counsel, although none of those decisions indicated that the defendant had been expressly apprised of the elements of the crimes charged." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bangulescu , 80 Conn.App. 26 , 45-46, 832 A.2d 1187 , cert. denied, 267 Conn. 907 , 840 A.2d 1171 (2003) ; accord State v. Wolff , 237 Conn. 633 , 656, 678 A.2d 1369 (1996) (" 'perfect comprehension of each element of a criminal charge does not appear to be necessary to a finding of a knowing and intelli

2006In fact . . . perfect comprehension of each element of a criminal charge does not appear to be necessary to a finding of a knowing and intelligent waiver.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bangulescu, 80 Conn. App. 26, 45 , 832 A.2d 1187 , cert. denied, 267 Conn. 907 , 840 A.2d 1171 (2003).

2017In each of those cases, we concluded that the defendant had validly *225 waived his right to counsel, although none of those decisions indicated that the defendant had been expressly apprised of the elements of the crimes charged." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bangulescu , 80 Conn.App. 26 , 45-46, 832 A.2d 1187 , cert. denied, 267 Conn. 907 , 840 A.2d 1171 (2003) ; accord State v. Wolff , 237 Conn. 633 , 656, 678 A.2d 1369 (1996) (" 'perfect comprehension of each element of a criminal charge does not appear to be necessary to a finding of a knowing and intelli

2017In each of those cases, we concluded that the defendant had validly *225 waived his right to counsel, although none of those decisions indicated that the defendant had been expressly apprised of the elements of the crimes charged." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bangulescu , 80 Conn.App. 26 , 45-46, 832 A.2d 1187 , cert. denied, 267 Conn. 907 , 840 A.2d 1171 (2003) ; accord State v. Wolff , 237 Conn. 633 , 656, 678 A.2d 1369 (1996) (" 'perfect comprehension of each element of a criminal charge does not appear to be necessary to a finding of a knowing and intelli

1994State v. Hernandez , 204 Conn. 377 (1987).

1990State v. Hernandez, supra, 396 , 397 and cases cited therein.

2026The inquiry mandated by . . . § 44-3 is designed to ensure the knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel that constitutionally is required.” (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Trice, 235 Conn. App. 203 , 241–42, 345 A.3d 433 , cert. denied, 353 Conn. 927 , 346 A.3d 512 (2025).

2026The inquiry mandated by . . . § 44-3 is designed to ensure the knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel that constitutionally is required.” (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Trice, 235 Conn. App. 203 , 241–42, 345 A.3d 433 , cert. denied, 353 Conn. 927 , 346 A.3d 512 (2025).

2025We disagree. ‘‘[W]hen the law governing a defendant’s constitutional claim has changed after the defendant’s trial, counsel acting under binding precedent in effect at the time of 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 31 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 33 Santaniello v. Commissioner of Correction the trial cannot make a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights affected by the later decision changing the law.’’ State v. Johnson, 345 Conn. 174 , 188–89, 283 A.3d 477 (2022).9 Further, although the respondent is correct that Johnson had not been decided at the time of the petitioner’s criminal trial, it would have

2025We disagree. ‘‘[W]hen the law governing a defendant’s constitutional claim has changed after the defendant’s trial, counsel acting under binding precedent in effect at the time of 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 31 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 33 Santaniello v. Commissioner of Correction the trial cannot make a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights affected by the later decision changing the law.’’ State v. Johnson, 345 Conn. 174 , 188–89, 283 A.3d 477 (2022).9 Further, although the respondent is correct that Johnson had not been decided at the time of the petitioner’s criminal trial, it would have

2023This is consistent with the principle that, ‘‘at a minimum, all defendants whose cases [are] still pending on direct appeal at the time of [a law changing] decision should be entitled to invoke the new rule.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grif- fith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 , 107 S. Ct. 708 , 93 L.

2023This is consistent with the principle that, ‘‘at a minimum, all defendants whose cases [are] still pending on direct appeal at the time of [a law changing] decision should be entitled to invoke the new rule.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grif- fith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 , 107 S. Ct. 708 , 93 L.

2022Conversely, once there has been an unequivocal request for self-representation, a court must undertake an inquiry [pursuant to Practice Book § 44-3],8 on the record, to inform the defendant of the risks of self-representation and to permit him to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.’’ (Footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Paschal, 207 Conn. App. 328 , 332–34, 262 A.3d 893 , cert. denied, 340 Conn. 902 , 263 A.3d 387 (2021), cert. denied, U.S. , 142 S. Ct. 1395 , L.

2013“Although a defendant need not have the skill and expertise of an attorney to competently and intelligently choose to proceed pro se, a record that affirmatively shows that [he] was literate, competent, and understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising his informed free will sufficiently supports a waiver.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 419 . “[0]nce there has been an unequivocal request for self-representation, a court must undertake an inquiry [pursuant to Practice Book § 44-3], on the record, to inform the defendant of the risks of self-representation and to permit him to

2013“Although a defendant need not have the skill and expertise of an attorney to competently and intelligently choose to proceed pro se, a record that affirmatively shows that [he] was literate, competent, and understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising his informed free will sufficiently supports a waiver.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 419 . “[0]nce there has been an unequivocal request for self-representation, a court must undertake an inquiry [pursuant to Practice Book § 44-3], on the record, to inform the defendant of the risks of self-representation and to permit him to

2012Recognizing that importance, we agree with our Supreme Court’s statement in State v. Drakeford, 202 Conn. 75, 81 , 519 A.2d 1194 (1987), that “[w]hile we have not required the procedure of bringing the defendant personally before the court, advising him of his right to be present, and then permitting a knowing and intelligent waiver ... we do believe that a defendant should be warned of the consequences of his failure to attend trial.” (Citation omitted.) The court concluded, however, that “it is sufficient if the trial court indicates to the defendant that the trial will continue in his absen

2012Recognizing that importance, we agree with our Supreme Court’s statement in State v. Drakeford, 202 Conn. 75, 81 , 519 A.2d 1194 (1987), that “[w]hile we have not required the procedure of bringing the defendant personally before the court, advising him of his right to be present, and then permitting a knowing and intelligent waiver ... we do believe that a defendant should be warned of the consequences of his failure to attend trial.” (Citation omitted.) The court concluded, however, that “it is sufficient if the trial court indicates to the defendant that the trial will continue in his absen

2012“It is well settled that counsel has the authority to waive such a right and that the court can rely on counsel’s representations regarding the propriety of the instructions at any stage of the proceeding. . . . [T]he requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver by the defendant himself is inapplicable when . . . counsel has waived a potential constitutional claim in the exercise of his or her professional judgment.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mungroo, 299 Conn. 667, 677 , 11 A.3d 132 (2011). 16 See footnote 9 of this opinion. 17 We recognize that there a

2012“It is well settled that counsel has the authority to waive such a right and that the court can rely on counsel’s representations regarding the propriety of the instructions at any stage of the proceeding. . . . [T]he requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver by the defendant himself is inapplicable when . . . counsel has waived a potential constitutional claim in the exercise of his or her professional judgment.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mungroo, 299 Conn. 667, 677 , 11 A.3d 132 (2011). 16 See footnote 9 of this opinion. 17 We recognize that there a

2012Id., at 419, 978 A.2d 64 .

2012Conversely, once there has been an unequivocal request for self-representation, a court must undertake an inquiry [pursuant to Practice Book § 44-3], on the record, to inform the defendant of the risks of self-representation and to permit him to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 423, 978 A.2d 64 .

2012In Mozell v. Commissioner of Correction, 291 Conn. 62, 70 , 967 A.2d 41 (2009), this court held that where the defendant, personally and through counsel, had expressly waived his right to trial, reversal for plain error was not appropriate because “if there has been a valid waiver, there is no error for us to correct.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) See also State v. Kitchens, supra, 299 Conn. 474 n. 18 (citing for this proposition in case in which defendant did not claim plain error).

2012In Mozell v. Commissioner of Correction, 291 Conn. 62, 70 , 967 A.2d 41 (2009), this court held that where the defendant, personally and through counsel, had expressly waived his right to trial, reversal for plain error was not appropriate because “if there has been a valid waiver, there is no error for us to correct.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) See also State v. Kitchens, supra, 299 Conn. 474 n. 18 (citing for this proposition in case in which defendant did not claim plain error).

2011(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cobb, 251 Conn. 285, 372 , 743 A.2d 1 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 841 , 121 S. Ct. 106 , 148 L.

2011(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cobb, 251 Conn. 285, 372 , 743 A.2d 1 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 841 , 121 S. Ct. 106 , 148 L.

2011(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cobb, 251 Conn. 285, 372 , 743 A.2d 1 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 841 , 121 S. Ct. 106 , 148 L.

2011(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cobb, 251 Conn. 285, 372 , 743 A.2d 1 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 841 , 121 S. Ct. 106 , 148 L.

2011(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cobb, 251 Conn. 285, 372 , 743 A.2d 1 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 841 , 121 S. Ct. 106 , 148 L.

2011As we stated in State v. Holness, 289 Conn. 535 , 958 A.2d 754 (2008), in which we considered whether a jury instruction was adequate to safeguard the defendant's constitutional rights, the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver by the defendant himself is "inapplicable when ... counsel has waived a potential constitutional claim in the exercise of his or her professional judgment." Id., at 544 , 958 A.2d 754 .

2011As we stated in State v. Holness, 289 Conn. 535 , 958 A.2d 754 (2008), in which we considered whether a jury instruction was adequate to safeguard the defendant's constitutional rights, the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver by the defendant himself is "inapplicable when ... counsel has waived a potential constitutional claim in the exercise of his or her professional judgment." Id., at 544 , 958 A.2d 754 .

2010Id., 463 .

2009“To invoke his [s]ixth [ajmendment right [to self-representation] under Faretta [v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 806 ] a defendant does not need to recite some *424 talismanic formula hoping to open the eyes and ears of the court to his request.

2007Our Supreme Court further explained: “By contrast, once there has been an unequivocal request for self-representation, a court must undertake an inquiry, on the record, to inform the defendant of the risks of self-representation and to permit him to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.” Id., 613 n.9.

2007Our Supreme Court further explained: "By contrast, once there has been an unequivocal request for self-representation, a court must undertake an inquiry, on the record, to inform the defendant of the risks of self-representation and to permit him to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel." Id., at 613 n. 9, 513 A.2d 47 .

2005United States v. Robinson, 913 F.2d 712, 715 (9th Cir. 1990) [cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1104 , 111 S. Ct. 1006 , 112 L.