knowing and intelligent waiver in Massachusetts

2011Id. [A]s a matter of Massachusetts practice, the Commonwealth must prove a knowing and intelligent waiver beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Day, 387 Mass. 140, 145 (1982). 1 On the basis of the record before me, it cannot be said that the Commonwealth met that burden.

2009The premise of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 , was that “without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.” While the Court consequently held that the admission of statements obtained through custodial interrogation in the absence of safeguards was not permissible, the Court described a procedure that would suffice to render inf

2005In Commonwealth v. Day, 387 Mass. 915, 920-21 (1983), the new rule being applied imposed a “beyond a reasonable doubt” burden on the Commonwealth to prove a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights by a defendant.

1995The Commonwealth had the burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt, Commonwealth v. Day, 387 Mass. 915, 921 (1983) (“as a matter of Massachusetts practice, the Commonwealth must prove a knowing and intelligent waiver beyond a reasonable doubt”), that the defendant’s waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

2017When a suspect is under the influence of alcohol or drugs, "police should not assume they can immediately receive a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights and commence interrogation." Commonwealth v. Hosey, 368 Mass. 571, 579 (1975).

1980This is not a case like Commonwealth v. Hosey, 368 Mass. 571, 575-579 (1975), where the police should have discerned from the defendant’s conduct and characteristics or from other attendant circumstances that the defendant was incapable of making a knowing and intelligent waiver.

1981Commonwealth v. Roy, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 14, 19-20 (1974).

1977“The absence of a written waiver is not crucial if... it can be found that in the circumstances a knowing and intelligent waiver took place.” Commonwealth v. Roy, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 14, 20 (1974).

1997Moreover, “[n]ot every asserted waiver of a constitutional right by a criminal defendant [must be] tested by the knowing and intelligent waiver standard.” Spence v. Reeder, supra, citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235, 237 (1973) (“Our cases do not reflect an uncritical demand for a knowing and intelligent waiver in every situation where a person has failed to invoke a constitutional protection”).

1981See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235, 237 (1973) (“Our cases do not reflect an uncritical demand for a knowing and intelligent waiver in every situation where a person has failed to invoke a constitutional protection”); Lydon v. Commonwealth, 381 Mass. 356, 363 , cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1065 (1980); Camp v. United States, 587 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1978).

1981There is also ample support for the judge’s conclusion that the defendant voluntarily waived his rights prior to making the statement. 9 “[I]f the record demonstrates that a defendant has been clearly and accurately told of the Miranda rights and that he has affirmatively acknowledged his understanding of those rights, a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights may be inferred, in circumstances not otherwise casting doubt on voluntary waiver.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, supra at 230 , and cases cited.

1981The defendant contends that both statements should *173 have been excluded because he did not explicitly waive his rights. “[I]f the record demonstrates that a defendant has been clearly and accurately told of the Miranda rights and that he has affirmatively acknowledged his understanding of those rights, a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights may be inferred, in circumstances not otherwise casting doubt on voluntary waiver.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 226, 230 (1975), and cases cited.

1989Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492, 497 (1977). 66 “In those jurisdictions which have adopted the ‘interested adult’ rule, the courts have generally held that to demonstrate a knowing and intelligent waiver by a juvenile the State must first prove that the juvenile and his parent, or if a parent is not available, someone in loco parentis, were fully advised of the juvenile’s right against self-incrimination through administration of the standard Miranda warnings.

1989See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, supra. We conclude that, for the Commonwealth successfully to demonstrate a knowing and intelligent waiver by a juvenile, in most cases it should show that a parent or an interested adult was present, understood the warnings, and had the opportunity to explain his rights to the juvenile so that the juvenile understands the significance of waiver of these rights.

2010We then went beyond the Supreme Court and held as a matter of State law that “to demonstrate a knowing and intelligent waiver by a juvenile, in most cases [the Commonwealth] should show that a parent or an interested adult was present, understood the warnings, and had the opportunity to explain his rights to the juvenile so that the juvenile understands the significance of waiver of these rights” and that “in the case of juveniles who are under the age of fourteen ... no waiver can be effective without this added protection.” Id. at 134 .

2010We then went beyond the Supreme Court and held as a matter of State law that "to demonstrate a knowing and intelligent waiver by a juvenile, in most cases [the Commonwealth] should show that a parent or an interested adult was present, understood the warnings, and had the opportunity to explain his rights to the juvenile so that the juvenile understands the significance of waiver of these rights" and that "in the case of juveniles who are under the age of fourteen... no waiver can be effective without this added protection." Id. at 134 .

1983We conclude that the Commonwealth has not sustained its heavy burden of demonstrating that the statement made by the juvenile was obtained after a knowing and intelligent waiver by the juvenile of his rights, Commonwealth v. Cain, 361 Mass. 224 (1972), and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Juvenile Court.

1983See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (adult advice may be necessary to put juvenile defendant on more equal footing with police) . . . .” Commonwealth v. Cain, supra at 229 n.3. 3 In those jurisdictions which have adopted the “interested adult” rule, the courts have generally held that to demonstrate a knowing and intelligent waiver by a juvenile the *134 State must first prove that the juvenile and his parent, or if a parent is not available, someone in loco parentis, were fully advised of the juvenile’s right against self-incrimination through administration of the standard Miranda warn

2011The questions we must answer are: “(1) whether there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver of the Miranda requirements; and (2) whether, in the totality of the circumstances, the [statements] given were the product of a free will, and not the result of coercion or intimidation.” Commonwealth v. Mello, 420 Mass. 375, 383 (1995) (Mello), citing Commonwealth v. Parham, 390 Mass. 833, 838 (1984).

1995Commonwealth v. Parham, 390 Mass. 833, 838 (1984).

2008Commonwealth v. Freeman, 430 Mass. 111, 115 (1999); see also Commonwealth v. Harris, 11 Mass.App.Ct. 165, 173 (1981) (“a knowing and intelligent waiver of [Miranda] rights maybe inferred, in circumstances not otherwise casting doubt on voluntary waiver”).

2001Commonwealth v. Freeman, 430 Mass. 111, 114 (1999), and cases cited.

2008Commonwealth v. Freeman, 430 Mass. 111, 115 (1999); see also Commonwealth v. Harris, 11 Mass.App.Ct. 165, 173 (1981) (“a knowing and intelligent waiver of [Miranda] rights maybe inferred, in circumstances not otherwise casting doubt on voluntary waiver”).

2001See Commonwealth v. Hussey (No. 1), 410 Mass. 664, 671 , cert, denied, 502 U.S. 988 (1991); Commonwealth v. Harris, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 165, 173 (1981) (“a knowing and intelligent waiver of [Miranda] rights may be inferred, in circumstances not otherwise casting doubt on voluntary waiver”).

1997See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 4 The precise issue presented: whether, in the absence of a knowing and intelligent waiver, a defendant may raise the defense of double jeopardy for the first time on direct appeal from the proceeding that allegedly violated his protected rights, is a matter of first impression in this Commonwealth.

1980There is, therefore, neither a knowing and intelligent waiver of a constitutional right on this record, see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938), nor evidence that the statement was signed with “awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).

2025To determine the validity of a Miranda waiver and the voluntariness of any subsequent statements, the court must ask "(l) whether there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver of the Miranda requirements; and (2) whether, in the totality of the circumstances, the statements given were the product of a free will, and not the result of coercion or intimidation." Commonwealth v. Martinez, 458 Mass. 684, 691 (2011) (internal citations omitted). -8- Here, Metellus asserts his Miranda waiver was invalid and his statements involuntary, due to a combination of the following circumstances: (1) he ini

2017Contrary to the judge's conclusion, the video recording of the defendant's interview with the police does not reveal a person who is "far too intoxicated to be able to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to remain silent." 25 See Commonwealth v. Simmons, 417 Mass. 60, 65-66 (1994).

2014We are mindful of the significant consequences of civil commitment proceedings and the desire to ensure adequate procedural safeguards, see Kirk v. Commonwealth, 459 Mass. 67, 72 (2011) (reviewing protections afforded to patients undergoing civil commitment proceedings); however, any interpretation that would preclude patient-psychotherapist communications from evidence at a civil commitment hearing absent a knowing and intelligent waiver of the patient-psychotherapist privilege, would not only fail to effectuate the plain language of the relevant statutes, but would also contravene the Legisl

2014See City of Worcester v. College Hill Props., LLC, 465 Mass. 134, 138 (2013) (statute should not be construed such that its application would lead to absurd result).

2011The questions we must answer are: “(1) whether there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver of the Miranda requirements; and (2) whether, in the totality of the circumstances, the [statements] given were the product of a free will, and not the result of coercion or intimidation.” Commonwealth v. Mello, 420 Mass. 375, 383 (1995) (Mello), citing Commonwealth v. Parham, 390 Mass. 833, 838 (1984).

2010“The decision to grant a motion for a new trial rests soundly within the judge’s discretion and ‘will not be reversed unless it is manifestly unjust or . . . the trial was infected with prejudicial constitutional error.’ Commonwealth v. Nieves, 429 Mass. 763, 770 (1999).

2009Commonwealth v. Martin, 425 Mass. 718, 720 (1997), quoting from Commonwealth v. Barnes, 399 Mass. 385, 390-391 (1987).

2009See Commonwealth v. Lee, supra at 218 (“defendant must establish that his waiver of counsel was ineffective because it was not intelligently made”); Commonwealth v. Barnes, supra at 391 .

2009Commonwealth v. Martin, 425 Mass. 718, 720 (1997), quoting from Commonwealth v. Barnes, 399 Mass. 385, 390-391 (1987).

2009See Commonwealth v. Lee, supra at 218 (“defendant must establish that his waiver of counsel was ineffective because it was not intelligently made”); Commonwealth v. Barnes, supra at 391 .

2009We must be confident that the defendant was ‘adequately aware of the seriousness of the charges, the magnitude of his undertaking, the availability of advisory counsel, and the disadvantages of self-representation, ’ Commonwealth v. Jackson, 376 Mass. 790, 795 (1978),” before concluding that he made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.

2008The Supreme Judicial Court has explained: “We have not prescribed the questions that a judge must pose to an accused who desires to represent himself nor is there any ‘particular piece of information that is essential to an effective waiver of counsel.’ Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 279 (1st Cir. 1976). ...

2007However, a defendant whose “right to counsel has attached by virtue of an indictment may execute a knowing and intelligent waiver of that right in the course of a police-initiated interrogation.” Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 352 (1990), citing Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988).

2005See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jackson, 432 Mass. 82, 87 (2000); Commonwealth v. Prater, 420 Mass. 569, 578-579 (1995); Commonwealth v. Libran, 405 Mass. 634, 638-639 (1989); Commonwealth v. Medeiros, 395 Mass. 336, 347 (1985).