knowing and intelligent waiver in North Carolina

2009While “[w]e have consistently held that a defendant’s subnormal mental capacity is a factor to be considered when determining whether a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights has been made,” State v. Fincher, 309 N.C. 1, 8 , 305 S.E.2d 685, 690 (1983) (emphasis added) (citations omitted), subjec tive mental characteristics are not relevant regarding whether “a reasonable person” would believe he had been placed under the equivalent of a formal arrest, Greene, 332 N.C. at 577 , 422 S.E.2d at 737 (emphasis added).

2009While “[w]e have consistently held that a defendant’s subnormal mental capacity is a factor to be considered when determining whether a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights has been made,” State v. Fincher, 309 N.C. 1, 8 , 305 S.E.2d 685, 690 (1983) (emphasis added) (citations omitted), subjec tive mental characteristics are not relevant regarding whether “a reasonable person” would believe he had been placed under the equivalent of a formal arrest, Greene, 332 N.C. at 577 , 422 S.E.2d at 737 (emphasis added).

2018The State "bears the burden of demonstrating that the waiver was knowingly and intelligently made, and an express written waiver, while strong proof of the validity of the waiver, is not inevitably sufficient to establish a valid waiver." Simpson , 314 N.C. at 367 , 334 S.E.2d at 59 (citations omitted); see also State v. Thibodeaux , 341 N.C. 53 , 58, 459 S.E.2d 501 , 505 (1995) (explaining that "[t]he State has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights and that his statement was voluntary").

2018The State "bears the burden of demonstrating that the waiver was knowingly and intelligently made, and an express written waiver, while strong proof of the validity of the waiver, is not inevitably sufficient to establish a valid waiver." Simpson , 314 N.C. at 367 , 334 S.E.2d at 59 (citations omitted); see also State v. Thibodeaux , 341 N.C. 53 , 58, 459 S.E.2d 501 , 505 (1995) (explaining that "[t]he State has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights and that his statement was voluntary").

2020In Argersinger v. Hamlin, however, the Supreme Court of the United States expanded on Gideon, holding the Sixth Amendment required: “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.” 407 U.S. 25, 37 , 32 L.

2020In Argersinger v. Hamlin, however, the Supreme Court of the United States expanded on Gideon, holding the Sixth Amendment required: “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.” 407 U.S. 25, 37 , 32 L.

2016We recognize that "[p]rior experience with the criminal justice system is an important factor in determining whether ... defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver." State v. Brown, 112 N.C.App. 390 , 396-97, 436 S.E.2d 163 , 167 (1993).

2016We recognize that "[p]rior experience with the criminal justice system is an important factor in determining whether ... defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver." State v. Brown, 112 N.C.App. 390 , 396-97, 436 S.E.2d 163 , 167 (1993).

1995Ed. 2d 854, 862-63 (1973). “[A] defendant’s subnormal mental capacity is a factor to be considered when determining whether a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights has been made.” Fincher, 309 N.C. at 8 , 305 S.E.2d at 690 (1983) (citing State v. Jenkins, 300 N.C. 578, 585 , 268 S.E.2d 458, 463 (1980); State v. Thompson, 287 N.C. 303, 318-19 , 214 S.E.2d 742, 752 (1975), death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 908 , 49 L.

1995Ed. 2d 854, 862-63 (1973). “[A] defendant’s subnormal mental capacity is a factor to be considered when determining whether a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights has been made.” Fincher, 309 N.C. at 8 , 305 S.E.2d at 690 (1983) (citing State v. Jenkins, 300 N.C. 578, 585 , 268 S.E.2d 458, 463 (1980); State v. Thompson, 287 N.C. 303, 318-19 , 214 S.E.2d 742, 752 (1975), death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 908 , 49 L.

2014Noting the presumption against a waiver of constitutional rights, the Court of Appeals observed that “ ‘[t]he State bears the burden of proving that a defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights[.]’ ” Id. at_, 728 S.E.2d at 389 (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Bunnell, 340 N.C. 74, 80 , 455 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1995) (citation omitted)).

2014Noting the presumption against a waiver of constitutional rights, the Court of Appeals observed that “ ‘[t]he State bears the burden of proving that a defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights[.]’ ” Id. at_, 728 S.E.2d at 389 (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Bunnell, 340 N.C. 74, 80 , 455 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1995) (citation omitted)).

1995Ed. 2d 854, 862-63 (1973). “[A] defendant’s subnormal mental capacity is a factor to be considered when determining whether a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights has been made.” Fincher, 309 N.C. at 8 , 305 S.E.2d at 690 (1983) (citing State v. Jenkins, 300 N.C. 578, 585 , 268 S.E.2d 458, 463 (1980); State v. Thompson, 287 N.C. 303, 318-19 , 214 S.E.2d 742, 752 (1975), death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 908 , 49 L.

1995Ed. 2d 854, 862-63 (1973). “[A] defendant’s subnormal mental capacity is a factor to be considered when determining whether a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights has been made.” Fincher, 309 N.C. at 8 , 305 S.E.2d at 690 (1983) (citing State v. Jenkins, 300 N.C. 578, 585 , 268 S.E.2d 458, 463 (1980); State v. Thompson, 287 N.C. 303, 318-19 , 214 S.E.2d 742, 752 (1975), death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 908 , 49 L.

2018The State "bears the burden of demonstrating that the waiver was knowingly and intelligently made, and an express written waiver, while strong proof of the validity of the waiver, is not inevitably sufficient to establish a valid waiver." Simpson , 314 N.C. at 367 , 334 S.E.2d at 59 (citations omitted); see also State v. Thibodeaux , 341 N.C. 53 , 58, 459 S.E.2d 501 , 505 (1995) (explaining that "[t]he State has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights and that his statement was voluntary").

2018The State "bears the burden of demonstrating that the waiver was knowingly and intelligently made, and an express written waiver, while strong proof of the validity of the waiver, is not inevitably sufficient to establish a valid waiver." Simpson , 314 N.C. at 367 , 334 S.E.2d at 59 (citations omitted); see also State v. Thibodeaux , 341 N.C. 53 , 58, 459 S.E.2d 501 , 505 (1995) (explaining that "[t]he State has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights and that his statement was voluntary").

2022See generally id.

2022See generally id.

2018At the time of the competency order, defendant would have been 18 years old and thus an adult, but he was 13 at the time of the interrogation, so the determination of defendant's competency has little weight in the analysis of defendant's knowing and intelligent waiver at age 13. 3 So the finding *795 that defendant "suffer[s] from a mental illness or defect" but does not meet the "test for mental retardation" is a relevant finding of fact which we cannot ignore when reviewing the denial of defendant's motion to suppress based upon a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights. 4 Based upon t

2018At the time of the competency order, defendant would have been 18 years old and thus an adult, but he was 13 at the time of the interrogation, so the determination of defendant's competency has little weight in the analysis of defendant's knowing and intelligent waiver at age 13. 3 So the finding *795 that defendant "suffer[s] from a mental illness or defect" but does not meet the "test for mental retardation" is a relevant finding of fact which we cannot ignore when reviewing the denial of defendant's motion to suppress based upon a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights. 4 Based upon t

2014Ed. 2d 734 (2010), and State v. Hardy, 339 N.C. 207 , 451 S.E.2d 600 (1994). “[T]he voluntariness of a consent or an admission on the one hand, and a knowing and intelligent waiver on the other, are discrete inquiries.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 , 68 L.

2014Ed. 2d 734 (2010), and State v. Hardy, 339 N.C. 207 , 451 S.E.2d 600 (1994). “[T]he voluntariness of a consent or an admission on the one hand, and a knowing and intelligent waiver on the other, are discrete inquiries.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 , 68 L.

2014Noting the presumption against a waiver of constitutional rights, the Court of Appeals observed that “ ‘[t]he State bears the burden of proving that a defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights[.]’ ” Id. at_, 728 S.E.2d at 389 (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Bunnell, 340 N.C. 74, 80 , 455 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1995) (citation omitted)).

2014Noting the presumption against a waiver of constitutional rights, the Court of Appeals observed that “ ‘[t]he State bears the burden of proving that a defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights[.]’ ” Id. at_, 728 S.E.2d at 389 (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Bunnell, 340 N.C. 74, 80 , 455 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1995) (citation omitted)).

2009This Court adheres to the view that “the custody inquiry states an objective rule designed to give clear guidance to the police, while consideration of a suspect’s individual characteristics— including his age — could be viewed as creating a subjective inquiry.” Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 668 , 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2151-52 , 158 L.

2009This Court adheres to the view that “the custody inquiry states an objective rule designed to give clear guidance to the police, while consideration of a suspect’s individual characteristics— including his age — could be viewed as creating a subjective inquiry.” Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 668 , 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2151-52 , 158 L.

2009While “[w]e have consistently held that a defendant’s subnormal mental capacity is a factor to be considered when determining whether a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights has been made,” State v. Fincher, 309 N.C. 1, 8 , 305 S.E.2d 685, 690 (1983) (emphasis added) (citations omitted), subjec tive mental characteristics are not relevant regarding whether “a reasonable person” would believe he had been placed under the equivalent of a formal arrest, Greene, 332 N.C. at 577 , 422 S.E.2d at 737 (emphasis added).

2009While “[w]e have consistently held that a defendant’s subnormal mental capacity is a factor to be considered when determining whether a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights has been made,” State v. Fincher, 309 N.C. 1, 8 , 305 S.E.2d 685, 690 (1983) (emphasis added) (citations omitted), subjec tive mental characteristics are not relevant regarding whether “a reasonable person” would believe he had been placed under the equivalent of a formal arrest, Greene, 332 N.C. at 577 , 422 S.E.2d at 737 (emphasis added).

2008Interrogation of the defendant may commence again only under two sets of circumstances: (1) "reinitiation of conversation by defendant and a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel by defendant" and (2) "police-initiated interrogation once counsel is present." State v. Morris, 332 N.C. 600, 610 , 422 S.E.2d 578, 584 (1992).

2008Interrogation of the defendant may commence again only under two sets of circumstances: (1) "reinitiation of conversation by defendant and a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel by defendant" and (2) "police-initiated interrogation once counsel is present." State v. Morris, 332 N.C. 600, 610 , 422 S.E.2d 578, 584 (1992).

2015"The State bears the burden of proving that a defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights and that his statement was voluntary." State v. Knight, 340 N.C. 531 , 550, 459 S.E.2d 481 , 493 (1995).

2015"The State bears the burden of proving that a defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights and that his statement was voluntary." State v. Knight, 340 N.C. 531 , 550, 459 S.E.2d 481 , 493 (1995).

2007State v. Miller, 344 N.C. 658, 666 , 477 S.E.2d 915, 920 (1996) (citing State v. Simpson, 314 N.C. 359, 367 , 334 S.E.2d 53, 59 (1985)).

2007State v. Miller, 344 N.C. 658, 666 , 477 S.E.2d 915, 920 (1996) (citing State v. Simpson, 314 N.C. 359, 367 , 334 S.E.2d 53, 59 (1985)).

1996Jackson, 308 N.C. at 582 , 304 S.E.2d at 152-53 .

1996Jackson, 308 N.C. at 582 , 304 S.E.2d at 152-53 .

2022Ed. 2d 353, 366 (1992) (“[I]t is impossible to say whether a defendant whose competence is in doubt has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a competency hearing.”); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 , 15 L.

2022Ed. 2d 353, 366 (1992) (“[I]t is impossible to say whether a defendant whose competence is in doubt has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a competency hearing.”); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 , 15 L.