knowing and intelligent waiver in Colorado

2018May, 859 P.2d at 883 . ¶ 38 “‘Intoxication will render a suspect’s waiver involuntary when government conduct causes the intoxication’ or, if self-induced, when ‘the suspect was so intoxicated that he or she could not have made a knowing and intelligent waiver.’” People v. Clayton, 207 P.3d 831, 836 (Colo. 2009) (quoting Platt, 81 P.3d at 1066 ).

2016See Davis, 512 U.S. at 458 (recognizing that Miranda rights require the special protection of the knowing and intelligent waiver standard). “A waiver is knowing and intelligent when made with full awareness of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” People v. Platt, 81 P.3d 1060, 1065 (Colo. 2004).

2014See Spring, 479 U.S. at 574 , 107 S.Ct. 851 ; Moran, 475 U.S. at 421-22 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 .

2014See Spring, 479 U.S. at 574 , 107 S.Ct. 851 ; Moran, 475 U.S. at 421-22 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 .

2016See Davis, 512 U.S. at 458 (recognizing that Miranda rights require the special protection of the knowing and intelligent waiver standard).

2016See Davis, 512 U.S. at 458 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 (recognizing that Miranda rights require the special protection of the knowing and intelligent waiver standard).

1972See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 .

1972See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 .

2018May, 859 P.2d at 883 . ¶ 38 “‘Intoxication will render a suspect’s waiver involuntary when government conduct causes the intoxication’ or, if self-induced, when ‘the suspect was so intoxicated that he or she could not have made a knowing and intelligent waiver.’” People v. Clayton, 207 P.3d 831, 836 (Colo. 2009) (quoting Platt, 81 P.3d at 1066 ).

2018May, 859 P.2d at 883 . ¶ 38 “‘Intoxication will render a suspect’s waiver involuntary when government conduct causes the intoxication’ or, if self-induced, when ‘the suspect was so intoxicated that he or she could not have made a knowing and intelligent waiver.’” People v. Clayton, 207 P.3d 831, 836 (Colo. 2009) (quoting Platt, 81 P.3d at 1066 ).

2004Viewing these cases together, while we have acknowledged the limited nature of understanding which must be proven to show a knowing and intelligent waiver, we have still required that the prosecution demonstrate that the police accurately communicate and that the defendant understand these “three precepts: (1) he did not have to talk, (2) he could have an attorney present, and (3) if he did talk, his statements could be used against him.” Id. at 1172 ; see also, e.g., People v. Jiminez, 863 P.2d 981, 984-85 (Colo.1993) (upholding the suppression of the defendant’s statement where the defendant

2002To find a knowing and intelligent waiver, I would have to be convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant was "fully aware of the nature of the right to remain silent ... and the consequences of abandoning that right." People v. Kaiser, 32 P.3d 480 (Colo.2001), citing Jiminez, 863 P.2d at 984 .

2026See People v. Kaiser, 32 P.3d 480, 486 (Colo. 2001) (“A defendant’s 18 mental capacity is important in determining whether [he] made a knowing and intelligent waiver, however it should not be the only, or even the primary, factor in a trial court’s analysis.”).

2006The trial court also determined that "the People have failed to sustain their burden of proving by 'a preponderance of the evidence that defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights." The trial court found the evidence insufficient to support a conclusion that defendant was "fully aware of the nature of the right to remain silent ... and the consequences of abandoning that right," as required under People v. Kaiser, 32 P.3d 480 (Colo.2001).

2017See Aguilar-Ramos, 86 P.3d at 402 . .¶ 27..When upholding, a trial court’s suppression order, we have emphasized that the totality of circumstances governs this analysis: “[The defendant] did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights because of the combined effects of the translator’s inadequate translation, the substantial miscommunication between the parties, and [his] cultural background and limited intellectual functioning.” People v. Redgebol, 184 P.3d 86, 92 (Colo. 2008) (emphasis added).

2008This conclusion accords with the reasoning in our previous decisions of People v. Mejia-Mendoza, 965 P.2d 777 (Colo.1998), People v. Aguilar-Ramos, 86 P.3d 397 (Colo. 2004), People v. Jiminez, 863 P.2d 981 (Colo. 1993), and People v. Al-Yousif, 49 P.3d 1165 *93 (Colo.2002).

2008This conclusion accords with the reasoning in our previous decisions of People v. Mejia-Mendoza, 965 P.2d 777 (Colo.1998), People v. Aguilar-Ramos, 86 P.3d 397 (Colo. 2004), People v. Jiminez, 863 P.2d 981 (Colo. 1993), and People v. Al-Yousif, 49 P.3d 1165 *93 (Colo.2002).

2004Viewing these cases together, while we have acknowledged the limited nature of understanding which must be proven to show a knowing and intelligent waiver, we have still required that the prosecution demonstrate that the police accurately communicate and that the defendant understand these “three precepts: (1) he did not have to talk, (2) he could have an attorney present, and (3) if he did talk, his statements could be used against him.” Id. at 1172 ; see also, e.g., People v. Jiminez, 863 P.2d 981, 984-85 (Colo.1993) (upholding the suppression of the defendant’s statement where the defendant

1999See Milton, 864 P.2d at 1101 (“absent an adequate advisement any purported waiver of that right by the defendant does ‘not demonstrate a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to testify’ ”) (quoting Chavez, 853 P.2d at 1153 ).

1993As we held in Chavez , absent an adequate advisement any purported waiver of that right by the defendant does “not demonstrate a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to testify.” Id., 853 P.2d at 1153 .

1989In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 , 92 S.Ct. 2006 , 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972), the Court held that “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.” Id. at 37 , 92 S.Ct. at 2012 (footnote omitted).

1989In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 , 92 S.Ct. 2006 , 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972), the Court held that “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.” Id. at 37 , 92 S.Ct. at 2012 (footnote omitted).

2018May, 859 P.2d at 883 . ¶ 38 “‘Intoxication will render a suspect’s waiver involuntary when government conduct causes the intoxication’ or, if self-induced, when ‘the suspect was so intoxicated that he or she could not have made a knowing and intelligent waiver.’” People v. Clayton, 207 P.3d 831, 836 (Colo. 2009) (quoting Platt, 81 P.3d at 1066 ).

2018May, 859 P.2d at 883 . ¶ 38 “‘Intoxication will render a suspect’s waiver involuntary when government conduct causes the intoxication’ or, if self-induced, when ‘the suspect was so intoxicated that he or she could not have made a knowing and intelligent waiver.’” People v. Clayton, 207 P.3d 831, 836 (Colo. 2009) (quoting Platt, 81 P.3d at 1066 ).

2017See Aguilar-Ramos, 86 P.3d at 402 . .¶ 27..When upholding, a trial court’s suppression order, we have emphasized that the totality of circumstances governs this analysis: “[The defendant] did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights because of the combined effects of the translator’s inadequate translation, the substantial miscommunication between the parties, and [his] cultural background and limited intellectual functioning.” People v. Redgebol, 184 P.3d 86, 92 (Colo. 2008) (emphasis added).

2013See Patterson, 487 U.S. at 293 , 108 S.Ct. 2389 ; Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577 , 107 S.Ct. 851 , 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987).

2013See Patterson, 487 U.S. at 293 , 108 S.Ct. 2389 ; Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577 , 107 S.Ct. 851 , 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987).

2009"Intoxication will render a suspect's waiver involuntary when government conduct causes the intoxication" or, if self-induced, when "the suspect was so intoxicated that he or she could not have made a knowing and intelligent waiver." Platt, 81 P.3d at 1066 ; see also People v. Jewell, 175 P.3d 103, 106 (Colo.2008).

2008People v. May, 859 P.2d 879, 883 (Colo.1993); see also People v. Hopkins, 774 P.2d 849, 851 (Colo.1989).

2006“If a person in custody is not properly apprised of these rights, or fails to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights, the prosecution may not introduce any statement procured from the custodial interrogation in [its] case in chief.” People v. Howard, 92 P.3d 445, 449 (Colo.2004).